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THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF HISTORY, ACADEMY 
OF SCIENCES OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 

OF KOREA 



HISTORY 

OF 

THE JUST FATHERLAND 

LIBERATION WAR 
OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE 



FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE 

Pyongyang, D.P.R.K. 

1981 





MARSHAL KIM IL SUNG 
Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Arm) 



FOREWORD 



The U.S. imperialists who are out for world conquest 
launched an armed invasion oin the Democratic People's Repub- 
lic of Korea on June 25, 1950. It was their dream to make the 
Korean people their slaves and turn Korea into their colony to 
set up a military base for conducting a war against the Soviet 
Union and the Chinese People's Republic. 

The war of aggression unleashed by the U.S. imperialists 
was a severe test to the Korean people and the people's demo- 
cratic system. The Korean people, however, stood up to safe- 
guard the country's freedom and independence in their just 
Fatherland Liberation War. 

Under the correct guidance of the Workers' Party of Korea, 
and enjoying support from the peoples of the Soviet Union and 
other socialist countries as well as the peace-loving peoples the 
world over, the Korean people and their armed forces, the Kore- 
an People's Army, overcoming every difficulty and hardship, 
fought in cooperation with the valiant Chinese People's Vol- 
unteers and won a great victory in the three-year long severe 
Avar by displaying mass heroism, patriotic devotion and unbend- 
ing fighting spirit. 

The Fatherland Liberation War which was a landmark in 
the national independence and social progress of the Korean 
people came to an end with the truce signed on July 27, 1953. 
The war was a military, political and moral defeat for the allied 
forces of imperialism with the U.S. as the ringleader and 
for the Syngman Rheeites, hirelings of the U.S. But it was a 
brilliant victory for the Korean people and the entire peace- 
loving peoples the world over. 

Today, the Korean people are winning one victory after an- 
other on the labour front in building socialism in the northern 
part of the country, the decisive guarantee for converting the 



ceasefire into a durable peace and for the country's peaceful 
unification. 

The Korean people who had overfulfilled the Three-Year 
Plan for the Post-war Rehabilitation and Development of the 
National Economy entered upon the First Five-Year Plan 
and completed it at the end of June 1959, two and a half years 
ahead of schedule, in the gross industrial output value. Now 
they are forging ahead on the Chullima (winged horse) to- 
wards their goal, Communism. 

The strength of the Korean people and their system is in- 
vincible, and the people's material and cultural standards keep 
rising. The Korean people owe their fruitful, happy life to the 
correct guidance of the Workers' Party of Korea and to the vic- 
tory in the war. 

During the war, the U.S. imperialists reduced our towns 
and villages to ashes and employed every kind of criminal in- 
human method such as never seen before in the annals of human 
history in their attempt to subdue the Korean people. However, 
contrary to their expectation, the Korean people were tempered 
more and the people's democratic system was strengthened fur- 
ther in the flames of the severe war. 

The war demonstrated the military, political and moral 
night of the Korean people, rallied firmly around the Party 
leaded by Marshal Kim II Sung. It also testified to the in- 
;xhaustible vitality of our Party pojicies in which the general 
principle of Marxism-Leninism was' creatively adapted to the 
;iven conditions at home and abroad. 

The war showed how much alive the brilliant revolutionary 
radition formed in the '30s by the Korean Communists headed 
byMarshal Kim II Sung was among the people and the People's 
Irmy. 

The war showed the great significance in the development 

of international affairs of the proletarian internationalist tie 
etween the peoples of the socialist camp formed after the 
econd World War. 

Lastly, the war clearly revealed the savagery of the U.S. 
nperialists, beasts in human skins and the man-eaters of the 
3th century. 



The main aim of this book is to sum up important aspects of 
the war and the experiences of the Korean people and the Peo 
pies Army as well as their victories in the war. 

The Research Institute of History, Academy of 
Sciences of the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea 

Jnlu 1959 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 

WAR PREPARATION OF THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS AND 
SYNGMAN RHEE CLIQUE IN KOREA I 

CHAPTER II 

START OF THE JUST FATHERLAND LIBERATION WAR OF 
THE KOREAN PEOPLE. COUNTER-OFFENSIVE OF THE 
KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY. LIBERATION OF VAST AREAS 
OF SOUTH KOREA. (June 25-September 15, 1950) ... 28 
Section 

1. U.S. Imperialists' and Syngman Rhee's Armed Ag- 
gression Against the D.P.R.K. Start of the Fatherland 
Liberation War. Radio Address by Marshal 
Kim II Sung on June 26. Putting the Country on a 
War-time Footing ..... 28 

2. Counter-offensive of the Korean People's Army. 
Liberation of Seoul and Crossing the Han River. 
Expansion of U.S. Armed Aggression. Radio Address 

by Marshal Kim II Sung on July 8 .41 

3. Rout of U.S. Army Around Taejun. People's Heroic 
Fight to Aid the Front 60 

4. Liberation of Vast Areas of South Korea. Restoration 
of Party and People's Power Organs and Imple- 
mentation of Democratic Reforms in Liberated Areas 80 

5. Heroic Fight of the Korean People's Army at the 
Rakdong River Line 92 

CHAPTER III 

ALL-OUT OFFENSIVE OF U.S. AGGRESSORS. STRATEGIC 
RETREAT OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY. NATION 
WIDE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ENEMY. (September 16- Octo 
ber 24, 1950) ... 97 

1 



CHAPTER 



WAR PREPARATION OF THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS AND 
SYNGMAN RHEE CLIQUE IN KOREA 



U.S. OCCUPATION OF SOUTH 
KOREA AND WAR POLICY OF 
THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS AND 
SYNGMAN RHEE CLIQUE 



On August 15, 1945, the 
Korean people were liberated 
by the great Soviet Army 
from the yoke of the Japanese 
imperialists' rule which lasted 
for nearly half a century. The 
country's liberation bv the 
Soviet Army and its presence in North Korea provided favour- 
able conditions for the Korean people not only for their national 
liberation but for the social liberation of the working people 
with the working class in the van. A new era was opened in 
the history of the Korean people. 

Immediately after the liberation, under the guidance of the 
Communists headed by Marshal Kim II Sung, the organizer and 
leader of the anti-Japanese national liberation struggle of the 
Korean people, a new type of revolutionary Marxist-Leninist 
Party was founded in Korea. Led by this Party, the liberated 
Korean people embarked upon a new path to freedom and inde- 
pendence. 

However, due to the U.S. occupation of South Korea and its 
aggressive policy, Korea's revolution came to assume a com- 
plicated, arduous and protracted character. 

U.S. imperialists, the Korean people's sworn enemy of long 
standing, made its appearance in the southern part of Korea to 
replace Japanese imperialism. 



The aggressive designs the U.S. imperialists held on Korea 
after the Second World War were a link in their set course for 
world conquest. A temporary, strategic decision had been taken 
by the allied forces that the U.S. Army should land on the Ko- 
rean territory south of the 38th parallel. However, the U.S. im- 
perialists availed themselves of the opportunity to turn Korea 
into a hotbed for the third world war for the realiza- 
tion of their wild dream of world conquest. .Their plan was to 
occupy South Korea, enforce a colonial enslavement policy, di- 
vide the country, and then start a war for taking the whole of 
Korea. 

It landed on the territory of the liberated Korea in Sep- 
tember 1945 without shedding a single drop of blood for the 
liberation of Korea. Yet General MacArthur issued the follow- 
ing proclamation to the people of South Korea: 

"As Commander-in-Chief, United States Armed Forces, 
Pacific, I do hereby proclaim as follows... All powers of govern- 
ment over the territory of Korea south of 38th degrees north 
latitude and the people thereof will be for the present exercised 
under my authority... Persons will obey my orders and orders is- 
sued under my authority. Actis of resistance to the occupying 
forces or any acts which may disturb public peace and safety 
will be punished severely. For all purposes during the military 
control, English wi'l be ihe official language..." 

Then, the U.S. military forces dissolved the people's com- 
mittees established by the people in South Korea and-restored the 
Japanese imperialist ruling machinery to maintain the colonial 
rule. They raked together the reactionary forces, the people's 
enemy — landlords, compradors, pro-Japanese, pro-Americans, 
national traitors — to oppress the patriotic democratic forces. 
They did not hesitate to employ any means to hinder 
the establishment of a democratic independent state of 
Korea. 

The U.S. imperialists wanted to put Korea under a long- 
term trusteeship so as to obstruct Korea's unification and inde- 
pendence. 

During the Second World War, the U.S. signed an agree- 
ment in which it is specified that Korea should be independent. 

This notwithstanding, the U.S. government took a perfidious 



stand of opposing the early realization of Korea's independence. 
This was made public in President Truman's statement issued on 
September 18, 1945. 

On October 20, 1945, Vincent, Head of the Far Eastern 
Affairs of the State Department, openly said that it was impos- 
sible for Korea to go over immediately to the system of self-gov- 
ernment, hence the U.S. approved a plan to set up a period of 
trusteeship in preparation for Korea's independence. (New York 
Times, October 20, 1945) 

Such an aggressive scheme of the U.S. imperialists became 
more apparent at the Moscow Conference of Three Foreign Min- 
isters in December 1945. The U.S. delegation presented a draft 
resolution on the Korean question, which called for an indefinite 
period of military rule and a 10-year trusteeship over Korea. 

However, thanks to sincere efforts of the Soviet Union, the 
U.S. proposal was rejected at the Conference and a decision 
which envisaged the early establishment of an independent gov- 
ernment in Korea was adopted. This decision was, however, not 
carried out because of the obstructions of the U.S. 

With a sinister design to perpetuate their occupation of 
South Korea, the U.S. imperialists shamelessly wrecked the work 
of the Joint U.S.S.R.-U.S. Commission. The Joint Commission 
met twice in 1946 and 1947 to help establish a united democratic 
government in Korea. But the U.S. imperialists blocked the Com- 
mission from carrying out the decision of the Moscow Three For- 
eign Ministers' Conference, which called for an interim united 
democratic government to help the Korean people in attaining 
the country's unification and independence. 

With a view to implementing their divide-and-rule policy 
over Korea and legalizing their occupation of South Korea, the 
U.S. government brought up illegally the Korean question to the 
U.N. Assembly. This was done to concoct a 'separate puppet re- 
gime in South Korea. At the same time the aggressive circles of 
the U.S. rejected under every kind of unjust pretext the simul- 
taneous withdrawal of the armed forces of both the Soviet Union 
and the United States from Korea. The entire Korean people 
wanted to see all foreign troops leave their land, and so did the 
entire peace-loving peoples the world over. 

Therefore, in order to promote the country's revolution and 



attain democratic independence of the country, it was required to 
establish as early as possible in North Korea a powerful revolu- 
tionary base which would be able to frustrate the U.S. imperial- 
ists' aggressive schemes. 

Immediately after the 1945 liberation, the Party worked 
out promptly the line of establishing a democratic base in North 
Korea, and created a guarantee for safeguarding the country's 
freedom and independence, shattering the U.S. imperialists' 
malicious, aggressive policy. 

Under the guidance of the Party, the North Korean Provi- 
sional People's Committee, established in February 1946, enforc- 
ed various democratic reforms. Enjoying the whole-hearted sup- 
port of the popular masses, the Committee carried out success- 
fully the historic land reform and nationalization of major indus- 
tries, and enforced Labour Law, the Law on Equality of Sex, 
and democratization of education and culture. The democratic 
reforms resulted in establishing the people's democratic system 
and a democratic base, a foundation for the country's unification. 
And material conditions were provided for the preparations for 
building a foundation of socialism. The unity of the popular 
masses based on the worker-peasant alliance led by the working 
class was further consolidated. And on this basis, towards the 
end of 1946 and early in 1947, elections to the local people's 
committees of all levels were held for the first time in our history 
on democratic principles. The North Korean People's Committee 
was thus established in February 1947. 

The North Korean People's Committee as a more strengthen- 
ed and developed power organ of people's democracy made 
strenuous efforts for carrying out the revolutionary tasks on a 
nation-wide scale. And at the same time it set about the tasks 
of the transition period to gradually go over to socialism by 
consolidating the achievements registered in the democratic 
reforms and restoring and developing the national economy 
in a planned manner in North Korea. In North Korea, the 1947 
plan for the rehabilitation and development of the national 
economy, the first national economic plan in our history, was 
successfully fulfilled. As a result, the gross output 
value of the state industry grew to 226 per cent compared with 

1946. The national economic plan for 1948, far greater than for 

1947, was carried out successfully. A solid material foundation 



for winning the country's unification and independence was 
established. During the period, however, the U.S. imperialists' 
aggressive policy against the Korean people became more 
naked. 

Early in 1946, the U.S. General Staff, taking Korea as a 
U.S. frontier, planned to use it as a strategical base in. opposing 
the Soviet Union (Saturday Evening Post» March 1949) and 
considered Korea as a most important base on the east coast of 
Asia. (Time, May 19, 1947) 

Therefore the U.S. Department of the Army envisaged in 
its plan the setting up of permanent bases on foreign land 
and worked out in 1946 the investment of vast amount ol 
money in South Korea. 

No sooner they had landed in South Korea than the U.S. 
imperialists expanded the Seoul-Inchon highway. From October 
1946 to June 1947 they repaired the highway between Seoul 
and Pusan, opened a new road from Seoul to Inchon via Kimpo 
air field, and another along the 38th parallel girdling the waist 
of the peninsula. In these projects they spent a large amount 
of money and mobilized some 850,000 men in total. 

Then a great number of military establishments were built 
and many air fields including the Moseul-po air field on Cheju 
Island and the Kimpo air field on the outskirts of Seoul were 
greatly expanded. A large fund was poured in for harbour 
improvement, and Pohang, Inchon, Pusan, Chinhae, Ryusu, 
Mokpo, Kunsan, Mukho and other ports were rebuilt into their 
naval bases. 

Many semi-permanent military establishments were built 
on strategic points in the basin of the Rim] in River, Tongdoo- 
chun and Choonchun areas while foxholes and trenches were dug 
in the whale area along the 38th parallel. All this was in prepara- 
tion for an attack against North Korea. At the same time the 
U.S. imperialists frenziedly busied themselves in founding a 
puppet army for cannon fodder and military pillars for carrying 
through their colonial enslavement policy in South Korea. 

In November 1945, they set up the "National Defence 
Command" which was put under command of the U.S. officers 
(It was renamed "National Defence Department" in October 
1946.) in accordance with Ordinance No. 28 of the U.S. Military 



Government in Korea. And in December of the same year they 
founded the "Military English School" (It was renamed "National 
Defence Guard Military Academy" in May 1946.) for training 
the backbone of the puppet army. 

From January to April in 1946. the so-called "National 
Defence Guard" and "Coast Guard," 8 regiments in all, were 
formed with officers of the former Japanese army, Manchukuo 
army and Kuomintang army, former Japanese army "volun- 
teers" and "student soldiers," former Japanese police, pro- 
Japanese and pro-American elements, national traitors, the 
reactionary elements who had fled from the North as the core. 
These armed forces took orders from the U.S. Army. After- 
ward the "National Defence Guard" was reorganized and to- 
wards the end of 1946 the "General Headquarters of National 
Defence Guard" was set up, which was formally under com- 
mand of the Koreans. 

The U.S. imperialists pressed the South Korean youth into 
the "National Defence Guard", equipped them with American 
arms, and trained them in the American style. 

In order to provide more cannon fodder for an aggressive 
war, the U.S. imperialists fanned the war fever. After 1946. in 
particular, the U.S. aggressive circles and their publications did 
not hesitate to con-duct provocative propaganda, saying that the 
Korean question was a powder-keg and that Korea was the most 
dangerous spot in the world. They spread all sorts of lies such as 
"Soviet invasion," "danger of civil war," etc. 

Thus attempting to justify the expansion of the puppet army 
by means of false propaganda, from the end of 1947 to May 1948, 
the U.S. imperialists more than doubled the numerical strength 
of the "National Defence Guard" and increased the number of 
military educational institutions, small and large, including a 
military academy, to nine. 

In the summer of 1947, Lieutenant-general Wedemeyer came 
to South Korea as a special envoy of the U.S. President to make 
an on-the-spot investigation in line with their war policy and in 
September of the same year, submitted a secret report to the 
U.S. government. A new line of aggressive war preparation in 
Korea was drawn up in accordance with the findings of the re- 
port. 

Wedemeyer stressed in his report that in order to secure the 



strategic advantage in Korea, the U.S. government must lay 
down measures for taking actual steps, and that the emergence 
of a united independent democratic Korea should not be allowed, 
because it was inimical to the interest of the U.S. To this end, 
the report went on, the U.S. military occupation of South Korea 
must be continued and occupation of the whole of Korea be 
realized in the future. And for its realization, he stressed, 
"National Defenoe Guard" and "Coast Guard" must be 
reinforced, equipped with U.S. arms and trained in the American 
way. 

With the concoction in May 1948 of the separate elections in 
South Korea and establishment of the Syngman Rhee puppet 
regime, the U.S. imperialists pressed preparations for an aggres- 
sive war more openly along the line proposed by Wedemeyer. 

After the fabrication of the puppet regime, the U.S. imperi- 
alists reorganized the "National Defence Guard" into the 
"National Defence Army," increased the number of its divisions 
and established separate naval and air commands to expand 
further the navy and air force. On September 8, 1948, the U.S. 
Army paper, Stars and Stripes, wrote that a well-equipped army 
of 100,000 was needed for occupation of North Korea. And the 
U.S. imperialists set a goal of 100,000 for the puppet army in 
order to occupy North Korea. 

Subsequently, the U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rhee 
clique made frenzied efforts for increasing the numerical 
strength of the puppet army and for training officers of infantry 
and mechanized corps en masse. Moreover, from November 1948 
to August 1949 they formed ten "National Guard" 

regiments as the reserves putting them under direct, command of 
the U.S. officers. They trained the South Korean youth and 
students and forced them into the puppet army. 

In preparation for a war it was an urgent question for them 
to rapidly reinforce and modernize the equipment of the puppet 
army. In April 1949, Syngman Rhee wrote to his "special envoy" 
to the U.S. Chough Pyong Ok: "I think that you should frankly 
discuss this situation in fullest confidence with high-officials of 
both the United Nations and the United States. In a strictly con- 
fidential manner tell them, what plans we have for the unification 
of the North and South. As a matter of fact, we are ready for the 



unification now in every respect but one; namely, we lack arms 
and ammunition." 

In order to equip the puppet army with modern combat 
technique and materials, the U.S. imperialists offered a large 
sum of "military aid" to the Syngman Rhee clique. They sent to 
South Korea American weapons, combat materials, warships and 
aircraft in large quantities. In the year of 1949 alone, they gave 
the Syngman Rhee clique weapons worth 190,000,000 dollars 
including 105,000 American rifles, 40,000 Japanese rifles, over 
2.000 bazookas with 40,000 shells, numbers of 105-mm 
howitzers, 37- and 57-mm anti tank guns, flame throwers, over 
2,000 machine-guns and automatic rifles, large numbers of 60- 
or 81-mm mortars with 700,000 shells, great numbers of mines 
and over 4,900 vehicles. 

The greater part of the Syngman Rhee regime's budget was 
appropriated to the military expenditure. Even acoording to an 
official announcement in 1949, some 50 per cent of the annual 
expenditure, over 91,110 million won, of the Syngman Rhee 
regime, about 3 times greater than that for 1948. was appropri- 
ated for war and police expenditure. 

When the puppet army was reorganized into the "National 
Defence Army," its numerical strength was 5 brigades, but the 
figure increased to 5 divisions and one brigade by May 
1949, and to 8 divisions by June of the same year numbering 
over 100,000 men. Besides these, there was a police corps of 
50,000. 

The U.S. imperialists worked frantically for continued 
occupation of South Korea with a view to preparing for a war. 
They reinforced the puppet army and supervised their combat 
training. 

On receipt of the "Request to the Governments of both the 
Soviet Union and the United States of America" for the 
simultaneous withdrawal of the Soviet and U.S. armies from 
Korea, adopted at the Joint Conference of Representatives of 
North and South Korean Political Parties and Social Organiza- 
tions held in April 1948, Hodge, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. 
Military Forces in South Korea, dispatched a secret message to 
Collins, Vice-Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. The message asked 
for reinforcement of the U.S. troops in South Korea. Marshall, 
then Secretary of the State Department, declared that it was 

8 



impossible for 'the U.S. government to take any step in connec- 
tion with the question of withdrawing its armed forces from 
South Korea without consent of the United Nations. 

The indefinite stationing of the U.S. Army in South Korea 
was expressly provided for in the "ROK-U.S. Temporary 
Military Agreement" signed in August 1948. 

By the end of 1948, the Soviet Army had completed its 
withdrawal from North Korea, alter finishing its duty as the 
liberator. Now there was no more plausible excuse for the U.S. 
army 'to stay in South Korea. The Korean people demanded its 
withdrawal from South Korea and world public opinion was 
opposed to the presence of the U.S. armed forces in Korea. But 
the U.S. imperialists only hastened their preparations for a war 
in Korea. 

At the instruction of the U.S. government and MacArthur 
headquarters, Colter, Commander of the U.S. Army in South 
Korea, and Roberts, head of the U.S. military advisory group, 
guided and supervised the war preparations of the puppet army. 

Already in 1949, they mapped out a plan of operations for 
•the puppet army's invasion of North Korea. In June of the year 
they completed the organization of 8 divisions of the puppet 
army, and deployed the first echelon along the 38th parallel. 

When the war preparations were basically completed for 
the puppet army, the U.S. imperialists, in an attempt to appease 
the surging public opinion in Korea and the world over which 
demanded the withdrawal of the U.S. Army, made a statement 
on June 30, 1949 that the U.S. troops would withdraw from South 
Korea and a military advisory group of over 500 would be 
stationed in South Korea. 

But the U.S. military advisory group held the authority to 
command both the "Ministry of Defence" and the puppet army, 
and they pressed preparations for war. The U.S. imperialists 
and Syngman Rheeites began to openly advocate the "necessity"' 
of "march north to unify" in an attempt to justify their 
criminal war plan. At a press conference on January 21, 1949, 
the traitorous Syngman Rhee openly said that he wanted the 
"northward expedition" by the "National Defence Army." In his 
speech in the "National Assembly" on February 7, 1949, he 
boasted that if it was impossible to amalgamate with North 
Korea in a peaceful way with the aid of the "United Nations 






/ 



\/* 







The 1949 plan o( operations worked out (or invading r 



lorth 



Korea by the U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rhee clique 



. 



Commission on Korea" the "National Defence Army" should 
make an attack on North Korea. 

Coincidentally with the Syngman Rhee's outcry of 
"northward expedition," the puppet army and police, under the 
command of the U.S. military advisory group, started armed 
intrusions into the north of the 38th parallel. During the first 
SIX months of 1949 alone, such intrusions reached several 
hundreds. 

In February 1949, the two battalions under the 10th 
Regiment, 6th Division, together with police force of about 
1,000, made a surprise attack on the Kosanbong Peak north of 
the 38th parallel in Yangyang County, Kangwon Province. In 
May 1949, the units of 1st Division of the Syngman Rhee's army, 
and the police force of about 4,000 made repeated attacks under 
cover of their artillery on the North in an attempt to occupy Mt. 
Songak and its neighbouring area, Jangpoong County, 
Hwanghai Province. 

The situation in the country became tense as the days went 
by. The frantic war preparations of the U.S. imperialists and 
Syngman Rhee clique presented a grave menace to peace in 
Korea and aggravated further the danger of a fratricidal war, 
hindering the Korean people's struggle for the country's 
peaceful unification. 



In view of the grave situa- 

STRUGGLE OF THE KOREAN .. . , , .7 T , c ■ 

tion created by the U.S. lm- 

PEOPLE FOR THE COUN- . , . . , , „ 

penahsts and Syngman 

TRY'S PEACEFUL UNIFICA- „, ., . ,. - J ~ , 

Rheeites policy ol national 

TI0N A- ■ ■ A It. ' 

division and their prepara- 
tions for an aggressive war, 
the Workers' Party of Korea and the Korean people had to take 
new measures for the country's unification and independence. 

With the final rupture of the second meeting of the Joint 
U.S.S.R.-U.S. Commission caused by the U.S. imperialists in 
October 1947, the possibility of establishing a united provisional 
democratic government in Korea in conformity with the Moscow 
Decision of Three Foreign Ministers on Korea was erased. 
Under the circumstances, based upon the principle that the unifi- 
cation and independence of Korea must be solved by the Korean 

11 



oeople themselves, our Party worked out the most just and 
reasonable measures for unifying the country, that is, to form 
a supreme legislative organ through all-Korea elections after the 
simultaneous withdrawal of the Soviet and U.S. troops from 
Korea. The measures of the Workers' Party of Korea for the 
country's peaceful unification became the programme in the 
common struggle of the entire democratic, patriotic political 
parlies and social organizations throughout North and South 
Korea for accomplishing the unification. 

The Party exposed and shattered to pieces the scheme of the 
U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rhee clique to fabricate a 
separate puppet government in South Korea by mobilizing the 
entire patriotic people throughout North and South Korea in the 
struggle for the realization of the country's peaceful unification. 
The May 10, 1948 separate elections in South Korea ended in 
complete failure in the face of the entire Korean people's opposi- 
tion. 

Yet. the shameless U.S. imperialists concocted by forging 
votes the separate government with the notorious traitor Syng- 
man Rhee as the head. They instigated Syngman Rhee to cla- 
mour about the "march north to unify" on the one hand, and 
on the other, ran amuck in preparation for an aggressive war 
against the Korean people. 

Such being the situation, the Korean people had to take a 
decisive measure for national salvation. Relying upon the Party 
line on the country's peaceful unification, they set about the 
founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the 
glorious fatherland of the Korean people. 

In August 1948, general elections were held throughout 
North and South Korea to set up the first supreme people's as- 
sembly. And on the basis of the victorious results of the elec- 
tions, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was proclaim- 
ed in September of the same year, and the Central Government 
was formed with Marshal Kim II Sung as its head. 

The founding of the D.P.R.K. by the will of the enitire Kore- 
an people was a fatal, blow to the U.S. policy of national split in 
Korea and a powerful guarantee for the country's peaceful 
unification for which the Korean people are struggling. 

"The proclamation of the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea ushered in a new stage of the struggle for building a unit- 
ed independent state, The entire patriotic political parties and 

12 



(he people, rallying ever more firmly around the government of 
the People's Republic, began to wage a vigorous struggle for 
further strengthening the political, economic foundation of the 
Republic and accelerating the unification of the country." 
(Kim II Sung) 

On the basic line of our Party for the country's peaceful 
unification against the war policy of the U.S. imperialists and 
Syngman Rhee clique and for the consolidation of the political 
and economic foundation of the Republic, Marshal Kim II Sung 
pointed out as follows: 

"First, our Party must, by combining the struggle for peace 
and against those who wish to provoke another war including 
the U.S., imperialists with the struggle for national independence 
against their aggressive policy, unite all the democratic, patriotic 
forces to expose and shatter to pieces the traitorous Syngman 
Rheeites' scheme to provoke a fratricidal war under the manipu- 
lation of the U.S. imperialists and must accomplish the country's 
peaceful unification... Second, a vigorous struggle should be un- 
folded tor the building of the national economy in North 
Korea to further strengthen the democratic base in the northern 
part of the Republic, the source of the Korean people's military, 
political and economic might in building our country into' an 
independent state." 

In order to intensify the struggle for the country's peaceful 
unification, the unity of the working class had to be further 
strengthened, and the unity and solidarity of the entire democra- 
tic, patriotic forces based on the worker-peasant alliance had to 
be strongly cemented. To this end, our Party took steps first of 
all for strengthening the Party's ideological, organizational unity 
and raising the Party's mobilizing and organizational role. At 
the same time the united front was fortified by uniting all the 
democratic, patriotic forces, thereby isolating the U.S. imperial- 
ists and traitorous Syngman Rhee clique. 

Relying upon the firm political, moral unity and solidarity 
of the people, our Party mapped out a great programme. The 
people's democratic system in the northern part of the country, 
powerful guarantee for the country's peaceful unification, was 
being strengthened, the revolutionary gains of our people were 
being consolidated and developed, and the national economy 
was being rehabilitated and developed in a planned manner. 

Despite the difficult conditions, the people guided by the 



Party carried out successfully the national economic plan for 
1948. With the same devotion and enthusiasm the people were 
unfolding labour struggle for the successful completion of the 
two-year (1949-1950) national economic plan. 

The backward industry and agriculture which had been 
severely devastated by the Japanese imperialists were being 
rapidly restored and developed. The colonial onesidedness in our 
industry was markedly eliminated, and the foundation for a self- 
reliant industry was on its way. Compared with 1946 the gross 
industrial output in 1949 grew to 337 per cent, and the grain 
output to 140 per cent. Thus the revolutionary democratic base 
in the northern part of the country, material guarantee for the 
country's unification, was being further strengthened and devel- 
oped. And this enabled the Party to take prompt measures for 
defence against the frantic war preparations of the U.S. imperi- 
alists and Syngman Rhee clique. 

One of the most important measures taken by our Party to 
this end was the founding 'and strengthening of the revolutionary 
armed forces. 

Marshal Kim II Sung pointed cut: 

"Under condition in which there existed aggressive forces 
whose aim was to oppose our fatherland and the people, our 
Government and Workers' Party were confronted with the 
necessity of founding their armed forces, the People's Army, for 
building and consolidating the state and safeguarding the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea." 

It was on February 8, 1948 that the Korean People's Army 
was founded amidst the warm enthusiasm of the entire people. 

The Korean People's Army is the Korean people's revolu- 
tionary armed forces that have inherited the lofty revolutionary 
tradition of the anti-Japanese partisan units which, under the 
guidance of the Korean Communists headed by Marshal Kim 
II Sung, fought for 15 years against the Japanese imperialists 
and won final victory. 

It was in 1932 that the Korean people first came to have the 
genuine people's armed forces, the revolutionary armed forces 
guided by Marxism-Leninism, to oppose imperialism and feudal- 
ism. This means that the Korean Communists led by Marshal 
Kim II Sung organized the anti-Japanese partisan units with the 
advanced workers, peasants and patriotic youth for the national 
independence and social liberation. 

14 



The fact that the Korean People's Army is composed of 
the best sons and daughters of the people with the revolution 
ary fighters of the anti-Japanese partisan units as its back- 
bone and has inherited the revolutionary tradition of the anti- 
Japanese partisan struggle is indicative of the nature and 
characteristics of the People's Army and constitutes the 
source of its invincible might. 

The People's Army has taken over the Marxist-Leninist ideo- 
logical system of the anti-Japanese partisan units. All-con- 
quering Marxism-Leninism firmly convinces every member of the 
People's Army of the laws of social development, the inevita- 
ble bankruptcy of imperialism, the final victory of socialism-com- 
munism and the justness of the cause of the Party and Govern- 
ment for the country's freedom and independence. And every 
man and officer of the Korean People's Army is boundlessly 
loyal to the cause of the Party and Government, sincere to 
protect the people's democratic system and the revolutionary 
gains of the people, and is filled with socialist patriotism. Guided 
by Marxism-Leninism and armed with the socialist patriotism, 
the People's Army is characterized by its political consciousness, 
sound ideology and loyalty to the Party and revolution. 

The Korean People's Army has inherited the revolutionary 
fighting spirit of the anti-Japanese partisan units, that is, their 
invincibility knowing no yielding under any circumstances. This 
noble tradition has armed men and officers of the People's Army 
with the lofty revolutionary fighting spirit, indomitable and 
valiant. And the lofty, popular character of the anti-Japanese 
partisans who came from among the people and fought in pro- 
tection of their interests, sharing sweets and bitters of life with 
them, has also been taken over by the People's Army. 

The Korean People's Army regards it as the most honoura- 
ble, lofty duty to protect the people's life and property with their 
own blood. And it is their principle to respect and love the peo- 
ple. The people and the army are united as one with the common 
aim and duty of safeguarding the country's independence, of ac- 
complishing the cause of the Party and of protecting the people's 
democratic system and the revolutionary achievements. 

The People's Army has inherited the lofty, revolutionary 
comradeship of the anti-Japanese partisans, which is the main 
source of its political, moral unity and solidarity, and their 
unbreakable fighting spirit. 



Proletarian internationalism also is a lofty revolutionary 
tradition which the People's Army has taken over from the anti- 
Japanese partisans, the tradition which was formed for the first 
time in our country by the anti-Japanese partisan units. The anti- 
Japanese partisans championed the Soviet Union with arms and 
fought in close co-operation with the Chinese people against the 
common enemy, Japanese imperialism, in the struggle for libera- 
tion. From its inception the People's Army took it as a duty to be 
loyal to proletarian internationalism. Hence the Korean People's 
Army not only protects the interests of the people at home but 
also value the interests of other nations. 

The Korean People's Army, like the Soviet Army and the 
armies of other fraternal countries, aims at the maintenance and 
consolidation of peace among nations. The People's Army is 
an army of peace which takes it as its duty to champion peace. 

Having taken over the patriotic revolutionary tradition 
which was formed in the course of the anti-Japanese armed 
struggle, the Korean People's Army is an army of a new type, 
fundamentally different from that of a bourgeois state. 

The armies of the capitalist countries, like the armies of the 
U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rhee clique, serve a handful of 
capitalists and landlords as tools for protecting their interests, 
exploiting the popular masses, and committing aggression 
against other nations and territories. 

Contrary to this, the Korean People's Army is an army that 
serves the people and their interests. The army and the people 
are united as one in safeguarding the country's independence 
and protecting the revolutionary achievements of the people. 

The Korean People's Army is the revolutionary armed forces 
of the Korean people guided by the Workers' Party of Korea, 
\vhose mission is to accomplish the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal 
democratic revolution on a nation-wide scale and then the so- 
cialist revolution, and protect the socialist achievements. 

The Workers' Party of Korea led by Marshal Kim II Sung 
carried out successfully the task of founding the revolutionary 
people's armed forces in due time on the basis of scientific 
analysis of the created situation, of training and strengthening 
them as a genuine people's revolutionary armed forces, and of 
strengthening their combatant power in a short span of time. 

In founding the People's Army and educating the men and 
officers, the Workers' Party of Korea applied creatively the 

16 



principles of Marxist-Leninist theories on war and army and 
the advanced military science in conformity with the basic 
tasks of our revolution, the mission of the Korean People's 
Army, and the actual conditions of our country. 

First of all, in 1 view of the basic tasks of our revolution and 
the mission of the People's Army, the Party adhered to the prin- 
ciple of organizing it with the best sons and daughters of 
workers, peasants and all the other working people, and has re- 
plenished its ranks on that basis. 

The Party paid special attention to the selection and alloca- 
tion of officers for strengthening the ranks of the People's Army. 
The revolutionary fighters of the anti-Japanese partisan units 
tempered militarily and politically during the long period of anti- 
Japanese national liberation struggle constituted the leading 
core of the People's Army. Besides, new cadres from among the 
working people trained after the liberation were also made 
officers. 

In order to construct a modern, regular army with strict 
order and discipline based on centralism, the Party established 
the system of one-man command, strict military discipline in 
units, and organized units and combined units of various arms to 
suit the modern warfare and the peculiarities of our country. 

When the People's Army was formed, the Party laid out the 
principles and basic line of educating soldiers. Our Party paid 
special attention to strengthening the combatant strength of the 
People's Army in every way and to developing it into a modern 
regular army. 

Relying on the economic might of the Republic and the peo- 
ple's patriotic zeal, the Party armed the People's Army with the 
advanced military technique and modern weapons, paying 
greater attention to the training of officers. In a short span of 
time, many tested military and political cadres, capable of 
educating fully their subordinates and tactfully taking com- 
mand of a modern, regular army, were trained. 

In bringing up the People's Army into a modern regular 
army and strengthening its combatant power, the Party attached 
the first importance to the ideological and political education of 
soldiers and took measures for its intensification. 

Under the correct guidance and great concern of the Party, 

17 



the People's Army was well trained and became a mighty army, 
well versed in handling modern weapons and combat materials. 
Thus the People's Army grew into a, mighty army capable of 
frustrating any aggressive attempts of the enemy. 

Strengthened politically, economically and militarily, the re- 
volutionary democratic base created in the northern part of the 
Republic became a reliable guarantee for the country's 
peaceful unification despite the preparation of the U.S. imperial- 
ists and Syngman Rhee clique for an aggressive war. 

The Party aroused the entire people for the realization of 
their unanimous aspiration for the country's peaceful unification. 
In response to the request of the First Session of the. Supreme 
People's Assembly of the D.P.R.K. for the simultaneous with- 
drawal of the troops of the Soviet Union and the United States 
from Korea, leaving the Korean question to the Korean people, 
the Soviet Government had completed the withdrawal of its 
tioops from Korea by the end of 1948. Under the circumstances, 
our Party, uniting on a wider scale the entire patriotic forces in 
North and South Korea, took more positive measures for the ac- 
complishment of the country's peaceful unification. 

In June 1949, the United Democratic Fatherland Front em- 
bracing 72 political parties and social organizations of North and 
South Korea came into being at the initiative of the Party. 

The inauguration meeting of the U.D.F.F. adopted an ap 
peal for the country's peaceful unification at the proposal of 
the Party. The appeal presented the most just programme, pro- 
ceeding from the principle of solving the Korean question by 
the Korean people, that a united government should be estab- 
lished through general elections throughout North and South 
Korea in September 1949 without any foreign interference after 
the withdrawal of the U.S. troops and the so-called "United 
Nations Commission on Korea" from South Korea. The entire 
Korean people unfolded a valiant struggle for the materializa- 
tion of this programme, which represented the unanimous as- 
piration of the Korean people for the country's peaceful unifica- 
tion and set forth feasible measures for its realization. 

However, the U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rhee clique 
stubbornly opposed this programme, and pressed harder 
than ever their preparations for an aggressive war in order to 
maintain the dying colonial system in South Korea. 

18 



WAR PLOT BY THE U.S. im- The economic crisis of the 

PERIALISTS AND SYNGMAN U.S. which started in the 

RHEE CLIQUE autumn of 1948 was further 

aggravated in 1949. Compar- 
ed with 1948 the U.S. indus- 
trial output in 1949 decreased by 15 per cent, and the profits of 
the U.S. monopolies went down by 16 per cent. The U.S. imperi- 
alists' preparations for a new war became more naked in an at- 
tempt to overcome the acute economic crisis. The concoction 
of the aggressive NATO in April 1949 was a clear-cut expres- 
sion of the U.S. scheme for a new war on a world-wide scale. 

The intensified war conspiracy by the U.S. imperialists in 
Korea was closely connected with their policy of seeking an out- 
let of the deep-going economic crisis in the capitalist world. 
Evidence of it is the words of the notorious U.S. General Van 
Fleet who said that such a war as in Korea was inevitable, that 
is, if it had not been in Korea, such a war would have inevitably 
been unleashed in some other part of the world. 

The completion of the great Chinese people's revolution and 
the founding of the Chinese People's Republic in October 1949 
signified a historic victory for the Chinese people and the peoples 
of the socialist camp, while it was the most severe blow after 
the Second World War to the imperialists and colonialists 
with the American imperialists as their ringleader. The victory 
of the Chinese people's revolution strengthened incomparably 
the peace and socialist forces in Asia, in the Far East in parti- 
cular, dealing a smashing blow to the aggressive policy of 
the U.S. imperialists in this area. 

A new, historic era was opened, the era in which the U.S. 
imperialists can no more check the Asian people's just struggle. 
However, the U.S. imperialists continued their hostility towards 
the Chinese people and intensified their criminal policy of pre- 
paring war against the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's 
Republic. 

With a view to recovering from defeat in their attempt to in- 
vade the Far East and to obtain a strategic base for the invasion 
of the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic, the U.S. 
imperialists attached all the greater importance to the prepara- 
tions for an aggressive war in Korea. 

19 



Press reports from New York in the summer of 1949 reveal- 
ed that the U.S. aggressive circles took into account the strategic 
importance of Korea in a new war against the Chinese people 
and the mobilization of the South Korean puppet army in their 
plan for military action. 

Such a malicious scheme of the U.S. aggressive circles was 
unmasked subsequently in Korea. 

From the latter part of 1949, the U.S. imperialists and Syng- 
man Rheeites became more frantic in their war conspiracy. The 
documents seized in Seoul prove that the Syngman Rhee clique 
had a plan to conduct the "northward expedition" in 1949. But 
the vigorous partisan struggle in South Korea, unreliability of 
the Syngman Rhee's army and other conditions compelled the 
U.S. imperialists to) postpone the start of war in Korea until 
1950. 

After deciding the postponement, the U.S. imperialists 
stepped up further war preparations. 

The U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rhee clique tightened 
further the terrorist system of the army and police in order to 
oppress the South Korean people who were struggling for the 
country's peaceful unification and to seek a "safe rear", resorting 
to the savage man-killing policy. People were arrested, imprison- 
ed and killed because they supported the country's peaceful unifi- 
cation. A great number of puppet army and police under the 
direct command of the U.S. Army were called out to suppress the 
people's partisan units. During the period from July 1949 to 
December of the same year, they killed over 62,000 patriotic peo- 
ple. From September 1949 to February 1950, more than 135,000 
peasant houses were burnt down under the pretext of "mopping 
up." The U.S. ambassador Muccio openly said: From the 
humanitarian point of view, some might not agree with such an 
action, but it was quite admissible for attaining the set object. 

Provocation of skirmishes by the Syngman Rhee's army 
along the 38th parallel against North Korea became more fre- 
quent. The aim of such provocation was to create a false picture 
of "danger of southward expedition from the North" for the peo- 
ple, justify their preparation for an aggressive war, impute the 
responsibility of the war they were about to start to the side o 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. More, they planned 
to create strain and uneasiness in the areas of North Korea, 

20 



scout our defence positions and occupy the strategical! 
portant points. A ■ - " 

During the period from January to December 1940 ,|,,, 
enemy provoked 1,836 armed skirmishes along the entire j- 
of the 38th parallel from Byuksung in Hwanghai ProvjJ- „, 
Yangyang, Kangwon Province. 

In July 1949, the enemy sent the so-called "Horii A Tjn't" 
composed of an intelligence corps and terrorists into the ' A 

Kangwon Province north of the 38th parallel so as to destj A 
achievements in our democratic construction, kill the A sidents 
disturb order and detect military secrets. In October 19<jq , ' 
battalions with a strength of about 1,000, 2nd Regime J the 
Metropolitan Division of the Syngman Rhee's army i A g A 
Byuksung County, Hwanghai Province, and attacked Mt. {?„,,„, 

Every military skirmish provoked by the Syngman Dhee's 
army under the instigation of the U.S. imperialists, howev A „ , , 
repulsed by the counter-attacks of our reliable garrisons. 

The U.S. imperialists and traitorous Syngman Rhe A ,]j,,. 
intensified their war preparations. For a "safe rear," supp, |., 
of the people was worsened, and armed intrusions into 
of the 38th parallel became more frequent. In August 19 A „ 
enforced a "conscription law" for pressganging the yoiv A ' 
students between the ages of 17 and 28 as cannon Jo A f„, 
;their aggressive war. 

In the latter part of 1949, an additional fund for bui|,|. , r 
air force facilities was invested by the U.S. governme A , 
air bases were built in Wonju, Hamyang, Namwon, 
Kwangjoo, Taegu and Cheju Island. And their c , , ' 
"March North" became louder. On July 17, 1949, Shin S„J T 
Syngman Rhee's "Defence Minister", boasted that thej,-..vr ' 
tional Defence Army" was only waiting for the Pre.,, , y 
order. They calculated that they would be able to seize p ° ,■ 
yang and Wonsan in a day at any time they were ordp, A .- A 

On October 7, 1949, Syngman Rhee told the Vice-P, •■■'. , 
of the U.P. that they could unify the country only by OCC|"' AA 
North Korea. And at a press conference held on Octob{> ] A 

told the pressmen that unification and independence ca A " . „. 
achieved or maintained without bloodshed. And in hi$ 
made on October 31 on the U.S. Cruiser "St. Paul", he s.,j A j,.,) 
the division of the country into the North and the South, ,,,,,< ]'„ 
settled by means of fighting. Then on December 30, Sy, ,,,,,.,, 



21 



Rhee said that in the new year they should all make efforts as one 
to recover their lost territory.., in the light of the changed inter- 
national situation, it should be borne in mind that in the new year 
they should unify Korea by their own strength. At a press con- 
ference held on January 24, 1950 once again Shin Sung Mo 
stated that all the preparations for the restoration of their lost 
'territory had been made and they were only waiting for the 
order. 

In his speeches made at the division commanders' meeting 
held in October 1949 at the puppet military headquarters and 
before the puppet ministers in January 1950, Roberts, head of 
the U.S. military advisory group, stated that "Attacks on the 
territory north of the 38th parallel may be carried out by the 
'National Defence Army' only on the orders of the United 
States Military Experts' Mission." "The plan of campaign 
against the North has been decided upon. There is not much 
time left now before a beginning must be made with putting 
it into effect. Even though we shall begin the attack, we must 
nevertheless find a pretext providing some justification." 

Many U.S. generals and war-mongers frequented South 
Korea, including Vice-admiral Borge who visited Inchon in 
October 1949 with part of the U.S. Far East Fleet. Then William 
Knowland, member of the U.S. Senate Military Affairs Commit- 
tee, Chennault, the notorious murderer of the Chinese people, 
Admiral Randall of the U.S. A.A.F., Burns, chief of the Korea 
section of the U.S. State Department. They all inspected the 
puppet army's military establishments, clamouring for "restora- 
tion of the lost territory" and "unification by force." In 1950 the 
US. imperialists and the traitorous Syngman Rhee clique per- 
fected their plan to unleash an aggressive war in Korea. 

Then came the "ROK-U.S. Agreement on Military 
Aid" in January 1950, which put the puppet army under Mac- 
Arthur Command. 

Sebald, foreign affairs advisor to the MacArthur Command, 
on his visit to South Korea gave Syngman Rhee assurance that 
when the northward expedition started the U.S. fleet and air- 
force based in Japan would participate in the fighting on the 
side of South Korea. 

In February, 1950, Syngman Rhee with his Chief of the 
General StaiT made a trip to the U.S. Army Far East Command 
in Tokyo to receive particular instructions from Mac- 

22 



Arthur on the armed attack on North Korea. 

The U.S. military aid to South Korea increased in volume 
while more men were forced into the puppet army. Even accord- 
ing to figures released by the U.S. State Department, the 
strength of the puppet army had increased to 150,000 by June 
'950, whereas it was 114,000 including 8 infantry divisions in 
June 1949. By April 1950, the puppet naval forces had 79 large 
or small warships of U.S. or Japanese make including destroy- 
i rs, and the puppet air force was equipped with large numbers of 
U.S. military aircraft. 

The U.S. imperialists and traitorous Syngman Rhee clique 
frequently held "high-ranking officers' meetings" to discuss in 
netail problems on completing war preparations and the 
"March North Plan." 

They planned to unleash an aggressive war in 1949. But 
iheir scheme ended in failure. After this the U.S. imperialists 
. nd Syngtnan Rhee clique drew up a new plan of troop deploy- 
ment along the 38th parallel. Large forces were concentrated in 
the Kaesong, Seoul and Uijungboo areas. Then the puppet 
irmy Metropolitan Division was posted in the Ongjin district, 
the 1st Division in the Kaesong district, the 7th Division in 
the Tongdoochun district, the 6th Division in the Choonchun 
district, and the 8th Division in Yangyang district. 

Towards the end of April 1950, they set up two front head- 
quarters with the 5 divisions deployed in the first echelon along 
the 38th parallel, reinforcing the divisions with artillery and 
technical military units. Then they brought up three infantry 
divisions — the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th from the rear to the Seoul area 
as reserves. 

In order to test our defence, the puppet army staged provo- 
cations along the 38th parallel from late "May to the be- 
ginning of June. Moreover innumerable spies and saboteurs 
were smuggled into the northern part to determine the time of 
intrus on and secure their plan for attacking the North by de- 
tecting the movement and intention of our units. 

The U.S. army, on its part, stepped up the war preparations 
under the personal direction of Bradley, Chairman of the 
J.C.S., Sherman, chief of the naval operations, and Vanden- 
berg, Chief of Staff, U.S.A.F., and others who came to Japan 
in January 1950. The U.S. Army and Navy in the Far East were 
put under one command and the U.S. naval forces on the Far 

23 



East waters were put under the MacArthur Command. 

In the early part of 1950, the U.S. 7th Fleet received addi- 
tional men-of-war: 2 aircraft carriers, 2 cruisers and 6 destroy- 
ers. During the same period, 3 groups of B-26 and B-29 bom- 
bers, 6 groups of pursuit planes and 2 groups of transport planes 
were added to the U.S. air force in Japan. The 4 U.S. infantry 
divisions, the 24th, 25th, 1st Cavalry, and 7th, in Japan 
under command of the U.S. 8th Army were reinforced with 
tanks, artillery, transport and other fighting units. The U.S. 
armed forces in Japan were put in fighting trim to be mobilized 
at any time to the war of aggression in Korea. It was not acci- 
dental that the U.S. magazine Life wrote in August 1950: 
Throughout the U.S. history the U.S. had never been so 
well prepared as for the war against the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea. Near the close of the first half of 1950 the 
U.S. armed forces had completed preparations for war. 

Thus peace in our country was gravely threatened as the 
U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rheeites completed the 
war preparations. And dark cloud of war hung over the country. 

In the beginning of May, the Workers' Party of Korea and 
the Government of the D.P.R.K. obtained reliable information on 
the enemy's war plan. Under such conditions, the Party and Gov- 
ernment took every necessary step to meet the enemy's surprise 
attack and, on the other hand, took measures once again to ex- 
pedite the peaceful unification in the hope of eliminating the 
danger facing the country and the people. 

At the initiative of the Party, the Central Committee of the 
United Democratic Fatherland Front released on June 7, 1950, 
an appeal for the acceleration of the peaceful unification of the 
country. 

The appeal proposed general elections throughout North 
and South Korea in August 1950 to establish a supreme legis- 
lative organ on the principle of settling the unification question 
by the Korean people themselves. The appeal went on to say, a 
conference of representatives of political parties and social or- 
ganizations of North and South Korea should be held in Haijoo 
or Kaesong in June to discuss the questions of the conditions for 
a peaceful unification, of the procedures of general elections, and 
of establishing a central guiding committee to help wjth the elec- 
tions. 

24 



However, the appeal of the Fatherland Front for the acce- 
leration of the peaceful unification was rejected by the U.S. im- 
perialists and the traitorous Syngman Rhee clique. Consequently 
on June 19, 1950, the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assem- 
bly, reflecting the request of the Central Committee of the Father- 
land Front as well as the earnest desire of the entire Korean 
people, adopted a new decision. The Supreme People's Assembly 
i 1 the D.P.R.K. called for forming a single all-Korean legisla- 
ture by uniting the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democra- 
tic People's Republic of Korea and the South Korean "National 
Assembly" in order to unify the divided land. 

But the U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rheeites again 
turned a deaf ear to this proposal. They went ahead with their 
war scheme. 

Already in May 1950, the U.S. government had authorized 
Dulles, advisor to the State Department, to give final instruc- 
tions for the war and ordered Muccio, U.S. Ambassador in 
Seoul, to arrange the formalities for the Syngman Rhee puppet 
regime to invite Dulles. 

As the time for war drew near, and in anticipation of the 
arrival of Dulles, the puppet army issued an order on June 11 to 
.seal the whole areas along the 38th parallel. The order was to 
arrest anyone who crosses the 38th parallel and shoot him if he 
resists. (Order of operations No. 78 of the puppet "Military 
Headquarters.") 

On June 17, the war-monger Dulles came to South Korea in 
the capacity of Truman's special envoy. Dulles, accompanied by 
the U.S. military advisory group and high-ranking officials of 
the puppet army, inspected military installations along the 38th 
parallel and finally approved the plan of operations for "March 
North." 

Upon his return to Seoul, Dulles issued orders that war 
should be started on June 25 and that it should be made to ap- 
pear that North Korea started the war, so that the U.S. might 
make the U.N. to intervene in the war. It was Dulles who said 
on June 19, before the puppet "National Assembly" that the 
U.S. was ready to give necessary material and moral aid to 
South Korea in the fight against communism. 

The Syngman Rheeites prepared to launch the war with- 
out delay. The "Chief of Staff" of the puppet army issued order 
of operations No. 29 dated June 21 to his commanders. It read 

25 



that the units deployed in areas No. 1, 2 and 3 should com 
mence attacks simultaneously at 5 o'clock (on June 25). 

In Tokyo on June 19, Johnson, Secretary of Defence, 
Bradley, Chairman of the J.C.S., MacArthur, Commander-in- 
Chief in the Far East, held secret talks. At these talks they dis- 
cussed and decided on a number of military measures about 
launching an aggressive war in Korea and occupying Taiwan, 
a territory of the People's Republic of China. John Foster Dulles 
took part in the talks after his visit toSouth Korea. After the 
talks, on June 22 he openly announced that the U.S. would take 
positive actions in the Far East. 

The military plans prepared in the Tokyo talks were ap- 
proved at the joint conference of high-ranking officials of the 
J.C.S., the Defence and the State Departments. And ultimately 
Truman gave a final O.K. 

Planning the aggressive war against the Democratic Peo- 
ple's Republic of Korea, the U.S. imperialists calculated that 
Syngman Rhee's 8 divisions would make a surprise attack and 
defeat at one stroke the garrison brigade of the D.P.R.K. along 
the 38th parallel, then destroy the People's Army in a flash oc- 
cupying the entire territory of North Korea. To this end, they 
planned that the U.S. air force would supply a protective cover 
to the advancing puppet army, while blocking the advance and 
deployment of the Korean People's Army in the rear. 

Syngman Rhee and his followers boasted time and again: 
"Once we start the northward expedition, we will have break- 
fast in Haijoo, lunch in Pyongyang and supper in Wonsan." 

But they were wrong, grossly wrong. 

The U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rheeites miscalculated 
the invincible vitality of the people's democratic system estab- 
lished in the northern part and the inexhaustible power of the 
political and moral unity of the Korean people rallying rock-firm 
around the Workers' Party of Korea and the Government of the 
D.P.R.K. headed by Marshal Kim II Sung. They underestimated 
the power of the People's Army that had taken over the brilliant 
revolutionary .traditions of the anti-Japanese armed struggle. 
Nor did they see the united power of the socialist camp linked by 
the unbreakable ties of proletarian internationalism. 



27 



CHAPTER 



II 



START OF THE JUST FATHERLAND LIBERATION WAR OF 

THE KOREAN PEOPLE. COUNTER-OFFENSIVE OF THE 

KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY. LIBERATION OF VAST AREAS 

OF SOUTH KOREA 



(June 2 5 -September 75, 1950) 



SECTION 1 

U.S. Imperialists' and Syngman Rhee's Armed Aggression 

Against the D.P.R.K. Start of the Fatherland Liberation War. 

Radio Address by Marshal Kim II Sung on June 26. Putting the 

Country on a War-time Footing 



At dawn on June 25, 1950, 
the U.S. imperialists who had 
been preparing for a long 
time ordered their henchmen 
Syngman Rhee clique to start 
an armed aggression on the 
Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea. 

Under the direct command 
at U.S. military advisory group, the Syngman Rhee's army de- 
ployed along the 38th parallel moved across the 38th parallel 
ill a surprise attack. 



ARMED AGGRESSION DY THE 
U.S. IMPERIALISTS AND 

SYNGMAN RHEE CLIQUE A- 
GAINST THE D.P.R.K. START 
OF THE FATHERLAND LIB- 
ERATION WAR 



28 



The enemy calculated that they would easily occupy within 
a few days the whole area of the northern part of the country 
in a surprise attack. They outlined an adventurous strategic 
plan. 

It was the enemy's plan to direct main attack on the Keum- 
chun-Sariwon area to coordinate with auxiliary forces coming up 
from the Ongjin Peninsula towards Shinchun and Sariwon. 
these enemy forces were to occupy Pyongyang. On the other 
hand, the enemy intended to put a landing force ashore in the 
llanchun area, northwest of Pyongyang. Thus they planned to 
hit Pyongyang in a sort of pincer movement from north and 
south. The enemy was also to advance towards Ryunchun, 
C.hulwon and reach Wonsan eventually. 

To coordinate with the units advancing towards Chulwon the 
enemy planned to make a landing in the Hanai-ri area, Yung- 
lieung County, South Hamkyung Province. In this way, they 
would occupy the Pyongyang-Wonsan line at one stroke, then ad- 
vance rapidly up to the Amrok and Dooman Rivers. The self- 
confident puppet army units that crossed the 38th parallel broke 
through our positions, penetrating two kilometres deep in;o the 
areas around Haijoo, Keumchun and Chulwon. 

Our garrison sub-units on the 38th parallel waged a de- 
fensive battle against the numerically superior enemy to safe- 
guard the fruits of peaceful, creative labour of the people. 

When the enemy crossed the 38th parallel the Government 
of the D.P.R.K. demanded the puppet Syngman Rhee clique to 
slop immediately the adventurous war gamble, warning them 
that should they fail to do so the Government of the D.P.R.K. 
would take a decisive measure to deal with them and subsequent- 
ly the whole responsibility for the consequences would fall on 
them. 

However, the Syngman Rheeites refused to heed the warn- 
ings of our Government. On the contrary, they intensified 
military actions. Battles along the 38th parallel grew in 
intensity. 

A grave danger was created for the fatherland and the peo- 
ple. Whether the people of the young D.P.R.K. who held firmly 
the political power in their hands would remain free or wouid he- 
roine the colonial slaves of U.S. imperialism was a life and death 
question. There was no alternative for the Workers' Party of Ko- 
rea and the Government of the Republic which shoulder the fate 

29 



of the Korean people but to take emergency measures. 

On June 25 the Political Committee of the Party Central 
Committee met to discuss the grave situation and decided to take 
i\ resolute measure to make a counter-offensive against the enemy. 
And the Government held an emergency Cabinet meeting. It 
ordered the garrison forces and the People's Army to check the 
puppet Syngman Rhee's army and start without delay a counter- 
offensive. 

Under the order the Korean People's Army started to strike 
back at the enemy, who waged a treacherous attack, to safeguard 
the freedom and independence of the country. 

Thus, the just Fatherland Liberation War of the Korean 
people against the U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rhee clique 
started. Accordingly, peaceful construction in our Republic had 
to be suspended and the whole nation was put on a war footing. 

The U.S. imperialists dragged out the U.N. emblem, as plan- 
ned, to cover tip and justify their armed aggression against 
Korea. 

The U.S. imperialists, having started a fratricidal war in 
Korea by instigating the Syngman Rhee clique, called for a U.N. 
Security Council meeting on June 25 without the participation of 
representatives of two permanent members, the Soviet Union and 
the Chinese People's Republic. The U.S. delegation tried to place 
the responsibility for the war in Korea on the side of the Demo- 
cratic People's Republic of Korea and forced the Security Council 
to adopt a series of unjust decisions which branded the D.P.R.K- 
as "aggressor." No representative of the D.P.R.K. participated in 
the deliberations of the question at the Councii. Then on June 27 
the U.S. government again forced the U.N. Security Council to 
adopt unlawfully the aggressive "decisions" which "authorized" 
the U.S. to intervene in the war in Korea. 

The U.S. imperialists saw to it that their armed invasion in 
Korea was called "police action" and pretended they were acting 
under the "decisions" of the U.N. Security Council. 

But all that was just to throw dust in the people's eyes. The 
U.S. government may insist till doomsday that it acted under the 
U.N. Security Council decision, but the fact remains that several 
hours before the U.N. Security Council adopted the "decisions," 
U.S. President Truman officially ordered, on June 27, the U.S. 
air force and naval fleet to participate in the war in Korea, and 
the U.S. 7th Fleet to occupy Taiwan. Already on June 26 prior to 

30 



SKETCH MAP OF THE FATHERLAND 
LIBERATION WAR IN ITS FIRST STAGE 



<J.S.S.R. 




Dok i,. 



the Truman's official order American aircraft were active on the 
Korean front. 

Therefore, the "decisions" of the U.N. Security Council were 

only aimed at covering up the aggressive nature of the U.S. armed 
invasion of Korea and deceiving world public opinion. The de- 
cisions were wangled by the U.S. pressure in gross violation of 
the U.N. Charter. As was pointed out, the decisions were 
"adopted" without the participation of representatives of two 
permanent U.N. Security Council members — the Soviet Union 
and the Chinese People's Republic. No Korean people's repre- 

entatives either were present at the sessions. 
* However, the trick did not work. The U.S. imperialists could 
not camouflage their aggressive designs on Korea nor deceive 
the people. 

Only the illegal "decisions" of the U.N. Security Council on 
the Korean question showed once more that the U.S. imperialists 
were using the U.N., an international organization to maintain 
peace and security, as a tool of their aggression. 

Therefore the Korean people and the honest-minded people 
of the world denounced vehemently the decisions of the U.N. 
Security Council on the Korean question. 

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea in its statement of June 27, rejecting resolutely the illegal 
"decisions" of the U.N. Security Council, declared these U.N. de- 
cisions null and void. Again on July 1, the Government of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued a statement deno- 
uncing the U.S. attempt to occupy all Korea by means of naked 
armed intervention under the U.N. emblem. The statement con- 
demned the U.S. aggressors who were bombing indiscriminately 
peaceful towns and villages killing thousands of innocent lives. 

Condemning the illegality of the Security Council 1 "deci- 
sions" on the Korean question, the Soviet Government in its June 
29 Statement urged that conditions should be created to enable 
'he Korean people to solve the Korean question by themselves 
without any foreign intervention. Moreover, the Soviet Govern- 
ment made it known that the responsibility for the Korean war 
rested on the side of the puppet Syngman Rhee authorities and 
the U.S. imperialists behind them. 

Opposing strongly the U.S. invasion of Korea and Taiwan, 
the Government of the Chinese People's Republic in its June 28 

33 



Statement warned that the U.S. should cease its aggressive ac- 
tion against Asia. 

Disregarding the just demand of the Korean people and the 
people of the world the U.S. imperialists continued the armed 
intervention. They intensified military actions as the U.N. de- 
cisions "authorized" them to do. They were bent on realizing 
their long planned aggressive designs. 

Waging the war of aggression in Korea the U.S. imperialists 
and their running dogs, Syngman Rhee clique, wanted, first of all, 
to conquer the D.P.R.K, wipe out the people's democratic sys- 
tem established in the northern part, and erase the successes 
achieved in democratic construction. They hoped to turn the 
whole Korea into an American colony and make the Korean peo- 
ple their slaves by extending the Syngman Rhee's anti A popular, 
reactionary regime to the North. 

Secondly, they intended to invade the People's Republic of 
China, then the Soviet Union and other Asian countries, by us- 
ing Korea as a stepping stone for 3 world war. 

Thirdly, they wanted to militarize the U.S. economy to pro- 
mote militarism-fascism in the U.S. and secure the maximum 
profits for the monopoly capitalists. 

Fourthly, they planned to threaten the ever growing nation- 
al liberation movement of the colonial peoples by force to 
strengthen their enslavement policy. 

Therefore the war started by the U.S. imperialists and Syng- 
man Rhee clique was thoroughly predatory, reactionary, unjust, 
and aggressive in character. 

From the very first day of the war the Korean people were 
confronted with the arduous task of repulsing both the foreign 
imperialist aggressive forces led by the U.S. imperialists and. 
their ally, the. reactionary Syngman Rhee forces. The war that 
the Korean people waged against the U.S. imperialists and 
Syngman Rhee clique was a righteous one. The Korean people 
fought a national liberation war to defend freedom and indepen- 
dence of their fatherland — the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea — from the armed aggression of foreign imperialists led 
by the U.S. imperialists. And at the same time the Korean peo- 
ple fought a revolutionary civil war to wipe out the reactionary 
forces within the country, to free the South Korean people who 
were groaning under the reactionary regime of the U.S. imperi- 
alists and the traitorous Syngman Rhee clique, unify the cOun- 

34 



try under the banner of the Republic, and carry out democratic 
revolutionary tasks throughout the country. 

The Fatherland Liberation War of the Korean people was 
a just war of great international significance because the Korean 
people, by preventing Korea from becoming the hotbed of a new 
war, stopped the U.S. imperialists from unleashing another world 
war and safeguarded peace and security of the world, of Asia in 
particular, and of the eastern outpost of the socialist camp. 

The Korean people did not, therefore, stand alone in the 
Fatherland Liberation War, but from the very beginning the 
struggle of the Korean people was closely linked with that of 
world people for peace, democracy and socialism. Particularly, it 
served as the key link in the Asian people's struggle for safe- 
guarding national independence and freedom against the U.S. 
imperialist aggression. 



RADIO ADDRESS BY MAR- 
SHAL KIM IL SUNG ON JUNE 
26, 1950. PARTY'S MILITARY, 
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
MEASURES FOR VICTORY IN 
THE WAR. THE COUNTRY 
REORGANIZED ON A WAR 
FOOTING 



When the Fatherland Libera- 
tion War started, the Workers' 
Party of Korea, the leading 
and guiding force of the Ko- 
rean people, carried out the 
great work of organizing and 
mobilizing the entire Korean 
people and the People's Army 
for annihilating the enemy. 

The Party was guided by 
the Marxist-Leninist theory 
on war. 

The Marxist-Leninist theory teaches us that war is a test for 
all the material and spiritual strength of a country and accord- 
ingly the conclusion of war depends upon the potential economic 
and military forces of the country. 

Therefore, relying upon the inexhaustible forces of the peo- 
ple's democratic system the Party pushed ahead with the organi- 
zational and political work of using to the utmost every possibility 
to strengthen the political, economic and military forces of the 
country in conformity with the war-time conditions. 

On behalf of the Workers' Party of Korea and the Govern- 
ment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Marshal 
Kim II Sung made an historical radio address on June 26, 1950. 



35 



In his radio address be appealed to the entire Korean people, 
men and officers of the Korean People's Army to stand up in the 
just Fatherland Liberation War for safeguarding the freedom 
and independence of the country. 

He pointed out in his address that the Syngman Rhee clique 
started the fratricidal war at the instigation of the U.S. in spite 
of the consistent, sincere efforts of our people for unifying the 
country in a peaceful way. He also stated that the war which the 
Korean people were waging was a righteous war for the freedom, 
independence and democratization of the fatherland, exposing 
thoroughly the aggressive nature of the U.S. imperialists and 
Syngman Rhee clique and the aggressive aim of war pursued by 
them. 

Marshal Kim II Sung stated as follows: 

"Through the fratricidal war the Syngman Rhee clique want 
to extend to the North the anti-popular reactionary rule of the 
South, the same as the Japanese imperialists' rule, and to rob 
our people of the fruits achieved in the democratic reforms... 
The reactionary Syngman Rhee clique are seeking to turn our 
fatherland into a colony and the people into slaves of the 
American imperialists. 

"In the war against the Syngman Rhee traitors, the Korean 
people must defend the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
and its Constitution, liberate the southern part of the country from 
the rule of the Syngman Rhee traitor's by liquidating the anti- 
popular fascist puppet Syngman Rhee's regime, restore the peo- 
ple's committees — the people's true political power — in South 
Korea, achieve the unification of the country under the banner of 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and build up a 
powerful democratic independent country." 

Marshal Kim II Sung, appealing to the entire Korean people 
to rise up as one in the national salvation struggle so as not to 
be enslaved again by foreign imperialists, emphasized that the 
people must watch carefully every move of the American imperi- 
alists who are pulling the strings behind the Syngman Rhee 
•clique. 

Then he went on to explain the military, political and econo- 
mic measures taken by the Party and Government for victory and 
the militant task set before the Korean people and the People's 
Army. 

Pointing out that the Korean People's Army 

36 



lo the true people's army serving the interests of the father, 
land and the people, Marshal Kim II Sung appealed to 
the entire men and officers of the Korean People's Army to fight 
for the fatherland and the people to the last drop of their blood 
with patriotic loyalty, displaying bravery, boldness and 
creative power in the sacred war, and safeguarding the 
independence and freedom of the fatherland. He asked the 
entire people in the northern part to mobilize all the 
forces available for crushing the enemy, reorganize all work on a 
wartime footing, and strengthen the rear in every way to meet 
the demand of the front. It was stressed that everything must be 
done for the cause of the war and for destroying the enemy. 
Moreover, the entire nation should help the People's Army. The 
ranks of the People's Army should be reinforced incessantly, the 
supply and transport of munitions be ensured, and the relief 
work for the wounded be organized. 

Saying that the most cunning enemy was doing his 
utmost to disseminate groundless rumours and deceptions, 
Marshal Kim II Sung appealed to the people to expose and liqui- 
date spies and saboteurs while struggling ruthlessly against 
shirkers and gossipmongers in the rear and to strengthen the 
people's democratic dictatorship over counter-revolutionary 
elements. 

He also stressed that the working people of the northern part 
should be highly vigilant in defending factories, plants and 
communication, transport, post and tele-communication facilities 
from the enemy, and strengthen war industry and increase the 
agricultural output to meet promptly the requirements of the 
front and the rear. 

Then Marshal Kim II Sung appealed to the people in South 
Korea that they should wage fiercely partisan activities for wip- 
ing out the enemy in the rear, wrecking his plan of operations, 
cutting off communication lines between the front and the rear 
of the enemy. He told them to disregard the orders and direc- 
tives of the puppet Syngman Rhee regime and help in every 
way the advance of the Korean People's Army by disrupting 
the South Korean reactionary rule. 

Through the radio address he confirmed the Korean people's 
confidence in the final victory of our just cause, stressing that the 
entire Korean people should unite closely around the Workers' 

37 



Party of Korea and the Government of the Republic to wipe out 
the enemy. 

This historic radio address was a great militant programme 
for our Party and people in safeguarding the freedom and inde- 
pendence of the country from the armed aggression by the U.S. 
imperialists and Syngman Rhee clique. 

The Party Central Committee noted that, among other 
things, the Party — leading and guiding force of the country — 
should be built up strongly, the unity and solidarity of the Party 
ranks be strengthened, and the organizing and mobilizing func- 
tion and leading role oif the Party organizations and the Party 
membership be enhanced so as to reorganize all the Party and 
state affairs on a wartime basis and fully organize and mobilize 
as quickly as possible the entire forces of the country 
for a victory in the war on the basis of the line Marshal 
Kim II Sung laid down in his radio address. 

The Central Committee of the Party addressed on June 27, 
1S50, a letter to the entire Party organizations and the Party 
membership. The letter called upon the entire members ior est- 
ablishing firmly the Party's iron discipline and mobilizing the 
whole forces of the Party for a victory in the war while strength- 
ening the unity and 'solidarity of the Party more than ever. 

The letter appealed to every organization and every member 
to fulfil fully the responsibility imposed upon them at the front 
and in the rear, to play the leading role in the van of the entire 
people. It set forthl a number of measures to further raise the 
Party's organizing and mobilizing role in order to help the Party 
members strengthen their work in line with the wartime condi- 
tions. 

Asking the entire Party organizations and members to put 
into practice the wartime military, political and economic policy 
of the Party and reorganize their work on a war footing, the 
letter read in part: 

"The war for national independence and sovereignty against 
the reactionary forces will enjoy the warm support of the anti-im- 
perialist democratic camp of the world including the great Soviet 
Union which liberated our people from the Japanese rule. The 
Party Central Committee is convinced that the Party organiza- 
tions and members at the front and in the rear of the enemy and 
the Party organizations and members in the northern part of the 
country, the cornerstone in building a united democratic repub- 

38 



lie, together with the entire people will carry out with credit 
llit'ir duty in the van of the popular movement in the war for 
wiping out the reactionary elements and the traitorous Syng- 
man Rhee clique and ensure the independence and unification 
of the country." 

With a view to mobilizing promptly all the forces of the Ho- 
le an people for victory, Military Commission was set up with 
Marshal Kim II Sung as its head under the decree of June 26, 
1950 of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly. And 
the Commission was vested with authority to mibilize the entire 
forces of the country. 

The Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly issued on 
June 27 a decree on ensuring the security and social order 
under war conditions. And this was followed by the wartime 
mobilization law which was proclaimed on July 1. The Pre- 
sidium of the Supreme People's Assembly appointed on July 4, 
1950, Marshal Kim II Sung as Supreme Commander 'Of the Ko- 
rean People's Army. 

The Party launched a vigorous struggle to further 
strengthen revolutionary discipline in compliance with the 
emergency state of war in the Party, Government and army, to 
' aise the role and ability of the Party organizations, to enhance 
Hie sense of responsibility of leading personnel and military 
officers, to heighten Party spirit and the leading role of the 
Party members, and to strengthen the Party unity and 
solidarity. 

At the same time, the Party fought ruthlessly various 
cowards, pessimists, evaders and other wreckers among the 
Party ranks and ensured the purity of the Party. It also took 
steps to strengthen the front and the' People's Army for victory. 
The Party reorganized the top ranking headquarters of the Peo- 
ple's Army, placing it on a war basis, which resulted in raising 
markedly its commanding ability. From the very inception of the 
war the Party strengthened the People's Army with the fine 
Party cadres and members. 

The Party took measures to strengthen the cultural depart- 
ments within the People's Army and the political work within 
c umbat units. 

The Party helped servicemen recognize the righteous 

character and objective of the war and educated them in the 

pirit of socialist patriotism and iron discipline, and in an un- 

39 



bending revolutionary spirit. A vigorous ideological work was 
carried out so that they might perform successfully the mili- 
tant task and render the distinguished service in the war. 

The Party members within the army set the example of 
heroism and valour in the van of soldiers, thereby playing the 
nuclear role in ensuring unyielding tenaciousness, strict disci- 
pline and unbending military spirit. 

When the war started the Party organized new army divi- 
sions and enlarged mechanized units, while preparing reserve 
forces. Military schools were expanded to train new officers 
needed for the front. 

While strengthening the front, the Party organized and 
carried out the work of fortifying the rear politically and econo- 
mically. 

The Party strengthened the people's power and the United 
Democratic Fatherland Front based on the worker-peasant alli- 
ance to rally the people more closely around the Party and Gov- 
ernment and tighten steel-like the political and ideological unity 
of the people. 

Party organizations were mobilized to carry out broad mass 
political work to infuse the popular masses with the righteous 
character and objective of the war, put the rear on a war foot- 
ing subordinating everything to the needs of the front, and 
induce the people to wage a selfless struggle with burning hosti- 
lity towards the enemy and the confidence in the victory of the 
war. 

The righteousness and lofty aim of the war against the U.S. 
imperialists and Syngman Rhee clique enhanced the moral 
strength of our people and inspired them and the People's 
Army to labour exploits and distinguished military service. 

The Party asked the entire Party members and people to 
raise their revolutionary vigilance, strengthen self-defence work 
in local areas, and organize wartime special armed militia to 
defend their native places, factories and offices from the in- 
filtration of reactionaries and protect the life and property of the 
people. The Party reorganized promptly the Two-Year (1949- 
1950) National Economic Plan into a wartime economic plan. In 
the light of the rapidly changing military situation, the na- 
tional economic plan was drawn up on a quarterly basis. 

Under the Party's guidance every branch of industry, tran- 
sport and agriculture was geared to meet the war needs. 

40 



War industry was swiftly expanded and strengthened. New 
munitions factories were built while the old ones were enlarged. 
A number of state enterprises which previously turned out peace 
time products were turned into munitions factories. Measures 
were taken to reap in good time a good harvest, though labour 
power and draught animals were short due 1d> the war. 

For the liberated areas of South Korea, the Party took mea- 
sures to step up the political work and strengthen the partisan 
struggle in coordination with the advancing People's Army. 

These measures taken, by the Party ensured a firm front and 
rear. 

The people and the army, the rear and the front became a 
single powerful fighting camp, united firmly. 

Upholding the call of the Party and their leader, the entire 
Korean people as well as the men and officers of the Korean 
People's Army under the correct leadership of the Party came 
out as one in the great sacred battle to protect their fatherland 
from the armed aggression of the U.S. imperialists and Syng- 
man Rhee clique. 



SECTION 2 



Counter-offensive of the Korean People's Army. Liberation of 
Seoul and Crossing the Han River. Expansion of U.S. Armed 
Aggression. Radio Address by Marshal Kim II Sung on July 8 



The U.S. imperialists and 
KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY Syngman Rhee clique figured 

SWITCHES OVER TO COUN- that they could destroy at one 

TER OFFENSIVE. FIRST CAM- stroke the People's Army and 

PAIGN FOR LIBERATION OF subdue our people by a sur- 

SEOUL. FALL OF MAIN prise attack on the young 

FORCE OF SYNGMAN RHEE'S Democratic People's Republic 

PUPPET ARMY of Korea. But they were 

wrong. The enemy miscal- 
culated the great strength of 
our people, who held power in their own hands, and who are led 
by the Workers' Party of Korea which regards the Marxist- 
Leninist theory as its leading and guiding star. Nor did the 



eriemy understand the indestructibleness of the people's demo- 
cratic system and the might of the Korean People's Army that 
serves the interests of the working people. 

Under the leadership of the Workers' Party of Korea, a new 
type Marxist-Leninist Party, the Korean people and the People's 
Army strong enough to check the enemy's aggression at any 
time or at any place and safeguard the freedom and independence 
of the fatherland, were able to resist the enemy without being 
thrown into confusion when the enemy started its surprise attack. 

On the basis of comprehensive analysis of the new political 
situation, our Party and Government under the direct leadership 
of Marshal Kim II Sung worked out a strategy to repulse the 
enemy's attack, to wipe out the puppet Syngman Rhee's army and 
liberate the entire area of South Korea by delivering successive 
telling blows before the U.S. imperialists could 'bring in greater 
forces to the Korean front. 

Accordingly, the Korean People's Army went over swiftly to 
counter-attack. 

On the basis of the Party's strategic plan, the Supreme 
Headquarters of the Korean People's Army placed the main units 
of the People's Army in the Keumchun-Goohwari, Ryunchun- 
Chulwon, and Hwachun-Yangkoo areas to encircle and annihi- 
late the enemy's main forces in the Seoul region, and then to 
advance to the southern tip of the penninsula. 

As soon as the People's Army started hitting back, the 
enemy's attack was successfully checked. On June 25, 1950, the 
People's Army went over to counter-attack along the entire 
battle front. 

The first campaign for liberating Seoul was successfully 
carried out. 

Our forces were to isolate the enemy forces deployed along 
the 38th parallel from the enemy units that were stationed south- 
west and south of Hoingsung, Wonju, Richun and Suwon. To do 
this our units had to approach Seoul from northwest, north, 
southeast, and south so that they could encircle and destroy the 
enemy's main units in the region of Seoul, and liberate many 
towns in the north of the Han River including Seoul. 

Our units directed main blow on Uijungboo and Seoul from 
Ryunchun and Chulwon, that is, from the left flank of its western 
front. The enemy's main forces were concentrated to the north of 

42 




Battles, j une 25-26 
Battles, June 27-28 
Battles on June 29 

Meehaniieduni), ofthe K, p. A. 
Areas <j( enemy's annihilation 

he enemy after 
attack 

Route of (he enemy's retreat 



Areas o( enemy 

ffi Retreat ol the 
"J~ hi* failure to ati 

D i- _ r il_ 



Seoul as Seoul was its political, economic, cultural a,nd com- 
munication centre. 

The enemy lost the initiative in the surprise attack on the 
North and had to hurriedly crawl into defence positions which 
they had previously prepared in the area south of the 38th 
parallel. The enemy, however, resisted our advance with 
fury. Moreover they brought three reserve divisions to the 
left bank of the Rimjin River and to the Uijungboo area. 
By concentrating large forces on this area the enemy hoped 
to stop the advance of the People's Army and continue its in- 
vasion of the northern part of the country. However, no matter 
how hard the enemy tried, they could not check the People's 
Army that inherited the brilliant patriotic revolutionary tradi- 
tion of the anti-Japanese partisans and was boundlessly loyal 
to the Party, the fatherland and the people. With burning hatred 
against the enemy the People's Army pushed back the enemy 
and kept steadily marching southward from the first day of its 
counter offensive. 

The combined infantry unit of the People's Army, to which 
comrade Pak Keum Chul was the cultural commissar, and 
other combined infantry unit led by Comrade Li Yung Ho 
and the combined tank unit under the command of Comrade 
Yoo Kyung Soo destroyed the enemy forces which were 
persistently defending the Tongdoochun-Pochun area. In this 
campaign the artillery provided a powerful protection. From 
three sides — northeast, north and northwest — the units of the 
People's Army pressed on to Uijungboo. Soon the enemy forces 
in Uijungboo were pocketed by our combined units. Uijungboo 
was liberated on June 26. 

Thus, a path was opened for swift occupation of Seoul and 
it became possible to scatter, isolate and annihilate the enemy's 
main forces in the north of Seoul. 

Our infantry units on the right flank of the western front 
cossed the lower reaches of the Han River and the Rimjin River 
after liberating the Ongjin and Yunan peninsulas, the areas of 
Kaesong and Jangdan. On the central front units of the Korean 
People's Army advanced on June 26 towards Kapyung, north of 
Choonchun and the area of Sa-mguri (25 kilometres southwest of 
Rinje), demolishing the enemy who, locked in the mountains, re- 
sisted stubbornly. 

The People's Army units moving southward along the east 

45 



coast reached a point south of Choomoonjin. They were 
joined with the landing party that landed in Okge and were 
threatening Kangneung from the south in the enemy's rear. 

In these first battles the People's Army men displayed a high 
degree of heroism and devotion. 

In the battle of Uijungboo squad leader Kim Hong Ryul, 
Hero of the D.P.R.K, led the platoon taking the place of his 
platoon leader who had fallen in the battle. He won merit by 
killing or wounding more than 50 men and officers of the enemy, 
and captured over 80 prisoners by himself. 

The fierce offensive of the People's Army along the entire 
front, especially that of units in the Uijungboo area, threw the 
enemy into great confusion. The enemy, however, became de- 
sperate. It regrouped its battered forces and put up stubborn re- 
sistance around Moon-san and northeast of Seoul. 

The enemy concentrated what was left of its six divisions — 
Metropolitan, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 7th — in these two areas. 

The U.S. planes came into the war to support the puppet 
army units. This created an entirely new situation in the war. 

Accordingly, the Supreme Headquarters of the Korean Peo- 
ple's Army laid a plan for speeding up the offensive of the units 
heading for Kimpo and Yungdeungpo in the west and those 
units on the central front. The plan called for taking Seoul by 
combining frontal and flank attacks before the enemy strength- 
ened its defence of Seoul. 

The Supreme Headquarters sent Comrade Choi Yong Kun 
to the Uijungboo area with the mission of commanding the 
combat operations of the combined units of the People's 
Army fighting in this area. 

Faced with the task of liberating Seoul, commanders and 
political workers carried out extensive ideological work to 
raise confidence of the men and officers in victory by bringing 
home to them Marshal Kim II Sung's radio address and 
inspiring them to greater heroism. 

The units of the Korean People's Army in the Uijungboo 
area shattered the stubbornly resisting enemy under the strong 
cover of the U.S. air force in Kejungri and Wulgeri south 
of Uijungboo; and approached Seoul from the east. The combined 
infantry and tank units advancing towards Seoul from the east 
approached Tongdaimoon district on the morning of the 28th 
under cover of tanks and powerful artillery-fire. These units 

46 



blocked the enemy's line of retreat to the south. One hour later 
our other combined units advancing eastwards broke 
through the enemy's defence and entered Seoul in the region of 
Miari. 

A fierce fight ensued in every part of the city. The enemy 
resisted desperately locking themselves in major buildings and 
strategic positions. At the same time, the enemy's planes 
stepped up their bombing and strafing. 

But our units pressed on without giving the enemy a breath- 
ing spell. The puppet government buildings, power stations, 
radio station, communication facilities, and banks fell into our 
iiand one by one. 

Our tankmen advancing at the front hoisted the national 
f.ag of the D.P.R.K. on the roof of the "central government" 
building of the puppet regime. 

Our units opened many prisons including the Suh- 
daimoon Prison and released numerous patriotic people im- 
prisoned by the enemy. 

At 11:30, June 28, 1950, Seoul was completely liberated. 

While our units in the direction of the main attack liberated 
Seoul, other combined units advancing along the Kimpo penin- 
sula in the western part of the front liberated Kimpo on June 
28 and threatened the rear of the enemy entrenched in the 
northwest of Seoul. And in the area of Moonsan our combined 
units after a bitter battle began on June 28 to push the enemy 
southward. 

The enemy entrenched in the Moonsan area resisted despe- 
rately. But they were threatened with a complete encirclement by 
our forces that liberated Seoul and Kimpo. Soon in the afternoon 
of the 28th they had swiftly withdrawn to the 'south of the Han 
River, out the units of the Korean People's Army gave the fleeing 
enemy hot pursuit. Our units turned their fire in the direction of 
Yungdeungpo to cut off the enemy's escape route. 

Pajoo and Koyang were liberated on June 28-29. Now the 
routed enemy fled southward in disorder. 

On the central front our infantry and motorized units reach- 
ed Mahyunri (35 kilometres southwest of Kapyung) and the area 
north of Hoingsung on June 29, breaking through the enemy's 
resistance in the areas of Choonchun and Hongchun. Then the 
units coming down along the coast of the East Sea advanced to 
the line south of Kangneung. 

48 



On June 28 some of our units landed on the islands of tin- 
Yellow Sea, including Paikryungdo and Haichungdo and routed 
the enemy and liberated these islands. 

Our young air force engaged the far superior U.S. air force 
in these battles. Our planes provided a protective wing for the 
ground forces advancing toward Seoul besides daring many sur- 
prise attacks on the enemy. 

The first campaign for liberating Seoul ended on June 29. 
The liberation of Seoul was of great significance politically and 
militarily. 

As a result of this campaign Seoul and several areas of 
South Korea were liberated from the dark rule of the enemy. 

Seoul citizens and the inhabitants of other liberated areas 
in South Korea warmly welcomed the People's Army, their 
liberator. 

Seoul citizens poured out to greet the People's Army with 
bouquets, national flags of the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea, and placards bearing such words as "Long Live the 
Workers' Party of Korea!" "Long Live the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea!" "Long Live Our Beloved Leader General 
Kim II Sung!" "Long Live the Heroic Korean People's Army!" 

The successful first campaign promoted the confidence of 
our people in victory and further enhanced the fighting spirit of 
the men and officers of the People's Army. The wishful thinking 
of the U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rhee clique for occupying 
the northern part at one stroke was shattered and the Syng- 
man Rhee's reactionary rule faced a total collapse. And his 
army suffered greatly. During that period our People's Army 
killed, wounded or captured more than 21,000 men and of- 
ficers of the enemy and seized a huge amount of war booty. 
Rhee's routed army fled to the south of the Han River in 
utter confusion. 

The victory in the first campaign demonstrated the indes- 
tructible vitality of the people's democratic system, the might 
of the young People's Army and its superior military art. 

In this campaign the People's Army liberated wide areas 
in the north of the Han River including Seoul, where the enemy 
had concentrated large forces and war munitions for the 
Korean war. 

When the Korean People's Army took Seoul 

on June 28, Marshal Kim II Sung sent warm con- 

49 



gratulations to the entire people of the country, the People's 
Army and Seoul citizens. He expressed thanks to the men and 
officers of the heroic People's Army who liberated Seoul, and 
appealed to the entire people to help in every way the advance 
of the People's Army so that the fratricidal war started by the 
Syngman Rhee clique at the U.S. instigation might be brought 
to an early end and the country undertake peaceful construction. 
Commending the men and officers of the 3rd and 4th 
-Divisions and the 105th Tank Brigade of the Korean People's 
Army — these units first entered Seoul after bitter fighting — 
Marshal Kim II Sung by his order of July 5 awarded them with 
the following titles of honour: the 3rd Seoul Division, the 
Fourth Seoul Division and the 105th Seoul Tank Division — 
the 105 Tank Brigade was raised to the rank of a division. 



SECOND CAMPAIGN OF THE 
KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY. 

EXTENSION OF ARMED AGG- 
RESSION BY THE U.S. IM- 
PERIALISTS. RADIO ADD- 
RESS BY MARSHAL KIM IL 
SUNG ON JULY 8, 1950 



Panic-stricken by the mise- 
rable defeat the puppet Syng- 
man Rhee's army suffered, 
the U.S. imperialists became 
more brazen in their aggres- 
sive aims. 

On June 30, U.S. President 
Truman ordered the U.S. 
army to the Korean front. 
And the U.S. army divisions 
in Japan which were in trim 

for action began to move to Korea. The U.S. air force and 

fleet too were greatly reinforced. 

U.S. airplanes started the barbarous bombing of the front and 
rear. The results of peaceful construction were destroyed and 
countless innocent people killed. 

The U.S. 7th fleet blockaded our seas and bombarded our 
towns and villages along the coast. 

Moreover, the U.S. attempted to regroup the badly battered 
puppet army. Protecting the crippled Syngman Rhee's army 
with their planes and naval bombardment, the U.S. tried to 
organize a strong defence on the southern bank of the Han 
River to check the advance of the Korean People's Army and 



50 



gain time for the U.S. army. When the U.S. ground iorces 
appeared on the Korean front, they hoped to retake Seoul and 
then carry out their original aggressive scheme on the whole o( 
Korea. 

MacArthur personally inspected the southern bank of the 
Han River and ordered the defeated puppet army units to make 
a stand. 

The Syngman Rhee clique organized "the Shiheung Area 
Military Headquarters" and the "Suwon Area Military Head- 
quarters", as instructed by their masters, the U.S. imperialists. 

Particularly they built up strong defence system around the 
Yungdeungpo and Roryangjin areas, centres of communications 
on the southern bank of the Han River. 

And on the central and eastern parts of the front, too, the 
enemy stopped running and made a stand around Hoingsung 
and Daikwanryung (southwest of Kangneung) areas. 

In building its defence line the enemy counted much on the 
Han River. They figured the river would be a natural barrier 
to slow down the advance of the People's Army. The bridge 
spanning over the Han River had been destroyed and the river 
was swollen because of the heavy rainfall which lasted several 
days. The enemy estimated that, taking the advantage of the 
flooding Han River, they could hold back the advance of our 
army if they resisted stubbornly. 

In such situation, the Supreme Headquarters of the Korean 
People's Army worked out a plan for the second campaign. 
The plan called for crossing the Han River, heading for 
Yungdeungpo, Suwon and Pyongtaik, and liberating Pyongtaik, 
Ansung, Choongjoo, Jechun, and Nyungwot before the U.S. 
forces arrived. 

The second campaign started on June 30. 
To stop the river crossing, the enemy planes and artillery 
bombed this area day and night without a letup. 

But they could not stop the People's Army. Units of the 
engineer corps started to repair the Han River bridge destroyed 
by the enemy. And numbers of patriotic Seoul citizens, railway 
workers in particular, who rejoiced over the liberation of the city, 
helped devotedly the rehabilitation of the Han River bridge. 
Thus the bridge was repaired in a short space of time. 



The advance detachments of our units in the main blow 
direction began crossing the river by the restored bridge on 
June 30 under cover of darkness after a barrage of our artil- 
lery. Other units effected crossings at Roryangjin and Yueuido. 
By the following morning (July 1), a bridgehead was secured 
on the opposite bank. The enemy repeatedly tried to dislodge our 
troops only to fail. 

Our units, however, together with the forces coming south- 
ward after liberating Kimpo kept pushing back the enemy. The 
bridgehead was widened and all conditions for the main forces 
of the People's Army to cross the river were secured. Our main 
forces succeeded in crossing the Han River and at dawn of July 
3, they started to attack the Yungdeungpo area. And Yung- 
deungpo was liberated. 

The enemy's defence on the southern side of the river began 
to crumble. 

Our units headed towards Suwon pursuing the enemy. 

At the same time the unit- of the Korean People's Army on 
the left flank in the main blow direction crossed the Han River 
successfully at Took Islet and Ryangsoori where the North and 
South Han Rivers meet. On July 3 our units were approaching 
Suwon from the northwest and Ryongin from the north, moving 
down the enemy. They cut communication lines between the 
western and central parts of the enemy's front and threatened 
the enemy's rear and left flank. 

The People's Army units that crossed the South Han River 
on the central part of the front kept marching southward, break- 
ing through the enemy's defence in the Ryuju-Wonju areas. 
Along the east coast the People's Army units advanced in two 
directions from the south of Kangneung: one toward Kang- 
neung, Pyongchang and Nyungwol and the other toward Kang- 
neung, Okge and Samchuk. And they appeared in Pyongchang 
and Samchuk areas on July 3. 

After the enemy failed to defend the southern bank of the 
Han River, they made another desperate attempt to defend the 
line of Suwon, Janghowonri and Jechun for the purpose of faci- 
litating the advance of the U.S. 24th Division that landed on 
July 2 at Pusan. 

The U.S. imperialist aggressors attempted to check the 
People's Army in the Charyung Range by deploying their 
ground forces toward the north of Pyongtaik and Ansung. 

52 



Such situation demanded the People's Army units to speed 
up attack and wipe out mercilessly the resisting enemy. 

Units of the People's Army, led by the tank unit, chasing the 
fleeing enemy, pierced the enemy's defence line. Suwon — the 
enemy's second stronghold — was liberated on July 4. On the 
same day our units on the right flank liberated Inchon, one of the 
main ports of our country on the west coast. 

And it was on the following day after the liberation of 
Suwon that our advance units pressing southward encountered 
the advanced troops of the U.S. 24th Division near Osan. 

As our units met the U.S. ground forces for the first time, 
every man of the entire units flamed with burning wrath and 
hatred for the American invaders. And, without waiting for the 
arrival of the main units, our men started operation against the 
enemy. Following closely a file of tanks, our infantrymen pressed 
ori while some of the units made frontal and flank attacks. 
Dashing into the enemy position, our tank units crushed its 
defence position and its heavy guns were silenced. The 
enemy was lured to the east, where they were given a blood-bath. 

Thus within less than two hours of fighting, one enemy in- 
fantry battalion and one artillery battalion were almost com- 
pletely wiped out. In this battle our men exhibited unparalleled 
bravery and boldness. For the Party and revolution and for the 
fatherland and the people, our men did not hesitate to> shed blood 
and bravely broke into the enemy lines delivering wholesale 
death to the enemy. 

An Dong Soo, Vice-Divisional Commander in charge of cul- 
tural affairs who was with a tank unit, fought heroically till 
his death, inspiring the men to victory, while Jo Hyung Koo 
jumped into an enemy trench and shot and slashed 17 enemy 
officers and men. Then he sent 40 soldiers to death with his 
hand-grenades. 

Heroic battles waged by the People's Army shattered to 
smithereens the illusions of the enemy. The American invaders 
were quite sure that as soon as the U.S. troops appeared on the 
battle field, the front would change basically in their favour. 

And the New York Herald Tribune made no bones to admit 
it. The paper asserted that the appearance of the U.S. ground 
forces would boost the morale o*f the Syngman Rhee's army and 
"the North Korean army" would withdraw. But, alas, it did not 

54 



turn out as they wished. The young Korean People's Army 
delivered a telling blow to the American aggressors, making 
them realize the might of the Korean People's Army who rose in 
defence of the independence and freedom of the fatherland. 

The combined units of the People's Army performing the 
main attack kept on their pursuit of the fleeing American and 
puppet armies wiping out the enemy's advance units. Allowing 
no breathing spell to the enemy forces, our units liberated 
Pyongtaik on July 6. 

Coordinating with the main forces, the units on the left 
flank routing the enemy in Poongdukchun-ri (northeast of 
Suwon) and in Keumryangjang-ri (southeast of Suwon), enter- 
ed the area of Pyongtaik and Ansung. 

On the central part of the front, our combined units liberat- 
ed Janghowon-ri, Jechun and other districts and advanced to 
the Eumsung area and to the line north of Choongju and south- 
east of Jechun on July 6, while our units on the east coast mar- 
ched to the south of Nyungwol and Samchuk. 

While the ground battles were raging, our young navy put 
up a heroic fight against the far numerically superior enemy 
forces on the East Sea, covering our infantrymen who were ad- 
vancing down the east coast. 

On July 2, two U.S. cruisers and one destroyer appeared on 
the sea off Choomoonjin. And the Torpedo-boat Squad No. 2 of 
our navy lost no time in challenging the enemy. Dashing at 
the enemy ships at the top speed our boats released torpedoes 
at the cruisers. 

Panic-stricken by the surprise attack, the enemy ships 
managed to concentrate their fire on our torpedo boats. How- 
ever, the rain of enemy shells could not stop our boats. They 
were closing in on the enemy ships one was 800 or 900 metres 
away, and another approached within 500 or 600 meters of the 
enemy ships. One torpedo after another was fired at the enemy 
men-of-war. 

Thus, a torpedo-boat unit of four small craft of our navy 
sank one medium cruiser and destroyed one light cruiser. In- 
deed, such bravery has rarely been recorded in the annals of 
world history of sea battles. The Torpedo-boat Squad No. 2 was 
later honoured with the title of Guard Unit. 



55 



fighting men of our ground forces. Our aircraft penetrated fni 
south of Suwon. Many dog fightings took place between out 
planes and the enemy's. Many B-29s and other enemy planes 
were shot down. Our planes also attacked the enemy's strong- 
holds. 

Thus by July 6, our forces had successfully executed tasks of 
the second campaign in the war. During this period wide areas 
of South Korea were liberated, and the American forces suffered 
the first crushing defeat. 

Having met with repeated humiliating defeats at the hands 
of the heroic Korean People's Army, the U.S. aggressors rein- 
forced their forces in Korea. Then, on July 7, the U.S. govern- 
ment forced the U.N. Security Council to adopt "resolution" to 
intensify the U.S. armed aggression in Korea. 

The Security Council, despite the absence of two of its per- 
manent members — the Soviet Union and the People's Republic 
of China — took up the Korean question at the U.S. bidding, 
adopting illegal "resolution." The Security Council made the 
U.S. -directed "United Command" command the forces of the 
U.S. satellite countries to be sent to the Korean front. The U.S. 
government was authorized to name the commander of the 
"United Nations Forces." 

Such naked armed aggression of the U.S. imperialists 
against the Korean people invited condemnation of the peace- 
loving peoples of the world. 

On July 4, 1950, the Government of the U.S.S.R. issued a 
statement denouncing the armed aggression of the U.S. imperi- 
alists. The statement declared that the U.S. imperialists' act of 
wrecking peace showed that the U.S. government had little 
intention of maintaining peace; the U.S. government itself 
was the enemy of peace. 

The Soviet Government insisted on the immediate stoppage 
of U.S. aggression of Korea and a peaceful solution of the Ko- 
rean question. 

Moreover, in its communication dated July 14, 1950, to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Soviet Government 
pointed out the illegality and aggressive nature of the "July 7 
resolutions" which the U.S. delegation inveigled the Security 
Council to take, making it clear that these "resolutions" had no 
legal force. And on July 15, it proposed a meeting of the Security 

57 



Council with the 5 permanent powers attending to discuss and 
solve peacefully the Korean question. 

Through the July 6 statement, the Government of the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China, condemning the armed aggression of 
Korea by the U.S., stated that the Security Council had failed to 
discharge its functions and obligation to preserve world peace 
by aiding the naked U.S. aggression, and had become a tool of 
U.S. aggression. The U.S. government under the U.N. flag 
brazenly extended its aggressive designs on Korea with what it 
called the "U.N. forces." 

Many fresh U.S. divisions were sent to the Korean front. 
The U.S. government nominated D. MacArthur, Commander-in- 
Chief in the Far East, as the Commander of the "U.N. forces" 
and set up the headquarters in Tokyo on July 24. General W. 
Walker of the U.S. Eighth Army arrived in Taejun on July 7 
and established his headquarters on July 13. 

As the U.S. invasion of Korea expanded, the Korean people 
were indeed confronted with a grave situation. The entire people 
and the People's Army had to wage an all-out fight against the 
aggressive U.S. army. 

Marshal Kim II Sung gave a message to the entire Korean 
people over the radio on July 8, 1950. 

Exposing the evil designs of the U.S. aggressors, Marshal 
Kim II Sung called on the entire people and the People's Army 
to wage a national liberation struggle to drive the alien invaders 
from the soil of our country. He denounced U.S. aggression and 
atrocities committed under the U.N. flag, emphasizing that no 
matter how desperately they might attempt to subdue our coun- 
try, the U.S. aggressors would never be able to bend the fighting 
spirit and lofty ideals of the Korean people who love freedom 
and independence of the country. Then he appealed to the entire 
people for unity, calling upon them to answer the U.S. armed 
aggression with a decisive blow. 

Marshal Kim II Sung, touching upon the lofty principle of 
patriotism, said: 

"Our people will never be colonial slaves again. All who 
value the freedom and independence of the fatherland 

58 



must rise up as one without exception in the sacred war for llio 
liberation of the fatherland against the armed invasion by the 
U.S. imperialists. 

"We shall never forgive the crimes committed by the 
American imperialists in our land. We shall never forgive the 
savage bombing of our peaceful towns and villages and the 
slaughter of our parents, brothers, sisters and innocent children. 
And not only we ourselves, but also our descendants, wili for- 
ever condemn the interventionists — the American imperialists 
who have soaked our land with the blood of our people." 

Marshal Kim II Sung went on to say that the entire people 
should aid in eveiy way'the People's Army which was pressing 
southward annihilating the enemy forces. He said the entire re- 
sources of the country should be made available for the units of 
the People's Army and the output of foodstuffs, fabrics, coal and 
steel should be increased, while labour discipline in the factories 
and enterprises should be made more stringent. Then he spoke 
of the need for speedy rehabilitation of production facilities 
destroyed-by enemy bombing, for heightening vigilance, and 
consolidating the rear still more firmly. 

Moreover, he emphasized that the members of the partisan 
units must deliver bravely and mercilessly telling blows to the 
enemy, destroy the enemy's transport and communication lines 
and bridges, wipe out the ammunition dumps and military in- 
stallations of the enemy, and let fire burn the vicious enemy. 

To the men and officers of the People's Army he appealed 
that they should fight more bravely to drive out the American 
pirates and their running dogs from our land. 

The units of the People's Army should pursue the fleeing 
enemy without giving them a breathing spell. 

Speaking to the men and officers of the People's Army, 
Marshal Kim II Sung said in his radio speech that they should 
master modern military art, ensure manoeuvre of their units, 
surround and destroy the enemy, fully displaying the super 
military art of our Army. 

The glorious records and bravery exhibited by our fore- 
fathers in defending the fatherland, he emphasized, would in- 

59 



spire the people and the men and officers of the People's Army 
to further heroic exploits. 

The speech of Marshal Kim II Sung intensified the entire 
people's enmity towards th-e U.S. imperialists and confirmed 
their confidence in victory while inspiring further the people and 
the men and officers of the People's Army to a life-and-death 
struggle for victory in the war. 



SECTION 3 



Rout of U.S. Army Around Taejun. 
People's Heroic Fight to Aid the Front 



As the naked U.S. armed 
EXTENSION OF U.S. ARM- aggression became more fla- 

ED AGGRESSION AND MEA- grant and the front line of the 

SURES TAKEN BY THE PAR- People's Army extended, ten- 

TY TO FURTHER CONSOLI- sion and intensity at the front 

DATE THE REAR increased. 

Anticipating the extension 
of the battle line, the Party 
on the initiative of Marshal Kim II Sung took a series of im- 
portant measures for consolidating the front and the rear. 

First of all, the Party, with a view to intensifying military 
command and improving guidance of the combined units of the 
Korean People's Army deployed on the ever extending front, 
and in order to meet the swiftly changing war develop- 
ments, took a measure to set up a Front Line Command. At the 
same time, auxiliary command posts were reorganized into 
army corps. Thus the command of the front line was further 
secured. 

Comrade Kim Chaik was appointed Commander of the 
Front Line Command and Comrades Kim II and Kang Kun 
the military commissar and the Chief of Staff respectively. 

Moreover, the Party reorganized the garrison brigades of 
the Ministry of Home Affairs into new divisions of the People's 

60 



Army and new reserve units and coast guard units were org, ill 
ized to increase the strength of the People's Army and fortify 
the defence of the coastal areas. 

As the U.S. aggression became more intense and the ranks 
of the People's Army increased rapidly, the Party set a system 
of military commissars to strengthen the Party's guidance of 
the army and improve the political work among the members of 
the armed forces. Soon military commissions were established 
in every army corps. Many leading Party workers were ap- 
pointed commissars of the military commissions. 

The military commissar representing the Workers' Party 
of Korea and the Government of the Democratic People's Re- 
public of Korea was the first political adviser to the commander 
of a unit. He played an important role in directing all political 
activities of the unit along with the decisions and directives is- 
sued by the Party Central Committee, educating the members 
of the Armed Forces with Party ideology and socialist patriot- 
ism and in strengthening the steel-like army discipline and 
order. The Party kept sending able cadres and members to the 
army to consolidate the Party's positions and raise the leading 
role of the Party members in combat. 

A series of measures were taken for promoting further the 
revolutionary spirit and patriotism of the men and officers of 
the Korean People's Army, in order that they might exhibit fully 
iheir lofty moral character in battle. 

Basing itself on the Party policy, the Presidium of the Su- 
preme People's Assembly issued a series of decrees instituting 
new decorations and orders for those who had achieved out- 
standing exploits by displaying bravery, boldness, and self- 
sacrificing spirit in the war for the country's freedom and inde- 
pendence. The title of Hero of the D.P.R.K., the highest hon- 
our — Order of Freedom and Independence and Order of Li Soon 
Shin, etc. 

While various steps were taken for strengthening the front, 
the Party also worked on building a rock-like rear. 

Mass political work programmes were carried out to arm 
the entire people with confidence in their great, just cause and 
in victory by inflaming the people's hatred against the 
enemy. 

In order to give due recognition to those who made out- 

61 



standing exploits in the field of economy, culture and construc- 
tion, the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly issued a 
decree on establishing the title of Labour Hero. 

The Party organized effective air-raid protection in the 
rear. 

And on July 26, the Military Commission adopted decisions 
on war-time compulsory labour service to ensure speedy recon- 
struction of towns and villages destroyed by the enemy bombing 
and to a,id the front. It also issued orders for ensuring treat- 
ment of civilians wounded by enemy bombing and improving 
air-raid shelters and fire-prevention work. 

At the same time, the Party pressed the work of providing 
military training of the people so that they could take up arms 
against the eneinv at any time. 

Thus, thanks to the various measures taken by the Party, 
both the front and the rear were strengthened greatly and every 
condition for crushing the enemy was created. 

The enemy who had fled 

THIRD CAMPAIGN OF THE southward reinforced its bad- 

KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY ly mau i e d puppet army divi- 

heavy losses of U.S. s ; ons w j t h the newly rounded- 

ARMY up recruits and regrouped 

them into two armv corns. 

Then the front line troops were replaced with fresh forces in 

an attempt to build a strong defence. 

The advance units of the U.S. 24th Division which had 
suffered heavy losses near Osan were ordered to the Chunan 
area and their main forces were deployed along the areas of 
Junui, Chochiwon and Taejun. Then the Syngman Rhee's 1st 
and 2nd Corps, replenished en route to the central front with the 
remnants of the routed army on the western front, were remov- 
ed to the areas of Jinchun, Eumsung, Choongju, and Tanyang. 

On July 7, the puppet Syngman Rhee's army headquarters 
relayed its master's voice to the 1st and 2nd Corps. The order 
read that by 6:00 on July 8, in a coordinated counter-attack 
with the U.S. forces, they should advance to the Pyongtaik- 
Ansung-Janghowonri-Jechun line. 

It was the enemy's plan to recover the district of the Char- 

62 



yung Range by counter-attack and to regroup the American 
forces in the rear. Then, a general offensive was to follow. 

However, the Supreme Headquarters of the People's Army, 
knowing the enemy's plan, laid out the third campaign. 

Not allowing the enemy necessary time to build a defence 
line, our units were to intensify the offensive to cross speedily 
the Keum River and the Sobaik mountains and, by surround- 
ing and annihilating the main enemy forces in Taejun and 
Sobaik mountains, to liberate Junju, Ronsan, Moonkyung, 
llljin and adjacent areas to the south. 

During this period, Marshal Kim II Sung, Supreme Com- 
mander of the Korean People's Army, directed in Seoul the 
military campaign. 

Marshal Kim II Sung, in the light of the existing poli- 
tical situation and on the strength of careful study of the camp- 
aign conducted by the People's Army, ordered the men and offic- 
ers of the combined units to penetrate into the rear of the enemy 
line by outflanking operation, and encircle and destroy the 
enemy forces. Moreover, night operations and the speed of the 
offensive were to be intensified. 

Following the strategy laid out by the Supreme Headquar- 
ters, the Front Line Command started the third campaign on July 
7, directing main attack to the areas of Chunan, Chochiwon, 
Taejun on the western part of the front and simultaneously 
delivered secondary attacks in several other directions. 

Our combined infantry unit and tank unit in the main attack 
direction waged a blunt frontal attack, while dealing attacks 
to the enemy's flanks and rear. The enemy suffered another 
heavy loss and on July 8 our units liberated Chunan. By the 
10th they were pressing on Junui. 

In coordination with this, another combined unit of the 
People's Army on the left, liberated Jinchun and pushed south- 
ward the enemy forces which were stubbornly resisting. 

Between July 7 and 10, our units on the central part of the 
front fought furiously in the areas of Eumsung, Choongju, and 
Tanyang. Under the protection of the air force, the enemy even 
waged several counter-attacks to slow down our advance and 
occupy the Charyung Range. But our side kept the southward 
march. 

Then on the 10th, our forces which were coming down 
along the east coast liberated Uljin. 

63 



in the face of the relentless attack delivered by the People's 
Army, the enemy's attempt to check our advance and stage a 
counter-attack was shattered. But taking advantage of the 
natural barriers of the Keum River and the Sobaik mountains, 
the enemy stubbornly attempted to check our advance. The 
enemy built strongholds on every favorable line. The new line 
they formed was called the "last line of their defence," or the 
"line of no retreat." 

Syngman Rhee and his followers made Taejun their tem- 
porary capital. 

As the U.S. military forces had been greatly reinforced, the 
People's Army had to wage difficult battles, crossing over the 
steep hills of the Sobaik mountains and the Keum River. And 
the Supreme Headquarters of the Korean People's Army, to 
meet the situation, took steps for bringing the reserve 
nnits into battle on the west coast and around Choongju on the 
central front. 

The Front Line Command accordingly laid down a course. 

The heavy field pieces were to follow immediately the 
rapidly advancing infantry, and the infantry and artillery units 
were to coordinate their actions closely, giving hot chase to 
the enemy and allowing them no time to build up a defense 
line along the Keum River and the Sobaik mountains. 

In army units, commanders and political workers talked 
to the men and officers of their unit about the July 8 speech of 
Marshal Kim II Sung and the plan laid down by the Supreme 
Headquarters. The political work was stepped up to inspire 
every soldier to heroic exploits. 

In the meantime our main forces on the west front crushed 
the stubborn resistance of the enemy infantry and tank units in 
Junui, Kwanjungri (southwest of Junui), Chochiwon districts, 
and reached the Keum River on July 13. While on the left flank, 
our units liberated Chungju on the same day. 

The enemy, pushed southward again, decided to defend at 
all costs Taejun, a strategic position and political and administ- 
rative centre, consolidating their defensive positions on the 
left bank of the Keum River and south of Chungju. 

In order to prevent our units from crossing the Keum, 

a large fleet of enemy planes kept on pounding the area day 
and night. During the night the enemy fired numerous flare- 
bombs over the river to detect any secret crossings by our side. 

64 



THE BATTLE FOR TAEJUN 




But nothing could stop the advance of our units. 

In the early hours of July 14, our combined units that had 
advanced to the neighbourhood of Kongju, under a heavy bar- 
rage of our artillery, staged a river-crossing operation. All the 
enemy's attention was focussed on this spot. In the meantime 
our units on both flanks succeeded in executing surprise cross- 
ings. 

Our advance troops that crossed the Keum first were tem- 
porarily cut off from the main forces because of the enemy's 
stubborn resistance and concentrated air attacks. Yet they were 
able to expand their foothold boldly and penetrate into the 
enemy's rear to smash up the enemy guns. Great confusion was 
created thus among the enemy. 

As the gains of the advance troops grew, our main forces, 
which had been temporarily forced to suspend the crossings, 
successfully landed on the other side of the river. The resisting 
U.S. forces were crushed and Kongju was liberated. The enemy 
swerved around to the north of Ronsan on the 16th. While 
other combined units of the People's Army in the area of 
Taipyungri (south of Chochiwon) began to cross the river at 
three points during the night of the 15th. 

Our artillery with its strong fire power played a decisive 
role in the river crossings. Our artillerymen brought down their 
guns to the bank of the river and silenced the enemy gun posi- 
tions across the river, ensuring the infantry's crossings. 

Under cover of the artillery fire our forces completed the 
crossings. In the area of Taipyungri our units encountered 
stubborn resistance of the enemy. While engaging the enemy, 
our forces successfully maneuvered to outflank them, choking 
off any escape route. 

Combining the frontal, flank and rear attacks, our units 
defeated within 3 to 4 hours the main forces of the 19th Infanlry 
Regiment of the U.S. 24th Division. In this battle some 1,700 
enemy men and officers were killed, wounded or captured. 

At this time fresh combined units of the Korean People's 
Army on the right flank in the main blow direction were press- 
ing hard on the enemy advanced to the Puyu area, while other 
units on the left flank were locked in a pitched battle with the 
forces of the 2nd Corps of the puppet army in the south of 
Chungju, 

67 



Having failed in their defence of the Keum, the enemy 
became more stubborn in the south of Chungju, and the U.S. 
24th Division concentrated its main forces in Taejun to in- 
tensify the defence of the city. 

After surveying the war situation, Supreme Commander 
Marshal Kim 11 Sung instructed the units in the Ronsan area 
to advance, without waiting for the forces that were engaged in 
lierce battles south of Chungju, to the south of Taejun im- 
mediately and, with our attacking units in the Taipyungri area, 
to encircle and destroy the enemy in the Taejun area. On July 
18, our combined units in the Ronsan area started the outflank 
movement to the south of Taejun. 

The soldiers of our units who were to outflank the enemy 
forces had to march 48 hours, carrying a heavy load of 1.5 
times the regular ammunition and rations for three days, be- 
sides one or two mortar shells. To escape the watchful eyes of 
the enemy, they crossed untrodden steep mountains and deep 
valleys. Yet all the difficulties and hardship were overcome and 
our men and officers successfully carried out their given task, 
remembering the struggle waged by the anti-Japanese parti- 
sans who had scaled the steep Changpaik mountains in heavy 
snowstorms and crushed the enemy when dark clouds overhung 
our fatherland. 

Marching day and night, our 18th Infantry Regiment 
reached the area of Taejun, and during the night of the 19th 
and in the early hours of the 20th secretly crossed the enemy 
lines to the south and southeast of Taejun to cut off enemy's 
approaches to the. city from Keumsan and Taegu. While another 
unit reached the westside of Taejun. 

In the meantime combined infantry units and tank units of 
the People's Army, having liberated Yoosung on the 19th, ap- 
proached Taejun from the northwest. 

Our units on the left wing in the main blow direction 
subdued the enemy south of Chungju on the 18th, while another 
unit that was heading for Chochiwon and Chungju reached 
north of Taejun. By the afternoon of the 19th our forces com- 
pletely encircled Taejun. However, the enemy, not knowing that 
they were outflanked, kept bringing in reinforcements from the 
south. 

Before daybreak of July 20, our infantry and tanks started 

68 



a general offensive on Taejun. The enemy answered back 
furiously, yet, gradually the net around them became tighter. 

Breaking through the enemy positions on the westside of 
the city, our tankmen appeared in the heart of Taejun. Great 
confusion seized the enemy forces concentrated in Taejun. And 
our infantrymen followed closely on the heel of tanks and, 
giving the enemy a blood bath, occupied the city's key points 
one by one. One storming party dared to penetrate deep into 
the. enemy line to knock out the enemy's 155 mm gun positions. 

Our artillerymen routed the enemy and their gun positions 
and at the same time successfully supported the charge of our 
infantry and tanks. 

Bewildered at the blows, the enemy attempted to retreat 
to the southeast of Taejun. But no such escaping routes were 
available, as our 18th Regiment relentlessly fought to annihi- 
late the enemy who were desperately seeking an opening for 
their retreat. 

To relieve the U.S. 24th Division pocketed in Taejun, the 
enemy hastily dispatched the U.S. 25th Division and the U.S. 
1st Cavalry Division (an infantry division) to Taejun. The 
former landed in Pusan on July 9, and the latter in Pohang on 
July 18. 

But our combined units, without allowing the enemy the 
time needed for reinforcements, crushed the enemy forces. At 
last, at noon of the 20th, Taejun fell to our hands and the city 
was liberated. 

In the meantime our combined units on the right flank in 
the main blow direction advanced to the region of Kimje and 
Junju, while those on the left reached the area of Boeun. 

The victory the People's Army won in Taejun threatened 
the enemy's flanks and greatly contributed to the successes of 
our combined units in the central part of the front. 

While the battle of liberating Taejun was raging, our 
units on the central part were engaged in a furious battle with 
the enemy to dislocate them from the Sobaik mountains. The 
enemy was determined not to yield. Should we penetrate the 
Sobaik mountains, the enemy feared, their line would be cut at 
the center as their positions in the west were being crushed. The 
enemy feared encirclement. 

And, unless they held the Sobaik mountains, they figured, 

70 



they could not get the time needed for their reinforcements 
U.S. troops — to reach the front. The entire forces of the 1st 
Army Corps of Syngman Rhee was deployed in the mountains. 
Taking advantage of the favourable natural conditions, they 
held on stubbornly, and, when they retreated, all the paths and 
bridges leading to the south were destroyed. 

And it should be added that the die-hard resistance of the 
enemy, the enemy's savage bombing and unscalable mountains 
presented many obstacles to our men and officers. Yet our units, 
disregarding all these obstacles, pressed on steadily southward. 

During a period of ten days from July 11, our units in the 
area of Eumsung advanced 50 kilometres reaching the vicinity 
of Kalryung (20 kilometres northwest of Sangju). 

Our forces in the area south of Choongju subdued the 
enemy at Yunpoong and pressed on Rihwa-ryung (Moonkyung 
pass). After the furious battle along the entire front, Moon- 
kyung was liberated on the 16th and by the 18th our units 
reached the area north of Hamchang. And in the region of 
Tanyang, our combined units liberated Poongki on July 14. 
The enemy put a heavy defence between Poongki and Yungju 
but they could not check our southward march. 

Our units coming down along the east coast, despite the 
heavy bombardment and bombing by the (nemy's navy and 
air force, kept pushing the enemy southward. By July 14, our 
forces reached the area of Yungduk, threatening the right 
flank of the enemy. 

Special mention should be made of the success our young 
air force won during this period. 

Kimpo was made the main base of our air force then. 
Everyday our planes took to the air to challenge the superior 
enemy air power, spreading a protective wing over our ground 
forces. Between July 7 and 20, pursuit formations led by Kim Ki 
Ok, Li Moon Soon, Li Dong Kyoo — all Heroes — in dogfights 
with the formations of enemy planes, downed more than 10 
planes including B-29s. 

Thus the third campaign of the Korean People's Army 
executed between July 7 and 20 was brought to a successful 
completion. Indeed the third campaign is one or the most 
colourful pages in the history of the Fatherland Liberation War. 

During this period the U.S. 24th Division was completely 

71 



wiped out, and crushing blows were given to the 1st and 2nd 
Army Corps of Syngman Rhee's army. Dean, Commander of the 
U.S. 24th Division, was taken prisoner of war. Some 32,000" 
enemy soldiers were killed, wounded or captured. Besides 220 
guns of various calibre, 20 tanks, 4,100 rifles, 540 machine- 
guns of various calibre and some 1,300 motor-cars were cap- 
tured or destroyed. 

The third campaign liberated almost the entire area of 
North and South Choongchung Provinces and wide areas of 
North Chulla and North Kyungsang Provinces. 

Moreover, the confidence of the entire people and the People's 
Army in crushing the bloodstained U.S. aggressors and achiev- 
ing victory became firmer. 

Our young People's Army exhibited invincible might by 
encircling and completely destroying the U.S. 24th Division 
that boasted of a history of aggressive wars. On the Korean 
front the U.S. 24th Division — "the division that knows no 
defeat" — met with a humiliating defeat. The Pentagon was dis- 
heartened. American GIs were trembling in fear and confusion. 

As they were repeatedly defeated on the front, the fleeing 
American invaders killed helpless, innocent inhabitants. Numer- 
ous patriotic people in Chunan, Chochiwon, Choongju and 
other places were killed by the American invaders as they 
turned tails and headed southward. In Taejun alone they 
slaughtered 8,000. 

The savagery of the U.S. imperialists — the self-styied pro- 
tector of "peace" and "good-conduct" — became more naked as 
the days went by. The atrocities committed by the U.S. aggres- 
sors evoked the people's condemnation. However, no inhuman 
brutality could frighten the Korean people. On the contrary, 
the people fought harder and more bravely as the enemy's 
atrocities worsened. 

The victories won in the third campaign, particularly in the 
liberation of Taejun, testified to the correctness of the Party's 
policy on military affairs and the superb command and wisdom 
cf Marshal Kim II Sung in directing the war. And the superb 
military art of the Korean People's Army that inherited the 
revolutionary tradition of the anti-Japanese partisan units and 
adapted the advanced military science to the actual con- 
ditions of the country was fully exhibited. 

Particularly, the disasters the U.S. army suffered at Taejun 

72 



brought to light the limitations and incapabilities of the 
U.S. military art which is based on the bourgeois military 
science and technical superiority. And the myth of "the U.s 
invincible army" was shattered utterly. 

Our units established a new tactics of encirclement by 
combining the frontal and flank operations in close coordina- 
tion of all branches of the service. 

During the third campaign our units wrested the Keum 
River and the Sobaik mountains from the enemy who had 
boasted of their impregnable defence line. And the successful 
campaign made it much easier to lay the ensuing operations. 

On July 23, Supreme Commander Kim II Sung in the name 
of the Military Commission and the Supreme Headquarters 
thanked and decorated those units and men and officers that 
exhibited outstanding exploits and showed lofty patriotism and 
untold bravery in the battle for liberation of Taejun. Then the 
Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly awarded the 
honour of Guard Units to the Seoul 3rd and 4th Infantry Divi- 
sions, 18th Infantry Regiment under the latter, Seoul 105th 
Tank Division, and the 1st Fighter Wing of the air force. 

Such victories won at the 

VIGOROUS MOVEMENT TO front by the Korean People's 

AID THE FRONT AND Army were ensured by the 

world's support people in the rear who waged 

a heroic struggle. 

Responding to the call of the Party and Marshal 
Kim II Sung, the entire people rose up in the just Fatherland 
Liberation War for defending the country's freedom and inde 
pendence. The entire people, upholding the Party's calls "All 
forthe front!" "All for the victory!", reorganized everything on 
war footing. Everyone stood up for turning out more goods 
for the front. 

Under the correct guidance of the Party Central Commit- 
tee headed by Marshal Kim II Sung, the nation's working peo- 
ple with the working class in the van came forward to under- 
take the task of carrying through the Party wartime economic 
policy, overcoming all hardships and difficulties. 

73 



To reduce the rear to ashes and cut off the front from the 
rear the enemy resorted to unheard-of indiscriminate bombing 
in Korea. From the early days of the war, the enemy subjected 
Pyongyang, Nampo, Heungnam, Wonsan and other towns and 
villages in the northern part of the country to blind bombing 
by numerous planes including B-29s and their naval craft. 
Numerous factories and mills,' cultural establishments and 
dwelling houses were destroyed. And many innocent civilians 
were killed. 

Yet the enemy bombing and shelling could not intimidate 
the Korean people. With only one aim — victory — the people 
stayed on in the factories, by the machines, turning out more 
goods for the front and the rear. 

Workers, technicians, office-employees of every factory, 
mine and enterprise not only fulfilled their quotas but were 
resolved to do the shares of their friends and comrades who 
had gone to the front. Various movements such as "Front 
Brigade", "Youth Work Team", "Front Shock Workers", "Doing 
2 or 3 Shares More", "Double Production for the Front", and 
other emulations for increased production were launched. 
Workers volunteered to work 12 hours instead of 8 a day, mak- 
ing 2 shifts a day instead of 3. 

The "overtime and holiday work" movement started by the 
workers of the Shinuijoo Textile Factory spread throughout 
the whole country in no time. During the first 10 days of the 
war, workers of more than 8,600 work teams joined this move- 
ment, working some 900,000 hours of extra work. 

The workers promptly recovered the damaged factories and 
protected the factories from enemy bombing at the risk of 
their lives. 

Li Ki Soo, a worker of the Kim Chaik Iron Works, climbed 
to the top of a gas tank of 5,000 cubic metres in the rain of 
enemy bombs when there was a danger of explosion. Before 
he was machine-gunned by the enemy planes, he successfully 
opened the gas pipes to avoid the explosion, thus saving many 
facilities and guaranteeing the war time production. 

Every worker, technician and office-employee overfulfilled 
his quotas successfully despite all the odds. Particularly, in 
many munitions factories production went up five or six* times 
that in the peaceful construction period. 

74 



The Bongoong Chemical Factory, Kumduk Mine, Moo .an 
Mine, Koksan Mine, Aoji Colliery, Sadong Colliery, East Pyong 
yang Machine-building Factory and many others increased the 
production by 50 per cent in the early days of the war compared 
with the prewar level. The workers of the Hamheung Silk 
Mill raised their production by 60 per cent. More coal and ores 
were mined and more war supplies and daily necessaries 
turned out. 

For the victory in the war and for ensuring the supply of 
goods to the front the transport workers played an import- 
ant role. 

The nation's entire railway workers waged a patriotic 
drive for carrying more freight despite the enemy's savage 
bombing. Weapons, ammunition, clothing, food and other war 
supplies flowed to the front in an unbroken stream, while raw 
materials were brought to factories and mills to guarantee 
the wartime production. 

Workers of the Pyongyang, Chungjin, Hamheung, and 
Anjoo Locomotive Yards came forward with such slogan: 
"Mobilize every locomotive for the front." A drive for shorten- 
ing the time needed for locomotive repair and for pulling more 
freight wagons was started. 

Workers of the Pyongyang Locomotive Yard halved the 
locomotive repair time compared with the pre-war days, while 
the Chungjin Locomotive Yard pulled 216 per cent more 
wagons. Engine drivers of the Hamheung Locomotive Yard 
raised the freight haulage by 3 times. 

The railroad workers, braving the shower of enemy bombs 
and shells, repaired damaged rails and bridges. 

The same heroic work was done by the automobile drivers 
in their effort to serve the ever extending front line. 

Keeping pace with the workers, the peasants, overcoming 
every difficulty and hardship, worked with a self-sacrificing 
spirit to increase grain harvest for the front and the rear 
Moreover, the peasants not only actively participated in road 
and bridge repairing work to keep the traffic open to the front 
line, but also aided the wartime transportation with their 
carts. They even carried the needed materials on their backs to 
the front. 

No sooner had the war broken out than youth and students 
of the country came forward volunteering to lay down books 

75 



and pens, and take up arms, or hammer and sickle in response 
to the call of the Party and Marshal Kim II Sung. And in the 
van of these volunteers are always to be found members of the 
Workers' Party of Korea and the Democratic Youth League. 

The youth held meetings in the factories, mines, fishing 
and rural villages, schools and in the residential quarters. At 
these meetings of workers, of the Democratic Youth League 
activists, or of primary organizations of the Democratic Youth 
League, they expressed their firm resolve to bend their efforts 
for increasing industrial and agricultural production and for 
aiding the front. At the same time, they expressed their 
determination to volunteer for the front to defend the country's 
freedom and independence by crushing the American aggres- 
sors. 

Thousands upon thousands of young people expressed their 
wish to join the ranks of the People's Army: 800 from the 
Nampo Smeltery and 4,400 from the Heungnam Fertilizer Fac- 
tory, Bongoong Chemical Factory and Hwanghai Iron Works. 
Then some 10,000 rural youth of Hamjoo County, South 
Hamkyung Province, and Jairyung County, Hwanghai Provin- 
ce, and more than 80 per cent of the youth in Soonchun County, 
South Pyongan Province, volunteered to go to the front. At 
Kim II Sung University some 2,800 students, men and women, 
asked that they be sent to the front. And these Kim II Sung 
University students were followed by the entire school bodies 
of other higher educational institutes, specialized schools and 
senior middle schools throughout the country. 

Within a few weeks after the outbreak of the war, the 
number of young volunteers for the front had reached 849,000. 

The women of the country, taking the place of their 
husbands and brothers who had joined the People's Army, took 
up the hammer and sickle in the factories and on the fields. 

In North Hamkyung Province alone, the iron works, 
textile mills and oil factories had 2,000 new women workers 
before the war was ten days old. Women workers worked 
self-sacrificingly, achieving great results in production. 

In Eunsan Sub-county, Soonchun County, South Pyongan 
Province, 2,300 women organized themselves into some 160 
front work-teams to do the wheat harvest which took them only 
4 days. Furthermore, they paid the tax-in-kind with first grade 
grain, thus establishing a good example. 

76 



The women of the country actively aided the front. They 
also helped the wounded soldiers, evacuating them to the rear. 

Workers in the scientific and cultural fields and students 
came forward for propaganda and agitation work. They 
explained to the people about the justness of the Korean people 
in the war imposed on them by the alien invaders and the 
correctness of the policies and measures taken by the Party and 
Government, while arousing them to hatred against the enemy. 
People were made more confident of victory. 

The people in the rear did everything to strengthen the 
Korean People's Army. Their best sons and daughters joined 
the army. And a nation-wide patriotic contribution movement 
for securing weapons was launched. 

Within two months after the outbreak of the hostilities no 
less than 416,000,000 won was sent to the Aid Society for 
Defending the Fatherland by the people, in addition to a great 
amount of valuables and other things. 

In towns and in the countryside a movement for aiding the 
army dependents was launched. And every citizen took 
an active part in defending the home front and in the struggle 
against the spies, saboteurs and gossipmongers. 

The entire people rose as one to defend the country. At no 
time throughout the long history of Korea was such unity of 
the people to be found. Superiority of the people's democratic 
system, the just cause of the war, the people's patriotic 
enthusiasm and the correct policies and measures taken by the 
Workers' Party of Korea — the leading and guiding force of the 
Korean people — made all this success possible. 

If there had been no heroic struggle of the people in the 
rear waged under the correct guidance of the Party Central 
Committee headed by Marshal Kim II Sung, and if there had 
been no self-sacrificing efforts of the people to aid the front, 
the Korean People's Army could not have achieved such results 
in combat. 

In analysing the reasons that the young Korean People's 
Army won such victories over the U.S. aggressors and the pup- 
pet Syngman Rhee's army, Marshal Kim II Sung said: 

"Our People's Army won victories because in combat il en- 
joyed constant help and support of the entire Korean people. 

77 



History tells us in no uncertain terms that no army that enjoys 
the people's support and encouragement has ever suffered de- 
feat. Having risen as one in the struggle against the armed ag- 
gression of the U.S. imperialists, the entire Korean people are 
supporting the Korean People's Army with all their energy, 
knowledge, and possessions. 

Such exploits made by the entire people in the rear and 
their self-sacrificing work to aid the front served as a material 
and moral foundation for the victory of the Korean People's 
Army. 

The just cause of the Korean people and the People's Army 
in fighting the American aggressors and the traitorous Svng- 
man Rhee clique in defence of the country's freedom and in- 
dependence evoked powerful support and encouragement of the 
peoples of the socialist camp and of the entire peace-loving 
peoples of the world. 

The U.S. imperialists were in high glee thinking that, if 
they hoisted the U.N. emblem to cover up their aggression and 
put blame on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the 
Korean people would stand alone isolated from the peace-lov- 
ing peoples throughout the world. 

But their wishful thinking missed the mark by far! 
The American invasion of Korea invited great indignation 
and condemnation of the whole world. 

The peoples of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic 
of China and other member states of the socialist camp denounc- 
ed the naked armed aggression against Korea by the U.S. im- 
perialists. From the very first day of the war, they supported the 
just struggle of the Korean people, encouraging us politically 
and spiritually. 

When the American aggressors started military action 
against Korea, numerous protest meetings were held in the So- 
viet Union. In the factories and collective farms the Soviet peo- 
ple demanded, "U.S. imperialists, hands off Korea!" "Let the 
Korean people decide their own destiny!" 

The Chinese people, condemning the U.S. invaders and ex- 
pressing their full support to the Korean people, dispatched a 
delegation of the Chinese people to Korea on the occasion of the 
5th anniversary (1950) of the August 15 Liberation. 

78 



They made a gift of 100,000 blankets and enormous quantities of 
medicines. 

In August 1950, a medical corps of 16 Hungarian medical 
workers arrived in Korea. Then in September the people of Cze- 
choslovakia and Poland sent a great amount of medicines and 
other materials. A delegation of the Rumanian people arrived in 
August 1950 to encourage the Korean people. The peoples of 
Bulgaria, Albania, the German Democratic Republic, the Mon- 
golian People's Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
Nam gave us great spiritual and material help. 

Protest meetings were held in the socialist countries, de- 
manding "U.S. aggressors, hands off. Korea!" 

Then the Communist and Workers' Parties of France, Italy, 
the United Kingdom and other countries expressed their indigna- 
tion at the blatant armed aggression committed by the U.S. gov- 
ernment, and expressed the internationalist solidarity with the 
Korean people who were fighting for freedom and independence. 

On July 5, 1950, the World Federation of Trade Unions is- 
sued a statement to establish the "week of friendship and soli- 
darity with the Korean people." "American imperialists, hands 
off Korea!" was the slogan of the statement in condemning U.S. 
aggression. 

The statement of the World Federation of Trade Unions 
was followed by a statement issued by the Bureau of the World 
Council of Peace on July 10, 1950. The Bureau, denouncing the 
armed aggression of the U.S. imperialists, strongly demanded 
the immediate stoppage of the U.S. military intervention in the 
affairs of the Korean people. 

Extensive campaigns against the military action by the 
U.S. armed forces in Korea were waged in France, England, 
Australia, Italy, Pakistan, India, Japan, and other capitalist 
countries including even the United States, demanding, "U.S. 
aggressors, hand off Korea!" 

Such great internationalist aid extended by the socialist 
and peace forces of the world drove the American aggressors 
into isolation and, at the same time, greatly inspired the Ko 
rean people in their struggle for freedom and independence of 
the fatherland. 

79 



SECTION 4 

Liberation of Vast Areas of South Korea. Restoration of 

Party and People's Power Organs and Implementation 

of Democratic Reforms in Liberated Areas 



With the repeated set-backs 
FOURTH CAMPAIGN OF THE the U.S. invaders fell back 

KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY. further to the south. 

LIBERATION OF VAST AREAS Their strongholds along the 

OF SOUTH KOREA Keum River and in the Sobaik 

mountains were lost to the 
advancing Korean People's Army. Taejun, a strategic position 
of the U.S. invaders, was liberated by the People's Army. But 
the enemy attempted desperately to check the Korean People's 
Army from advancing. Keumsan and Yungdong districts and 
the north bank of the Rakdong River were fortified to meet the 
onslaught of the Korean People's Army. 

Particularly, the enemy was in a frenzy in the mountainous 
areas on the central and eastern fronts to hinder our advance to 
Taegu and Pusan. Hamchang, Rvechun, Antong — the key points 
on the northern bank of the Rakdong River -were reinforced. 

In the west the enemy deployed units of the U.S. 1st 
Cavalry Division, the 25th Division and what was left of the 
24th Division. On the central and eastern fronts, besides the 
puppet 2nd Corps which had been badly battered in the south 
of Chungju, almost all puppet forces were deployed. 

To meet such situation the Supreme Headquarters of the 
Korean People's Army laid down the plan for the fourth cam- 
paign. The plan called for wiping out the enemy in the areas of 
Yungdong, Hamchang, Antong, and liberating the vast areas 
in the north and west of the Rakdong River, thus creating 
favourable conditions for the People's Army to effect an early 
crossing of the Rakdong and deliver a final punch to the enemy. 

The fourth campaign started on July 21. The Front Line 
Command ordered the frontal and flank attacks from several 

80 



points, delivering main blows to Kimchun and Taegu district • 
Marshal Kim II Sung personally directed the campaign at 
the Front Line Command established in Sooanbo south of 
Choongju. He studied the situation on every line, then set down 
the measures for executing correctly the strategy laid down b\ 
the Supreme Headquarters. 

Particularly, on the central part of the front, Marshal 
Kim II Sung ordered our units not only to pursue the enemy 
along the open highways, but go round the mountain paths and 
slopes to encircle the enemy, and deliver him a fatal blow by 
attacking him on both flanks and from the rear. And the speed 
of the attack should be stepped up so as not to allow any breath- 
ing spell to the enemy. Moreover, it was stressed that coordina- 
tion between different branches of the units should be stepped 
up, artillery utilized correctly, scouting and communications 
improved and night-campaign strengthened, and the political 
work in units intensified. 

Marshal Kim II Sung called upon the commanders, men 
and officers at the front to wage a heroic struggle and to be 
always confident of victory. And they fought bravely to crush the 
enemy, fully exhibiting devotion to the fatherland and the 
people. 

Under the personal guidance of Marshal Kim II Sung the 
Front Line Command took a measure to bring up fresh task 
reserves to the western and central fronts to reinforce the of 
fensive force. 

On the western front, the combined infantry and tank units 
in the main blow direction crushed the enemy in the areas of 
Chungju and Boeun. Joined with other units of the Korean Peo- 
ple's Army coming down southward, these units fought between 
July 24 "and 29 with the U.S. 1st Cavalry and 25th Divisions 
inflicting heavy losses on them around Yungdong and Hwang- 
kan. Our units made steady southward advance, pursuing the 
fleeing enemy, and reached Kimchun. 

The enemy decided to make a stand at Choopoongryung 
northwest of Kimchun. 

Our units advancing along the main route between I'aegu 
and Taejun made a frontal attack on the enemy, overcoming the 
difficult topographical conditions of Choopoongryung. At the 
same time some of our units, taking advantage of the enemy's 



rather weak spot in the south, made an outflanking movement 
to the southeast of Kimchun via Yungdong and Moojoo dis- 
tricts. The scouts of our tank unit which was at the head of the 
main force hit under cover of night a commanding post of the 
U.S. 1st Cavalry Division in Choopoongryung and wiped it out. 
Our main force's advance across the Choopoongryung Range 
became easier. 

Our units, now clear of the steep mountains of Choopoong- 
ryung, kept pounding on the flanks of the enemy's defence line 
and in co-ordination with the units advancing along the flank 
of the enemy's rear checked off the enemy's escape route to the 
south, and encircled and annihilated them. On August 2, Kim- 
chun was liberated. On the right wing, our units crushed the 
enemy in the regions of Keumsan, Jinan, Aneui, and Kuchang 
and, on August 3, Hapchun was liberated. 

Our combined units that were advancing along the west 
coast gained 30 to 35 kilometres every day, shattering the pup- 
pet Syngman Rhee's army as they went. Within a week vast 
areas of southwest Korea were liberated. By July 31, our units 
had reached the front east of Jinju. 

On the central part of the front our units began to expand 
their gains, crushing the enemy's stubborn defence. 

The Supreme Headquarters of the Korean People's Army 
appointed Comrade Kim Kwang Hyup to lead the combined 
unit that was fighting the stubborn enemy north of Hamchang. 

The combined infantry unit under the command of Comrade 
Kim Kwang Hyup repulsed between July 28 and 29 the enemy's 
repeated counter-attacks. Waging a coordinated action with 
the units which had joined the battle on the right wing of the 
line, the combined unit assumed the offensive and liberated 
Hamchang on August 1, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. 
By August 3, the combined unit reached the right bank of the 
Rakdong River. 

On the right flank, other combined units of the Korean 
People's Army under cover of the artillery crushed the enemy 
in the districts of Kalryung and northwest of Hamchang. On 
August 2, the Sangju area was liberated and on the following 
day, these units, too, reached the right bank of the Rakdong 
River. 

Another combined unit of the People's Army engaged the 
enemy in the north of Ryechun, cut off the enemy's escape route 

82 



fo the south, and pressed the enemy to the north and southeast. 
They liberated Ryechun on July 30, and reached the right bank 
of the Rakdong River on August 2. 

The combined units of the Korean People's Army, which 
were meeting the persistent resistance of the enemy in the 
regions of Poongki and Yungju, succeeded in liberating 
Yungju on July 24 and reached the north of Antong on July 
29. Determined to defend Antong at any cost, the enemy 
reinforced their forces greatly to bar our advance. But, for 
two days — July 30 and 31 — our 12th Infantry Division in 
close cooperation with other neighbouring units in the right 
wing succeeded in an encircling operation to seal off the escape 
routes for the enemy and kept pounding at the enemy from the 
north, east and west. During this battle more than 2,000 
enemy men and officers were killed, wounded or captured. 
And in the early hours of August 1, Antong was liberated. 
Praising the brave conduct of the 12th Infantry Division, 
Supreme Commander Kim II Sung honoured the Division with 
the title of Antong 12th Infantry Division. 

On the east coast, our units that had liberated Yungduk 
were locked in a fierce battle with the enemy in the district 
south of Yungduk. 

Thus the Korean People's Army advancing southward at 
a lightening speed liberated vast areas of the southwest Korea 
and won several strategic positions on the right bank of the 
Rakdong. But the enemy still held on to several key-points on 
the right bank of the river with their crack troops, while 
intensifying the defence on the left bank of the river. 

The U.S. 8th Army brought up its 2nd Division which had 
landed in Pusan on July 30 to reinforce the western part of 
their line. So within a small pocket of land along the Rakdong 
River four U.S. divisions and seven divisions of the puppet 
army were concentrated. And they built up a strong defence. 

Under these circumstances, not to give the enemy a 
breathing spell, the units of the Korean People's Army kept 
striking at the enemy on the entire front to prepare for the 
early crossing of the river. They drove the enemy in a small 
area of land around Taegu and Pusan. 

On August 8, units of the Korean People's Army crossed 
the Rakdong. The enemy — U.S. 1st Cavalry and 25th Divi- 

83 



sions — put up a stubborn resistance, but our units succeed- 
ed in penetrating the enemy defence line and on August 15 
reached Waikwan. 

Then our combined units that were lighting in the Koryung 
regions on the right flank executed the river crossing on 
August 11 and reached on August 14 the Hyunpoong district, 
while other combined units crossed the Rakdong from Hapchun 
on August 6. Having crushed the defending U.S. 2nd Division, 
our units reached a point west of Ryungsan on the 11th. 

Down deep in the south, our combined units which had 
been attacking in the areas of Jinju marched to the west of the 
Haman-Masan line pounding at the U.S. 25th Division. 

On the east end of the front, our combined units that were 
advancing toward Taegu from southeast of Hamchang and 
Sangju succeeded in crossing the Rakdong on August 4. They 
liberated on August 13 Koonwi, and Sunsan County to the 
west, reaching Tabudong and Yongchudong. On the left flank, 
our combined units crossed the river on August 3 and 4 and 
Isung was liberated on August 14. These units reached Iheung to 
the south of Isung. 

The units of the Korean People's Army that liberated 
Antong made the river-crossings on August 2 and kept 
advancing southeastward. Assaulting the enemy in the 
west of Pohang, our units liberated Pohang on August 11, 
while the units coming down along the east coast crushed the 
enemy south of Yungduk and reached the Pohang region. 

The enemy became desperate in the face of such effective 
river crossings of the Korean People's Army. 

Suffering one defeat after another the enemy's resistance 
became more frenzied. Particularly, as their defence of Taegu 
and Pusan was threatened on both sides, the enemy put up a 
lurious resistance on the central part of the front. And they 
even staged counter-attacks on the east and west ends of the 
battle line. They started to hit back in Haman-Masan districts 
on August 7, and in the Ryungsan-Hyunpoong-Waikwan dis- 
tricts and around Pohang between August 11 and 15. 

The enemy ordered large fleet of planes to the Rakdong 
River front to check our advance and to give cover to their 
counter-attacks. Moreover, a large-scale bombing to disrupt 
our military transportation from the rear took place. 

84 



The intensity of their bombing of the front line lias tew 
parallels in the history of war. On August 16 alone, in the (lis 
trict of Waikwan, more than 100 B-29s and several hundred 
fighter planes staged a day-long bombing with napalm bombs. 
The enemy boasted that the August 16 bombing was the big- 
gest air-raid conducted since the Normandy landing in World 
War II. 

All this murderous fire power of the enemy, however, had 
little effect on the Korean People's Army. Men and officers of 
the People's Army fought heroically. In the rain of enemy 
bombs and shells communication lines were linked by their 
own bodies to keep the lines open with the commanding post. 
The enemy tanks were crushed and wholesale death was given 
to the enemy. Combatants of the Korean People's Army exhibit- 
ed fully their immeasurable heroism and self-sacrificing spirit, 
putting the freedom and independence of the fatherland above 
1 heir lives. 

Between August 7 and 20, the enemy mobilizing great 
numbers of combat planes and tanks launched several fierce 
attacks in the western front and around Pohang in the east. 
However, the units of the Korean People's Army repulsed suc- 
cessfully the enemy's assault. Our units, inflicting heavy losses 
on the enemy, withdrew to favourable positions on the right 
bank of the Rakdong and north of Pohang and Waikwan. 

The enemy's superior forces deep in the south started 
counter-attacks behind columns of tanks in the west of Masan 
and Haman, threatening our units with an encircling move- 
ment. But the dauntless units of the People's Army gave the 
enemy a fierce battle taking a geographically favourable posi- 
tion. The strong fire power and numerous hit-and-run attacks 
waged by our units shattered the enemy's counter-attacks and 
finally forced them to withdraw to the east. 

While this was going on, units of the People's Army on the 
central front held their own, repulsing the repeated enemy's 
onslaughts. 

During the period of one month between July 21 and Au- 
gust 20, units of the Korean People's Army killed, wounded or 
captured some 34,400 men and officers of,,, the enemy forces. 
Thus the fourth campaign,, came to an end. .With .the eomple- 



tion of the fourth campaign the enemy was driven out of the 
vast areas of southwest Korea and squeezed in a small area of 
100 square kilometres. 

In less than a month and a half after the Korean People's 
Army started the counter-attack, more than 90 per cent of the 
whole of South Korea and more than 92 per cent of the total 
South Korean population were liberated. 

The enemy faced total expulsion from the soil of our father- 
land and the Korean People's Army started to map out the next 
course of action. 



RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PAR- 
TY AND PEOPLE'S POWER 
ORGANS IN THE LIBERATED 
AREAS OF SOUTH KOREA. 
IMPLEMENTATION OF DEMO- 
CRATIC REFORMS 



As the people of South 
Korea were liberated from the 
anti-popular reactionary rule 
of the American imperialists 
and Syngman Rhee clique by 
the heroic advance of the Ko- 
rean People's Army, their joy 
and political enthusiasm knew 
no bounds. 

And so, the Party Central Committee set forth the follow- 
ing as the most important tasks: the restoration of the Party 
organizations and democratic social organizations, elimination 
of Syngman Rhee's reactionary rule, revival of the genuine 
people's power, and implementation of democratic reforms. 
And the people's living had to be stabilized and their material 
and cultural standards be raised. 

Needless to say, the execution of these tasks was by no 
means easy. 

First of all, they had to be carried out while the war was 
raging in full force. 

The Party directed its main force to achieving victory in 
the war and strengthening the rear. At the same time, it also 
had to give attention to the rehabilitation work and democratic 
reforms in the liberated areas of South Korea. 

Secondly, almost all the Party organizations and revolu- 
tionary forces in South Korea were put out of action due to the 
brutal suppression and murder committed by the U.S. imperi- 

86 



alists and Syngman Rhee clique, and particularly, due to the 
destructive roles played by the U.S. hired spies — Pak Hun 
Yung, Li Seung Yup and others, and to the grave factional 
feud staged by the factionalists who had inflicted heavy losses 
on the Korean labour movement in the pre-liberation years. The 
criminal activities of the U.S. spy gang, the Pak Hun Yung 
and Li Seung Yup clique, who wormed their way into the North 
and occupied the leading posts, and the cold-blooded slaughter 
by the enemy sent numerous Party members to their death, 
while many surrendered to the enemy or became turncoats. 

Only true Communists remained underground or became 
partisans. However, their number was extremely limited, nor 
did they have any wide contact with the masses. 

Thirdly, evil aftermaths of the reactionary rule of the U.S. 
imperialists and Syngman Rhee clique were very much alive. 

During their rule over South Korea, the U.S. aggressors 
and the traitorous Syngman Rhee clique forced numerous 
workers and peasants to join various anti-revolutionary, re- 
actionary organizations by economic suppression and intimida- 
tion. And their fraudulent anti-communist propaganda poison- 
ed some backward segment of the population. To make matters 
worse, when the enemy took to their heels they butchered 
patriotic citizens en masse everywhere and planted many spies 
and saboteurs behind. 

Fourthly, the evil activities of the Pak Hun Yung and Li 
Seung Yup clique were still going on in the liberated areas. The 
Pak Hun Yung and Li Seung Yup clique murdered in diabolical 
ways the not-too-many remaining Party members and democra- 
ttc-minded personnel in those areas. To carry out mass execution 
of the Party members who knew about their criminal acts, the 
Pak Hun Yung and Li Seung Yup clique set up the "Land Inves- 
tigation Committee" and "special section of the volunteers 
headquarters" allegedly to collect necessary information for 
"state affairs." In reality, however, these organizations were 
to carry out their programme of terrorism and murder sys- 
tematically in a clandestine way. Moreover, they recruited 
spies and turncoats and planted them in the Party and govern- 
ment organs as their political stooges in their dirty schemes. 
This criminal gang attempted to wreck the democratic reforms 

87 



and weaken the people's confidence in our Party and Govern- 
ment. 

Yet overcoming all the obstacles and hindrance, the 
Party restored Party and government organs in the liberated 
areas of South Korea and successfully organized and executed 
the tremendous organizational and political work for the im- 
plementation of democratic reforms. 

To this end, the Party dispatched distinguished Party and 
government workers to the liberated areas. And over 4,000 
political workers were mobilized to make the people familiar 
with the Party and government policies. 

To organize and guide the class struggle correctly, to in- 
fuse the people with Party policies, and to organize and mo- 
bilize the South Korean people for the victory in the war and 
for the implementation of Party policies, the Party Central 
Committee took various measures for restoring and strength- 
ening the Party organizations in South Korea. In the 
light of the situation prevailing in South Korea, the Party 
Central Committee instructed that nucleuses be formed with 
the Party members who fought in the partisan detatchments, 
underground workers or active members who were liberated 
from the prisons by the People's Army. 

On the other hand, those who served faithfully in demo- 
cratic construction and in aiding the front were admitted into 
the Party, while several democratic social organizations were 
set up to embrace the masses and rally them around the Party. 

In addition, various cadres' schools and training centres 
were established in order to train cadres of South Korean origin. 

Thus Party organizations in South Korea were rapidly 
restored. And the newly revived Party organizations became 
very active mobilizing the people of South Korea for realizing 
decisions of the Party Central Committee and for victory in 
the war. 

With the restoration of Party organizations, democratic 
social organizations, too, came into existence again. Trade 
unions, peasants' unions, democratic youth leagues, women's 
unions in addition to many cultural and art organizations kept 
expanding, linking the masses with the Party. 



The restored people's committees, the true people's pow< i 
organs, began to function; factories and enterprises began 
operating again; transport and communication facilities were 
restored to keep the supply lines open to the front; the peo 
pie's life was stabilized; and the social order and security 
were maintained. 

In order to democratize further and legalize the newly 
revived people's committees the Party called for elections to 
form the people's committees. Such measures were necessary 
in the light of the existing condition in South Korea. For, unless 
the people's committees were strengthened, it would have been 
impossible to establish a democratic system in South Korea in 
view of the fierce class struggle and the war. Moreover, it would 
have been impossible to mobilize the people in South Korea for 
victory in the war. 

It was on July 14, 1950 that the Presidium of the Supreme 
People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Ko- 
rea issued a decree on the elections to the county, sub-county, 
ri (dong) people's committees in the liberated areas. 

The Party mobilized the Party organizations, party mem- 
bers, and the entire people for the elections. And the people in 
the liberated areas participated in the elections most enthusias- 
tically. The enemy forces desperately tried to wreck the elec 
tions only to fail miserably in their schemes. 

Between July 25 and September 13, elections were held in 
the newly liberated areas in South Korea 108 counties, 1,168 
sub-counties, and 13,654 ri (dong) in the nine liberated pro 
vinces in South Korea excluding several counties south of the 
Rakdong River. 

Between 97 and 98 per cent of the total voters took part in 
the elections and all the candidates secured 95-97 per cent of 
the total votes cast. It must be added that the result of the elec- 
tions showed clearly how the people in South Korea wanted to 
have their people's committees, the genuine people's power or- 
gans, and how whole-heartedly they supported the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea. 

Workers, peasants and others representing every segment 
of the population were elected to the people's committees of all 
levels, while the pro-Japanese, pro-American elements and 
national traitors were excluded. Suffice it to ;'dd tHaf the elec- 

89 
v. 



tions to the local people's committees rallied further the anti- 
imperialist and anti-feudalist revolutionary forces of South 
Korea around the Workers' Party of Korea and the Govern- 
ment of the D.P.R.K. 

Moreover, the Party and Government took immediate steps 
for effecting a land reform, which the peasantry had dreamed of 
tor centuries, together with other anti-imperialist, anti-feudalist 
democratic reforms. On July 4, 1950 the Presidium of the 
Supreme People's Assembly of the D.P.R.K. issued a decree on 
the land reform in the newly liberated areas of South Korea. 

The land reform aimed at wiping out the centuries-old 
feudalistic land ownership and tenant farming system, which 
was the source of non-rights and poverty of the peasants, 
enhancing patriotism and initiative of the peasantry, and 
raising their material and cultural standards and creating 
favourable conditions for the development of industrial and 
agricultural productive forces. 

Under the U.S. and Syngman Rhee rule, most of the South 
Korean peasants, who constitute the absolute majority of the 
population, owned no land. Their lot was constant poverty and 
hunger. Therefore, it was only natural for the South Korean 
peasants to demand a land reform like that effected in North 
Korea. 

Even the U.S. imperialists and the Syngman Rheeites had 
staged a spurious "agrarian reform" and disposed of the 
former Japanese-owned land. With the so-called "agrarian 
reform," they had planned to sell the land at a dear price and 
protect more effectively the interests of the landlords. 

However, it should be pointed out that not ail the peasants 
of South Korea were able to see through the scheme of the Syng- 
man Rhee clique. Some of them had been misled by the Syng- 
man Rhee's tricks, and looked suspicious when the Presidium 
of the Supreme People's Assembly issued the decree on the 
land reform. 

To meet the situation squarely, the Party and Government 
took steps for exposing the fraudulent features of Syngman 
Rhee's "agrarian reform" and for explaining clearly to the 
peasants the true meaning of the land reform that was to be 
executed. And the land owned by the puppet regime, 
its apparatus, landlords and those who continued to 
rent was confiscated and distributed without compensation to 

90 



the peasants, who owned little or no land. To those peasants 
who had gotten land on the installment plan, the land was 
given outright without any further payment. 

Inasmuch as the land reform was effected at the height of 
war, the Party and Government, anticipating a severe class 
struggle, dispatched steeled Party workers and advanced work- 
ers to the countryside to help the peasants. These measures 
helped a great deal in raising the class consciousness and poli- 
tical zeal of the South Korean peasants and their firm confi- 
dence in the ultimate victory. 

Indeed, the land reform was carried out in a heightened 
class struggle of the peasant masses against landlords and 
Syngman Rhee clique. And the experiences gained in the ex- 
ecution of the land reform in the North proved very valuable. 

As a result of the land reform, over 1,267,800 peasant 
households were given free of charge a total of more than 
573,300 jungbo of land. At the same time the payment on the 
land purchased from the landlords on the instalment plan was 
cancelled and the exorbitant land tax was abolished. Thus in 
the liberated areas of South Korea, the feudalistic curse which 
had for a long time hindered the development of agriculture 
was done away with once and for all, and the long-cherished 
desire of the peasants for land was realized. 

Following the land reform a new Labour Law was pro- 
claimed. 

On August 19, 1950, the Government of the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea announced a new Labour Law for 
the workers, technicians and office employees in the liberated 
areas with a view to wiping out imperialist, colonial exploita- 
tion, improving the working conditions, and bettering the liv- 
ing standards of the working people. In addition, labour re- 
gulations as well as social insurance system were instituted 
for them as in the North. 

Measures were taken also for democratization in every 
field. A new educational system was instituted along demo- 
cratic line. Various laws used by the U.S. imperialists and 
Syngman Rhee clique were abrogated and a popular judicial 
system was set up. Moreover, rationing of foodstuffs and other 
effective measures were also taken to stabilize the people's 

91 



living. 

All these measures convinced the people of South Korea 
that the Workers' Party of Korea and the Government of the 
D.P.R.K. were the only political Party and the Government 
which stand for the people's interests and happiness. At the 
same time, the strict discipline and high moral traits dis- 
played by the advancing People's Army assured them that the 
People's Army was a new type of army which served truly 
the people's welfare. 

And it must be added that all these measures taken by the 
Party and Government and the daily conduct of the People's 
Army shattered the vile slander and propaganda spread by the 
Syngman Rhee clique and their masters — the American im- 
perialists — against the Workers' Party of Korea and the Gov- 
ernment of the D.P.R.K. 

As time went by, the trust and confidence of the people of 
South Korea in the Party and Government and the People's 
Army deepended. They gave wholehearted support to the ad- 
vancing units of the People's Army. They rebuilt destroyed 
roads and bridges, carried ammunition and foodstuffs to the 
front and took care of the wounded. And in a few weeks, 400,000 
voting people in the liberated areas joined the volunteers and 
the ranks of partisans. 

Thus before the war was two months old, the invincible 
power of the Korean people firmly rallied around the Party and 
Government headed by Marshal Kim II Sung was fully ex- 
hibited. 



SECTION 5 



Heroic Fight of the Korean People's Army at the Rakdong 

River Line 

With the penetration of the units of the Korean People's 
Army far into the south, a decisive stage in the war was reach- 
ed in routing and driving out-the enemy from its last foothold 
on the peninsula. 



02 



Pressed into a small pocket of land, the desperate U.S in 
vaders hurriedly threw in more men, their own and mcrccn 
aries. On August 29, the 27th Brigade of the United Kingdom 
landed in Korea, and on the following day the U.S. 5th Regi 
ment arrived. Shipment of men and war-material continued. 
Then the U.S. and Syngman Rhee armies drove the South Ko- 
rean youth whom they had forced to go with them on their re- 
treat as well as the young people of the areas under their con- 
trol into the Syngman Rhee's army, which was badly battered. 
Not only their divisions were regrouped but new ones were 
organized. 

All in all, in the small pocket of land in the southern tip 
of Korea, the U.S. concentrated a large force — five U.S. divi- 
sions, one British regiment and eight divisions of Syngman 
Rhee's army. They were deployed along the Rakdong River in 
the west, as well as in the east along the Kyungsang mountains 
stretching from Waikwan to Pohang. They tried desperately 
to check our advance. They even forced the residents to defen- 
sive works before the advancing columns of the Korean Peo- 
ple's Army. The enemy's air force was working 24 hours a day. 

In view of the tense situation of the front the Workers' Party 
of Korea and the Government of the D.P.R.K. appealed to the 
entire people and the members of the People's Army to light more 
resolutely, showing a high degree of perseverance and end 
urance in driving out the enemy from our land. 

In mid-August the Supreme Headquarters laid down a 
plan for wiping out the main forces of the enemy concentrated 
along the Rakdong River. Reinforcements, both in men and 
arms, were dispatched to the front while the defence of the 
coastal areas of Wonsan and Inchon was stepped up. 

Accordingly, the Front Line Command drew up a plan for 
the fifth campaign. Under that plan, while holding the right 
bank of the Rakdong between Hyunpoong and Waikwan, two 
units were to strike at the enemy in the north and west, beseige 
and annihilate them in the areas of Taegu and Yungchun. I low 
ever, the enemy forces harassed persistently the execution of 
the plan. In spite of all difficulties, preparations for crossing 
the Rakdong River were successfully carried out. 

Together with the military preparations, political work 
was carried out among the members of the People's Army. 
Commanders and political workers undertook an intensified 

93" 



program of explaining to the men and officers of the People's 
Army the speech and order made by Marshal Kim II Sung on the 
Fifth Anniversary of the August 15th Liberation and the military 
and political significance of the imminent battle. 

Marshal Kim II Sung said in his speech: 

"The battle in the last stage of war becomes more intense... 
It is up to your fortitude and courage, and your military skill as 
well as your determination to carry out fully your duties in 
defending the country, to wipe out the U.S. invaders and their 
running-dogs, the Syngman Rhee clique, from the territory of 
the Fatherland. We can drive out the American aggressors 
from our land in a short period of time, and we must drive 
them out." 

The words of Marshal Kim II Sung inspired greatly the 
men and officers who were firmly resolved to defend the land 
to the last drop of their blood. Moreover, it was at this time 
that the Organizational Committee of the Party Central Com- 
mittee adopted a decision to admit the soldiers who had per- 
formed their duty with special merits to the Party. The deci- 
sion inspired the members of the People's Army to heroic 
exploits. 

Special mention should be made of the fact that despite 
the continued activities of the enemy air force, the people of the 
newly liberated areas, particularly of the regions along the 
Rakdong River, rendered all possible aid to the People's Army. 
— On August 31, with a terrific barrage of artillery, the Peo- 
ple's Army opened a general offensive. 

By nightfall our advance troops had succeeded in establish- 
ing a bridgehead on the left bank of the river. The natural 
barrier was overcome. And on the following day — September 
1 — our main forces made successful crossings and encountered 
the enemy. 

For more than a month the U.S. 25th and 2nd Divisions and 
1st Cavalry Division as well as the British 27th Brigade had 
been trying to strengthen their defence on the left bank of the 
river. But they could not stop the crossings of our units. Our 
units advanced rapidly 10 to 15 kilometers deep and the enemy 
forces fell back to Ryungsan, Changryung, and Hyunpoong 
areas. 

84 



In the meantime, our units along the southern coast lib 
erated Haman on September 1, and by September 3 had ad- 
vanced further eastwards. 

On the northern front, our army assumed offensive on Sep- 
tember 1, crushed the enemy forces lodged in the Kyungsang 
mountains. The puppet army was broken up and our troops 
kept advancing deep into the enemy's rear. On the right flank, 
repulsing the stubborn enemy, our units reached by September 
10 the areas of Waikwan, south of Tabudong, and Palkong 
mountain. And its forward units were on the right bank of the 
Keumho River north of Taegu. Already the roar of guns 
was heard in the city of Taegu. And between September 4 and 
6, our units on the left flank advanced towards Yungchun, 
Kyungju and south of Pohang. 

The enemy, panic-stricken by our advance, threw in every- 
thing they had including their reserves. With the support of 
large quantities of planes, tank units and artillery, they staged 
counter offensive. Starting on September 10, the enemy under 
the wing of their planes and headed by columns of tank units 
struck out desperately. 

Encountered with the enemy's stubborn resistance our units 
had to temporarily go over to the defensive. For several days a 
seesaw battle continued. 

Day and night the enemy planes showered the fronts with 
bombs including napalm bombs, turning our positions and 
villages and mountains along the river into a sea of flames. 
The enemy forces, fearing our night attack, retreated to the geo- 
graphically advantageous depth of their position during the 
flight, and with dawn they resumed their fierce attack under 
cover of planes and tanks. However, despite the fury of their 
attacks the enemy failed to break through our defence line. 

The men and officers of our units resisted heroically the 
onslaught of the enemy, inflicting heavy losses on their man- 
power and war-materials in the areas of Haman, Ryungsan, 
Waikwan, Tabudong, Palkong mountain, Yungchun, and Pohang. 
Many soldiers carrying hand-grenades jumped in among the on- 
rushing enemy tanks. Scores of enemy tanks were thus blown 
up. And many storming groups were formed to wage night at- 
tacks on the enemy. Sometimes these groups penetrated deep 
into the enemy's rear to blow up troop concentrations and 

95 



munition depots, harassing the enemy's reinforcements and 
mobility. 

The difficult battle waged by the Korean People's Army at 
the Rakdong River front clearly demonstrated the unbounded 
loyalty to the country, unbending spirit, and immortal heroism 
of the men and officers who had been trained by the Workers' 
Party of Korea and inherited the revolutionary traditions 
established by the anti-Japanese partisans. 

Between June 25, the first day of our counter-attack, and 
September 15, the People's Army inflicted heavy losses on the 
enemy, liberating almost all the areas of South Korea. However, 
our army fell short of its aim of driving out the enemy from our 
land in face of the all-out offensive of the U.S. aggressors. Con- 
sequently, before completely carrying through the fifth campaign 
laid down by the Supreme Headquarters, the People's Army 
entered the second stage of war. 



CHAPTER III 



ALL-OUT OFFENSIVE OF U.S. AGGRESSORS. STRATEGIC 

RETREAT OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY. 

NATION-WIDE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ENEMY 

(September 16-Odober 24, 1950) 

SECTION 1 

Landing of Enemy's Large Forces in Inchon and Counter- 
offensive at the Rakdong River Front. Defence of the Kore- 
an People's Army in Seoul-Inchon Area and North of the 
Rakdong River 



Faced with the danger of 
LARGE ENEMY FORCES being kicked out of the 

.LANDED IN INCHON AND Korean peninsula, the des- 

OUR COUNTER-ATTACK perate U.S. invaders decided 

LAUNCHED AT RAKDONG to recover at any cost their 

RIVER FRONT. KOREAN PEO- prestige, which had suffered 

PLE'S ARMY'S DEFENCE IN a t the hands of the heroic 

INCHON AND AT RAKDONG Korean People's Army and to 

RIVER FRONT carry through the aggressive 

aim of conquering the whole 
of Korea. While desperately attempting to break through our 
lines along the Rakdong River front, the enemy laid a plan to 
land large forces in Inchon. To this end, they mobilized their 
land, naval, and air forces of the Pacific area. 

In mid-September they brought in the 1st Marine Corps and 
the 7th Division to the Korean theatre of war besides mercenary 
armies from the Philippines, Australia and other satellite coun- 

97 




c 







losing two destroyers and four landing boats. 

The successive failures evidently infuriated the enemy. 
They turned their entire fire power on the defenders of Wolmi 
Island. 

Their planes carried out more than 100 missions over the 
island. Every square metre of this small island was hit by at 
least four enemy bombs and shells. The entire island was 
wrapped in smoke. Again the enemy ships approached the 
island. 

The defenders of the island resisted the enemy. Parti- 
cularly the members of the Workers' Party of Korea set an 
example in this fight. 

Li Dai Hoon, commander of the battery, and his members 
stayed by their guns until the barrels were bent from over- 
heating and put out of action. Again four enemy ships were 
destroyed or sunk. Soon a hand-to-hand fight ensued on the 
island. 

At 10 in the morning of September 15, 1950, the entire 
defenders of Wolmi Island charged into the ranks of the enemy 
who had crawled up to the island. 

The entire members of the battery and the infantry 
company fought heroically to the bitter end. With a small force 
they delayed the enemy's landings for three days. They were 
loyal and faithful to the end to the Party and their leader, to 
the fatherland and to the people. Exhibiting unparalleled 
bravery, they fought the superior enemy to protect their 
homeland. 

Towards evening of the 15th following a furious bombard- 
ment and shelling, the U.S. army with the puppet Syngman 
Rhee's marines in the lead made landings on the north and 
south of Inchon. 

Against a superior enemy force, the defenders of Inchon 
put up a fierce fight. Mention must be made of the machine- 
gunners who mowed down so many of the enemy. 

By night fall street fighting was in progress in Inchon, 
and in the early hours of the morning (September 16) our 
defending units disengaged themselves. Later in the day our 
units were reinforced and waged a counter-attack on the 
enemy force in Inchon, inflicting heavy losses on them and 
upsetting their timetable. 

101 



In view of the critical situation created in Inchon, the 
West Coast Defence Command mapped out a plan to attack 
the enemy with the units deployed in the areas of Seoul and 
Inchon. 

On the 17th our units encountered the advancing enemy 
near Sosa. The enemy suffered severely in this battle and fell 
back seven kilometres. However, soon the enemy received 
additional men and material and directed its attacks towards 
Yungdeungpo and Bupyong. 

Wherever they encountered the enemy, our units put up a 
strong resistance. Our sappers laid obstacles to bar the 
advance of enemy tanks, and our infantrymen fought furiously 
under cover of the artillery fire inflicting heavy losses on the 
enemy. 

At heavy cost, the enemy reached the left bank of the Han 
River and Anyang River on September 18. 

In order to strengthen the defence of Seoul the Supreme 
Headquarters ordered part of the reserve units to Seoul. And, 
according to the order of the Supreme Headquarters, the West 
Coast Defense Command fortified the defence of the right 
bank of the Han and Anyang Rivers and the city of Seoul 
itself. Every highway and road leading to Seoul was blocked 
and mined. Anti-tank objectives were erected. 

Our units engaged the enemy in Yungdeungpo and re- 
pulsed them. Near Kimpo the enemy attempted to cross the 
Han River near Unyangpo (north of Kimpo) but our units 
successfully beat them back. Being unable to effect the river 
crossing from Yungdeungpo the enemy directed its main forces 
to Kimpo. 

Under the heavy cover of aircraft and artillery fire, the 
enemy started crossing the Han River on September 19 near 
Haingju ferry. Our units that were defending the region 
rained down fire on the enemy. But the odds were too great. 

The enemy forces effected crossings and approached north 
of Seoul along the Seoul-Kaesong highway. On September 20, 
our units dealt a blow at the advancing enemy, forcing them 
to retreat 10 kilometers. 

In the meantime the units of the People's Army still held 
their own in Yungdeungpo district. In face of strong opposi- 

102 



tion, the enemy attempted to outflank Seoul from the south, 
while another enemy force struck at Suwon. 

In the meantime, the enemy repeatedly staged furious at 
tacks to break through our lines along the Rakdong River. The 
brunt of their attack was directed towards Yungchun-Wonju 
and Taegu-Taejun areas. The enemy poured bombs and shells 
on our defence positions. On the heels of numerous tanks the 
enemy infantrymen lashed out at our strongholds. But the men 
and officers of our units put up a heroic battle. 

Our units on the western front, stationed around Haman 
and on the left bank of the Rakdong River, waging a most 
effective defensive battle, succeeded in withdrawing to the 
strategic positions on the right bank of the river. On Septem- 
ber 18-19 the enemy crossed the Rakdong paying very dearly 
in men and materials. However, the enemy was stopped short 
by our units. 

On the central front, in the areas of Waikwan, Tabudong 
and Palkong mountain, our units withstood the attacks 
of the superior enemy forces. But on the 19th the enemy 
penetrated our line to the west of Yungduk threatening the 
rear of our forces which were defending Palkong mountain. A 
grave situation was created for our forces. 

In the meantime, our units along the east coast repulsed 
successfully the repeated enemy's attacks in the areas of 
Pohang and Kyungju. However, the enemy broke through our 
forward defence line on September 21 and advanced to a point 
northeast of Pohang to meet our fierce resistance. 

But under the condition in which the enemy was threaten- 
ing Seoul from the north, and part of the Rakdong River front 
was broken through, a grave situation was brought about in 
the general picture of the war. 



defence of Seoul and In the light of the dange- 

NORTH OF THE RAKDONG rous situation, the .Supreme 

river Headquarters adopted me- 

asures for strengthening the 
defence of Seoul. Moreover, measures had to be taken to bar 
the enemy forces which landed in Inchon from advancing 
towards Wonju and Taejun, block the enemy's fire along 

105 



the Rakdong River, transfer immediately part of units to the 
lorth of the Keum River — a more favourable position — so that 
-ommunication may be maintained between the units of the 
Rakdong River region and those of the Seoul area. 

It was Marshal Kim II Sung's order to the units that 
manpower and war materials should be protected even though 
we might have to shorten and limit our defence lines, that we 
should maintain close links between units so as not to give 
the enemy a chance to split our lines, and that we should hold 
our positions at favourable points to wear down and weaken 
the enemy forces. 

Every unit did its utmost to carry out the Supreme Com- 
mander's order. 

The units under the West Coast Defence Command and 
the Seoul citizens came out to defend the city to the last man. 
In the city of Seoul and in its vicinities strong defence posi- 
tions were built up. Seoul people helped the army dig trenches, 
and streets of Seoul were well barricaded. Moreover the work- 
ing people took up arms to protect the city from the oncoming 
enemy. 

In the northern part of the Republic mass rallies were held 
in factories and enterprises and in the countryside to encourage 
the defence of Seoul. The rallies encouraged the fighters of 
Seoul to defend the city with their blood and send the enemy 
to their death. 

On September 21, the enemy launched a three-way attack 
on Seoul — from the northeast, east and southeast. Prior to 
their offensive, the notorious U.S. General Douglas MacArthur 
issued the following infamous proclamation to the men under 
his command: 

"Take Seoul. There will be plenty of girls and women. 
They will be yours... Take Seoul... You will find ample reward 
there." 

However, despite this General's barbarous incitement, the 
U.S. aggressive army did not progress as expected. In the 
northeast of Seoul, our units successfully repulsed the enemy. 
In this sector the enemy suffered heavily. And in the areas of 
Yungdeungpo and Roryangjin too the units of the People's 
Army held their own. 

The desperate enemy subjected Seoul to a terrific bom- 
bardment for a few days. Gasoline was poured over the bar- 

106 



ricades and buildings in the city, turning the whole city into a 
sea of flames. After paying a heavy price in men and materials 
the enemy entered Seoul on September 23, whereupon a fierce 
hand-to-hand fight developed. 

On the evening of the 25th, our units retook Namsan Hill 
and held until the following day. In Namdaimoon and 
Suhdaimoon districts fiery street fighting continued several 
days. 

The defence of Seoul developed into a battle of the popular 
masses. The armed workers and the citizens of Seoul together 
with the units of the People's Army self-sacrificingly fought, 
braving the rain of enemy bombs. The Seoul citizens helped to 
transport ammunition, and the women tended the wounded and 
prepared meals for the men and officers of the People's Army. 
As soon as the enemy entered Seoul every sort of outrage was 
committed against the people of Seoul. Innocent people, young 
and old, were butchered and women were violated. At one time, 
they put 600 tram-car workers of Seoul to death branding 
them as "communist sympathizers." 

But the citizens of Seoul did not surrender to the enemy 
and to the bitter end aided the People's Army. No street, not a 
single house was given away to the enemy without a fierce 
battle. And on September 29 at great cost of life the enemy 
occupied Seoul. 

In fighting the numerically superior enemy forces in 
Seoul-Inchon district the People's Army killed, wounded or 
captured over 12,000 enemy soldiers. It was true that our units 
could not stop the enemy as the enemy was far superior in 
manpower and equipment. However, our units succeeded in 
winning time by holding the invaders at bay. A precious period 
of 14 days was secured, thus foiling the enemy's "blitzkrieg."' 
It was the enemy's plan to take Seoul at one stroke, then pro- 
ceed to Wonju and Taejun to encircle our units fighting on the 
Rakdong River front. Moreover, the gaining of time helped 
our units in the south in their defensive battles. 

As Marshal Kim II Sung pointed out, though the men and 
officers who fought in Seoul-Inchon district were new and poor- 
ly-trained, they distinguished themselves in defending Seoul 
and Inchon. Particularly members of the Workers' Party of 
Korea played an inspiring role as the leading core of those 
units. 

108 



In the meantime a fierce battle raged in the south too 
Along the Rakdong River the units of the Korean People's Army 
put up a successful defensive battle, but they could not check 
the superior enemy forces indefinitely. 

Under the protection of their air force, the U.S. 1st and 
9th Army Corps and puppet Army Corps, 1st and 2nd, broke 
through on September 22 our lines along the Rakdong River. 
Then they turned their offensive towards Haman-Changnyung- 
Taejun, Taegu-Taejun, Sangju-Choongju-Wonju, Yungchun- 
Antong-Wonju, and Pohang-Samchuk-Kangneung directions. In 
view of the new development our units fell back to more 
favourable positions, waging defensive battles. 

The People's Army units in the central and eastern parts 
of the front fought fiercely in Hamchang, Antong, Rihwaryung 
and Jukryung. They withstood the six days' continued bombings 
by the enemy forces in Hamchang and Rihwaryung districts 
from September 24 to 30. Moreover, they inflicted heavy losses 
on the enemy along the Hamchang-Choongju highway. In 
Antong and Jukryung districts our units held up the enemy's 
advance for a few days, and provided a cover for the main units. 
And in the west, too, our units fell into a difficult situation fac- 
ing the enemy's attack from three sides. Our units were in 
danger of being outflanked. However, Kim Woong who held a 
responsible position in a unit on the western front and other 
counter-revolutionaries and anti-Party elements criminally 
neglected to carry out the orders of the Supreme Headquarters. 

These criminals ignored the Supreme Headquarters' order 
to transfer part of the forces deployed along the Rakdong River 
to the areas of Inchon-Seoul to bolster the defence there in view 
of the imminent landing attempt of the enemy in Inchon. 
Moreover, they failed to carry through another order to transfer 
the units on the west end of the front to a more favourable posi- 
tion behind the Keum River in the light of the new developments 
in the war. These criminals, by ignoring the orders of the 
Supreme Headquarters, aided the enemy greatly and worsened 
the situation for the units of the People's Army. 

Despite heavy losses the enemy advanced northward, meet- 
ing at Chochiwon on September 30 the columns of their forces 
coming down from the north. Then they turned their fire in the 
direction of Wonju and Kangneung. 

109 



Thus before our entire units withdrew from the south and 
while some of them were still waging defensive battles on the 
Rihwaryung and Jukryung line, the enemy occupied most of the 
southern part of our country. A crucial- situation was created on 
the front. 



SECTION 2 



Strategic Retreat of the Korean People's Army. Marshal 
Kim II Sung's Radio Speech on October 11, 1950 



The enemy's counter-attack 
MEASURES TAKEN BY THE on the main front and the 

PARTY FOR OVERCOMING landing of the big enemy 

DIFFICULTIES OF THE RE- f orC es in Inchon split our 

TREAT. MARSHAL KIM IL battle line into two and most 

SUNG'S RADIO SPEECH ON f the main units of the Peo- 

OCTOBER 11, 1950 p i e ' s Army faced the danger 

of being encircled. 

A most unfavourable situation was created at the front for 
our forces. 

Firstly, the enemy with the Inchon landing bacame superior 
in men and the equipment. The U.S. aggressors who had 
sustained one defeat after another launched a large-scale of- 
fensive on the front by mobilizing the bulk of their army, navy 
and air forces. Needless to say, in connection with the U.S. 
armed invasion of Korea, our Party and Government took all 
measures to ultimately crush and annihilate the enemy and 
prepared a considerable number of reserves. However, the 
number of reserves we had was not large enough to check and 
frustrate within a short space of time the large-scale general 
offensive which the enemy launched so frenziedly. Nor had we 
time to make full preparations to overcome difficulties and 
hardships. 

Before we had time to train an ample number of reserves 
and make full preparations, the U.S. imperialist aggressors 
who had prepared the war long in advance further expanded 

110 



the scope of the war, mobilizing large numbers of their armed 
forces, several times greater than ours. The enemy became 
superior in numerical strength and in firing power and the 
People's Army failed to stop the enemy's offensive. 

Secondly, Kim Woong and other counter-revolutionary, 
anti-Party elements who had crept into the People's Army and 
some other commanders failed to carry out thoroughly and 
promptly the strategy and orders laid down by the Supreme 
Headquarters. Despite the repeated orders of the Supreme Com- 
mander, Moo Jung and other commanders displayed no mobility, 
initiative and creativeness in leading their units. Nor did they 
apply skilfully the enveloping operations by taking the mountain 
paths instead of advancing along the highways. As a result, 
they not only lost much time but also wasted manpower and 
materials. Furthermore, by merely pushing the enemy along 
the highways instead of encircling and annihilating them, they 
allowed the enemy to gain time for regrouping their units. 

Kim Woong and other counter-revolutionary, anti-Party 
elements sabotaged the implementation of the orders of the 
Supreme Headquarters on troop transfer. They hindered thus 
the defence at the southern front and in the Inchon-Seoul area. 
Furthermore, the Li Seung Yup spy gang neglected inten- 
tionally to carry out the measures taken by the Party and 
Supreme Headquarters for the defence of the Inchon-Seoul 
area and hindered in every possible way their implementation. 

Therefore, the defence in the Inchon-Seoul area was so 
weak as to allow the enemy to launch flank attack. Then there 
were some commanders who failed to put up a well coordinated 
strong defence against the large-scale offensive of the enemy. 
There were cases of lack of discipline and want of organization. 
All this resulted in failure to frustrate the enemy's offensive. 

Thirdly, almost the entire Party organizations and partisan 
activities in South Korea were out of action because of the 
brutal slaughter committed by the U.S. imperialists and the 
Syngman Rhee clique, because of the subversive activities of 
the Pak Hun Yung-Li Seung Yup clique,' spies and sectarians, 
and of the factional conflicts caused by the sectarians. Conse- 
quently, the Party organizations and partisans failed to act in 
close harmony with the advancing People's Army. 



As was known in the course of the war, there actually 
existed no Party nucleus in South Korea capable of mobiliz- 
ing and organizing the masses for struggle. Yet the Pak Hun 
Yung clique, the U.S. spies, made a false report stating that 
there were 200,000 Party members in the South. And the false 
report did great harm to implementing the strategy laid down 
by the Party. 

In fact, due to the subversive activities of the Pak Hun 
Yung-Li Seung Yup spy gang, no mass struggle against the 
U.S. aggressive army took place in South Korea. 

In this way the enemy could easily concentrate large forces 
at the front. 

Such being the case, the Korean People's Army for all their 
remarkable successes in the first stage of the war failed to 
drive the enemy from our land, and the enemy took the initiative 
when they started the large-scale offensive. And we had to 
make a temporary retreat. 

Grave danger overhung our country. 

To surmount the crisis, the Party organized the planned, 
strategic retreat, setting it as an important task "to slow down 
the enemy's advance, gain time and enable the main units of the 
People's Army dropped in the south to retreat in a planned way 
on the one hand, and on the other, to continuously train reserve 
units" (Kim II Sung). 

In short, the planned temporary retreat was to prepare for 
a new and decisive blow at the enemy and turn the tables. 

The strategy of the temporary retreat laid down by the 
Party was the only correct one and it meant a creative appli- 
cation of Marxist-Leninist tactics to meet the situation created 
at that time. More, it was a positive measure for preserving and 
reorganizing our forces for a new and great blow to the enemy. 

Marshal Kim II Sung, addressing on October 11, 1950, the 
entire people and men and officers of the People's Army over 
the radio, clarified the Party's line for the temporary strategic 
retreat. 

Analyzing grave political and military situation in our 
fatherland, Marshal Kim II Sung set forth the concrete tasks 
for putting an end to the grave situation, and armed firmly the 
people and members of the People's Army with firm conviction 



in final victory. Pointing out that the road of the people's great 
struggle for freedom and independence was not a smooth one. 
he recalled the Soviet and Chinese peoples who had emerged 
as final victors from their arduous struggles against the 
foreign imperialists, adding that the imperialists' attempt to 
subdue the Soviet and Chinese peoples had come to naught. 
Then he said: "Now the imperialists are trying to subjugate 
Korea. However, the reactionary aggressive plan of the Ameri- 
can imperialist robbers is doomed once again to fail. 

"The national liberation struggle, which the Korean people 
are waging for the freedom and independence of their father- 
land against the U.S. imperialists' attempt to enslave them, did 
not arise from a transient or temporary cause but from the 
fundamental national aspiration of the Korean people who do 
not wish to become slaves again to foreign imperialists after 
experiencing the long enslavement under Japanese imperi- 
alism . . .For this very reason, the Korean people will be 
victorious." 

He went on to stress that the important task confronting 
the people was to defend every inch of the land with their blood 
and to prepare all their strength for inflicting a new and 
decisive blow on the enemy. Only that way could the Korean 
people wipe out once and for all the U.S. imperialists and the 
Syngman Rhee clique from their land. 

He called upon the men and officers of the People's Army 
to fight to the last drop of their blood for their fatherland. Then 
he emphasized that the people in the rear should work with 
greater intensity and ensure the supply to the front. And in 
case of retreat all materials and all the communication and 
transportation facilities must be evacuated; not a single loco- 
motive, a freight car, not even a single gramme of rice should 
be left for the enemy. Especially he instructed the people in the 
enemy-occupied areas to launch a wide-scale partisan warfare, 
demolish enemy headquarters, cut their supply lines, destroy 
transportation and communication means, and set fire to 
enemy's arms and ammunition depots. Then he appealed to 
the entire people to further sharpen their vigilance, and 
promptly disclose and wipe out the spies and saboteurs and 
wage an uncompromising struggle against rumour-mongers, 
whimperers, pessimists, shirkers and cowards. 



He emphasized that in the struggle for the freedom and 
independence of the fatherland the Korean people were not 
isolated, but they were supported by the peoples of the great 
Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic and other 
socialist countries, and the entire progressive mankind of the 
world. Marshal Kim II Sung, urging the entire people and men 
and officers of the People's Army to courageously march ahead 
for victory, said that final victory would be on the side of the 
Korean people. 

Marshal Kim II Sung's radio speech was a militant pro- 
gramme of the Party to organize and mobilize the entire people 
and men and officers of the People's Army and partisans for a 
determined struggle at the most critical moment the fatherland 
had ever faced. The entire people and the People's Army men 
rose up, with a firm conviction in final victory, to carry out a 
new militant task set by the Party and their leader. 

It was not easy work, however, to ensure the strategic 
retreat of the People's Army. Immeasurably difficult problems 
lay in effecting the retreat: 

Firstly, the enemy was advancing rapidly. The enemy 
controlled the air, and with fury they were attempting to smash 
the forces of the People's Army which were encircled in the 
southern part. We had to relieve our forces surrounded by the 
enemy while preserving manpower and war materials. We had 
to halt, on the one hand, the powerful advance of the enemy 
with the newly organized units, and on the other, had to execute 
a long-distance retreat not by vehicles but on foot. No highways 
were available for us. We had to take mountain paths. 

Secondly, in the face of the large-scale enemy onslaught 
it was extremely complicated and difficult to move the people 
and the Party and state organs to places of safety within a 
short space of time. 

Especially, few communication and transportation facili- 
ties were available and the traffic networks were subjected to 
the enemy's constant bombing. We had to transfer rapidly not 
only the people, but the productive facilities and materials and 
put them into operation so that the front could be supplied. 

Thirdly, there were cases of some officers and Party and 
government cadres failing to keep discipline when they faced 
the temporary retreat. 



They were still young with no experience of retreat in 
modern warfare. Consequently some cadres lacked organizing 
ability to overcome difficulties and were wanting in perseve 
ranee. Such phenomena caused tremendous hindrance to our 
struggle. 

However, the strategic retreat of the People's Army was 
successfully organized and executed by the Party despite 
insurmountable odds. 

Recognizing that enhancement of the Party spirit among 
the Party members was the key to the success of the strategic 
retreat, the Party took measures for eradicating confusion and 
disorder which existed for a time among some Party members, 
while strengthening the Party, state and military discipline. 
In particular, the Central Committee of the Party, in view of 
the fact that there still remained sectarian remnants, waged a 
powerful struggle against the attempt to cause a split within 
the Party during the arduous retreat and for ensuring the unity 
and solidarity of the Party. 

The Party carried out mass political work for removing 
uneasiness and confusion among the cadres and the masses, for 
enhancing their sense of responsibility for the Party and state 
and their confidence in victory. 

The Party took effective steps for maintaining iron 
discipline in the army, educating the members of units with 
revolutionary spirit, ensuring a strong defence by the new units 
at the front, and enabling our force to break through the 
enemy's encirclement. At the same time, it organized and car- 
ried out the work of preparing reserve units. 



DEFENCE ALONG THE 38th In accordance with the 

PARALLEL AND IN WONSAN strategy laid down by the 

AND YANGDUK AREAS Party, the Supreme Headquar- 

ters took operational mea- 
sures to fortify the defence at the front and at the same time, 
to save the units which had fallen into the enemy's encirclement. 
Attaching great significance to a defensive warfare which 
was to be carried out along the 38th parallel by combining the 
forces of the People's Army which were fighting in the Seoul 
area and in the Rakdong River region, on October 1, 1950, the 



115 



Supreme Headquarters divided the front into two — the western 
and eastern fronts. The western front was put under the charge 
of the West Coast Defence Command and the eastern front un- 
der the Front Line Command. 

Then reserve task forces under the Supreme Headquarters- 
were dispatched to the areas along the 38th parallel. It was 
the responsibility of the defense units to halt and repulse the 
enemy's advance while ensuring the withdrawal of our units 
from the southern front. 

The enemy that had occupied most of the southern part 
calculated on a "lightning victory". Before our forces on the 
southern front could break through, the enemy counted on 
marching to the Amrok and Dooman Rivers and swiftly occupy- 
ing the whole of Korea. 

Therefore, the enemy started to hit the territories north of 
the 38th parallel after regrouping its forces, which had been 
mauled badly in the previous battles. 

Turning the brunt of its attack to the Kaesong-Pyongyang 
area, the enemy occupied Kaesong on October 7 and then head- 
ed towards the Keumchiin area. In the meantime, the enemy for- 
ces operating in the central and eastern regions occupied, on 
October 3, Tongdoochun and Choonchun and turned to Ryun- 
chun end Hwachun. And the enemy that was advancing along 
the east coast crossed on October 1 the 38th parallel in the 
Yangyang area and took Tongchun on October 5. 

At that time, the U.S. imperialists, while launching their 
invasion against the northern part of the Republic, used once 
again the name of the U.N. to legalize the extension of the 
Korean war and their occupation of the whole of Korea. 

At the 5th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, the U.S. 
government, invoking its voting machine, wrested on October 
7, 1950, another aggressive and illegal "decision" to extend the 
Korean war. It was the U.S. intention to first occupy the north- 
ern part of Korea and then spread the flames of the aggressivfe 
war to Northeast China. 

Against the scheme of the U.S. imperialists to extend the 
Korean war the peace-loving peoples of the world raised their 
voices loudly, demanding a peaceful solution of Korean ques- 
tion. 

Representatives in the U.N. Assembly of the socialist 
countries, the U.S.S.R., the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland and 

116 



Czechoslovakia, forcefully argued for an immediate end to tin 
U.S. imperialists' military action in Korea, the withdrawal of 
foreign troops, and the realization of the peaceful unification 
of Korea by the Korean people themselves. 

And, resolutely condemning the evil aggressive designs 
the U.S. imperialists had on Korea and China, the Government 
of the People's Republic of China said that the Chinese people 
would never tolerate the aggression of foreign imperialists. 

The freedom-loving peoples of the world waged more ener- 
getically the struggle to protest and condemn the U.S. actions 
to extend the Korean war. "U.S. imperialists, keep your blood- 
stained hands off Korea!" was their cry. 

However, the U.S. imperialists were bent on extending 
their armed aggression. 

Nothing could be more heart-breaking to the men and of- 
ficers of the People's Army than to see the achievements of the 
people made in democratic construction trampled upon by the 
U.S. robbers, when they retreated and crossed over the 38th 
parallel. The mere thought that the capitalist-landlord re- 
gime was once again instituted in the enemy-occupied villages 
and towns, and that The yoke of slavery was placed on the peo- 
ple, inflamed their rage and enmity against the enemy. The 
order of Supreme Commander Marshal Kim 11 Sung: "No 
retreat! Not even one step!" was the battle-cry of the entire 
men and officers of the People's Army. 

Our units on the western front organized the defence of the 
broad areas from Korangpo-ri to the Ongjin peninsula. 

On October 8, the U.S. 1st Corps launched an offensive in 
the Kaesong-Keumchun area, where our units made a firm 
•stand until October 11. Our brave anti-tankmen and ambush 
parties knocked out several enemy tanks, while our storming 
parties hit the enemy's concentration centre, and their tank and 
artillery positions. When the enemy took Mt. Songak, our units 
fought back fiercely. On October 11, our forces retook the moun 
tain. Our units operating in Yunan district made a counter 
attack on the enemy in the Baechun area on October 11, upsett- 
ing the enemy's timetable. Repulsing the repeated offensives of 
the puppet 2nd Corps our units in the Koohwa-ri area 
held their positions until October 13, delivering heavy losses to 
the enemy. 



On the 14th, part of our troops on the western front moved 
to Pyongsan district and continued defensive operations. The 
enemy made constant onslaught under cover of heavy fire of 
tanks and artillery, and large numbers of aircraft. But our 
troops withstood the enemy's attacks. Our strong fire drove in 
a wedge between the enemy infantry and their tank units enab- 
ling us to hit at them separately. Our storming parties launch- 
ed surprise attacks on the flanks and in the rear of the enemy 
throwing them into confusion. 

The enemy occupied Pyongsan on October 16 at a heavy 
cost. 

On the eastern front the units of the People's Army drew 
up an extensive line of defence from Korangpo-ri to Yangkoo 
districts, conducting powerful defensive operations. Our troops 
in the Ryunchun-Chulwon areas held Chulwon until October 
9, inflicting heavy losses on the puppet 2nd Army Corps. Though 
our units in Hwachun district were fresh troops who had no 
training, they held back the puppet 2nd Army Corps for four 
days from October 5. Later they moved to Keumhwa district 
and held their own for two days. 

On the east coast our units waged defensive battles in 
the district of Wonsan, which started on October 5. Our units 
fought the enemy north of Tongchun located south of Wonsan. 
On October 8, the enemy's 1st Army Corps which was advanc- 
ing along the road between Yangkoo and Shinkosan made its 
appearance in the district south of Wonsan, striking at our 
units from east and south. The enemy's plan was to rapidly 
occupy Wonsan and extend their gains towards the north. They 
planned to advance towards Pyongyang to join with the forces 
on the western front, so that they could encircle our forces along 
the 38th parallel. 

But our troops that were defending the Wonsan area con- 
tinued stubborn resistance against the onslaught of the numeri- 
cally superior enemy. And Party members and working people 
of Wonsan came out to aid the People's Army. Braving the fire 
of the enemy artillery, they built up defensive positions and 
carried ammunition and war materials. 

On October 11, furious street fighting started. Our soldiers, 
shielding themselves on mountain tops or behind buildings, 
fought resolutely. Our storming parties armed with grenades 



destroyed the oncoming enemy tanks and armoured cars. One 
unit defending Mt. Rapal put up a heroic fight, repulsing the 
attack of the strong enemy. In this battle, Pak Yung, a com 
pany commander, was wounded three times, but he refused to 
be evacuated. When he was hit again he turned to his men and 
gave his last order: "Comrades! I have three grenades unused. 
Annihilate the enemy with my grenades before I die. Long live 
the Workers' Party of Korea! Long live General Kim II Sung!" 

And our men on Mt. Jangduk successfully repulsed the 
enemy's attacks four times though they were encircled by the 
enemy. 

In the meantime, our battery in defence of Sinto Island 
fought valiantly against enemy warships and destroyed two 
of them. 

The defensive operations in Wonsan continued until the 
14th. 

Our units threw themselves selflessly in the fierce defensive 
operations along the 38th parallel and in the Wonsan area. Yet 
they could not check the oncoming enemy who was several times 
superior in strength, and had to disengage themselves. The 
enemy, however, paid dearly for every inch of our land they 
took. Moreover, our units delayed the speed of the enemy off- 
ensive nearly 10 days along the 38th parallel and in the Won- 
san area. The defensive operations made it possible for the 
main forces of the People's Army surrounded by the enemy on 
the southern front to make a retreat, and to move the people, 
state organs, factories and enterprises to safer areas. In parti- 
cular, the campaigns waged by our units around Wonsan dis- 
rupted the enemy's plan to advance in the direction of Pyong- 
yang in an attempt to surround and annihilate our units along 
the 38th parallel. 

Taking advantage of the precious time gained by the de- 
fensive operations along the 38th parallel and in the Wonsan 
area, our units north of the Rakdong River succeeded in break- 
ing through the siege of the enemy and effected a systematic 
retreat, hitting the enemy in the rear. 

Our units engaged the puppet 2nd Army Corps in. the 
Yangduk area from October 15 to 17. The enemy attacked vio- 



lently from both the directions of Wonsan and Koksai 
was their intention to occupy Yangduk speedily and adv; 
to the west and the north to join with the U.S. units in 
west so as to envelop and annihilate our units in the Si 
chun-Sookchun area. They, however, failed to materialize the 
plan due to the persistent resistance of our units, suffering 
setback after another. 

On the 15th, on Ahobi range, east of Yangduk, our units 
kept silent and allowed intentionally the enemy to reach a 
certain line. Then suddenly our side showered them with fire, 
mowing them down en masse. By the 16th, our units had 
moved to a pre-arranged line, smashing successfully the re- 
peated attacks of the enemy. On October 17, the enemy units 
in this region struck again from the south and the east, but 
with little success. In the Yangduk area the enemy lost over 
1,000 killed or wounded and 11 tanks destroyed besides scores 
of motor vehicles. The deeper the enemy crept into the north- 
ern part of the Republic, the heavier became their losses in 
men and war materials. 

While working for the victories at the front, the Party 
organized successfully systematic evacuation of the people, of 
the Party and state organs, factories and enterprises. 

Under the guidance of the Party, workers kept up the 
war-time production successfully and carried out the speedy 
removal of factory installations and machinery as well as raw 
materials and products to safer areas. There were hardly any 
transportation facilities available, but the workers, braving 
the rain of enemy bombs and shells, carried their precious 
machinery on their backs and heads to safer areas. And they 
buried or destroyed the machinery which they could not remove. 

The workers of Factory No. 65 did not discontinue muni- 
tions production until the U.S. army came close to the district 
where the factory was located. Only when danger was immin- 
ent did they set to the removal work and completed it in a 
short space of time. And the production was on again at once 
at the new location. 

The peasants harvested promptly to provide the food for 
the front and the rear. They removed grains and farm produce 
to safer areas, and repaired the destroyed roads and bridges. 

120 



The peasants were determined not to allow the enemy to de- 
prive them of rights and happiness which they had enjoyed 
under the people's power. 

Our working intellectuals and artists, too, retreated fol- 
lowing . the Party and Government over the snow-covered 
mountains and crossing the frozen rivers. They were firmly 
convinced that the policy of the Party was correct and that the 
Korean people guided by the Party were bound to win the final 
victory in their struggle against the U.S. imperialist aggres- 
sors. 

In response to the call of the Party our workers and youth 
came foward to join the ranks of the People's Army or the 
partisans. They marched to the front to repulse the enemy. 

Through this most difficult, trying period, our people and 
the People's Army rallied more firmly around the Workers' 
Party of Korea and the Government of the Republic headed by 
Marshal Kim 11 Sung, demonstrating the immense vitality of 
our people's democratic system and the political and moral 
unity of the people. 



END OF THE STRATEGIC RE- Having suffered serious 



TREAT OF THE PEOPLE'S 



losses in the areas north of 
army, party's policy for the 38th parallel, Wonsan 

A counter offensive and Yangduk, the enemy fren- 

ziedly replenished and rein- 
forced their forces. Hurriedly they brought up the U.S. 9th 
Army Corps from the south where it had been stationed to 
choke off our units besieged in the southern part. Then they 
moved the 10th Army Corps by sea, landing them at the Won- 
san port and in the Riwon areas. In addition, the U.S. aggres- 
sors brought the British 29th Brigade into Korea on October 17. 
The e'nemy pushed their own and mercenary troops for a 
desperate offensive. On October 15, MacArthur, Commander of 
the "U.N. Command," conferred with U.S. President Truman 
on Wake Island and released his preposterous statement which 
stated that the war in Korea would be finished by Thanksgiving 
Day, November 23. As the days went by, the fury of the enemy 
raged higher. 

Encountered with the desperate enemy, the People's Army 
units evacuated Pyongyang on October 19, 1950. 



The enemy dropped the U.S. 187th Parachute Regiment in 
the areas of Sookchun and Soonchun in an attempt to cut off 
the retreating route of our units. However, the enemy could 
produce no fundamental change in the general war picture; 
the enemy only increased their heavy losses. 

Towards the end of October the U.S. 1st, 9th and the pup- 
pet 2nd Corps crossed the Chungchun River and occupied 
some towns and villages on its northern bank. Our units operat- 
ing in the Pakchun-Jungjoo area blocked the advance of the 
British 27th Brigade by dealing it a telling blow on the bank 
of the Taeryung River. 

The stubborn resistance of our units forced the U.S. units 
to slow down in the east of Palwon, which was in the enemy's 
hand. The enemy was heading towards Taichun. And in the 
area of Hichun our units engaged the puppet 2nd Corps. 

On the eastern front, our units engaged the U.S. 10th 
Corps in Hamheung, Oro and in the west of Oro, inflicting 
serious losses on them. And the puppet 1st Corps which was 
coming up along the east coast received staggering blows 
at the hands of other units of the People's Army. 

Thanks to the strong defence put up by our units and the 
heavy losses the enemy suffered, the enemy was slowed down 
and MacArthur's plan for a "blitzkrieg" began to crack. 

The main units of the People's Army which had been in 
the enemy's encirclement successfully broke through and effect- 
ed the long-distance retreat, taking advantage of the ener- 
getic defensive operations waged by other units of the Peo- 
ple's Army on every front. In executing such difficult retreat, 
the men and officers of the People's Army who had inherited 
the revolutionary tradition of the anti-Japanese partisans, 
drew immense inspiration from the indomitable, heroic ex- 
ploits of the partisans in their fight for the liberation and 
freedom of the fatherland and against the Japanese imperial- 
ists in the snow storms in and around the steep Changpaik 
Mountains. No difficulties and hardships were too great for 
them to overcome and most successfully they effected the long 
retreat covering 600-700 kilometres, breaking through the 
enemy's encirclement. Moreover, they preserved their strength 
and combat materials. 

Our units which had advanced to the area of Haman 
along the bank of the Rakdong River withdrew systematically, 

122 



fighting courageously in the rear of the enemy. They crossed 
over the Jiri Mountain and Sobaik Mountains. In the areas of 
Jechun, Wonju, Choonchun, Hwachun, Pyonggang, Ichon, Ma- 
junri, Maingsan and other places our units inflicted immense 
losses upon the enemy. Moreover, a large number of patriots 
imprisoned by the enemy were saved. By the end of October 
they joined with the main forces under the Front Line Command. 
Our units that had advanced to the Pohang area returned 
to Jangjin district after liberating themselves from the enemy's 
encirclement. These units hit the enemy from the rear in the 
areas of Samchuk, Kangneung, Choomoonjin, Kosung, Tong- 
chun, Kowon, and Yungheung. Meanwhile other units of the 
People's Army passed over the steep Taibaik Mountains, wag- 
ing surprise attacks on the enemy, and completed the system- 
atical retreat to the designated areas. 

Thus the enemy's attempt to wipe out our units surround- 
ed in the rear was miserably smashed by the stubborn opera- 
tions of our combined units. 

As the temporary strategic retreat was being successfully 
effected the Party took measures for preparing a decisive 
counter-attack by the Korean People's Army. 

Marshal Kim II Sung, envisaging already in the hardest 
period of the retreat the forthcoming counter-attack, put forth 
the plan to form a powerful second front in the enemy's rear. 
To form a powerful second front in the enemy's rear was 
immensely significant in view of our weak air force. A second 
front was needed in the rear of the enemy to win over the peo- 
ple of the enemy occupied areas, to destroy the mobility of the 
enemy, and to harass them. Furthermore, the second front 
was to choke off the enemy's escape routes when our units 
started on the march again. Confusion and bewilderment would 
be created in the enemy's rear on such occasions and the Peo- 
ple's Army would be able to deliver a double punch to the ene- 
my on its face and back. 

Because of our stubborn resistance and their own weak 
ness in military art, the enemy lacked coordination between 
units. Then some of our units trained and seasoned in the 
course of war still remained behind in the rear of the enemy 
and the members of the People's Army enjoyed absolute sup- 
ports of the people wherever they were. All these conditions 
played favourably in the formation of the second front. 

123 



This being the case, the Supreme Headquarters of the Ko- 
rean People's Army ordered the formation of a second front 
with several units that had returned to the Chulwon area from 
the Rakdong River front. And these units started their activi- 
ties from the end of October. Gradually the scope of their op- 
eration expanded covering Kangwon, North Hwanghai and 
South Pyongan Provinces. 

The Party took measures for regrouping the units which 
had returned from the front and re-equipping them with com- 
bat materials. Measures were also taken for speedily organiz- 
ing and training new divisions and reserve units and organ- 
izing new corps. 

Moreover, the Party, in order to strengthen the People's 
Army, dispatched many able Party members and cadres to the 
People's Army while training a large number of military and 
political cadres. 

At the personal suggestion of Marshal Kim II Sung, the 
Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Party 
adopted on October 21, 1950, the decision on "Organizing 
Party Organizations and Instituting Political Organs in the 
People's Army" for the purpose of enhancing the influence of 
the Workers' Party within the People's Army and strengthen- 
ing the ideological, political educational work among the men 
and officers. 

Prior to this, with a view to strengthening the political 
work in the army in accord with the intention of the Party Cen- 
tral Committee, the Political Committee of the Party Central 
Committee had organized the General Political Bureau of the 
Korean People's Army. 

On the basis of the Party decision, the Cultural Depart- 
ments in the army were reorganized into the Political Depart- 
ments while Party organizations were organized in all units 
and small-units. The cultural commissar, the second in com- 
mand of a unit, was replaced by a political commissar. 

This step was revolutionary in strengthening the Peopled 
Army. The step was taken on the basis of the profound analy- 
sis of political and military affairs of the preceding four months 
of war. 

The establishment of political organs and Party organiza- 
tions in the People's Army was an epochal event in strengthen- 

124 



ing the political work among the members of the People's Army 
and in raising their fighting strength. These political organs 
and Party organizations from the very inception played a great 
role in fully executing the Party line and policy as well as the 
Supreme Commander's orders, in educating the men and offic 
ers in revolutionary spirit and communist ideology so as to 
rally them more firmly around the Party Central Committee, 
in enhancing organizational capacity and discipline of units, 
in guaranteeing the vanguard role of the Party members, in 
inspiring the members of the armed forces to militant ex- 
ploits, and in mobilizing them for fulfilling their combat mis- 
sions. 

Thanks to the measures taken by the Party, the People's 
Army was rapidly strengthened and the might for their coun- 
ter-attack intensified. Thus the strategical task of the tempor- 
ary retreat was successfully carried out and preparations for 
launching a decisive counter-attack went ahead. 



SECTION 3 



U.S. Atrocities. People's Heroic Struggle 
in Enemy-occupied Areas 



As the Korean People's 
ENEMY'S ATROCITIES Army withdrew temporarily 

the enemy occupied many 
areas in the northern part. 

The U.S. imperialist aggressors committed brutal atroci- 
ties unparalleled in the annals of humanity. 

V. I. Lenin wrote: "The U.S. billionaires, the modern slave- 
owners, have opened a specially tragic page in the sanguinary 
history of sanguinary imperialism." (Lenin, Collected Works, 
Russ. ed„ Vol. 28, p. 44) 

The inhuman atrocities of the U.S. imperialists made the 
Korean people realize how correct these words of Lenin were 
and how diabolical and cold-blooded the U.S. imperialists were. 

To materialize their dirty aggressive end, the U.S. im- 
perialists, first of all, set up a reactionary rule in the areas 

125 



under their occupation as in the southern part. The people's 
democratic system was thrown out and the achievements of 
democratic upbuilding by our people were obliterated. They 
restored the Japanese imperialist ruling apparatus. Police 
stations were set up everywhere. Then the pro-Japanese, pro- 
American elements and national traitors were made govern- 
ors, county or sub-county heads. The enemy counted on these 
characters as their prop. 

Besides, they declared in effect that all the democratic re- 
forms carried out by the people's power were null and void and 
attempted to hand over the land and enterprises to U.S. capit- 
alists, former Korean landlords and compradors. 

Under a U.S. wand, the pro-Japanese and pro-American 
elements, former landlords, comprador capitalists, and re- 
negades organized all sorts of reactionary and terrorist or- 
ganizations such as "Security Corps," "Communist Annihila- 
tion Corps," "Chiandai" (peace preservation corps), "North- 
west Youth Association," "Taihan Youth Corps," etc. These 
unsavory organizations were set up by the U.S. invaders to 
suppress and massacre the people and destroy and plunder 
their properties. Numerous patriots including the members of 
the Workers' Party of Korea and innocent people were brutally 
butchered by the enemy. Men and women, young and old, 
were wantonly killed. 

The bestial atrocities of the U.S. aggressive troops against 
our people were systematically organized by their commanders. 

It was not uncommon to find the captured U.S. soldiers and 
mercenary soldiers of the "U.N. Command" with hand-books or 
"manifestoes" issued by the U.S. Army headquarters calling 
upon them to be merciless to the Koreans, not to have the 
slightest sympathy and pity even for a child. 

The U.S. 8th Army Commander issued a call to the "U.N. 
Command" soldiers which reads in part: 

"...The war is raging. Therefore, if you want to save your 
life, you should kill as many Asians as possible. Be it an infant 
or the aged, you should not let your hands tremble. Kill them; 
jl is the way to relieve yourselves from destruction and fulfil 
your responsibility as the U.N. Command soldiers." 

Such was the credo of the U.S. aggressors. 

As a result, wherever the blood-stained hands of the U.S. 

126 



imperialist aggressors and their hirelings reached, the soil of 
our beautiful land was drenched with the blood of the Party 
members and people. The number of innocent people they 
killed reached hundreds of thousands. According to a prelimin- 
ary investigation in the Province of Hwanghai alone some 

120,000 were murdered by them. 

In Shinchun County of Hwanghai Province alone, over 
35,000 inhabitants were slaughtered, including more than 

16,000 women, during the period between October 17 and 
December 7, 1950 when the enemy were occupying this re- 
gion. In Woonbong-ri, Onchun Sub-County, Shinchun County 
they slaughtered over 600 innocent people or 68 per cent of 
the total inhabitants. Among the murdered were 10 infants 
under the age of 5, some 150 boys and girls aged 6 to 15 years 
and more than 80 old men and women aged over 50 years. 
All this mass-slaughter in the Shinchun area was done under 
the personal instruction of a U.S. army officer, Harrison. 

For instance, on October 18, some 30 soldiers under Har- 
rison murdered cold-bloodedly more than 900 innocent people 
in Shinchun. An eye-witness of the murder case described the 
scene in the following manner: 

"The beasts stripped the people naked, bound them together 
by fours or fives, drove them into a pit at the point of the bayo- 
net, and set fire after pouring gasoline over them. The air was 
filled with the shrieks of the women and children and an offen- 
sive smell of burning human flesh. Yet the whole thing was 
highly amusing to American soldiers. They clapped their hands 
gleefully watching the people burning. They shot those who 
crawled out of the pit and eventually closed the pit, burying 
alive those who were still breathing. When earth blocked the 
opening completely the devilish U.S. officer Harrison left the 
scene, whistling a jolly tune." 

On December 7, 910 innocent people in Shinchun County 
lost their lives at the hands of the blood-thirsty U.S. soldiers. 
Into two warehouses they packed children and adults separate- 
ly. For three days no food was given to them, then the U.S. sol- 
diers burnt them alive, after covering them with straw mats. 

Following are the words of the person who first found the 
horrible sight inside the warehouses when Shinchun was lib- 
erated from the enemy occupation: "When I first opened the 

127 



door of the warehouse I found heaps of children's bodies piled 
up. Evidently the children were trying to get out. Many had 
been burnt, while others had frozen or starved to death. The 
finger nails of most of the children were smeared with blood or 
torn off. It was obvious that the children had desperately tried 
to escape from the murderous flames." 

During their occupation of many towns, cities and villages 
in the northern part the U.S. aggressors slaughtered innumer- 
able inhabitants individually or in groups with abominably 
cruel methods. Over 15,000 people were killed in Pyongyang 
and more than 19,000 in Anak, Hwanghai Province. The Ameri- 
can beasts gouged out people's eyeballs, cut off their limbs, 
branded them with hot irons, drove tanks over them, drove nails 
into their heads, chopped off their heads with an axe, and ripped 
open the abdomen of pregnant women. 

In November 1950, in Shinjangri, Anak County, Hwanghai 
Province, about 1,000 patriots and peaceable inhabitants were 
buried alive and then in Woonyoo Sub-County, Songhwa 
County, over 200 women and children including 70 odd small 
ones between 4 and 8 years of age were killed, on the ground 
that they were family members of the Workers' Party mem- 
bers. Those women and children were locked up in a ware- 
house for one week. During that time no food was given to 
them at all. As a result, most of them were starved to death. 
The U.S. army saw to it that any survivors were buried alive. 
In the middle of November 1950, the U.S. beasts rounded up 
over 20 members of the Workers' Party in Bongmyungri, 
Sangjoyang Sub-County, Hamjoo County, South Hamkyung 
Province, whom they later killed by chopping with an axe and 
burning their bodies and in Haknam Sub-County, Haksung 
County, North Hamkyung Province, 28 patriots were dragged 
to a hill top where gasoline was poured over them and then 
fire was set to them. 

At the beginning of October 1950, the American mercenary 
soldiers arrested 135 patriots in Koha Sub-County, Pajoo Coun- 
ty, Kyunggi Province, whom they bound together, laid on the 
highway, and drove tanks over them. Then six children were 
arrested because they sang patriotic songs. The U.S. mercen- 
ary soldiers cut off the lips and tongues of the children. In Ji- 
koori, Onchun Sub-County, Shinchun County, South Hwang- 
hai Province, the chairman of the Party cell was burnt to death. 

128 



In Wooneung-ri, Suh Sub-County, Taichun County the enemy 
slaughtered the chairman of the ri peasants' union, scooping 
out his eyeballs and skinning him alive. 

The U.S. beasts tore off the scalps of Korean patriots for 
"souvenirs." 

In Hasung Sub-County, Kimpo County, they kidnapped a 
woman, stripped her naked, stabbed her at random in the sexu- 
al organ and at last disemboweled her. They also cracked the 
skull of her two children on the spot. 

These are part of the numerous inhuman atrocities com- 
mitteed by the U.S. army. The Korean people will never forget 
the brutal atrocities perpetrated by the U.S. imperialists and 
will curse them forever. 

Another kind of the U.S. bestial act was the outrage 
committed against the women. The brutes violated women 
everywhere and mercilessly killed them if they resisted. Even 
old women aged 65 or little girls aged 12 were assaulted. 

Furthermore, the U.S. imperialist army plundered the peo- 
ple's properties. In South Pyongan Province alone, they robbed 
the peasants of over 14,000 tons of grains, more than 64,000 
cows and hundreds of thousands of domestic fowls during a 
period of 40 days or so of their occupation. 

During the months of November and December 1950, when 
the U.S. aggressors took to their heels from the northern part 
of the country, they organized special destruction corps to des- 
troy or burn down our factories, enterprises, cultural and other 
establishments. 

Immediately before they fled from Pyongyang, the enemy 
demolished 12 industrial enterprises including the Pyongyang 
Textile Mill and destroyed or burnt 17 schools including Kim 
II Sung University. In addition, they demolished a large num- 
ber of cultural and health establishments including the Central 
Hospital, the State Art Theatre and the Rodong Shinmoon 
Printing Plant and destroyed the city water-supply facilities. 
Besides, the electric network was ruined and traffic network 
was destroyed, the Taidong Bridge included. 

The U.S. imperialists, in their flight, destroyed and burnt 
every private dwelling-house in towns and villages along tin- 
highways and abducted innumerable inhabitants by threatening 
them with the use of atom bombs. 

129 



During their temporary occupation of many areas in the 
northern part, the enemy demolished or burnt hundreds of thous- 
ands of dwelling-houses and official buildings and killed more 
than 60 per cent of livestock. Moreover, they demolished or 
plundered our precious relics of national culture which had 
been preserved for thousands of years. 

Historical museums in Pyongyang, Chungjin, Hamheung, 
Haijoo, and in Mt. Myohyang were no exception and the pre- 
cious cultural relics were plundered. Besides, the enemy 
destroyed or burnt a large number of ancient tombs of the Ko- 
kuryo period in Kangsu, Ryongkang and Anak along with many 
time-honoured ancient buildings. 

These diabolical atrocities perpetrated by the U.S. imperi- 
alist army in the areas of the northern part under temporary 
occupation have revealed all the more clearly the inhuman 
cruelty and the true colour of the U.S. style "hurnanitarianism." 
During the Second World War, the brutality of the German fasc- 
ist army was beyond description and no one imagined there 
could be more malicious and horrible atrocities than those com- 
mitted by the Hitlerite murderers. But the acts of the Yankees 
in Korea made the Hitlerites blush. 

Yet no amount of brutal atrocities of the U.S. imperialist 
army could break the fighting spirit of the Korean people who 
rose up to safeguard freedom and independence of the country 
or could subdue them. 

The brutal atrocities of the enemy only roused all the more 
the rage and indignation of the Korean people and incurred 
all the more the world peace-loving people's condemnation. 



PEOPLE'S HEROIC STRUG- The more cruel the atro- 

GLE IN ENEMY-OCCUPIED cities of the U.S. imperialists 

AREAS became, the more resolutely 

the peoples fought against the 
enemy with burning anger and indignation. And in the van 
of the struggle always stood the Party organizations and Party 
members. 

Upholding the call of the Party Central Committee and 
Marshal Kim II Suimg; ffffijr strengthening the partisan activities 
in the enemy's rear, the underground Party organizations in 
the enemy-occupied areas maintained close links with the peo- 



130 



pie, roused the masses' hostility against the enemy, and sue 
cessfully mobilized them for the nation-wide struggle against 
the U.S. imperialists and their running dogs. 

As a result, partisan detachments were organized in many 
areas with the Party members as their core, and waged stub- 
born partisan warfare. The enemy's communication lines were 
disrupted, railways and bridges destroyed, trains and motor 
vehicles overturned, and ammunition depots blown up. The 
ever-growing partisan activities of the people dealt telling 
blows to the enemy with their surprise attacks. 

Particular mention must be made of the following partisan 
detachments which distinguished themselves in heroic struggles 
in the enemy-occupied areas: Kowon and Jungpyong People's 
Partisan Detachments in South Hamkyung Province, Moon- 
chun and Anbyun People's Partisan Detachments in Kangwon 
Province, Maingsan People's Partisan Detachment in South 
Pyongan Province, and Mt. Koowol and Koksan People's Parti- 
san Detachments in Hwanghai Province. 

The Kowon People's Partisan Detachment was organized 
under the leadership of the underground Party organization in 
Kowon County with the active Party members as its nucleus. 
In the early part of October 1950, there were about 150 
Party members and 35 rifles in the detachment but soon it en- 
listed more than 800 members and come to have more than 240 
guns of various calibre. 

Based in Woonkok, Soodong, Sankok and other mountains, 
our partisan detachments unfolded dauntless activities. They 
constantly harassed the railway lines and highways from 
Pyongyang to Wonsan, disrupting the enemy's vital communica- 
tion between the eastern and western fronts. Surprise attacks 
were made on the enemy military trains and motor vehicles 
around the Booraisan and Midoon Railway Stations inflicting 
heavy losses on the enemy in men and materials. Then they 
destroyed and harassed by surprise attacks the enemy organs 
and vicious reactionary elements, liberating many patriots lock 
ed up by the enemy. 

The Kowon People's Partisan Detachment made large 
and small-scale attacks on 95 occasions during a period of 
about two months. 

In the detachment was a boy scout named Suh Kam Ryung, 
who supplied the partisan detachment with valuable informa- 

131 



tion. He was captured by the enemy while on a mission. The 
enemy, in an attempt to locate the bases and learn the secrets 
of the Kowon People's Partisan Detachment, tortured him in a 
most brutal way. Sometimes the enemy tried to buy him off. 
Nevertheless he did not surrender and was shot by the enemy. 
The boy Suh Kam Ryung set an example of patriotism and 
valour for the young generation of our country. 

The Maingsan People's Partisan Detachment was organiz- 
ed by the underground Party organization in Maingsan County 
with active Party members and patriotic youth. Destroying or 
blocking the highways between Maingsan and Yungheung and 
between Maingsan and Yangduk it disrupted enemy's com- 
munication lines. 

On November 19, the Maingsan People's Partisan Detach- 
ment launched a surprise attack on a tank-led puppet unit in 
Bangpyungri, Dong Sub-County, killing a large number of the 
enemy. 

Moreover, under the direct guidance of the underground 
Party organization, it dispatched more than 150 Party mem- 
bers to carry out underground activities in every ri. These under- 
ground workers, maintaining close links with the people, se- 
cured vital information on the enemy. Then they carried out an 
extensive political work of enhancing the people's confidence in 
victory. And handbills and leaflets were distributed. 

The Mt. Kodwol People's Partisan Detachment started their 
activities toward the end of October 1950 in 50 ri in four coun- 
ties around Mt. Koowol. These units conducted 64 large- and 
small-scale surprise attacks on the enemy. 

They blocked the highways from Eunyul to Jangyun and 
from Eunyul to Songhwa and dealt a serious blow to the 
enemy's supply line. Moreover, they destroyed many of the 
enemy's "Peace Preservation Corps" and police force, relieving 
the people groaning under the brutal enemy. The enemy stag- 
ed "expeditions" on several occasions, but they met with an in- 
glorious end every time. 

The Koksan People's Partisan Detachment unfolded a 
dauntless partisan warfare enjoying the active support of the 
people in Koksan and Sooan Counties in Hwanghai Province. 

On November 9, they raided the enemy base in Koksan and 
liberated it. They waged an energetic struggle in coordination 

132 



% 

with the People's Army units on the second front. On December 
10, members of the Koksan People's Partisan Detachment 
waited in ambush for the U.S. army motor vehicles which were 
headed for" Shinke from Sooan when they opened fire on the 
enemy, inflicting over 30 casualties. Besides, they captured one 
enemy tank and seven motor-cars. The Koksan Detachment 
waged small- and large-scale attacks on 146 occasions during a 
period of two months. 

The Moonchun People's Partisan Detachment, led by the 
underground Party organization in the county of Moonchun, 
waged a fierce partisan warfare for two months in the enemy's 
rear. It inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in manpower and 
relieved a great number of patriots from the hands of the enemy. 
Especially it disrupted the enemy's communication lines in 
Masikryung region by blocking the road from Wonsan to 
Pyongyang. 

Besides these partisan detachments, the people launched a 
struggle against the enemy at every place under temporary occu- 
pation, including Pyongyang, Anjoo. Yangkoo, Rinje, Chulwon, 
Yangduk, Dukchun, Eunpa and Anak. In the ranks of the people's 
partisan detachments were a great number of women, who dis- 
played the unparalleled heroism and patriotism in protecting 
their country which had given them freedom and rights. 

Jo Ok Hi, the first woman Hero of the Republic, was a 
Party member. When the Eunpa Mountain Partisan Detach- 
ment was organized by the underground Party organization in 
Byuksung County to resist the enemy that made its way into 
the Northern part, she was one of the first who joined the de- 
tachment. 

She was in charge of supply services for the staff of the 
partisan detachment and when her detachment launched attacks 
she was always in the lead. Several successful surprise attacks 
were made on the enemy. But she was wounded in the middle 
of November during an encounter with the enemy and fell into 
the enemy's hand. 

The beasts subjected her to every kind of brutal torture in 
an attempt to wring out secrets of the partisan detachmenl 
They pulled out all her finger nails. But the enemy always got 
the same answer: 

"You fools! No one gets secrets from a Workers' Party 
member!" The blood-thirsty U.S. cannibals and their underlings 

133 



raged. They gouged out her eyeballs, burned her with a red hot 
iron and cut off her breasts. The ordeal lasted for 11 days. But 
the enemy could not bend her steel-like fighting spirit. At last, 
the U.S. soldiers dragged out Jo Ok Hi to face firing squad. 
But to the last she did not surrender. This is what she told the 
enemy: "You may kill me here today, but there is our People's 
Army to revenge my death. Victory will be ours!" "Long live 
the Korean Workers' Party! Long live General Kim II Sung!" 
were her last words. 

Thus a great number of women fought selflessly in the 
partisan ranks for the freedom and independence of the coun- 
try. 

A great role was played by the nation's youth in partisan 
operations and underground movement. 

When the enemy occupied Pyongyang, patriotic young men 
and women organized youth guards. The Pyongyang West 
District Youth Guards, formed with the Party members as the 
core, pledged themselves they would devote unsparingly then- 
youth to their fatherland. Despite the watchful eyes of the 
enemy, they distributed handbills and put up militant slogans. 

Besides, many boy guards were organized under the guid- 
ance of the Workers' Party members to carry out activities in 
many regions including Anjoo, Bakchun, Sungchun, Hamheung, 
Yungheung, Moonchun, etc. 

In Anjoo, South Pyongan Province, under the guidance of 
the Party members the Anjoo Boy Guard was organized with 
11 boys. The majority of them were miners' children, Anjoo 
being a mining district. The boys cut the enemy's telephone 
lines, laid nailed planks in the enemy's, transport route, broke 
into the enemy's arsenal to capture ammunition, weapons and 
grenades, and destroyed the signal-lights on- enemy's airports. 

In addition, the boys put up wall-newspapers, cartoons and 
handbills, exposing the brutal atrocities of the U.S. imperialists 
and Syngman Rhee traitors and telling about the forthcoming 
People's Army's counter-attack. Through this most arduous 
period in the nation's history the Korean people never knew 
despair and lamentation but rallied steel-like around the Work- 
ers' Party of Korea and the Government of the Republic. The 
people put their trust in the Party and Government, and unfold- 
ed with firm confidence in the final victory an indomitable 



134 



heroic struggle to safeguard the freedom and independence of 
the country. 

The patriotic and selfless struggle which Party members 
and the people waged during the period of the temporary retreat 
will remain eternally in the history of our fatherland. Through 
the bitter trial of the retreat, the Party, people and People's 
Army had been tempered all the more into a strength capable 
of dealing the finishing blows to the enemy. 



135 



CHAPTER IV 



COUNTER-ATTACK BY THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY 

AND CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS. LIBERATION 

OF ENTIRE TERRITORIES OF THE NORTHERN PART OF 

THE REPUBLIC. ENEMY'S LOSSES IN MEN AND 

MATERIALS 

(October 25, 1950-June 10, 1951) 



SECTION 1 



Entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers into the Korean War. 

Rout of the Enemy in Woonsan-Onjung Areas. Defence in 

Hwangcho-ryung Region. Activities of the Korean People's 

Army Units in the Second Front 



The Korean people carried 
ENTRY OF THE CHINESE out successfully the difficult 

PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS IN- strategic retreat to regroup 

TO THE KOREAN WAR the ranks of the People's 

Army and prepare for a new 

decisive counter-attack. At this time the Chinese people, rais- 
ing aloft the banner of "Resist U.S. Aggression, Aid Korea, 
Protect the Homes and Defend the Country," sent their 
volunteers, organized with their best sons and daughters, to 
aid with their own blood the Korean people in their righteous 
war. 

From the very first day of the war, the American imperial- 
ists, the ringleader of world reaction, considered the aggres- 

136 



sive war against the Korean people as a link in their wild 
scheme of Asian and world conquest. 

Regarding it as a thorn in their flesh that the Korean and 
Chinese peoples have become masters of their own countries, 
the U.S. imperialists were phrenetic in their scheme to wipe- 
out the successes of the people's democratic revolutions in Ko- 
rea and China. It was their plan to overthrow the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea and then use Korea as a spring- 
board to invade the People's Republic of China. 

Therefore, when they launched the aggressive war in Ko- 
rea, the U.S. aggressors ordered their 7th Fleet to invade the 
territorial waters of China and occupy Taiwan. 

From the outset of the U.S. armed intervention in Korea, 
the Government of the People's Republic of China and the 
Chinese people followed closely every move of the U.S. imperi- 
alists. 

Foreign Minister Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of 
China warned the U.S. Government against its aggressive 
acts: 

"The Chinese people are deeply concerned about the situa- 
tion which was brought about after the American imperialists 
invaded Korea. The Chinese people will not tolerate foreign 
aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neigh- 
bours being savagely invaded by imperialists." 

The U.S. aggressors, however, ignored the Chinese Gov- 
ernment's warning. On the contrary, they intensified the war, 
and their attempt to invade China became even more naked. 

U.S. planes began to attack Northeast China from August 
1950. Between August 27 and October 29, 1950, U.S. planes in- 
vaded the air space of China no less than 151 times. The U.S. 
planes bombed and strafed, killing a great number of Chinese 
people and destroying peaceful establishments. Moreover, they 
perpetrated provocative acts of intruding frequently into 
China's territorial waters and bombarding Chinese merchant 
vessels. 

By late October the American aggressors had penetrated 
deep into the northern part of our country, reaching the Kore- 
an-Chinese borders in some places and threatening China 
directly. U.S. planes intensified bombing and machine-gunning 
on the Chinese territory. 

137 



This further inflamed the Chinese people. At this time, the 
General Council of the Chinese People for Resisting U.S. Ag- 
ression and Aiding Korea, headed by Kuc Mo-jo, was formed 
inChina. The Chinese people could tolerate no longer the U.S. 
aggressive acts which threatened the security of the People's 
Republic of China. Under the sacred banner of "Resist U.S. 
aggression and Aid Korea," the Chinese people organized and 
ent the People's Volunteers to the Korean front. 

The Korean and Chinese peoples have long enjoyed the rel- 
ations of brotherly and militant friendship formed in the 
ourse of the fight against their common enemy. 

Especially, the anti-Japanese partisans organized and led 
)y the Korean communists headed by Marshal Kim II Sung 
waged for 15 years a joint struggle with the Chinese people ag 
ainst the common enemy, Japanese imperialism. 

After the defeat of Japanese imperialism, a good number of 
Korean patriots joined the Chinese People's Liberation Army 
to aid the Chinese people in their war against the American im- 
perialists and Kuomintang reactionary regime. 

Therefore, Comrade Mao Tse-tung said that the bright five- 
starred national flag of the People's Republic of China was also 
dyed with the blood of the Korean revolutionaries. Thus the Ko- 
rean and Chinese peoples always sympathized with and aided 
each other in their struggle for the national independence and 
freedom against foreign invaders and their henchmen. Hence 
it was a fresh expression of comradely mutual aid, based on pro- 
letarian internationalism formed through their long-standing 
friendship and joint struggle, that the Chinese people stretched 
out a warm helping hand to the Korean people at the critical 
juncture when the Korean people were engaged in an arduous 
war in defending their freedom from the all-out offensive of the 
American aggressors. 

Historical facts show that Korea's fate is closely bound 
with China's safety, and vice versa. Consequently, to the Chi- 
nese people to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea meant de- 
fending their own country. 

In support of the Chinese People's Resist U S. Aggression 
and Aid Korea Movement, the Chinese Communist Party and 
democratic political parties and social organizations, in their 
joint statement, declared on November 4, 1950: 

138 



"Just as the Japanese imperialists did, the U.S. imperial 
ists, in invading Korea, aim not only at Korea but chiefly al 
China." Historical facts teach us that Korea's existence is 
closely linked with China's fate, just as the teeth are exposed 
without lips and a broken door threatens the safety of a home. 
The Chinese people's aid to the Korean people in the war a- 
gainst the United States was presented not only as moral 
responsibility, but also as the necessity of self-defense, because 
it was closely connected with the vital interests of the entire 
Chinese people." 

The Chinese People's Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Ko- 
rea Movement was a manifestation of the historic militant 
comradeship between the two peoples based on proletarian 
internationalism, and a patriotic movement to safeguard their 
country. And at the same time it formed an important link in 
the world peace movement to prevent the U.S. imperialists from 
kindling the third world war and to defend peace and security 
in the Far East and of the world. 

The great Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea MQVC- 
ment launched by the Chinese people under the leadership of 
the Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, 
along with the internationalist aid of the peoples of the social- 
ist camp, constituted one of the decisive factors which enabled 
the Korean people to win the glorious victory in the Father- 
land Liberation War. And at the same time, this movement 
became a driving force in consolidating the great victory of 
the people's revolution in China and further solidifying the 
people's democratic system, and developing China politically, 
economically, culturally and militarily. Moreover, this move- 
ment was a great inspiration to the struggle for defending 
world peace and security, frustrating the designs of the Ame- 
rican and British imperialists to unleash another war. It in- 
spired greatly the peoples under the yoke of colonialism in 
their struggle for independence and national liberation. 

Concerning the justness and significance of the participa- 
tion of the Chinese People's Volunteers in the Korean war, 
Marshal Kim II Sung said: 

"The participation of the Chinese People's Volunteers in 
the Korean war denotes not only the great significance of moral 
relations of age-long friendship between the Korean and Chi- 

139 



nese peoples, the solid defence of their own fatherland, and the 
peace and security of the world, especially in the Far East, but 
also constitutes a graphic demonstration of lofty international- 
ism newly shaped in human society after the victory of the 
Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia." 

On October 25, 1950, the Chinese People's Volunteers ap- 
peared on the Korean front. 

The appearance of the Chinese People's Volunteers on the 
Korean front brought about a radical change in Ihe war picture, 
turning the scales in favour of the Korean People's Army. 

Thus the Korean People's Army, having made full prepara- 
tions for a new counter-attack in a short space of time under 
the distinguished strategic guidance of Supreme Commander 
Marshal Kim II Sung, entered the third stage of the war in 
close cooperation with the Chinese People's Volunteers. 



The strategy adopted by 
FIRST JOINT CAMPAIGN the Party for the third stage 

OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S of the Fatherland Liberation 

ARMY AND THE CHINESE War was that the Korean 

PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS People's Army in close co- 

operation with the Chinese 
People's Volunteers check the 
enemy's attack, drive them 
back south of the 38th parallel, reorganize our forces and make 
new preparations for a final victory by waging a continued war 
of attrition. 

In the latter part of October 1950 the U.S. aggressive army 
and their mercenaries continued their desperate offensives hav- 
ing occupied many districts of the northern part of our Re- 
public. 

However, as a result of the resolute defensive battles put 
up by the Korean People's Army units, big gaps were created 
between enemy positions, especially between the eastern and 
western parts of the front. 

Imminent danger was created in the enemy's rear by the 
Korean People's Army units on the second front. 

After getting a good grasp of the prevailing situation, 
Marshal Kim II Sung ordered that the units on the second 

140 



front should step up activities in the enemy's rear, delivering 
them a blow, while the units on the western front make a 
powerful counter-attack on the enemy north of the Chungchun 
River to check their advance, and that other units on the 
eastern front delay the enemy's attack by waging a stubborn 
defensive battle and create favourable conditions for a future 
decisive counter-attack. 

Accordingly, units of the Korean People's Army and Chi- 
nese People's Volunteers started the first operations from Oc- 
tober 25 against the enemy who had penetrated deep into the 
northern part. In the western part of the front, the combined 
units of the Korean and Chinese armed forces were 
to launch a counter-attack with the object of crushing the enemy 
who had penetrated into, the area north of the Chungchun 
River. The Korean and Chinese units were to administer blows 
in the direction of Pakchun and Kaichun from the Onjung- 
Hichun area, the perimeters of the enemy, maneuvering the 
enemy back to Sunchun and Koosung districts. 

On October 25, the Korean and Chinese units, dealing 
blows to the enemy units west of Onjung, freed Onjung by 
night-fall. This was the first joint operations of the Korean 
People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. Between 
October 28 and 29, the Korean and Chinese forces encircled and 
wiped out puppet army units near Koodoo-dong east of Onjung 
and Kojang south of Chosan. On October 31 the Korean and 
Chinese forces were active in the vicinity of the Taichun- 
Jungjoo line. They lured the U.S. and British armies to the 
Sunchun-Koosung district and delivered heavy blows at them. 

Coinciding with this, the Chinese People's Volunteers units 
checked the enemy in the north of Hichun and liberated it on 
October 29. Then they pressed on to Wonri to the north of Kai- 
chun on November 2, thereby threatening the right wing of the 
rear of the enemy that had crossed the Chungchun River. The 
Korean and Chinese forces active in the north of Woonsan be 
sieged and annihilated on November 2 the U.S. and puppet army 
units in the Woonsan district. The Korean and Chinese units, 
which had liberated Onjung, kept their southwestward advance. 
Having suffered staggering blows, the enemy on November 2 
began a general retreat from the north of the Chungchun River. 

Korean and Chinese fortes giving hot pursuit to the fleeing 
enemy reached Jungjoo and Taichun. In the meantime, our 

141 



units active in the south of Woonsan extended their gains in 
the direction of the south of Nyungbyun and Pakchun. The Ko- 
rean and Chinese forces active on the Wonri line continued to 
hit the enemy in the direction of Kaichun and other army units 
advanced on to Dukchun. 

Thus the Korean and Chinese army units on the western 
front delivered crushing blows to the enemy divisions and had 
driven them away south of the Chungchun River by- 
November 5. 

In these battles, the Korean and Chinese units killed, 
wounded, or captured more than 15,000 enemy soldiers and of- 
ficers, and destroyed or captured enormous amounts of combat 
materials. 

The counter-attacks of the Korean and Chinese forces 
smashed the "blitzkrieg" the enemy dreamed of. The enemy 
fancied they would reach the Amrok River before Thanksgiving 
Day, November 23. 

But the enemy, still boastful of "technical superiority," did 
not give up its aggressive scheme to extend the war to the 
Korean-Chinese borders and occupy the whole of Korea. 

After regrouping and reinforcing its forces the enemy made 
frantic attacks against our army on the western front. Under 
such circumstances the Korean and Chinese forces, dealing 
heavy blows to the enemy, withdrew their main forces to the 
north of the Chungchun River in order to create favourable con- 
ditions for future operations. 

In the meantime, the People's Army units on the eastern 
front waged positive defensive battles in cooperation with the 
counter-attacks of the units on the western front. 

The People's Army units which went over to the defence 
on Hwangcho-ryung and Boojun-ryung ranges, beat back the 
desperate attacks of the U.S. 10th Corps and the 1st Corps of 
the puppet Syngman Rhee army on October 25. And the Chinese 
People's Volunteers units entered this battle on October 27. The 
defensive battle on the Hwangcho-ryung Range lasted for 13 
days. 

In these battles the Korean and Chinese forces, in close 
cooperation, killed, wounded, or captured more than 3,600 
enemy soldiers. 

On November 6, taking advantage of geographically 
favourable conditions Korean and Chinese units locked them- 

142 



selves in the Lake Jangjin area luring the enemy there. Here 
they frustrated the enemy's attack. 

The strong defence of the Korean and Chinese armies 011 
Hwangcho-ryung and Boojun-ryung Ranges and the shores of 
Lake Jangjin foiled the enemy's attempt to strike a blow at 
our units from behind by making a detour in the direction of 
Kangge. 

Meanwhile, some units of the Korean People's Army fought 
furiously the U.S. 7th Division in Poongsan district, and other 
People's Army'units fought fierce battles on the Machun-ryung- 
Kimchaik-Kiljoo line. 

On November 6, the People's Army units active along the 
east coastal areas went over to the defence of the Uhrang 
River. The People's Army fighters repulsed several attacks of 
the numerically superior enemy. By November 12 the enemy 
was pushed back 10 kilometres southwards. 

During these battles the Party members and inhabitants 
in Uhrang organized themselves into stretcher-bearer groups 
and carried the wounded soldiers to the rear, while women pre- 
pared food for the fighters'and took it to them on the hills, brav- 
ing the hail of enemy bullets. 

Fighters and local pepple fought in a body against the 
enemy. 

The support of the people inspired the fighters of the Peo- 
ple's Army to even greater services in war. 

The Korean People's Army units on the eastern front were, 
for the most part, formed of recruits. Nevertheless, they 
resisted stubbornly the adventurous attacks of the numerically 
superior enemy by displaying high degree of patriotic devotion 
and self-sacrificing spirit. 

Meanwhile, from the latter part of October the People's 
Army units on the second front under the command of Comrade 
Choi Hyun hit the enemy from the rear. To resist the People's 
Army units on the second front, the enemy brought up the 2nd 
Division of the puppet army in the Chulwon area and the 
British 29th Brigade in the Keumchun-Pyungsan line. Then 
towards the end of October the enemy organized the puppet 3rd 
Army Corps with two divisions, and deployed it near the 38th 
parallel. 

143 



But, from the end of October to the beginning of Novem- 
ber, the People's Army units on the second front waged furious 
battles, liberating Yangduk and Koksan and driving a wedge 
between the enemy units on the eastern and western fronts. 
By November 11, other units of the People's Army wiped out the 
enemy and liberated Shinkosan, Scpo, Pyonggang, Ichun, Chul- 
won, Keumhwa, Hwachun, and Yangkoo. As a result, the routes 
of the enemy forces on the eastern and central fronts were cut 
off from their rear. 

The battle to liberate Chulwon between November 5 and 23 
was the fiercest. 

The puppet 2nd Division and the police were concentrated 
in Chulwon. 

On November 5, our army units on the second front made 
a surprise advance to Chulwon, encircled and gave the enemy 
a hard punch. And they liberated Chulwon. However, the enemy 
regrouped and reinforced their forces with those from the vicini- 
ty of Ryunchun to recover Chulwon. The battle lasted for 
several days and finally on November 23 Chulwon fell into 
our hand. 

In the Chulwon battles, our army units killed, wounded or 
captured over 3,400 soldiers and officers and blocked the enemy's 
advance northward. The enemy could not go beyond Chulwon. 
Between November 5 and 9 other units on the second front 
liberated Shibyunri and Shinke districts, restricted the U.S. 
forces deployed in the area of Pyongsan and Keumchun from 
moving to the western part of the front and cut off the enemy's 
reinforcements. 

Many areas of Kangwon, Hwsnghai and South Pyongan 
provinces were liberated thanks to the resolute fight of the 
People's Army units on the second front. Party and govern- 
ment organizations were restored in the liberated areas. 

The people and fighters on the second front displayed to the 
full lofty patriotism, heroism and undaunted fighting spirit in 
the strenuous battles behind the enemy line. They were short of 
munitions and food. Even in severe cold they fought in sum- 
mer uniforms-. But they executed their battle tasks with credit. 

The men and officers of the Korean People's Army, who 
have been educated and trained by the Party and have inherit- 
ed the glorious patriotic revolutionary tradition of the anti- 

144 



Japanese partisans, fought valiantly to the bitter end against 
the enemy, braving every difficulty and danger in defence of the 
Party, Government and the revolutionary gains of the people. 

Political and Party organizations of the units carried out 
ttie Party organizational and political work and political edu- 
cation work, seeing to it that armymen observed rigidly dis- 
cipline, and strengthened in every way the unbreakable ties with 
the people. 

The fighters of the People's Army units behind the enemy 
line devoted everything to the interest of the people, strength- 
ening their kinship with them. They defended the people from 
the enemy's encroachment, saved many patriots, and carried on 
the political agitation work to inspire the people with firm con- 
viction in victory. 

The People's Armymen assisted the restored local Party 
and government organs in their work and helped peasants in 
their farming in the intervals between battles. Aiding the men 
and officers of the People's Army on the second front, the peo- 
ple also resolutely fought against the enemy. The people join- 
ed the partisans. They organized armed self-defence forces in 
the liberated areas to defend their native villages. Moreover, 
men and women, young and old, rose up to weed out spies 
and saboteurs. 

In the areas liberated by the Korean People's Army a 
large number of youth came forward to join the ranks of the 
Korean People's Army to fight the enemy in the rear. The 
people destroyed highways and bridges, helped in the trans- 
port of ammunition and war materials, and furnished the Peo- 
ple's Army with vital information. 

This ardent support and encouragement given by the peo- 
ple to the People's Army on the second front was a source of 
strength for victory in the fight in the enemy's rear. 

During one month our forces on the second front killed, 
wounded or captured 12,800 enemy men and officers and cap- 
tured quantities of combat materials. Moreover the enemy's 
rear was made insecure and the enemy's communication lines 
were disrupted. Thus the struggle waged by the units of the 
Korean People's Army in the vast areas under enemy occupa- 
tion contributed greatly to the successful campaigns by the 
Korean and Chinese forces on the main front. 

145 



During the first joint campaign, October 25-November 
24, the units of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese 
People's Volunteers dealt heavy blows to the enemy. And the 
combined Korean and Chinese forces were ready to give a yet 
more decisive blow to him. 



SECTION 2 

Enemy Crushed on the Chungchun River and Lake Jangjin. 
Units on the Second Front Act in Coordinated Operation with 
the Units on the Front Line. Liberation of the Northern Part 

of the Republic 



CONFERENCE OF COMMAND- 
ERS AND POLITICAL COM- 
MISSARS OF COMBINED 
UNITS OF THE KOREAN 
PEOPLE'S ARMY 



When the first joint cam- 
paign of the Korean and 
Chinese people's forces was 
being successfully carried out 
a conference of command- 
ers and political commissars 
of units of the Korean Peo- 
ple's Army was held in 
November 1950. At the con- 
ference Marshal Kim II Sung made a report on "The Summing 
Up of Four Months of the Fatherland Liberation War and Our 
Future Tasks." 

Analysing the merits and defects in the first and second 
stages of the Fatherland Liberation War, Marshal Kim II Sung 
set down in his report the Party's strategy for the third stage 
of the war, which was worked out drawing on the valuable ex- 
periences gained in the past two stages, and taking into account 
our country's geographical conditions, manpower and equip- 
ment, and characteristics of the enemy's military operations. 

He urged to stubbornly defend the areas under our con- 
trol, persistently prepare for the future counter-attack and do 
everything to wear the enemy down. The units in the enemy's 
rear, he went on, must foment partisan warfare, cut off the 
enemy's supply routes, exterminate his manpower and destroy 
his war materials. 

Moreover he stressed that the precious time earned with 



146 



the blood of Korean and Chinese soldiers must be used for 
securing reserves, for improving the arms and intensifying the 
combat and political training so as to deliver strong blows to 
the enemy. Particularly Marshal Kim II Sung stressed that the 
ideological work among the soldiers should be intensified in 
preparation for counter-attacks. He said that the ideological 
work should be directed to instilling in the men and officers 
firm conviction of final victory. 

Marshal Kim II Sung went on: 

"Victory does not come of itself. It is to be achieved by 
overcoming all kinds of difficulties and bottlenecks. We must 
wage a merciless struggle against defeatists who tremble, 
waver and get discouraged before difficulties instead of fear- 
lessly surmounting them." 

He further emphasized that the decision of the Political 
Committee of the Party Central Committee on establishing 
political organs and Party organizations in the Korean Peo- 
ple's Army should be thoroughly executed. The Party work 
among the soldiers must be strengthened to enhance their 
combat strength and steel-like discipline. At Ihe same time the 
entire men and officers should be educated in the spirit of no- 
ble patriotic devotion and valour. The role of Party members 
as an advance guard both in battle and military and political 
training must be elevated. Coordinated operation with the 
Chinese People's Volunteers should be duly organized and 
the militant friendship, solidarity between the Korean Peo 
pie's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers should be 
further strengthened and consolidated in every possible way. 
And the units in the enemy's rear should deepen their kindred 
relationship with the people. 

In conclusion, Marshal Kim II Sung appealed to the en- 
tire commanders, officers, non-commissioned officers and men 
to rally more closely around the Party Central Committee and 
the Government and keep onward march bravely to crush the 
U.S. aggressors and their lackeys — traitorous Syngman Rhee 
clique — and liberate our fatherland. This conference was of 
great importance in preparing the couoter-attack by the units 
of the People's Army, in strengthening the Party political 
work and steel-like .military discipline, and in achieving final 
victory. 

147 



SECOND JOINT CAM- 

PAIGN OF THE KOREAN 
AND CHINESE FORCES LI- 
BERATION OF THE NORTH- 
ERN PART OF THE REPUB- 
LIC 



Though the enemy suffered 
a staggering biow at the 
hands of the heroic Korean 
and Chinese forces and its 
plan to occupy the entire Ko- 
rea by Thanksgiving Day 
was shattered, the enemy 
was far from giving up its 
aggressive aims. 

The enemy next came up 
with another goal: "All Ko- 
rea by Christmas!" 

For "Christmas Offensive" the enemy supplemented and 
reinforced its forces which had sustained heavy losses in the 
preceding battles. Moreover, its entire reserves were thrown 
into the front line. The enemy brought into Korea the U.S. 
Third Division in addition to its mercenaries from France, 
Thailand, the Netherland and other satellites. 

The U.S. 1st and 9th Army Corps and the 2nd Army Corps 
of puppet Syngman Rhee were to man the line from Dukchun 
on the west front to the west coast, 75-80 kilometres long, and 
the U.S. 10th Army Corps and the puppet 1st Army Corps 
were concentrated in the districts of Lake Jangjin and Chung- 
jin. The enemy figured that they could swiftly reach the Amrok 
River by breaking through our defence line in the Chungchun 
River and Lake Jangjin area. He planned to besiege 
and crush our main forces in the north of the Chungchun River 
and Kangge areas. 

The enemy air force kept bombing our positions, supply 
lines and the rear in preparation for their offensive. Then on 
November 23 MacArthur encouraged the U.S. soldiers, saying 
that the boys would be going home for Christmas. 

Truman and Austin prated that only the unconditional 
surrender by North Korea would end the war and before long 
General MacArthur would get such surrender on the Amrok 
and Dooman Rivers! 

In such situation the Supreme Headquarters of the Ko- 
rean People's Army drew up the plan for the second campaign 
according to the line laid down by Marshal Kim II Sung, at 

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the commanders and political commissars conference. The plan 
called for besieging and crushing the enemy in the Chungchun 
River, Lake Jangjin and Chungjin areas and liberating the 
territory north of the 38th parallel in coordinated operations 
with the units on the second front. 

The Supreme Headquarters built up powerful forces in the 
north of Jungjoo, Taichun, Woonsan, Dukchun, Nyungwon and 
in the Lake Jangjin and Chungjin areas for launching counter- 
attacks. And in order to strengthen the forces in the enemy's 
rear the Supreme Headquarters dispatched some units of the 
Korean People's Army to the Maingsan- Yangduk area. And 
measures were taken to intensify reconnaissance and organize 
effective air-raid protection at the front. Some highways also 
were restored to keep our supply lines open. Thus the Korean 
and Chinese forces were fully ready for a counter-attack. 

On November 24 the American invaders again went over 
to general offensive. 

To deal with the enemy the Korean and Chinese People's 
units went over to a decisive counter-attack on the evening of 
November 25. 

In the coordinated operation with the Chinese People's 
Volunteers, the Korean People's Army units liberated Jungjoo 
on November 25 and pushed the enemy in the direction of Pak- 
chun. Other units of the Korean People's Army and the Chin 
ese People's Volunteers administered a heavy blow to the U.S. 
1st and 9th Army Corps in the Woonsan and Taichun areas. 
The enemy's offensive was disrupted and our forces closed in 
upon Pakchun and Nyungbyun on November 28. 

The Chinese People's Volunteers mauled most of the 2nd 
Corps of the puppet army on November 26 and pressed on to 
Kaichun and Soonchun. Some of these units reached Samsori 
village, 10 km. southeast of Kaichun, and cut off the enemy's 
retreat route on November 28. At this point the enemy rein- 
forced its forces in the area by bringing up part of the U.S. 
1st Cavalry Division and British 29th Brigade which had been 
in the Soonchun area. Though hemmed in on the south and 
north, our units in Samsori kept waging a brave fight. 

On November 29 the U.S. 1st Corps crossed the Chung 
chun River to the south and withdrew to the Anjoo region and 



the units of the U.S. 9th Corps were pushed into the Kaichun 
area. Faced with encirclement the enemy desperately attempt- 
ed -to disengage themselves. But our forces assaulted them 
from three directions and on November 30 routed the Turkish 
Brigade and the American divisions in the Kaichun area. In 
this battle, the Turkish Brigade was almost completely wiped 
out and the rest fled leaving quantities of combat materials. 
In the meantime, units of the Chinese People's Volunteers who 
had been attacking the enemy in the Nyungwon region advanc- 
ed to Shinchang, east of Soonchun, on November 30, menac- 
ing the flank of the enemy's rear. 

The enemy began a general retreat on December 1, 1950. 
along the whole front in the west. As the enemy began to re- 
treat our units advanced in the direction of Anjoo and 
Soonchun. Moreover, our forces cut off the enemy's escape 
route, and pursued the fleeing enemy. At that time the units 
of the Korean People's Army on the second front which had 
been active in the Kangdong-Sungchun areas attacked the 
enemy in a closer coordinated operation with the units which 
had been advancing southwards, and liberated the city of 
Pyongyang from the temporary occupation of the American im- 
perialist aggressive forces on December 6. 

On the occasion of the liberation of Pyongyang, congra- 
tulating the entire people and the Korean People's Army and 
the Chinese People's Volunteers, Supreme Commander 
Marsha! Kim II Sung appealed to the units of the People's 
Army to further speed up the tempo of the offensive and in- 
tensify partisan warfare in the enemy's rear so as to give the 
enemy no breathing spell for regrouping. 

The people who had been groaning under murderous atro- 
cities and humiliation during the enemy's temporary occupa- 
tion welcomed with boundless joy and emotion the advancing 
units of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's 
Volunteers. Having liberated Pyongyang, the units of the Ko- 
rean People's Army gave hot chase to the fleeing enemy, lib- 
erated Nampo on December 8, Sariwon on December 11. 

In coordination with fierce counter-attacks of the units of 
the Korean and Chinese people's armies on the main line, the 
People's Army in the western and southern regions of the se- 
cond front cut off the enemy's retreat routes and waged a stub- 

152 



born tight which checked the enemy's reinforcements. 

The second front units of the People's Army fighting on 
the Sooan line cut off the enemy's retreat. The enemy was 
retreating from Pyongyang to Shinke district and our units 
made a surprise attack on them inflicting heavy losses on them. 
Then our units marched down to Keumchun-Kaesong districts 
from the Shinke-Shibyunri region, smashing the British 29th 
Brigade and the 5th Division of the puppet Rhee's army that 
were providing a cover to their retreat. 

Advancing to the region southeast of Shibyunri, the second 
front units of the People's Army in Pyonggang and Chulwon 
district mauled the enemy retreating along the Sooan-Ryun- 
chun highway. A unit of the People's Army on the second front 
active in Chulwon and Keumhwa districts delivered a crush- 
ing blow to the puppet 3rd Army Corps which was trying des- 
perately to cover the retreat. At that time in the region south 
of Junkokri, Ryunchun County, a unit of the People's Army 
killed General Walker, Commander of the U.S. 8th Army, and 
80 of his staff members who came to organize the retreat of 
their units. 

The units of the People's Army active in the western and 
southern areas of the second front, with the main units of the 
Korean-Chinese forces taking counter-offensive on the main 
front, had destroyed or driven out the enemy from the western 
and central areas north of the 38th parallel by December 24. 

Parallel with the counter-offensive on the western front, 
Korean-Chinese units in the Jangjin Lake area started 
action on November 27. 

The Jangjin Lake battle was a very severe one. Our men 
fighting the enemy in the severe cold and heavy snowstorm 
also had to conquer steep mountains, some 1,000 metres above 
the sea level. 

Our units started counter-attack in the region west and 
southwest of Jangjin Lake on the night of November 27. After 
dislodging the enemy from the Sawoong range in Ryutamri, 
the Korean-Chinese forces pressed the enemy hard at Hagal- 
woori (Jangjin) from both flanks. Our units in the north and 
east of Jangjin Lake attacked the enemy in Shinheungri on 
both flanks. Units of the Chinese People's Volunteers fighting 
in Shinhari districts, southwest of Jangjin Lake, crushed the 

J 54 



enemy south of Hagalwoori, and cut off the road from Jangjin 
to Hamheung to prevent the enemy from reinforcing and ret- 
reating. 

Around the Jangjin Lake area the U.S. 10th Army Corps 
was encircled by our army. The enemy made desperate attempts 
day after day to break through the encirclement, and the ene- 
my air force was most active. 

For two days, November 28-29, the enemy in the south of 
Kotori made desperate attempts to open an escape road for 
their units encircled in the Jangjin Lake area. But gradually 
our units narrowed the encirclement. On December 1, our 
units exterminated most of the enemy in the Shinheungri re- 
gion. The remaining enemy forces gathered at Hagalwoori 
where they decided to make a stand. Our units persistently 
closed in on them in Hagalwoori. 

Especially furious was the battle of Height 1,071 situated 
on the southern end of Hagalwoori. 

The unit led by Yang Ken-ssu, Hero of the Chinese Peo- 
ple's Volunteers, which had been ordered to hold the height, 
repulsed eight times the enemy who stormed the height in 
large waves. The enemy lost some 500 men and officers. The 
unit fought to the last man to defend the height, displaying 
heroism and the noble spirit of proletarian internationalism. 

The enemy lost most of its men in the Jangjin Lake area 
enveloped by our units and the small remaining force began to 
retreat southward on December 6. 

The Korean and Chinese units gave hot chase to the ret- 
reating enemy and on December 18 liberated Hamheung 

As the enemy forces were battered in the Jangjin Lake 
area, other units of the enemy which had advanced as far as 
Hyesan were cut olf and began to flee towards Kim Chaik and 
Riwon when the People's Army there started pounding them. 

And our units active in the region north of Chungjin liber- 
ated Kiljoo and Kim Chaik on December 9. Part of enemy 
force fled from Kim Chaik by sea, and the rest, with other 
enemy units retreating from Poongsan, ran southward. The 
units of the People's Army freed Bookchung on December 10. 

As our units on the eastern front went over to counter- 
156 



THE JANGJIN LAKE BATTLE 

(November 27-December 17, 19o0) 




offensive, the units of the People's Army active on the Majunri 
Yangduk line behind the enemy hit the enemy from the rear 
and liberated Wonsan on December 6. Consequently the enemy's 
retreat by land on the eastern front was completely blocked. 
The units of the People's Army which were pursuing the enemy 
along the east coast, in cooperation with the combined Korean- 
Chinese People's forces attacking from Hwangcho-ryung and 
Hamheung, drove the enemy into the Heungnam-Ryunpo area. 
Our forces concentrated fire on the enemy squeezed in this 
area, giving them a blood-bath. What was left of the enemy 
escaped by sea from Heungnam on December 24. As a result, 
we drove the enemy out of the eastern area north of the 38th 
parallel completely. 

The people's partisan detachments waging vigorous strug- 
gles in the area under enemy occupation stepped up their ac- 
tivities as the Korean-Chinese forces went over to the offen- 
sive. They launched surprise attacks on the enemy, cut off 
enemy's retreat route, disrupted its communication lines, and 
disposed of its gendarme, police, "Chiandai" (a reactionary 
security corps) and other reactionary organizations. 

During the second joint campaign, from November 25 to 
December 24, 1950, the units of the Korean People's Army and 
the Chinese People's Volunteers wiped out some 36,000 officers 
and soldiers of the enemy including 24,200 Americans 
and destroyed or captured a vast amount of military equipment. 

Thus the MacArthur's "Christmas offensive" failed miser- 
ably and the myth about the '"invincible" U.S. was shattered. 
Even the New York Herald Tribune lamented that it was the 
biggest defeat the U.S. army had ever suffered in its history. 

Through this campaign the units of the Korean-Chinese 
people's forces drove the enemy beyond the 38th parallel and 
the northern part of the country was completely liberated. 

Special mention should be made of the units of the Peo- 
ple's Army on the second front. In parallel with the counter 
attack on the front, they did not allow the fleeing enemy to 
pause and organize themselves for defence battles. Thus they 
aided greatly in liberating the northern part of the country. 

The Korean-Chinese forces demonstrated with striking 

159 



clarity the might of joint operation and strengthened militant 
comradeship and unity between the units of the Korean Peo- 
ple's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. 



SECTION 3 



Third Plenum of the C.C. of the Workers' Party of Korea. 
Rout of the Enemy in the South of the 38th Parallel 



Though the enemy was 

battered severely, it was 

THIRD PLENUM OF THE , ,, ., . , 

planning another military 
C.C. OF THE WORKERS' , . , 

adventure, hoping to recover 

PARTY OF KOREA. STRENG- f ., ■ , , , „ . 

from the miserable defeat. 

THENING OF THE PARTY, c , ... .. ... 

faced with the new mili- 

STATE AND MILITARY DIS- . . , •■• i t - 

tary and political situation, 

the Workers' Party of Korea 
laid down new measures for 
winning final victory in the 
war. First of all, the Party 
and state organs and social organizations should be restor- 
ed in the liberated areas, the severely damaged nation- 
al economy rehabilitated, the deteriorated people's living 
stabilized and the rear fortified. Hardship created during the 
temporary enemy occupation should be eliminated, and the 
Party and state organs should be made to function to meet 
the requirements of the front. The fighting power 
of the People's Army should be strengthened in order to con- 
solidate and extend the gains won by the joint actions of the 
Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers. 

For the successful execution of these important tasks, it 
was necessary to further strengthen the Party, the organizer 
OT the victory of the Korean people. And the Party recognized 
the need of strengthening Party, state and military descipline 
to overcome disorder and lack of discipline caused by the 
following: 

160 



Firstly, during the period of the strategic retreat of the 
People's Army some Party and government organs and 
leading Party workers failed to organize promptly the retreat 
and systematically mobilize all possible forces. Nor did they 
properly imbue the people and armymen with revolutionary 
spirit of surmounting all difficulties. 

Secondly, activities of spies and factional elements became 
more pronounced during the difficult period. 

The Pak Hun Yung-Li Seung Yup clique, the U.S. spies, 
worked to wreck the unity of Party ranks and the political, 
moral unity of the popular masses. 

Pak Hun Yung made an attempt to split the Party, oppos- 
ing openly the Party instructions or neglecting their implemen- 
tation. 

The anti-Party, factional element Huh Ga I was indulging 
in a loose life, though he was charged with reporting the strug- 
gle of our people to the world and carrying out the mass politi- 
cal work to inspire the people and armymen. Then there were 
Pak 11 Woo, Choi Chang Ik and other anti-Party factional ele- 
ments. Vilifying the Party policy they attempted to foment 
disruption of the Party. They thought that it was high time 
for their factional activities. 

Thirdly, some commanders of the People's Army lacked 
organizing ability to face the difficult situation and failed to 
carry out promptly their superior's orders. 

Lastly, some Party members and a segment of population 
were seized with demoralization in face of the trial of retreat. 

These shortcomings were attributable to the fact that some 
Party organizations and workers failed to ensure political edu 
cation, to imbue the masses with the spirit of overcoming all 
hardships and difficulties. These workers did their work in a 
perfunctory manner in leading the masses. 

Unless these negative phenomena that appeared during the 
temporary retreat were corrected, the Party could not be 
strengthened nor the armed forces be reinforced, nor the rear 
be consolidated. 

In order to ensure the victory, the important tasks set be- 

161 



fore the party were, first of all, to tighten up the slackened dis- 
cipline and eliminate disorder within the Party, government 
organs and the army. 

Under such situation, the historically significant Third 
Plenum of the C.C. of the Workers' Party of Korea was con- 
vened in the city of K.angge in the latter part of December 
1950. It took up the question of eliminating all shortcomings 
revealed during the temporary retreat, implementing a num- 
ber of tasks facing the Party, and in particular, strengthening 
the revolutionary discipline of the Party, government and 
army, and consolidating further the front and the rear. 

At the Plenum Marshal Kim II Sung made a report on the 
"Present Situation And Our Immediate Tasks." 

In his report he reviewed the military situation of each 
stage in the course of the six months of war and the policy the 
Party followed during that period. 

Pointing out that the Fatherland Liberation War would 
be a long-drawn-out war, Marshal Kim II Sung set forth the 
tasks to strengthen the Party unity and its fighting power, to 
reinforce the armed forces of the People's Army, to consolidate 
the internationalist friendship and solidarity with the countries 
of the socialist camp, and to fortify the rear. Speaking on the 
grave shortcomings revealed in the course of the war, Marshal 
Kim II Sung said that one of the most important questions the 
Party faced was the strengthening of the Party, government 
and military discipline. He said: 

"One of the basic conditions for enabling us to rout the 
vicious enemy and win a glorious victory is to strengthen the 
Party discipline more than ever before and rally firmly the Party 
ranks around the Central Committee. It is indeed a serious 
matter that the Party discipline is still weak. To carry 
out the Party instructions resolutely, properly and in time des- 
pite all kinds of difficulties should be the guiding principles 
dominating the whole Party... We must wage a merciless strug- 
gle against every trend which weakens the Party discipline. 
Anyone who violates the Party discipline, no matter who they 
are, is to be severely punished." 

He criticized formalism in the mass political work and the 
grave shortcomings that weaken the work of the United Front, 

162 



and set forth the important tasks to intensify the political work 
a<mong the masses and to carry through the Party policy on 
the United Front. 

Marshal Kim II Sung called on the Korean People's Army 
to intensify further the joint operation with the Chinese Peo- 
ple's Volunteers, deny the enemy any breathing spell for build- 
ing new defense lines and regrouping their scattered forces, 
wage expertly night battles against the technically superior 
enemy, elevate the leading abilities of the commanding staffs 
at every level and master various kinds of weapons and, above 
all, organize effective concerted operation with the artillery. 
And at the same time, he went on, the political work 
for the members of the People's Army should be stepped up and 
the People's Army be made an army with the steel-like disci- 
pline. ; A 

The report said that we must expose all the enemy's atro- 
cities before the eyes of the world and thus completely isolate 
them, while cementing the friendly relations with the demo* 
cratic countries, a guarantee of our final victory. 

Marshal Kim II Sung then emphasized the need of rehabili- 
tating the devastated rear and stabilizing the people's living. 
At the same time, he said, we must speedily restore the Party 
and government organs and social organizations to function 
normally in the liberated areas. And speaking on the need of 
rehabilitating the war-damaged economy, he said that we 
should restore all the enterprises and increase the wartime pro- 
duction to meet the ever-growing requirements of the front, 
and stabilize the people's livelihood and all the more reinforce 
the rear. 

The historical report made by Marshal Kim 11 Sung was a 
militant programme, under the new military, political situation, 
to strengthen revolutionary discipline of the Party, to consoli- 
date the front and the rear and to win final victory in the 
Fatherland Liberation War. 

And the Third Plenum of the C.C. of the Workers' Party of 
Korea adopted relevant decisions for implementing the tasks 
set forth in Marshal Kim II Sung's report. 

The Plenum also decided to unify trade unions, youth 
leagues, women's unions and cultural and art organizations of 

163 



the South and North into one organization respectively. 

The Third Plenum was the first plenum held during'the 
severe war and it marked a great turning point in all the 
domains of the Party and state life for ensuring the victory in 
the war. 

Following the Plenum the whole Party rallying still more 
firmly around the Party Central Committee unfolded a vigorous 
struggle to strengthen the Party, state and military discipline 

The Party looked into the responsibilities of those respon- 
sible workers who had violated during the temporary retreat 
the Party, state and military discipline and had done a harm 
to the work of the Party and state, especially to the waging of 
the war. The Party also took steps to eliminate in time the 
disorder, tighten up the slackened discipline and to establish 
the steel-like Party discipline, a guarantee of victory. 

However, some factional elements raised objections. Pak 
II Woo was one of them. He wailed: "This is too much! Can the 
Party punish those who deserve commendation?" But the Party 
took and carried through revolutionary measures in a short 
time on the basis of the decisions of the Third Plenum. 

Suffice it to say that had the Party failed lo take these re- 
volutionary measures at that time, the front and the rear could 
not have been strengthened in a short span of time after the re- 
treat. Consequently, victory in the war would not have been 
won, nor would the rapid rehabilitation and reconstruction of 
the rear have been possible. 

Thanks to the resolute measures taken by the Party, the 
unity and solidarity of the Party was further fortified and the 
Party, state and military discipline was more firmly strength- 
ened. The scars of the retreat period were rapidly healed. As a 
result, the Party and state functioned effectively ensuring the 
victory of the People's Army. And in close cooperation with the 
units of the Chinese People's Volunteers the People's Army, 
whose fighting power had been rapidly strengthened, gave hot 
pursuit to the fleeing enemy. 

The Third Plenum was of great importance in strengthen- 
ing the front and the rear and in preparing for the final victory 
in the war. It laid down military, political and economic mea- 
sures to be taken against the long-drawn-out war. 

164 



After the Third Plenum, 
the Party had strongly pro 

THIRD JOINT CAMPAIGN OF ^ ^ Htkal WQrk of 

THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ^ p ^^ ^ 

ARMY AND THE CHINESE and further intensified U _ 

PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS tkal education among the 

soldiers to further strength- 
en their fighting power. 

Under the condition in 
which our army had no sufficient number of aircraft the Party 
urged every member of the armed forces to master the art of 
mountain and night battles so as to inflict heavy losses on the 
enemy's manpower and surmount the "technical superiority" of 
the enemy. The Party paid keen attention to improving the 
abilities of the commanding staff at all levels, making the sol- 
diers become expert in handling their weapons; the Party em- 
phasized the importance of coordinated operations with artil- 
lery fire, as well as the speedy training of reserve units, the me- 
chanized troops in particular. 

In December 1950. Marshal Kim II Sung ordered that air- 
craft-hunting groups be organized and the anti-aircraft units 
strengthened to cope with the preponderant enemy's air force. 

This initiative taken by Marshal Kim II Sung became an- 
other creative pattern which applied and developed creatively 
the advanced military science to the concrete situation of the 
Korean war. 

Between December 1950 and January 1951, elections were 
held to the leading Party organs at all levels within the units 
of the Korean People's Army at the front and in the rear. 
Through these elections criticism and self-criticism were widely 
encouraged within the units of the People's Army. And the 
Party members were awakened more keenly to the sense of 
responsibility and became more enthusiastic in military affairs. 

Besides, in December 1950, the Party set up the civil af- 
fairs section in the People's Army in order to strengthen the 
relation with the Chinese People's Volunteers, to help establish 
close ties between the Chinese People's Volunteers and the 
people, especially to further consolidate the blood-relationship be- 
tween the People's Army and the people at the front and in the 

165 



rear. Moreover the civil affairs section was to help restore the 
Party and government bodies ajid stabilize the people's living 
in the liberated areas. Thanks to the above-mentioned mea- 
sures taken by the Party, the People's Army was greatly 
strengthened, militarily and politically. 

In order to gain time to reinforce their battered units and 
recover from the miserable defeat they sustained, the U.S. im- 
perialists invoking their voting machine in the 5th U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly set up the so-called "3 member committee" to 
"study" the problem of the deceptive "cease-fire" in Korea. 

The U.S. government, putting up the show of "armistice" 
on the one hand, proclaimed a state of emergency in the United 
States. Such measure was for expanding armaments and 
inducting a large number of recruits. In addition, the U.S. gov- 
ernment forced such satellite countries as Canada, New Zea- 
land, Belgium, Luxemburg to supply manpower to the Kore- 
an front. 

Then the MacArthur Headquarters, alleging that the failure 
of their "Christmas offensive" was due to "the severe cold" and 
"unfavourable weather", attempted to cling on to the myth 
about the "invincible" U.S. 

MacArthur ordered his aggressive troops to make a stand 
on the 38th parallel and check the advance of the People's 
Army. Accordingly, along the 38th parallel the enemy built up 
fortifications and several defensive positions in the rear up to 
the 37th parallel. Then the enemy deployed 16 divisions in these 
areas. 

In view of the newly created situation the Supreme Head- 
quarters of the Korean People's Army worked out a new- 
strategy. 

According to the new plan, units of the People's Army 
active on the eastern front were to strike at the enemy from the 
rear, while those on the central and western fronts were launch- 
ing an attack to annihilate the enemy in defensive positions. 

On the basis of this plan of operations, attacking groups 
were swiftly established and disposition of the combined units 
was rearranged. 

The Supreme Headquarters of the Korean People's Army 
ordered part of the People's Army units on the second front to 

166 



FIRST. SECOND AND THIRD CAMPAIGNS 
IN THETHIRD STAGE OF THE WAR 



[* la' 

( October 2$. T950- January 8. 1931) 



'ay or West Korea 




J' 











ldn^>i 



lit Campaign, Oct. 25- 
Nov. 24, 1 950 



2nd Campaign, Nov. 25- 
"^-^a^ Doc. 24. 1950 

3rd Campaign, Dec. t\ t 
1950- Jan g, ,95i 

Advance of our 2nd front 
— ^,-_ Hoops N&v.25-Dmc, 
^^"P" 1*50 

Area* occupied or under 
sway of our second fronl 
WV1W troops by Nov. 24, 1950 

■*• , Acl-vrtiei *n Ihe enemy's 
--*•--' rear of our troops 

Advance ol Korea- Chines* 
_.._- troop* « ©' Jan. 8, 1951 

~ Position* ol Ihe enemy 
as of Jw 8, 1951 
Route ot enemy 'i 



. 1 

•,,. ■;,- 1 ruuungoy J 

i*. R\ Hongcnun W 



J 1 



"Yiingduk 




Wooln«utV9 



UJ 



outflank the enemy in the eastern areas before our main 
forces started action. 

These units waged a severe battle on December 22 south 
west of Yangkoo to break through the enemy's defence line. 

The enemy entrenched in geographically favourable posi- 
tions along the Soyang River resisted stubbornly. Particularly, 
the enemy fortified Height 602.6, 5 kilometres southeast of 
Chukokri, and taking to this strong point, blocked the main road 
to the south. It was imperative for our units to dislodge the 
enemy from the height. 

In the battle to take Height 602.6 Kim Chang Kwol, Hero 
of the Republic, rendered an immortal service by ensuring the 
successful advance of his unit by blocking with his own body 
the muzzle of an enemy gun. The burning patriotism of Hero 
Kim Chang Kwol imbued still more lofty patriotism and heroism 
into the hearts of the entire Korean people and men and officers 
of the People's Army. 

Units of the People's Army which occupied Height 602.6 
continued their southward advance, destroying the enemy's de- 
fensive positions. 

At that time other units of the Korean People's Army broke 
through the enemy's defence line south of Hvunri, and took a 
circuitous route deep in the southwest. By December 30, these 
units advanced to Yangdukwonri (some 10 kilometres south of 
Hongchun), threatening the enemy on the central front from 
the rear. The enemy's defence on the eastern front began to 
crumble in the closing days of 1950. 

On December 31, 1950, units of the Korean People's Army 
and the Chinese People's Volunteers launched the third camp- 
aign along the entire front preceded by a terrific barrage of the 
artillery. Immediately, the enemy positions along the Riinjin 
River, Hantan River, in Yungpyong and south of Hwachun were 
taken by the combined units of the Korean-Chinese forces. By 
January 2, 1951, our forces had penetrated 15 to 20 kilometres 
deep into the enemy's defence line. The enemy began a general 
withdrawal. 

Units of the Korean People's Army active in the north of 
Moonsan on the western front liberated Moonsan on January 
2, and kept advancing along the Moonsan-Scoul highway. On 

169 



the same day units of the Chinese People's Volunteers liberated 
Tongdoochun on the left flank and started marching towards 
Seoul. 

On January 4, units of the combined Korean-Chinese forces 
broke through enemy's defence of Seoul and the city of Seoul 
was again iiberated. 

Some enemy units hurriedly withdrew to Inchon from 
where they fled by sea, while others escaped across the Han 
River. As the enemy took flight from Seoul, he destroyed and 
looted schools, hospitals, libraries, museums, and historical re- 
lics. Still worse, he forced more than 30,000 patriots to come 
with him. On the way the enemy shot more than 10,000 of them. 

Combined units of the Korean-Chinese People's forces cros- 
sed the Han River in hot chase of the enemy. On January 8 In- 
chon was liberated. Extending their gains, our units delivered 
heavy blows to the units of the U.S. and British armies in the 
region south of Yungdeungpo and marched to the Suwon- 
Kuemryangjangri line on January 7. 

In the meantime, the Chinese units on the central front, 
shattered the puppet 3rd Army Corps in the region north of 
Choonchun and Kapyung on January 2, and Choonchun and 
Kapyung fell into our hands. These Chinese units, then in joint 
operation with the units of the Korean People's Army on the 
second front which had already advanced to the region south 
of Yangdukwonri in the rear of the enemy, besieged and wiped 
out successfully the enemy in Yangdukwonri. Our combined 
units, pursuing the enemy, arrived at Ryuju on January 8. 

On the eastern front, units of the Korean People's Army 
crushed the enemy's resistance and liberated Hongchun on 
January 4, Hoingsung on the 6th and Wonju on the 8th in suc- 
cession. 

During this period, a number of the Korean People's Army 
units penetrated into the enemy's rear reaching Jechun, Nyung- 
wol, Tanyang and Yungju. These forces cut off the enemy's 
escape routes and supply lines. Some of our units advanced 
as far as Antong, disrupting the enemy's rear. 

Other combined units of the Korean People's Army 
marched down to the Kangneung area along the eastern coast 
and firmly held the eastern end of the front. 

170 



Our aircraft-hunting groups fought bravely. They downed 
many enemy planes and protected railway bridges and high 
ways from the enemy bombing. 

At the beginning of the war some soldiers were frightened 
at the enemy bombing, but soon they became bold. 

The third joint campaign of the Korean-Chinese forces with 
its brilliant victories came to an end on January 8. During this 
period, the enemy suffered heavy losses in manpower. And a 
vast area north of the 37th parallel was liberated by the Ko- 
rean-Chinese joint forces. 

The enemy's plan for holding fast to the 38th parallel and 
rapidly going over to a large-scale attack to recover their 
"prestige" fell to pieces. And the morale among the U.S. army 
hit a new low. An anti-war trend prevailed among the members 
of the aggressive U.S. armed forces. And the repeated military 
defeat of the U.S. imperialists in Korea caused them to lose 
face before their satellite countries. Contradictions between the 
U.S. and its satellites grew sharper. Even among the reaction- 
ary ruling circles of the U.S. friction became deeper. 

But on the Korean-Chinese side, the soldiers' morale 
soared, the solidarity of Ihc socialist camp was reinforced, in 
ternationalist assistance to the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea was strengthened, and the Korean people's confidence 
in victory became firmer. 

SECTION 4 

Party's Measures for Reconstruction and Stabilization 

of People's Living in the Liberated Areas. Labour 

Exploits of the People 

As the military gains were 
extended, the question of 
PARTY'S MEASURES FOR stabilizing the people . s liv - 

RECONSTRUCTIOK AND STA- j j n ^ Hberated areas be _ 

BILIZATION OF PEOPLE'S came a si one for the 

LIVING IN THE LIBERATED d„,. + „ 

rally. 

AREAS And Marshal Kim 11 Sung 

outlined the steps to be 

taken for reconstruction in 

the liberated areas in his speech "On the Measures to be taken 

171 



by the Workers' Party of Korea" at the joint conference of high- 
ranking officers and political workers of the Korean People's 
Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers in January 1951. 

In his speech Marshal Kim II Sung stressed that the most 
cardinal and urgent task set forth before the Party in the pre- 
vailing situation was above all to strengthen the Party still 
more, and restore and fortify speedily the Party and govern- 
ment organs for safeguarding the victories won and rapidly 
creating conditions which would pave the way for the final vic- 
tory. He emphasized the restoration of the war damaged eco- 
nomy, stabilization of the people's living, eusurance of spring 
sowing, consolidation of the United Front, struggle against re- 
actionaries, and the education of the popular masses in prole- 
tarian internationalism. 

Marshal Kim 11 Sung set forth in his ,-jpeech the policy of 
the Workers' Party of Korea for fortifying the front and the 
rear. The Party undertook, first of all, tht restoration of the 
Party organizations in the liberated areas. The Party conduct- 
ed re-registration of Party members. Spies and alient elements 
that had wormed themselves into the Party were exposed and 
dealt with to ensure the purity of the Party ranks. The Party, 
while waging a vigorous ideological and organizational 
struggle against those Party members who committed anti- 
Party activities during the temporary retreat, took measures 
for absorbing into the Party ranks patriotic workers, peas- 
ants, intellectuals, who were tested in the war. Moreover, the 
Party intensified training of the Party nucleus and political 
education within the Party, while enhancing the vanguard 
role of the Party members. 

The Party also took steps to restore and reinforce the gov- 
ernment organs and social organizations in the liberated areas. 
All the government bodies were reorganized on a war footing, 
and able personnel were placed in them. Especially many 
women workers were appointed. And short courses were given 
for the benefit of the newly selected or appointed cadres. 

The Party strengthened its political work to fortify the 
people's confidence in victory. Halls of democratic publicity 
were restored in the liberated areas, and Party policies and 
heroic exploits attained by our people during the war were 
explained among the masses. The enemy's atrocities were ex- 

172 



posed and condemned, while the people were imbued with pro- 
letarian internationalism. 

The Party paid keen attention to strengthening the United 
Democratic Fatherland Front and took steps to rally the broad 
masses around the Party. Especially, the Party condemned 
(hose who held the views that associate parties were unneces- 
sary, or that cooperation with them was of no importance. The 
Party improved the work of the United Democratic Fatherland 
Front and enhanced the guiding role of the Party in the work 
of the United Front. 

In rebuilding the war-devastated areas the Party had to 
wage a severe struggle against the reactionary elements. 

During the period of enemy occupation, these reactionaries 
became the running dogs of the U.S. imperialists, committing 
atrocities against the people. And even after the enemy took to 
their heels, they continued their criminal activities. 

Therefore, it was unthinkable to restore or strengthen the 
rear unless counter-revolutionaries' plans were crushed. Unless 
the class enemies were removed, it was impossible to lift the 
spirit of those demoralized individuals and enhance their politi- 
cal zeal and creativenc ss. Consequently the Party made a firm 
stand against the reactionary elements. The Party took a course 
of suppressing severely the very small group of vicious reaction- 
aries, urging their followers to surrender on their own. Then 
mass trials were organized so that the popular masses them- 
selves could pass judgement on the reactionaries. Waverers and 
cowards were put under social restraint. 

A ruthless fight against the reactionary elements and 
spies was launched on a nation-wide scale. In every village, 
people's armed self-defence corps were reinforced and even 
old men and boys were mobilized into the anti-espionage 
struggle. 

The anti-Party and factional elements, Pak II Woo was 
one of them, accused the Party of using "leftist" tactics in its 
attack on the reactionary elements. However, the Party success- 
fully carried out its policy. As a result, the people's confidence 
in the final victory was deepened further. The people's political 
and ideological unity was strengthened, and their revolutionary 

173 



vigilance was enhanced. Moreover, the people's hatred against 
the enemy was intensified. 

The stabilization of the people's living was one of the most 
important tasks in the work of restoring the rear. For people's 
living was extremely deteriorated since the temporary retreat. 

The enemy conducted indiscriminate bombings and straf- 
ing. And its naval ships shelled blindly. Our peaceful cities and 
rural villages were reduced to ashes. Then the enemy savagely 
plundered and destroyed people's wealth during its temporary 
occupation. Moreover, countless numbers of innocent people 
were slaughtered by the U.S. army. Under such circumstances 
the Party and Government took every measure to stabilize the 
people's living. 

Marshal Kim 11 Sung said: 

"Party organs and government bodies must pay keen at- 
tention to stabilizing the people's living... This is one of the 
most important tasks the state, Party and society face. 

"No matter how seriously the American imperialists may 
ruin, devastate and scorch our land, we can rebuild our coun- 
try to a new, powerful one after the war so long as there are 
people. 

"Comrades! It is the most important task for us to value 
and relieve men." 

Already in December 1950 the Party and Government took 
emergency measures for solving the pressing questions of 
housing, clothing, and food for the war-stricken people. 

In January 1951 the Political Committee of the C.C. of the 
Workers' Party of Korea adopted the decision on "economic 
measures for stabilization of the livelihood of people in relation 
to the Fatherland Liberation War." 

Based on this decision, the Government took a series of 
measures. 

To stabilize the livelihood of workers and office employees 
a wage system with an allowance in kind was enforced and 
every factory and enterprise was encouraged to carry on a 
side-line. 

By giving a loan of 20,000 won (old currency) to every 
household that lost their dwelling quarters, the Government 

174 



helped the people build or repair their houses. For the poor 
peasants, the Government exempted them from paying part of 
the tax-in-kind. 

Having organized the Committee For Relieving War Vic- 
tims, the state distributed provisions and clothes free of charge 
and gave free medical care to the war victims. Also measures 
were taken for evacuating urban people to the mountain areas 
to protect them from the enemy's indiscriminate bombing and 
for enabling them to get employment. 

Especially the Party and Government took steps for or- 
ganizing on a nation-wide scale relief work for the bereaved 
families of soldiers and patriots killed in action, as well as for 
the dependent families of servicemen or wounded soldiers. 
During the first half of 1951 children's homes and schools for 
bereaved children and wounded soldiers were opened. And the 
Government expanded further the social insurance system. 

A nation-wide movement for adopting war orphans was 
organized among the women and mothers of the nation. 

In this period, the aid goods delivered by the people of the 
Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and other fra- 
ternal countries greatly contributed to the stabilization of the 
people's living. 

These correct steps and warm solicitude of the Party and 
Government further inspired the men and officers of the Peo- 
ple's Army and the entire people who rose up as one for the 
victory in the Fatherland Liberation War, making them re- 
double their resolution to struggle to the last for their country 
and people. 

Thanks to the measures 
LABOUR MERITS OF THE taken by the Party and 

PEOPLE IN THE REAR Government for rehabilita- 

tion and reconstruction of 
the rear and for improving the people's living, things began 
to improve gradually. And the entire people rose up in a vigo 
rous labour struggle for aiding the front and consolidating 
the rear. The working people achieved brilliant labour results 
in the wartime production at the factories and mines, in the 
countryside and fishing villages. 

In January 1951, the Party and Government took steps for 
the first-stage-rehabilitation of the national economy and cul- 

175 



ture, and the national economic plan for 1951 was adopted. 
The plan was to be carried out quarterly even under the dif- 
ficult wartime conditions. 

The wartime national economic plan for 1951 aimed 
mainly at ensuring arms and agricultural production by rapid- 
ly rehabilitating and developing the ruined national economy. 
To this end, as Marshal Kim II Sung said, all available 
materials and all the production means, even the outdated ones, 
had to be utilized in restoring production facilities and supply- 
ing the front. At the same time it was expected to prepare 
for the rapid rehabilitation in the post-war year. 

Despite the enemy's fierce bombing the heroic Korean 
working class with the Party members in the van rehabilitat- 
ed destroyed production establishments or removed them. In 
addition, a number of new factories were built. Soon construc- 
tion work on munitions plants were started. Fighting against 
all odds, the workers ensured the production of munitions. 
Then necessary daily items were turned out and for the coun- 
tryside farm implements were made. Among the workers 
an emulation campaign for increased production was unfolded 
widely. 

Responding to the appeal of the nation's miners: "Raise 
the tempo of wartime production and preparation for rehabili- 
tation!" the workers of several thousands of brigades in muni- 
tions, timber, machine-building, power industries and trans- 
portation and communications joined in the emulation move- 
ment. In carrying out the emulation campaign, the workers 
unfolded an extensive creative movement for breaking old 
norms and establishing new ones. As a result, a number of 
labour innovators came out of the ranks of the working class. 

The workers in the branch of traffic and transportation, 
too, waged a strained struggle. Overcoming all sorts of dif- 
ficulties, the railway workers rehabilitated the damaged in- 
stallations. They repaired wrecked locomotives day and night, 
and laid rails even in ice-cold weather. They carried weapons, 
bullets and food to the front in the teeth of heavy bombing by 
the enemy air force. 

From 1951 the Party directed due attention to the rehabili- 
tation and development of agriculture. In the light of the fact 

176 



that nearly all cities and industrial establishments were com 
pletely ruined, the countryside came to assume more important 
role. Particularly, following the temporary retreat, the produc- 
tion of more grains was presented as a very pressing question. 
But, because of the enemy's atrocities, there was an acute 
shortage of manpower and draught animals in the countryside. 
Besides, Party and government organs as well as social organi- 
zations were disrupted. Furthermore, the Party nucleus was 
either killed by the enemy or moved away from the countryside. 

And so, "Best Party workers to the rural areas!" was 
the main line the Party pursued. Particularly, in March of 
1951 Marshal Kim II Sung in his talks with the peasants of 
South Pyongan Province clarified the Party's policy on the 
development of agriculture. 

The Party dispatched fine cadres to the rural areas to 
fortify all the more the Party organizations and government 
bodies in the rural villages and intensify the mass political 
propaganda work. Above all, the Party saw to it that the front 
and the rear were supplied with ample food and meat. Then a 
number of state farms and stock farms were opened or expand- 
ed, where war victims and poor peasants were given a place 
to settle down. 

The Party and Government also took steps for helping the 
individual peasants. For the war-stricken peasants the state 
gave aid to build new houses or repair old ones, cancelling the 
unpaid taxes-in-kind, irrigation fees and part of the other taxes. 
Moreover, the state provided the foodless peasants with provi- 
sions and seed grains besides a loan for farming. 

To overcome the shortage of manpower and draught 
animals, measures were taken to give the countryside nation- 
wide help. Draught animals sent by the fraternal countries were 
promptly distributed and arrangements were made between 
provinces, cities, counties, sub-counties and ri, so that the 
peasants would help each other. The "labour-exchange-teams" 
and "ox-share-teams" were very popular among the peasants. 
To tackle the question of insufficient farming tools and fertili- 
zers, the Party and Government called upon the entire peasants 
to wage a movement for preparing compost and turn out a 
large number of farming tools by utilizing local resources to the 
maximum. At the same time, chemical fertilizers and farm 

177 



machines sent by the peoples of the Soviet Union and other 
brotherly countries were given to the peasants. Then the state 
machine-hire stations were activated. And the Government 
allocated a large amount of funds for repairing the war-damag- 
ed irrigation facilities. 

Along with the economic measures, the Party strengthened 
the ideological and political work among the peasants. 

In this connection, mention must be made of the meetings 
of active peasants held in every rural village in the beginning 
of 1951. At these meetings the Party's policy on wartime 
agriculture was explained to the peasants, advanced farming 
methods and the best experiences of the peasants who gathered 
in bigger harvests were popularized, and measures were taken 
for the coming spring sowing. The political zeal of the peasants 
was heightened and the nation's peasantry, upholding the 
militant slogan: "The struggle for producing food is the strug- 
gle for the fatherland!" rose up as one for greater yields of 
grains. The peasants digged air-shelters by the fields and 
did farming with their oxen camouflaged. In this way, the 
spring sowing of 1951 was overfulfilled by 1.3 per cent and 10 
to 15 days earlier than usual. 

This was the first great victory of the wartime agricultural 
policy of our Party, and was an eloquent expression of the 
confidence and boundless patriotism the nation's peasants held 
in the Party and the fatherland. 

The country's fishermen, too, stayed on their job. Under 
the very nose of enemy ships they engaged in fishing to supply 
the People's Army and the people with marine products. 

The educational and cultural establishments destroyed and 
burnt by the enemy's barbarous bombing were rapidly restored. 
Most of the primary and middle schools, colleges and higher 
learning institutes held classes and in 1951 over one million 
students were enrolled in school. 

Even under the difficult circumstances newspapers, 
magazines and books kept coming out in great numbers. The 
radio never ceased its programmes, and central, provincial and 
mobile art troupes gave performances on the front and in 
the rear. 

In the field of public health, medical and prophylactic work 
178 



was restored and expanded with the disinterested assistance 
given by the peoples of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic 
of China and other fraternal countries. Epidemics, spread by the 
enemy while they were retreating, were promptly rooted ou' 
and the wounded soldiers and civilians were properly taken 
care of. 

Mention must be made of the daily-increasing assistance 
given by the peoples of the brotherly countries for the rehabili- 
tation. 

In particular, following the temporary retreat the peoples 
of the fraternal countries in active support of our just struggle 
rendered us greater material and moral assistance. And this 
played a great role in rebuilding the rear. 

Thus, after the Third Plenum of the Party Central Com- 
mittee, the rehabilitation work in the rear and the liberated 
areas was successfully carried out. As a result, the people re- 
covered to a considerable degree from the severe damage suf- 
fered during the temporary retreat and stepped up preparations 
for a long-drawn war. 

Upholding the Party's slogan, "All for the victory in the 
war!" the entire people, man and woman, young and oid, came 
out to restore the destroyed railways, roads and bridges in the 
rain of enemy bombs which fell day and night, and carried 
shells, ammunition, provisions and other war supplies on their 
backs or by carts to the front. 

In May 1951, the soldiers of the Guard 18th Regiment 
made an appeal for making a contribution for arms. And the en- 
tire people responded enthusiastically to this call. For the first 
40 days alone, the people contributed 1,539 million won in cash, 
168 thousand sacks of grain in addition to great quantities 
of goods. 

And when the Government issued national defence bonds 
at the beginning of 1951 the people's subscription during the 
first 10 days reached 600 million won. 

The patriotic labour struggle of the people in the rear 
inspired the men on the front for bigger military exploits. 



179 



SECTION 5 



Our Mobile Defence and Enemy's Heavy Losses in 
Manpower and Equipment. Battles 
in the North of Seoul and Hyunri 



FOURTH CAMPAIGN OF THE 
KOREAN-CHINESE FORCES 



After the three victorious 
campaigns the Supreme 

Headquarters of the Korean 
People's Army drew up a 
new plan. It was defensive in nature. The plan envisaged 
further strengthening our forces, securing supply lines to the 
extended front, gaining more time needed for the restoration 
of Party and government bodies in the areas liberated from the 
enemy's temporary occupation, restoring the ruined industries 
and transportation system, and further fortifying the defence 
of the west and east coasts. 

Accordingly, on January 8, 1951, units of the Korean- 
Chinese forces went over to defence in the Suwon-Ryuju-Wonju 
iine. The disposition of units was rearranged and reinforce- 
ments were received. And rest was organized while preparing 
for another blow to the enemy. 

The Supreme Headquarters ordered some units of the 
Korean People's Army to the west and east coasts to fortify 
the defence there. 

When our units went over to defence, the enemy, who had 
fled to the 37th parallel after sustained heavy losses at the 
hands of the Korean-Chinese people's forces, tried to make a 
comeback. 

What they announced was a war of attrition under the 
label of "limited offensive" with "limited objectives." But their 
real plan called for another big offensive 

And the enemy threw most of their forces into the battle. 

Their main attack was directed to the western front. The 
enemy forces were to make straight advance along the entire 
200 kilometres long front step by step without forming peri- 
meters and deliver concentrated attacks on the Korean- 
Chinese forces. Their attack was supported by numerous air- 

180 



craft and war-vessels. Heavy field-pieces and tanks were called 
out to the front. In short, the enemy counted on their technical 
superiority. 

The Supreme Headquarters of the Korean People's Army, 
however, saw through the enemy's plan. A mobile defence was 
to be organized and our forces were to hit the enemy in the 
most favourable areas and at an opportune time. Under this 
plan the Korean-Chinese units began the fourth campaign on 
January 25, 1951. 

On January 27, the U.S. 1st and 9th Corps launched 
an attack along the 68-kilometre long Suwon-Ryuju highway 
supported by numerous planes, guns and tanks. The enemy 
was especially furious on the Suwon-Seoul highway. On 
February 3, the enemy advanced to the Suri Mountain, 
Moonhyungri and Ripori regions north of Suwon. 

Preceded by tanks, the enemy pressed on to the Suri 
Mountain, a juncture to Seoul and Inchon from Suwon, and to 
the east of the mountain where units of the Korean People's 
Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers were deployed. 

But the units of the Korean-Chinese forces waged 
heroic defensive battles. 

In these battles the soldiers of the 82nd Regiment of the 
Korean People's Army displayed to the full brilliant mass 
heroism. 

On February 3, a company belonging to the battalion 
commanded by Hero Bai Yoon Sung repulsed the enemy's 
attack no less than 11 times. But a position manned by a 
platoon was overrun by the enemy. At that moment Shin Chun 
Kyoon, chairman of the Party cell of the company, shouted to 
his fellow fighters: "Comrades! we are the true sons of the 
Korean people. At any cost we must carry out the task given 
to us by our Party and fatherland." Then he and other 11 
members formed a storming party to retake the height from 
the enemy. 

Our men defending the Suri Mountain beat back the enemy 
42 times in 3 days. In the Suri Mountain battle alone scores 
of members of the Democratic Youth League and model 
armymen who fought devotedly for the fatherland and the peo- 
ple came to enjoy the honour of being admitted into the Party 
on the firing line. 

181 



In the Suri Mountain battle which lasted over ten days 
the units of the Korean People's Army killed, wounded or 
captured over 4,500 men and officers of the enemy, and des- 
troyed over 20 tanks and shot down 21' planes. On February 
8, units of the Korean Chinese people's armies went over to 
defence in the area north of the Han River. 

In the meantime, our units defending the Keumryang- 
jangri and Ryuju regions withdrew, on February 11, to the 
north of Kyunganri and RipoFi dealing continuous blows to 
the enemy. 

The units of the U.S. 10th Army Corps and the puppet 1st 
and 3rd Army Corps on the central and eastern fronts launch- 
ed an attack on the day following the enemy's offensive on the 
western front. 

In close cooperation with the Chinese People's Volunteers, 
the Korean People's Army in these areas, inflicting heavy 
losses upon the enemy's manpower and equipment, lured the 
enemy to the north of Hoingsung. On February 6, our units 
launched a counter-offensive against the enemy concentrated in 
Hoingsung. Our forces encircled and wiped out many of the 
enemy, stopping the enemy's advance to the north of Hoing- 
sung. 

After starting the fourth campaign, the Korean-Chinese 
people's armies waged a defensive battle by small forces in 
order to ensure rest to the main forces and deal a more power- 
ful blow to the enemy later. Also favourable conditions were 
created for launching a powerful counter-attack against the 
enemy. 

Under the plan of the Supreme Headquarters of the Kore- 
an People's Army, large Korean-Chinese forces were concen- 
trated to the south of Hongchun. And on February 11, 1951, 
units of the Korean-Chinese people's forces went over simul- 
taneously to the counter-attack in the area about 48 kilometres 
north of Hoingsung. Units of the Korean People's Army hit the 
enemy from the east, while the units of the Chinese People's 
Volunteers attacked the enemy from the north and west. By 
February 13 the Korean People's Army reached the southeastern 
region of Hoingsung. 

And on that day the joint forces of the Korean-Chinese 
units encircled the enemy in the Hoingsung region and des- 
troyed them. In the three days' battle, from February 11 to 13, 

182 



over 12,100 men and officers of the enemy were killed, wounded 
or captured. The battered enemy hastily withdrew towards 
Wonju. 

Parallel with the offensive in the Hoingsung area, the 
units of the Korean People's Army active in the north of 
Pyongchang pushed the enemy 40 km southwards. And the 
units of the Chinese People's Volunteers defended the bridge- 
head on the Han River south of Yangsuri for 11 days, thus 
ensuring our offensive in the Hoingsung area. 

Despite the repeated setbacks, the enemy did not give up 
their "limited offensive" and on February 19 launched attacks 
in the Hoingsung region and in the west of Hoingsung on the 
central front, and towards the end of February around Pyong- 
chang on the eastern front. 

The enemy kept up their persistent attacks until the early 
part of March, but they could not regain what they had had 
before our counter-attacks started. 

Particularly, the units of the Korean People's Army in 
the vicinity of Mt. Daimi in Bangrimri north of Pyongchang 
beat back the persistent attacks staged by the U.S. and puppet 
armies with the support of numerous aircraft, heavy guns and 
tanks. 

Through these bitter defensive battles the members of the 
Korean People's Army displayed their loyalty to the Party, 
lofty patriotism and indomitable strength, self-sacrificing spirit 
and unparalleled valour. 

Under the slogan: "Every height of the fatherland belongs 
to us, let's hold our height with blood!" men and officers of the 
Korean People's Army fought to defend every height of the land. 
The "every-height-belong-to-us" movement was started by 
Hero Han Ge Ryul, who called on every soldier to defend even 
an inch of the land with blood. 

Hero Kang Ho Yung was seriously wounded in both arms 
and legs in the Gamak Peak battle in the Wonju area in 
February 1951, but he rolled over into the enemy position with 
hand-grenade in his mouth, and silenced the enemy's gun, 
and An Yung Ai, a nurse, saved scores of the wound- 
ed under rain of enemy bombs and shells. When she was 
fatally wounded she gave her Party card and membership dues 
to the political instructor of her company, saying: "The 

183 






Workers' Party of Korea 
brought up and educated me. 
The Party is my life. Please 
pay my membership dues and 
take my Party card to the 
Central Committee of the 
Workers' Party of Korea." 

There are a number of blood- 
stained Party cards and Demo- 
cratic Youth League cards 
symbolizing the lofty patrio- 
tism and selflessness of the 
Party members and Democra- 
tic Youth League members who 
gave their lives for freedom 
and independence of their 
fatherland, happiness of their 
people and prosperity of 
generations to come. They 
were, and are, great inspira- 
tion to the people and the Peo- 
ple's Army men in their firm 

determination to safeguard their socialist gains from the 
enemy's encroachment. In face of fierce enemy attacks in the 
middle of March, the units of the Korean-Chinese forces went 
over to the mobile defence and moved the front line to the 
38th parallel. This was done in order to preserve the manpower 
of our main units and ensure them rest on the one hand and, 
on the other, to wear out the enemy and lure them to the 
prepared position to deliver them telling blows. Gradually 
moving northward, our units struck severe blows at the enemy 
at every prepared position. 

On March 14, units of the Korean-Chinese people's armies 
evacuated Seoul. The enemy came into Seoul and then occupi- 
ed Hongchun, gradually moving northward. 

On March 23, the enemy, launching attacks on the front, 
dropped the U.S. 18th Parachute Regiment in the area of Moon- 
san in an attempt to encircle and destroy the units of the Peo- 
ple's Army active in the Seoul-Moonsan area. However, our 
units which were covering the retreat of the units of the Peo- 
ple's Army in the north of Moonsan waged a successful battle a- 



184 



gainst the U.S. parachute troops, killing more than 2,000 
enemy men and officers. Thus the enemy's attempt failed. The 
enemy suffered repeated setbacks and, by the middle of April, 
the enemy's advance was completely stopped in the Kaesong- 
Jangtan-Korangpori-Ryunchun-Yangkoo-Kansung areas. 

During the period of the mobile defensive operations from 
January 25 to April 21, units of the Korean People's Army 
in collaboration with the Chinese People's Volunteers killed, 
wounded or captured more than 78,000 enemy men and 
officers. 

The "limited offensive," "killing and wounding operation" 
and "war of attrition" of the enemy fizzled out completely. 

During the fourth campaign, 87 days of precious time 
were gained to enable the units of the Korean-Chinese forces 
to train more reserve forces and to reinforce the main units 
on the front. And our defence forces on the east and 
west coasts held firmly both ends of the front. It must be 
added that all this turned the scales of war in favour of the 
subsequent operations of the Korean-Chinese forces. 

On the other hand, repeated frustration of the American 
invaders considerably weakened their forces. And contradic- 
tions among the American ruling circles became more acute. 

As a result, on the 11th of April, U.S. Army General 

Mac Arthur was fired from his post as Commander-in-Chief 

of the "U.N. Forces" and of the U.S. forces in the Far East, 

and Ridgway, another notorious U.S. general, was appointed 

to succeed his post. 



FIFTH CAMPAIGN OF THE 
KOREAN-CHINESE FORCES 



The American ruling circl- 
es replacing MacArthur with 
Ridgway rapidly supple- 
mented soldiers and military 
equipment to his units and forced their satellites to send more 
troops to Korea. Then Ridgway was ordered to extend the 
war and take the initiative in the war. 

Continuing frantic offensives on the front the enemy 
organized the 16th Corps in Japan with new divisions sent 
from the United States and drove the troops of their satel- 
lite countries including Colombia and Ethiopia into the Kore- 

185 



an front. Then the enemy planned another landing operations 
behind our lines. However, the enemy failed to carry out the 
plan because of their repeated heavy losses, and by mid-April 
they were obliged to go over to the defensive for a while along 
the 38th parallel. 

Taking into account the newly created situation Marshal 
Kim II Sung set forth a plan to unfold a strong counter- 
offensive in order to forestall the enemy's landing plan and 
inflict heavy losses upon them. 

The fifth campaign of the Korean-Chinese forces was 
prepared in accordance with his plan. 

Reserve units of the Korean-Chinese forces were concen- 
trated in Shinkye, Keumchun, Ichun, Pyonggang and Hoiyang. 

Marshal Kim II Sung personally inspected the front, and 
ordered to step up preparations for action and strengthen the 
coastal defence. 

During the period of the fifth campaign extending from late 
April to early June 1951, units of the Korean-Chinese forces 
waged two strong counter-attacks. 

In the first operation the brunt of our attack was directed 
to the western front north of Seoul, where large forces of the 
enemy were concentrated. To support the attack of our forces 
on the western front, our units on the eastern front hit the 
enemy in the areas of Rinje and Chapyungri. 

According to the operational plan drawn up by the 
Supreme Headquarters our forces on the western front were 
organized into three groups — in the areas north of Kaesong, 
north of Koohwari and Ryunchun, and south of Chulwon and 
Keumhwa. 

On the western front, the combined units of the Korean- 
Chinese forces simultaneously started attacks on the enemy 
on April 22. 

The units of the Korean People's Army active in the north 
of Kaesong and Koohwari, in co-operation with the units of 
the Chinese People's Volunteers, rapidly swept out the enemy 
operating on the right side of the Rimjin River and succeeded 
in crossing the river on the night of April 23. After furious 
battles our forces broke through the enemy's main defence line 
by April 25 and advanced to the south of Moonsan. 

Other Chinese units active in the Ryunchun and Chulwon 

186 



areas smashed the enemy's main defence forces in a four-day 
battle, and on the 25th of April reached a point north of Toug- 

doochun and Pochun. Then combined units of the Korean Peo 
pie's Army active in the south of Keumhwa overran the enemy's 
strong defence line and advanced to the area north of Kapyung 
on the 24th so as to threaten the right flank of the enemy 
from the rear. 

The enemy, who had lost their main defense line and 

suffered heavy losses, withdrew on the 25th to their second 

defence line north of Uijungbu, Kapyung and Choonchun, 

with the support of a great number of their aircraft and 

artillery. 

Our units split the enemy's second defence line, encircled 
and destroyed the enemy forces everywhere, without giving 
them a breathing spell. And our forces pressed on to the 
enemy's new defence lines. 

The Korean-Chinese forces on the right flank reached 
Kuksa Peak, Okeumri and Baikoondai north of Seoul on 
April 28. And units of the Korean People's Army completely 
encircled and annihilated the enemy in Okeumri, and threa- 
tened Mt. Bukak. in the meantime, the units in the Tongdoo- 
chhun-Pochun-Kapyung areas advanced to the Toikewonri- 
A\asukuri line while other units liberated on 29th Kapyung 
after a bitter fight with U.S. troops. 

Our units on the eastern front, timing ,with the counter- 
attacks of the units on the western front, began to take action. 

Breaking through the enemy's defence line from the front 
and on both flanks under cover of the night, our forces active in 
the south of Suhwari cut off the highways between Chapyungri 
and Rinje and between Rinje and Hyunri, and encircled the 
enemy in the Chapyungri and Rinje regions. From April 23, 
our units, tightening the net, wiped out 3 regiments of the pup- 
pet army. Other units of the Korean People's Army active in 
the region northeast of Yangkoo smashed the resistance put 
up by some units of the U.S. aggressive army and advanced 
5-7 km. by the morning of the 23rd. After daybreak, the enemy 
went over to a counter-attack under the wing of large numbers 
of tanks, artillery and aircraft. However, our units held their 
own against the enemy superior in number. 

On Fleight 909.4, east of Yangkoo, a bitter battle took 
place. In this battle Jo Koon Shil, Hero of the Republic, set a 



brilliant example of unyielding patriotism Though he had lost 
his left arm and suffered a heavy wound in the leg, he con- 
tinued to fire his machine gun, giving the enemy a blood bath 
until the end of his life. He killed or wounded over 450 men 
and officers of the enemy and held the height. 

Between April 22 and 29 units of the Korean-Chinese forces 
killed, wounded or captured over 20,790 enemy soldiers includ- 
ing 5,800-odd Americans, over 3,800 British and more than 
1,000 Turks. And the enemy, suffering heavy losses, withdrew 
to the southern banks of the North Han and Soyang Rivers. 
However, having regrouped and reinforced their forces hurried- 
ly, the enemy started another offensive on May 8 to advance 
to the Koyang-Uijungbu-Chungpyungri-Rinje- Yangyang line. 
But our resolute defence shattered the enemy's attacks on 
May 15, ending successfully the first operation of the fifth 
campaign. 

The enemy which had sustained one defeat after another 
was frantic in his attempt to extend his gains at a perimeter 
which had been formed in the area of Hyunri. At the 
same time the enemy also attempted a landing operation on the 
east coast in our rear in parallel with an offensive of his 
ground forces. 

In order to kill more enemy and foil the landing opera- 
tion, the Supreme Headquarters prepared the second operation 
of the fifth campaign. The plan called for concentration of 
large forces on the eastern front to annihilate the puppet army 
active in Hyunri. And, in parallel with the offensive on the 
eastern front, our forces on the western front were also to strike 
the enemy. Then the Supreme Headquarters dispatched 
Comrade Choi Yong Kun to the eastern front to organize and 
deliver a decisive punch to the enemy. 

In order to annihilate the enemy at Hyunri and in the area 
south of Hyunri, two strong forces were organized in the area 
northwest of Mt. Sulak (northwest of Yangyang) and in the 
region west of Rinje. 

On May 16, the Korean People's Army, in a coordinated 
action with the Chinese People's Volunteers, began a counter- 
attack. 

Our combined units active in the east of Rinje and west 
of Mt. Sulak started to break through the enemy's defence line 
along the 26 km long front. 

190 



Other units of the People's Army smashed the enemy's 
strong resistance and approached from the front and left flank 
to the Hyunri area, dislodging the enemy towards Height 
1,082 west of Hange Range and Karibong Peak. Breaking 
through the enemy's desperate resistance on May 16, other units 
of the Korean People's Army active in the areas east of Hyunri, 
marched on southward more than 25 km, thus blocking in the 
.Jindongri and Mt. Bangdai areas the enemy's escape route 
from the Hyunri area. 

At the same time some units of the Chinese People's Volun- 
teers in the area west of Rinje on the eastern front broke 
through the enemy's defence line and marched 21-28 km south- 
wards by the morning of May 17. Then they advanced to the 
line of Hupyongri and Misanri southwest of Hyunri so as to 
intercept the enemy's retreat in the Hyunri area. 

Other units of the People's Army fighting in the area north 
of Mt. Sulak crossed over the mountain, about 1,700 metres 
above the sea-level, attacking the 1st Corps of the puppet army, 
and prevented the enemy from sending their reserve forces from 
Yangyang to the Hyunri line. 

Thus, the main forces of the enemy in Hyunri were com- 
pletely surrounded. 

Engaging in violent attacks on the enemy, the Chinese 
People's Volunteers on the line south of Mundeungri held the 
right flank. 

The encircled enemy in the Hyunri area tried desperately to 
break through the encirclement, but failed. 

From May 18, our units began to tighten the net around 
the enemy forces in the Hyunri area and annihilated most of 
them. Then on May 20, the combined units of the Korean and 
Chinese forces, after annihilating the enemy in the Hajinburi 
area, occupied Hajinburi and on May 21 other combined units 
advanced to the north of Hajinburi, after breaking through the 
enemy's defence line in Mt. Sulak. 

At that time, in support of the battle on the eastern front, 
our units on the western front gave a fierce blow to the enemy 
in the area north of Koyang and Chungpyongri, and repulsed 
successfully the enemy's persistent counter-attacks. 

Between May 16 and 21, the Korean and Chinese forces 

191 



made great military achievements. They annihilated more than 
18,000 officers and soldiers of the enemy and destroyed or cap 
tured 937 automobiles, tanks and armored cars and 386 guns 
of various caliber. 

In order to get supplies, organize rest for the units and 
prepare for the next operations, the main units of the Korean 

and Chinese forces, finishing their planned counter-attack, be- 
gan to move towards the next line under cover of fire from part 
of other units. 

In spite of those repeated defeats, the U.S. imperialist army 
started another general offensive on May 23 by mobilizing even 
their reserves. 

Giving heavy blows to the attacking enemy by the resolute 
mobile defensive operations, the units of the Korean and Chi- 
nese forces completed their withdrawal to the pre-arranged line 
and checked the enemy's attack along the entire front. Thus the 
second operations of the fifth campaign ended on June 10. 

Special mention must be made of the fact that through the 
fifth campaign, especially the operations in the region of Hyun- 
ri, the coordinated operations and militant friendship sealed 
with blood between the units of the Korean People's Army and 
the Chinese People's Volunteers were further strengthened. In 
the course of the difficult war against their common enemy, the 
American imperialist aggressors, the blood relationship be- 
tween the officers and soldiers of the Korean People's Army 
and the Chinese People's Volunteers became closer than ever 
before. 

At the front, they shared their joys and sorrows, 
helped each other, saved the wounded even under a shower of 
the enemy's bullets, and rescued comrades facing danger. When 
one had no bullets, the other would share what he had, when 
one was short of provisions, the other would give him his. 

The victory of the Korean and Chinese people's armies in 
the third stage of the war completely foiled the vicious design 
of the enemy to occupy the whole of Korea by a "blitzkrieg and 
lightning victory." Chaos, contradictions and conflicts among 
the enemy forces were further aggravated and the morale of 
their mercenaries was lowered. 

But the units of the Korean and Chinese people's armies 

193 



showed that they could frustrate any scheme of the American 
and British armed interventionists. 

The great success accomplished at the front and in the rear 
in the third stage of the war vividly proved the correctness of 
the decisions of the Third Plenum of the Party Central Com- 
mittee and that our Party brilliantly displayed its organizational 
and mobilizing role in the arduous struggle for carrying out 
the decision. At the same time it demonstrated that the Korean 
people rallied around the Party and Government could over- 
come any difficulty and win a final victory. 



194 



CHAPTER 



STALEMATE ON THE FRONT. POSITIVE POSI- 
TIONAL DEFENCE ON THE PART OF THE KOREAN 
PEOPLES ARMY AND THE CHINESE PEOPLES 
VOLUNTEERS. CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE 
AGREEMENT 



(June 11, 1951 - Julu 27, 1953) 



SECTION I 



Korean-Chinese Forces Going Over to Defence along 
the 38th Parallel. Opening of the Korean Armistice 

Talks 



Around mid-June in 1951, 

the Korean-Chinese forces 
KOREAN-CHINESE FORCES and ^ g went oyer tQ 

GOING OVER TO DEFENCE defence ^ ^ north ^ 

ALONG THE 38TH PARAL- SQuth of thjJ 3^ ^ 

TFT 

extending from the mouth of 
the Rimjin River to Ryun 
chun, Chulwon, Keumhwa, 
Sanyangri (approximately 12 kilometres north of Hwachun), 
Jangpyungri (approximately 10 kilometres northwest of Yang- 
koo), Ronjangri (approximately 15 kilometres north of Rinje). 
Thereon the front line came to a standstill, and the war enter- 
ed the fourth stage. 

195 



During the year the enemy suffered heavy losses in man- 
power and war materials. More than 598,000 men and officers 
were killed, wounded or captured. Over 86,000 smail arms, 
over 5,200 field-pieces of various caliber, 1,997 tanks and 
armored cars, 1,730 air planes, 122 big or small vessels, 9,145 
automobiles, more than 120 wagons of ammunition and huge 
amounts of other military equipment were destroyed or 
captured. 

Even according to the figures released by the enemy the 
loss of manpower and war materials the U.S. armed invaders 
suffered during the first year of the war in Korea was more 
than half that they had sustained during the Second World 
War. 

Politically and morally, too, they suffered greatly. 

The myth of the "invincible" U.S. was utterly shattered and 
the true colours of the aggressors were brought to light. The 
aggressive army became demoralized, the antagonism among 
the enemy powers became more acute. 

But the strength of the Korean people and the combat ef- 
ficiency of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's 
Volunteers had grown. In accordance with the decision of the 
Third Plenum the counter-attack operations were successfully 
executed while rehabilitation work in the rear went ahead in 
full speed. 

What is more, the forces of the world socialist camp and 
of the world peace-loving peoples were strengthened still fur- 
ther. The Korean people enjoyed the boundless support, both 
material and spiritual, of the freedom-loving peoples of the 
world. International and internal situation had turned in our 
favor. 

Yet we were not without weak points. 

First of all, our soldiers were tired with the successive 
battles, the front and the coastal defences on the east and 
west had still to be strengthened, and the war-wounds in the 
northern part liberated from the enemy's temporary occupation 
had yet to be healed. 

Such being the situation, the Workers' Party of Korea 
adopted a strategy by which our forces would go over to posi- 

196 



tive defence all along the front. Our forces were to hold de- 
fence lines to gain time so as to improve further the combatant 
efficiency and technical equipment of our People's Army and 
consolidate the rear. Then we were to prepare for the final vic- 
tory, punishing the enemy severely. The enemy, though 
having suffered setbacks on several occasions, were bent on ex- 
tending the Korean war. The strength of our forces had grown 
but it was not yet enough to wipe out the enemy completely. 
Therefore, time was needed for us to prepare for winning the 
final victory. 

Faced with a prolonged war the Korean people had to heal 
rapidly the war-wounds caused by the temporary enemy 
occupation, restore the Party and state organs, stabilize the 
people's living in every possible way, and fortify the rear to 
provide the front with ever greater quantities of war supplies. 

Going over to the positive defensive battle, the Party in- 
culcated on combatants and the people in the rear military and 
political aim of the positive defence. 

On the front the entire members of the Korean People's 
Army strengthened the defensive positions. 

In defiance of the enemy's frenzied bombings, the entire 
workers, peasants and intellectuals put heart and soul in their 
work of sending more weapons, ammunition, food and clothing. 

In the early days of the positive defensive battle, the Ko- 
rean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers had to 
put up bitter battles. The enemy's air force was superior to 
ours and their firing power greater. Every day the enemy 
showered each of our divisional positions with an average of 
6,000 bombs and tens of thousands of shells. 

The entire front was wrapped in flames. 

The fighters of the Korean and Chinese armies repaired or 
newly built at night the defensive barricades that the enemy 
destroyed during the day time. Inasmuch as the supply routes 
were constantly bombed and strafed, the transportation of am- 
munition and provisions was taken to the front through deep 
valleys and over steep ridges. 

Even under such grim circumstances, however, our soldiers 
took the initiative in the war and defended stubbornly their 

197 



positions, inflicting heavy blows upon the enemy whenever it 
started attack. Moreover, our soldiers made surprise attacks 
on the enemy's positions at night. 

In the meantime, our night bombers showered bombs upon 
the enemy's arms dumps and reserve centres in Seoul, Inchon, 
Ryongsan. In concert with the naval forces, the troops in the 
coastal areas also fortified the coastal defence line. Thus the de- 
fensive forces of the Korean and Chinese armies were strength- 
ened greatly. 

As the Korean-Chinese 
forces strengthened their 

OPENING OF KOREAN . . , r ■ , ^i n 

positive defensive battle, the 

ARMISTICE TALKS. U.S. \ , _ , , 

U.S. aggressors reached an 

ATTEMPT TO UTILIZE THE . to 5,, . ,. - .. , 

impasse. Their prestige lell to 

TALKS TO RECOVER A , , . F b r i1 

the ground because ol the re- 

THEIR MILITARY DEFEAT , ° , .,., ,. i . , , 

treated military, political and 
moral defeats they sustained 
on the Korean front. Then the 
fires of the Korean and Chi- 
nese armies kept growing and the voice of the world's peace- 
loving peoples against the U.S. aggressors in Korea became 
louder. Moreover, contradictions within the imperialist camp 
aggravated. 

It was at this time that the Soviet Union, which always 
stood for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, re- 
flecting the will of the entire Korean people and the peoples of 
goodwill all over the world, proposed a peaceful settlement of 
the Korean question. On June 23, 1951, the Soviet representa- 
tive to the U.N. spoke over the radio, proposing the cessation 
of hostilities in Korea. The Soviet representative suggested 
that, as the first step, negotiations should be held to discuss a 
cease-fire and withdrawal of troops of both sides from the 
38th parallel. 

The U.S. imperialists had no choice but to bow to the 
proposal for the peaceful negotiations. And on June 30, 1951, 
Ridgway, Commander-in-Chief of the "U.N. Forces," approach- 
ed our side on the question. Marshal Kim II Sung, Supreme 
Commander of the Korean People's Army, and the Commander 
of the Chinese People's Volunteers sent a communication to the 

198 



enemy agreeing to his proposal. Thus the agreement to hold 
talks on a cease-fire was reached between the two belligerents. 

In agreeing to hold the armistice talks, our side was 
guided, first of all, by the consistent peace-loving policy pursu- 
ed by the Workers' Party of Korea and the Government of the 
D.P.R.K., notwithstanding the real intention of the U.S. ag- 
gressors in suggesting cease-fire talks. We had been making 
consistent efforts for the peaceful unification of the country. 
We, therefore, accepted their proposal in the hope to end the 
bloody war. 

We Korean people always stood for peace. And the reali- 
zation of cease fire might enable us to consolidate the revolu- 
tionary democratic base and attain the peaceful unification of 
the country. The peaceful settlement of the Korean question 
was in accord with the wish of the peace-loving peoples the 
world over. And the cessation of hostilities in Korea was 
necessary for preventing the U.S. imperialists from starting 
another world war. 

Armistice talks began in Kaesong on July 10, 1951, be- 
tween the delegate of the Korean People's Army as the senior 
delegate of the Korean-Chinese side on the one hand and the 
delegate of U.S. army as the senior delegate of the "United 
Nations Forces" on the other. 

Thus the U.S. imperialists who refused to recognize the 
existence of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could 
not but sit down facing our delegate across a table on which 
the national flag of the D.P.R.K.. and the "United Nations flag" 
were placed. 

When they started to invade our country on June 25, 1950, 
the U.S. imperialists calculated that they would be able to 
"finish off" our Republic at one stroke. But their aggressive war 
in Korea failed to bring them what they had dreamed of. In- 
stead they were made to sit and hold armistice talks on the 38th 
parallel whence they had unleashed the war. 

The Korean armistice negotiation was welcomed by the 
entire Korean people and peace-loving peoples of the world. 
World public attention was focussed on Kaesong where the talks 
were held. 

The entire Korean people and the peoples of goodwill 

199 



throughout the world wanted the termination of hostilities in Ko- 
rea; only Syngman Rhee and his followers at the instigation of 
the U.S. imperialists raised a hue and cry about the possible end 
of the war and demanded more bloodshed in Korea. The trai- 
torous Syngman Rhee clique demanded the "United Nations 
Command" to abandon the armistice talks. Demonstrations 
were held in opposition to the negotiation. All this proved once 
again that the Syngman Rhee clique were the sworn enemy of 
the Korean people and peace. 

At the talks our side maintained a fair and reasonable 
stand. Our side held that the bloody war should be terminated 
at the earliest possible date, and expressed our preparedness to 
take up even the question related to the peaceful unification of 
the country. 

However, the story was entirely different with the U.S. 
side. 

Though the U.S. imperialists asked for the peace negotia- 
tions in face of their repeated defeats and under the pressure of 
world public opinion, they were far from abandoning their ag- 
gressive designs against Korea. They had to hold the talks, but 
never for a cease-fire. Through the talks they were seeking a 
way out of their impasse. Should the war end, the American 
aggressors knew, the profits from the expansion of armaments 
would shrink and the dream of world conquest would be shat- 
tered. 

Therefore they needed the talks to accomplish through the 
sinister political and diplomatic methods what they could not 
do on the battle front. Furthermore, they wanted to bring in 
new reserves to replenish their huge losses and gain time so 
as to prepare for a new offensive. At the same time they wanted 
to mislead world public opinion which condemned U.S. armed 
intervention, hide their aggressive nature and relax the ever- 
deepening contradiction within the ruling circles of the U.S. 
and its satellites. 

From the very inception of the negotiation the U.S. im- 
perialists resorted to every trick to scuttle the talks. 

On the third day after the beginning of the talks the U.S. 
imperialists already revealed their true colours. In discussing 
the agenda they rejected the item on the concrete measures for 

200 



the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Instead, they 
asked for a recess in an attempt to delay the talks. But thanks 
to the sincere efforts of our side the following agenda was 
adopted on July 26. 

First: Adoption of the agenda. 

Second: Establishing a demarcation line for setting up a 
demilitarized zone, a prerequisite to the termination of hostili- 
ties in Korea. 

Third: The question of composition, authority, function, etc. 
of a mechanism to enforce the inspecting provisions of the 
armistice and cease-fire as a concrete measure for effecting 
armistice and cease-fire in Korea. 

Fourth: On the question of Prisoners of War. 
Fifth: The question of presenting proposals to various gov- 
ernments connected with the two sides. 

Discussion of the second item on the agenda started on 
July 27. 

Our side, taking into account the existing front, put 
foward a fair and reasonable proposal to fix the demarcation 
line on the 38th parallel and set up the demilitarized zone by 
withdrawing 10 kilometres from the line on each side. But the 
U.S. imperialists insisted upon a line far north of the 38th 
parallel, on the absurd plea of "necessity of defence" and 
"superiority in the air." Their demarcation line would run from 
Namai-ri, Kosung County, north of the 38th parallel to Keum- 
sanri in the Ongjin Peninsula. In other words, they wanted 
to grab an area of 13,000 square kilometres, one twentieth of 
the whole territory of Korea. It was a shameful act to gain at 
the conference table what they could not get on the battle field. 

Of course, their outrageous demand had no place at the 
conference. Such being the situation, they resorted to "military 
pressure" on our side. 

Between July 23 and 27, hundreds of the American aircraft 
bombed indiscriminately the city of Pyongyang, killing and in- 
juring many of its inhabitants. Then on July 27, the day when 
the discussion on the second item on the agenda began, the 
U.S. side launched a large scale attack in the area northeast of 
Yangkoo and on the right bank of the North Man River. 

201 



Then they staged many provocative acts to wreck the talks. 
The enemy bombed intentionally Kaesong, a neutral area, hit 
the quarters of the Korean-Chinese delegates. It was around 
this time that U.S. Senators Smith and Taft loudly threatened 
that if the armistice talks failed the United States would extend 
the war and bomb many bases in Northeast China. 

When it became clear that their demand on fixing the 
demarcation line would not be met, the enemy broke off the 
talks on August 22, 1951. Then the enemy launched an offen- 
sive. With the new offensive the enemy tried to corner our side. 
And they wanted to give a wrong picture to the world. They 
wanted the people to believe that negotiations would not solve 
anything in Korea, and that military means was the only real- 
istic way to settle the Korean question. They wanted to 
"justify" their military acts, aggravate tension in Korea, and 
create a pessimistic atmosphere with regard to the Korean 
armistice talks in the imperialist camp, in the United States in 
particular. 



SECTION 2 

Enemy's "Summer and Autumn Offensives" of 1951 

Frustrated. Heroic Defence on Height 1,211 by the 

Korean People's Army 

As pointed out already, 
from the very first day of the 
armistice talks, the Ameri- 
can imperialists bent on 
dragging out indefinitely 

and wrecking the armistice 
talks and made preparations 
for a new offensive. 
Around this time Washington ordered Ridgway, Comman- 
der-in-Chief of the "United Nations Forces" to start new opera- 
tions on the front. After inspecting the Korean front, Ridgway 
instructed Van Fleet, Commander of the U.S. 8th Army "to 
fortify the front, to bring in new reserves to make up for the 
losses in manpower and supply the frontline units with weapons 



NEMY'S 


"SUMMER 


OF 


ENSIVE' 


OF 1951 
STRATED 


FRU 



202 



and ammunition needed for launching a large scale offensive 
during the talks." 

The bellicose Van Fleet reinforced the manpower and 
combat materials, saying that "agreement on the armistice 
would be possible only by a military victory by the United 
Nations Forces." 

On July 10, the day when the armistice talks began, the 
l 1 S. military authorities stated that 23,000 U.S. soldiers 
would be brought in every month for the next three as the re- 
placement of military personnel. Then they brought pressure to 
the satellite countries to hurl new armed forces into the Korean 
war. 

By the end of July 1951, the enemy had no less than 21 
divisions, some 300,000 men — 7 divisions of the U.S. army, 
10 divisions of the puppet Syngman Rhee's army and more than 
! brigades of the troops of U.S. satellite countries. In addition, 
more than 17,000 guns of various caliber, over 670 tanks and 
armored vehicles, over 1,600 aircraft and some 130 warships of 
various types were mobilized. 

But all of their attacks ended in utter defeat for them. 

Yet the enemy was making preparations for a "summer 
offensive" in the eastern and central areas in August. 

The aim pursued by the enemy in this offensive was: 

Militarily, to seize the mountainous areas of strategical 
significance held by the Korean and Chinese units on the 
eastern and central fronts. The enemy was to effect a landing on 
Wonsan or Tongchun to join their forces in the eastern and 
central areas, to advance the battle line to Kaesong, Keum- 
chun, Ichun and Wonsan, and then to occupy the whole of the 
northern part. 

Politically, to attain an "honourable armistice." With 
"military pressure" they wanted to make our side accept their 
unreasonable proposals in the armistice talks. 

The enemy directed their fire mainly to the eastern front. 
They planned to break through our defence line from two direc- 
tions, from Biari north of Yangkoo and Kajunri north of Rinje, 
to hit our units in Ipori. 

For this operation the enemy hurled a large force of 
130,000 men and 1,000 aircraft besides many tanks into the 
eastern front. In the meantime scores of enemy ships were 
ready to land a big army on the east coast. 

203 



By that time, two infantry divisions and amphibious 
tank units had been trained in Yokosuka, Japan. They were 
being trained from the latter part of June for participating in 
the new offensive in Korea. The training lasted until the middle 
of August. 

When the enemy started the attack, the defence line of our 
forces was yet to be consolidated. To make the situation worse, 
the country was suffering from the worst flood in 30 years. 
Roads and bridges were washed away, disrupting our supply 
routes. 

It was since transpired that the U.S. spies Pak Hun Yung 
and Li Seung Yup had been instructed by the U.S. imperialists 
to stage a military coup d'etat in the rear simultaneously with 
the enemy's offensive. So, the enemy figured, reoccupation of 
the northern part was in the bag. 

But the enemy was wrong again, grossly wrong. 

The Supreme Headquarters of the Korean People's Army 
saw through the enemy's plans in time. 

Marshal Kim II Sung foresaw that the enemy's main at- 
tack would be concentrated on the eastern front. 

Consequently, several combined units of the Korean and 
Chinese troops posted in the west coast were trans- 
ferred to strengthen the defence in the eastern areas. Parti- 
cularly, measures were taken against enemy tanks and more 
heavy guns were concentrated. 

Then Marshal Kim II Sung ordered to reinforce the defen- 
sive shelters on the main front and along east and west coasts. 

The enemy's attack was supported by numerous aircraft 
and tanks. Our defensive positions were still insecure. There- 
fore, our troops had to build rapidly strong tunnel positions, 
organize in a big way tank-hunting and aircraft-hunting teams 
as well as night surprise attack parties and mobile-artillery 
teams to inflict heavy losses on the enemy. 

But, at this time, anti-Party and counter-revolutionary 
elements Kim Woong and Bang Ho San who had wormed their 
way into responsible positions of front line units intentionally 
sabotaged the building of defensive positions. They attempted 
to twist the strategic measures of the Party. They failed to take 
effective measures, nor did they take initiative in repulsing the 
enemy. As a result, in the early period some of our artillery units 
in certain areas did not fire lest they would be detected by the 

204 



enemy aircraft, and several gun positions were removed far 
from the front under the pretext that the gun positions should 
not be exposed. Moreover, even the heavy and light machine- 
guns were made to concentrate on short distance firing instead 
of using their effective ranges. Their contention was that thus 
they would protect the gun positions. Consequently they allow- 
ed the enemy to approach close to our lines and wage a hand- 
10 hand fight, which caused very often unnecessary casualties on 
our side. Particularly, Bang Ho San maintained that the fight 
could be carried out without building tunnel positions and 
without the coverage of artillery. He did not even let his men 
to dig fox holes. Hoisting a label of mobile warfare he moved 
his men from one hill to the other continuously. Kim Woong 
not only failed to correct such behaviors. Saying that the artil- 
lery needed special training, he removed the artillery units from 
the front to the Yangduk area, thus weakening greatly the fires 
of our units. 

In view of such situation, it was urgent for the Supreme 
Headquarters of the Korean People's Army to take appropriate 
steps to root out their harmful acts. 

Marshal Kim II Sung emphasizing the great role of artil- 
lery in the war, especially of high-angle fires in the mountain- 
ous areas, ordered to make the effective use of artillery in the 
battles in the mountainous areas. 

And, according to Marshal Kirn II Sung's order, new steps 
were taken for effective use of artillery in the mountainous 
areas. The strength of our units and combined units was thus 
bolstered greatly by our artillery. Consequently, a wrong view 
held by certain commanders of belittling the use of artillery in 
the mountainous areas in the light of the strong enemy's air- 
force was gradually corrected. Then such wrong tactics as 
"short-distance actions" which had hampered the effective use 
of various guns in hilly areas was also corrected. 

Marshal Kim II Sung also ordered that the defensive posi- 
tions on the main front and in the coastal areas be promptly 
fortified against the enemy's airplanes, tanks and artillery. He 
stressed further that all military construction be completed so 
that our combatants could fight the enemy without any handi- 
cap. 

All along the front trenches were built amidst the showers 
of enemy bombs and shells Obstacles were laid to hinder the 

205 



enemy's mechanized units. At the same time, the Supreme 
Headquarters ordered that defensive measures be taken against 
the enemy's possible amphibious assaults and the supply sys- 
tem be improved. 

Particular mention should be made of the political work 
carried out by the Party during this period for further raising 
the moral and combat efficiency of our troops. In this connec- 
tion the decisions adopted on July 27, 1951, by the Political 
Committee of the Party Central Committee "on the summing 
up of the programme of establishing the Party organizations 
in the People's Army and on the work of political organs" were 
of great significance in improving and intensifying the poli- 
tical work among the units and in tightening up military dis- 
cipline. 

In accordance with the decisions of the Political Com- 
mittee, political organs and Party organizations of all levels 
in the army took steps to improve their organizational and 
political work. Political education among the Party members 
and entire armymen was intensified and military discipline im- 
proved while carrying out resolute struggle against any trend 
that might weaken the fighting power of the units. Consequent- 
ly, the vanguard role of the Party organizations and members 
was elevated in improving combat efficiency and military dis- 
cipline. Fighting power of the troops was further strengthened. 
Every armyman was burning with patriotic zeal to defend the 
soil of, the country and crush the enemy to the finish. 

In the rear the Party, in an endeavour to ensure the victory 
of the war, mobilized the whole people to the struggle for ful- 
filling and overfulfilling the arms production plans and for aid- 
ing the front in every way. 

On August 18, 1951, the enemy launched the large-scale 
"summer offensive." 

Preceded by terrific bombing by the air force and an in- 
tense barrage of artillery, the enemy at first attacked our 
positions in the Biari area north of Yangkoo and Kajunri north 
of Rinje 'on the eastern front. 

The People's Army units waged severe battles to check the 
onslaught of the enemy. From the first day of the offensive, it 
was a battle for heights. Particularly fierce was the fighting 
on a number of heights — Heights 983.1 and 773.1 southeast of 
Biari and Heights 965 and 884 northeast of Kajunri. The enemy 



206 



rained down on our outposts tens of thousands of bombs and 
shells. Then the enemy's infantry men closed in on the heels 
of tanks. They kept coming in waves in spite of heavy casual- 
ties. 

From the heights our men pushed back the enemy who was 
far superior in number. They faithfully carried out Supreme 
Commander Marshal Kim II Sung's order not to surrender even 
one inch of the land or one height to the enemy. 

The enemy was persistent. Large forces and great quanti- 
ties of war materials were brought in around Biari and the 
enemy hammered our positions more than 10 times everyday 
from the first day of the offensive. 

On August 22, the enemy received fresh reinforcements and 
launched a more desperate attack. 

The units of the People's Army in this area continued their 
defensive battle under unfavourable conditions. They had to 
fight back the enemy's charges for several consecutive days 
from their fox holes and trenches filled with water after the 
heaviest rainfalls in thirty years. Tiny streams in the valleys 
became big rivers, hindering our troops in their action. More- 
over, the supplies were cut off and the communication with the 
headquarters became difficult. 

Our troops, however, made a heroic stand. Men and of- 
ficers attached to the headquarters and the troops in the rear 
saved their food for the heroic defenders of the hills. They car- 
ried ammunition and food supplies on their backs to the fight- 
ing comrades. In the valleys, ropeways were thrown across the 
swollen streams to send the supplies over. But, all the roads and 
bridges being flooded, it was no easy matter to send reinfor- 
cements, ammunition or food to the frontline units on the 
heights, where ammunition and food on hand dwindled gradual- 
ly. Meanwhile, the enemy's air and artillery bombardment be- 
came more intense. The enemy tried ten times or more a day to 
come up the heights. Although some of our units had to fight 
with very small amount of bullets and hand-grenades, they did 
not budge. 

When the enemy came up for the seventh attack on Height 
983.1, the soldiers of the unit under the command of Li Soon 
Jong had run out of bullets and hand-grenades, but they re- 
mained unperturbed, and Corporal Kim Jung Ho, and four 
others began showering the oncoming enemy soldiers with 

207 



rocks and stones to repulse them. 

Throughout the battle for the heights, the enemy generally 
outnumbered us 4 to 5 times. But the enemy's desperate attacks 
which had continued for five days in the area of Biari was at 
last stopped on August 23. 

Around the same time another bitter battle was raged for 
seven days on the hills northeast of Kajunri. 

Under unavoidable circumstances, our units defending the 
hill would withdraw from their positions in daytime and launch 
fierce counter-charges at night to recover them. 

On August 24, during the battle for Height 965, Platoon 
Commander Li Myong Shik led a storming party of seven 
members, approaching within 20 metres of the enemy position 
from its rear. 

Immediately before starting the charge Li Myong Shik pro- 
duced a flag of the Republic which he had kept on him and told 
his men: "We must plant this flag on the hill-top. It is our duty. 
Let's display our loyalty to the fatherland and people, to the 
Party and the leader!" Then he dashed forward ahead of every- 
one and instantly silenced two enemy's machine-guns. He was 
about to knock off the third when he was hit by the enemy and 
could go no farther. Yet he knew the remaining gun had to be 
silenced. Mustering the last of his waning strength he manag- 
ed to fling himself over the muzzle of the enemy's gun. Thus he 
made his men complete the mission. 

Paying a tremendous price in men and materials in several 
cays of fierce battle the enemy occupied a few hills. But they 
could not break through our defence line. In the Kajunri area, 
too, the enemy's attack was frustrated. 

During the seven days of harsh battle the units of the Peo- 
ple's Army killed, wounded or captured over 16,000 enemy sol- 
diers. And on August 24, the enemy was stopped on the entire 
eastern front. 

When the enemy was checked, the People's Army forces 
went over to counter-attacking the enemy on the hill south- 
west and southeast of Biari. The battle lasted for several days. 
Our troops wiped out more than 8,000 enemy soldiers and re- 
covered several positions. 

During this period, the Supreme Headquarters of the Ko- 
rean People's Army ordered redeployment of those troops which 
had been fighting under most difficult conditions. Several units 

208 



which had been concentrated in the area southeast of Hoiyang 
were ordered into action in Kosung and Tongchun on the 
tast coast and our defence strength in Biari, Kajunri and 
other major areas was strengthened. 

Despite the heavy losses it suffered, the enemy started an 
"all-out attack" again early in September. For this the enemy 
threw in even its task reserve forces. 

The enemy made a frontal attack on our 27-kilometre-long 
defence line stretching from the southwest of Mundeungri to 
the northeast of Kajunri. 

The enemy troops which had been active in the Biari area 
started a rigorous assault supported by a large fleet of aircraft, 
numerous tanks and terrific artillery fire. Our forces fought de- 
sperately, taking a heavy toll of the numerically superior 
enemy. The enemy pushed the battle line to the north to a 
certain degree, but our troops stopped the enemy forces around 
Height 1,211. And starting on September 4 our fighters waged 
a grim battle to drive out the enemy active in the areas of 
Heights 1,211 and 1,052, the two most important strategic 
points in the region. 

The enemy showered a day more than 30,000 shells and 
bombs as well as large quantities of napalms on Height 1,211. 
And they attempted over 10 times everyday to scale the ridge 
But Height 1,211 was an impregnable fortress. Everytime the 
enemy ran leaving behind the dead by thousands. 

About this time, the enemy also launched a furious attack 
on our forces in the area north and northeast of Kajunri. The 
enemy charged each hill in the region 15 to 20 times everyday 
with the large-scale artillery and air support. Particularly fierce 
was the battle in the area extending from Hwanggi northeast 
of Kajunri to Songowol. Our troops active in the area north 
of Kajunri under the command of Yoo Kyung Soo were in dif- 
ficulty for they sometimes ran out of ammunition and food. But 
they stubbornly held their own for more than 10 days. "Let's 
hold our land with blood!" was their cry. No enemy was allow- 
ed to set foot on the hills. 

Especially, on Height 748.9 north of Kajunri hand-to-hand 
fighting took place everyday. Before the portrait of 

Supreme Commander Marshal Kim II Sung, our soldiers pledg- 
ed themselves to fight to the bitter end against the enemy. On 
the last day of the battle only 10 fighters were found alive on 

209 



the hill, and most of them were wounded. Yet they did not 
surrender but defended it to the very last man. 

Such stubborn resistance put up by our fighters forced the 
enemy to give up the attack on the eastern front on September 

18. 

Parallel with the attack on the eastern front, the enemy 
on the central front carried out a desperate offensive along the 
20 kilometre-frontline, stretching from a point 11 kilometres 
east of Keumhwa to the right bank of the North Han River. But 
here too the enemy was stopped. Hand-to-hand battles continu- 
ed day after day. But the valiant Chinese People's Volunteers 
in this area firmly defended their posts by repulsing a numeri- 
cally superior enemy. 

Thus, by September 18, the units of the Korean People's 
Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers had completely 
smashed the enemy's "summer offensive." The enemy during 
this offensive which lasted for a month threw in more than 12 
divisions on the eastern and central fronts alone. 

Throughout the period of the offensive, that is, from August 
18 to September 18, the enemy lost over 78,800 men and officers 
as well as huge quantities of combat materials. 

The enemy himself admitted his ignominious defeat. Chair- 
man of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff deplored that the "summer 
offensive" of Van Fleet was the wrong move against the wrong 
enemy at the wrong time and wrong place. 

Having crushed the enemy's "summer offensive," the Korean 
and Chinese people's forces were able to fortify further their 
positions. 

The U.S. imperialists 

ENEMY'S 1951 "AUTUMN would not draw a lesson 

OFFENSIVE" CRUSHED. from their shameful defeat. 

BATTLES FOR HEIGHT As their "summer offensive" 

1,211 of 1951 fizzled out, the U.S. 

aggressive forces hastily 

prepared another large-scale 
offensive — "autumn offen- 
sive". 

Like their "summer offensive" the enemy struck mainly at 
the eastern and central fronts in the "autumn offensive." But 
this time they forced their way into the Saknyung and Sibyun- 

210 



ri areas on the western front too. The enemy's move on the 
western front was designed to occupy the Kaesong district and, 
decoying the Korean and Chinese forces into this area from the 
central and eastern sectors, achieve what they failed to do in 
the summer offensive. 

In this autumn offensive the U.S. Command rushed 5 divi- 
sions to the western front, 4 divisions to the central front, and 

6 divisions to the eastern front, to form the first echelon while 
retaining several task reserve divisions. Then an enemy force 
made preparations for landing on the east coast according to 
their previous plan. In addition, the U.S. artillery, bomber 
wings and men-of-war stationed in Japan were ordered to the 
Korean front. 

During this period, the enemy subjected our rear to ter- 
rific bombing. Day and night enemy planes showered bombs 
on the areas far from the front in an attempt to isolate our 
front line units from the rear. 

The Supreme Headquarters of the Korean People's Army 
had perceived such attempt of the enemy in advance. 

In order to coordinate our coast defence units fully against 
the enemy's amphibious attempt, each combined headquarters 
was established for both the east and west coast area defence. 
Moreover, our front line units were directed to fortify their 
positions. 

Furthermore, the Military Commission took measures for 
restoring and improving the supply routes, which had been 
flooded during the past summer. Thus weapons, ammunition, 
food, clothing and other war supplies were promptly sent to the 
front. 

Party organizations and political organs in the People's 
Army undertook intense political work for organizing and 
mobilizing the combatants to implement the immediate combat 
duties. 

Guided by the decisions of the Political Committee of the 
Party Central Committee dated July 1951 "on the summing up 
of the programme of establishing the Korean Workers' Party 
organizations in the People's Army and on the work of the 
political organs," the Party organizations and political organs 
exerted their efforts for establishing steel-like discipline in the 
army so as to enhance the fighting power of the People's Army. 
At the same time, each fighter was inspired to be faithful to his 

211 



fatherland, the Party and the leader. Particularly, all men and 
officers were educated in the patriotic revolutionary tradition 
of the anti-Japanese armed struggle led by Marshal Kim II 
Sung. 

Men and officers of the Korean People's Army became 
convinced of their final victory and firmly resolved to build up 
impregnable defences and hold their positions to the bitter end. 
Despite the tense atmosphere of the war, the Party and 
Democratic Youth League organizations in the army held 
general meetings and activists' conferences: In these meet- 
ings, each fighter renewed his pledge to protect the soil 
of the fatherland to the last drop of his blood from the 
enemy. They shouted: "I will uphold my honour as a Korean 
Workers' Party member to the last!" "Don't yield even an inch 
of land to the enemy!" "Death to the American imperialists!" 
And men and officers sent many messages and letters to the 
Party Central Committee and their beloved leader Marshal 
Kim II Sung, expressing their fidelity to the Korean Workers' 
Party and the leader. One of the letters addressed to Supreme 
Commander Marshal Kim II Sung read in part: 

"...We are the fighters of the glorious Korean Workers' 
Party. We, who inherit the patriotic revolutionary traditions 
of the anti-Japanese partisans headed by Marshal Kim II Sung 
firmly pledge that, for the freedom and honour of the 
fatherland, we will never retreat even an inch from our posi- 
tions and will safeguard the precious territory of our country 
as directed by the Party and the leader." 

The fighting power of Korean and Chinese troops was 
greatly enhanced and their spirit surged higher than ever. 

On September 29, the enemy started the "autumn 
offensive" on the western and eastern fronts. 

On the western front setting the Mt. Chunduk-Saknyung 
area as his first target, the enemy started attacking our posi- 
tions on Mts. Yawol and Chunduk. 

As Mts. Yawol and Chunduk formed the highest terrain 
west of Chulwon where our front line bulged out into enemy 
territory, the enemy intended to grab the area first in an 
attempt to eliminate our threat on the west of Chulwon and 
pave the way for his units to hit Saknyung. But after two days 
of fierce battle, units of the Chinese People's Volunteers stopp- 
ed the enemy. 

212 



But on October 3, the enemy in greater forces launched 
another desperate attack on the whole western sector in this 
region. 

The enemy troops which had attacked on the area of 
Mt. Chunduk occupied a number of heights at a price of some 
2,500 casualties. But the enemy was dislodged from the area 
the following day by a powerful counter charge of the CPV 
units. During the battle for Chunduk a company led by poli- 
tical instructor Yen Cheng-en held a height for three days 
against the enemy who was several times superior in number. 
The heroic defenders were conferred with the honorable title 
of the Hero Company of Mt. Chunduk. 

Fierce battles also were waged for Mts. Malyang and 
Kovvang. In these battles which lasted for several days some 
hills fell into the enemy hands, but a heavy price was paid for 
them. The enemy, however, could not advance any farther. 

By mid-October it had become quite clear even to the enemy 
that he could not penetrate our lines west of Chulwon and 
Ryunchun, occupy the Kaesong area and lure our forces of the 
central and east sectors to the west. So on October 13, the 
enemy in greater forces hit the district south of Keumsung 
supported by more than 200 tanks, 14 field artillery battalions 
and a fleet of airplanes. 

A bitter battle was waged day after day. The enemy pound- 
ed more than 30,000 rounds of shells and bombs daily on our 
defensive positions. However, the valiant CPV fighters held 
back the oncoming enemy under the slogan, "Let's fight to the 
last for our Korean brothers!" 

A company of CPV fighters who had been defending Height 
032.5 south of Keumsung beat back the enemy occupying bomb 
craters as their trenches after their positions were bombed out 
by the enemy planes. They firmly held the height for three days 
until only eight of them were left alive. In the three-day battles 
the enemy lost over 17,000. 

However the enemy did not give up. Their forces were 
reinforced to stage another attack. The enemy managed to 
push a little northward to the vicinity of Mts. Bonghwa and 
Kyoam at the price of very heavy casualties, but could not go 
farther in face of the tenacious resistance of the CPV units. 
And on October 22, the enemy abandoned their offensive on the 
central front. 

213 



Simultaneous with the attacks on the western and central 
fronts, the enemy forces furiously hit the areas of Mundeungri, 
Satairi and Heights 1,211 and 1,052. 

Having concentrated large forces on important strategic 
points along our defensive perimeter, the enemy commenced an 
attack on September 29 along the battle line stretching from 
the left bank of the North Han River down to the road con- 
necting Mundeungri and Yangkoo. Later on, the enemy units 
advanced along the Yangkoo-Mundeungri and Yangkoo-Satairi 
highways, while on the right flank the enemy's fire was con- 
centrated on Heights 1,211 and 1,052. Then other units of the 
enemy marched along the east coast. 

Virtually the entire eastern front was ablaze. On each 
flaming hill Workers' Party members held meetings in the 
trenches when there was a lull in the battle to discuss how to 
fulfil war duties most faithfully. At these meetings the Party 
members renewed their militant determination to safeguard the 
heights of the fatherland with honour until the last drop of their 
blood was shed for the sake of the country and the people. 
Through their exemplary deeds, they led the entire combatants 
ever more powerfully to a showdown battle with the enemy. 
The morale of our fighters was soaring and their strength was 
stronger than ever. 

Battles for Heights 1,211 and 1,052 were most fierce. 

The U.S. 8th Army Headquarters regarded Height 1,211 
as the most important objective in their summer and autumn 
offensives. 

That was because Height 1,211 is located in a very 
important position strategically. The height overlooks the 
cross-section of the two highways from Rinje and Yangkoo to 
Malhuiri. Heights 1,211 and 1,052 situated east of the Yangkoo- 
Satairi highway are the highest hills in this area, which form 
the main part of a mountain range connecting from north to 
south Mt. Daiwoo, Kachil Peak and Mai Peak. Therefore, the 
enemy had to take the two heights if he wanted to break 
through our defence line and press on northwards. 

Since the summer offensive the enemy occupied some hills 
and advanced several kilometres into other areas. But not an 
inch in the area of Height 1,211. This was one of the reasons 
why the enemy concentrated his fires on this area more fran- 

214 



tically. Although the myth of the "invincible" U.S. had been 
shattered by the heroic struggle of the Korean and Chinese 
units and its military and political prestige was at the lowest 
ebb, the enemy had been making excuses to the world public 
for his shameful defeat. And staging their autumn offensive the 
enemy set the capturing of the height as one of its main 
objects. For the enemy human lives were expendable. Tens of 
thousands of men were thrown in. And hundreds of aircraft 
and tanks and thousands of artillery pieces played their parts. 

For over a month, the enemy kept up frontal attacks on 
Heights 1,211 and 1,052. Then his fire was directed to Height 
851 northwest of Satairi and he attempted to hit both heights 
from the flanks and the rear. 

Farly in October, the enemy started raiding our positions 
west of Satairi and in the vicinity of Height 1,211. From the 
first day of the attack the enemy boasted of the "most powerful 
bombing and artillery fire" that had ever been launched. By 
mid-October t.he enemy had captured Height 851 at the cost of 
heavy losses. As a result, Heights 1,211 and 1,052 were placed 
in a more difficult situation, encircled by the enemy on three 
sides. 

Fierce battles raged day and night. 

The enemy's bombing and artillery fire on the whole area of 
Height 1,211 were so severe that boulders were smashed into 
bits and big trees went up in smoke and ashes. The hill-top 
lost its original features completely. However, amidst black 
smoke and a sea of flame, the heroic defenders of the. height 
stood like an impregnable wall. 

The enemy launched no less than 130 savage attacks by 
October 20 but with little success. On the contrary, the enemy 
withdrew leaving over 8,000 bodies behind. The valley in front 
of the height was littered with the dead enemy. However, the 
enemy did not give up and continued his furious efforts to 
capture the height. 

Late in October, even the enemy's last reserves were thrown 
into the battle for the height. Pouring out tens of thousands of 
shells and bombs on Height 1,211 and Height 1,052 daily, ihe 
enemy attempted to occupy a range of hills on the left of 
Height 1,211 and on the right of Height 1,052, from where, 
the enemy figured, he could capture Height 1,211 at one 
swoop. 

217 



On October 27, the enemy after waves of savage bombing 

and terrific barrages of artillery bombardment set loose the 
strength of more than one regiment against our force of one 
company on Height 1,052 from the front and both flanks. 

Our troops mustering all their strength gave the enemy a 
bloodbath. In this battle, however, our troops too suffered los- 
ses in manpower and fire-arms. As the fire power of our troops 
was weakened, the enemy brought up fresh reinforcements and 
closed in on the hill-top. Our defenders were encircled by the 
enemy. The situation was very critical. But our forces on the 
hill-top formed a ring of defence waging a savage hand-to- 
hand fight with the enemy. Some of our outposts were overrun 
by the enemy repeatedly only to be recaptured. In the end the 
enemy withdrew after terrific losses. On the following day, 
October 28, the enemy attempted backdoor approach all day 
long, only to meet with disaster. Our men fortified their posi- 
tions and their ranks were replenished during the night. 
Everything was made ready to punish the enemy mercilessly. 
During the two-day battle our fighters killed and wounded 
over 1,000 attackers and held Height 1,052 with honour. 

In parallel with the attack on Height 1,052, the enemy 
threw in huge forces to capture a nameless height on the left 
of Height 1,211. 

By October 29, the enemy had succeeded in getting hold 
of a range of hills threatening the nameless height. As a result 
our troops on this height were exposed to the enemy's fire and 
Height 1,211 was placed in an extremely dangerous situation. 

Regardless of losses, the numerically superior enemy kept 
crawling up the hill-top on the heel of his "resolved-to-die 
party." But our heroic defenders showed no hesitation. A fierce 
grenade battle was waged on the height. Each defender shower- 
ed the enemy with 150-200 hand-grenades within a few hours. 
On that day, too, the enemy failed to capture the nameless 
height. 

On October 30, the enemy again brought in fresh reinforce- 
ments and made more frantic attack under cover of large 
numbers of aircraft and artillery. 

Within less than an hour after the battle started, our com- 
pany on the nameless height engaged in a showdown battle 
with the enemy. The squad led by Yum Tai Kvung, Hero of the 
Republic, which had been defending the height ran out of 

219 



bullets and had communication lines cut when the squad leader 
Yum Tai Kyung inspired his men to fight heroically. He told 
Ihem: "Comrades! Defend the height of the fatherland with 
blood!" "Don't yield even an inch of our beloved country!" The 
enemy came up the height for six times. The battle was indes- 
cribably harsh and bitter. The enemy now closed in upon our 
trenches. The squad had no more grenades. Not a bullet was 
left. The height was in grave danger. Suddenly Yum Tai 
Kyung jumped onto the attackers like a flash of lightning and 
snatched from them a light machine gun with which he mowed 
down some 270 enemy soldiers. The battle continued. Our de- 
fenders on the height repulsed 15 assaults by the enemy but no 
reinforcements were to be had. The enemy was incomparably 
superior to our side in number. 

Under such circumstances, each combatant had to deal 
with scores of enemy soldiers. 

The defenders killed the raiders with bayonets and rifle 
butts. Sometimes they picked up and threw back the hand- 
grenades which the enemy threw. Those who had lost their 
eye sight or were seriously wounded in the limbs hurled 
themselves at the enemy with explosives in their arms to destroy 
the oncoming enemy men. 

On October 30 our soldiers on the height were ordered to 
withdraw from their forward positions. 

The next day, however, the height was recaptured by the 
storming party of a model company led by Jung Hwa Yung. 

In this raid Kwon Hyuk Chan's platoon accomplished an 
exemplary feat. As the leader of the storming party, Kwon 
Hyuk Chan directed the operation most skillfully. His men 
silenced the enemy's guns and recaptured the nameless height 
in a flash. 

It was in this battle that squad leader Li Soo Bok flung 
himself over the muzzle of an enemy's heavy machine-gun at a 
decisive moment to save his comrades from danger and ensure 
their advance. The Korean people will always remember this 
19-year-old Democratic Youth League member, Li Soo Bok, 
later Hero of the Republic, and his imperishable patriotism. 

Before setting out as a commando, he wrote down in his 
notebook: 

"I am a youth of free Korea. Life is precious. So is the 
hope of a bright future. But my hope, my life and my happin- 

220 



cious time, enabling us to rehabilitate and adjust our rear, 
elevate the fighting efficiency of the People's Army and im- 
prove its technical equipment. Through this campaign, our 
forces enriched the experience of positional defensive battles 
and, in particular, came to realize that in positive defensive 
battles it was imperative to build tunnelled positions so as to 
deal heavy blows to the U.S. imperialist aggressive army 
while preserving our manpower. From then on, on the initia- 
tive of Supreme Commander Marshal Kim II Sung, all our 
front line units started large-scale tunnelling work. 

The miserable failure of the enemy's summer and autumn 
offensives frustrated the malignant scheme of the Pak Hun 
Yung-Li Seung Yup clique to overthrow the Korean Workers- 
Party and the Government of the D.P.R.K. from within in co- 
operation with the enemy's offensives. Simultaneous with the 
enemy's "summer and autumn offensives", they, on the instruc- 
tion of the U.S. imperialists, collected military and political in- 
formation to be forwarded to the U.S. imperialists, while 
hatching the plot to raise a counter-revolutionary, anti-state 
armed revolt to overthrow the Party and the Government. 
However, their criminal plot failed and the enemy's offensives 
were crushed by our heroic armed forces and by the political 
and moral unity of the entire Korean people firmly rallied 
around the Party and the Government. 

Hence, the U.S. imperialists could achieve none of the 
military and political purposes which they had intended to 
achieve through the two offensives. 

Our troops took the initiative on the front from that time 
on, beating back all the reckless attacks of the enemy on 
Height 1,211 and on the eastern front. What is more, in 
November alone, our forces on the western front, hitting the 
enemy in the areas of Mt. Maryang, Mt. Kowang and other 
places, killed and wounded over 10,000 enemy soldiers. And 
during the period from November to mid-December our coastal 
defence units supported by our air force liberated 16 islands 
off the west coast including Cho-do, Daihwa-do and C.hung- 
yang-do, the enemy's espionage centres. 

Thus the "summer and autumn offensives" produced 
results which were quite contrary to the enemy's expectations. 
The enemy came to realize that his "technical supremacy", of 
which he had been so boastful, was of no avail against the 

224 



ever-growing armed might of the Korean and Chinese forces. 

As a result, on October 25, 1951, the enemy was forced to 
come back to the armistice conference which he had walked 
out of. And on November 23. the enemy side accepted reluc- 
tantly our proposal that the Military Demarcation Line be 
fixed in accordance with *he existing line of contact between 
the two opposing sides and that both sides withdraw two 
kilometres from the line respectively to establish a demilitarized 
neutral zone. 

This was another shameful defeat on the part of the 
enemy. 



SECTION 3 



The Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the 

Workers' Party of Korea. Further Consolidation 

of the Rear. Aid of the Peoples of 

Fraternal Countries 



The U.S. imperialists had 
no alternative but to come 
FOURTH PLENUM OF THE back to the conference table. 

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF Thus the truce talks were 

THE WORKERS' PARTY OF resumed and at last they 

KOREA AND THE HISTORIC accepted the proposals ad- 

FEBRUARY SPEECH OF vanced by our side with re- 

MARSHAL KIM IL SUNG gard to the second item on 

the agenda: Establishing the 
Military Demarcation Line. 
However, they were still 
unwilling to give up their aggressive designs on Korea. 
They showed no sincerity at the truce talks for terminating 
the aggressive war in Korea. The debate on the third item 
which began on November 27, 1951 clearly proved this. 

Our side put forward proposals on replacement of military 
strength, organization of supervisory organs, and so forth. Our 
proposals had one object in mind — preventing the recurrence 
of war after the armistice. However, in the course of debates 

225 



on the "question of terms of reference of the Neutral Nations- 
Supervisory Commission," the U.S. imperialists attempted to 
enable them to interfere in the internal affairs of our country 
and freely reinforce their military strength in South Korea in 
preparation for a resumption of war in Korea after the arm- 
istice. 

When the fourth item: Repatriation of Prisoners of War 
was brought up on December 11, 1951, to be discussed con- 
currently with the third item, the U.S. side played every trick 
to delay and torpedo the talks in defiance of the solemn inter- 
national agreements governing the disposal of prisoners of 
war. They schemed for forcible detention of prisoners of the 
Korean-Chinese side. To this end, they insisted upon the so- 
called "head-for-head" exchange and "voluntary repatriation." 
Then, while maintaining such unreasonable approach at the 
truce talks, the U.S. imperialists stepped up their brutal indis- 
criminate bombing of our rear. They went so far as to employ 
bacteriological weapons and poison gas. Besides, taking 
advantage of the cease-fire talks, they continued reinforcing 
their military adventure. 

All this showed clearly that the U.S imperialists did not 
want to terminate the war, a source of securing fabulous pro- 
fits. Nor had they any intention of stopping the Korean war.. 
They only wanted to use the truce talks as a means of retriev- 
ing their shattered prestige and preparing a new attack. 

As the enemy intensified the aggressive acts the Korean 
war assumed a protracted nature. And our Party and people- 
were confronted with increasing difficulties. In the rear, the 
terrible scars of ravages wi ought by the enemy during our 
strategic retreat were yet to be healed. And the rehabilitation 
and construction work had just started. Accordingly, the front 
did not get a sufficient supply of munitions and the people's 
living was difficult in the rear. As the war assumed a protract- 
ed nature the class struggle became more acute and the activi- 
ties of secret agents and saboteurs became more active. 

On the front the enemy kept up their attacks and our 
defense positions were not fully fortified. Moreover, we did not 
have enough reserves of modern weapons, ammunition, and 
foodstuffs. In the rear, too, there was a shortage of manpower 
and foodstuffs. 

226 



To meet the situation the Party had to organize and 
mobilize the entire people for making the rear firmer and rein- 
forcing the front. The Party had to further strengthen the com- 
bat ranks of the Party and the ties between the Party and the 
masses, thereby rallying the entire patriotic forces more firmly 
than ever around the Party. 

The implementation of the decisions of the Third Plenum of 
the Party Central Committee strengthened the discipline in the 
Party and government organs and in the army. The re-registra- 
tion of Party members and adjustment of Party organizations 
carried out in the liberated areas from the enemy's temporary 
occupation were of great significance for consolidating the 
Party ranks organizationally. 

The Party shattered the tricks of the U.S. imperialists and 
Syngman Rhee clique and the plots of the U.S. spies, Pak Hun 
Yung-Li Seung Yup group, who attempt to destroy the Party 
from within and isolate it from the popular masses. The entire 
Party members and working masses were mobilized for crush- 
ing and driving back the enemy. Thus victory was ensured on 
the front while consolidating the rear. 

But a number of shortcomings cropped up in the Party's 
organizational work in restoring, adjusting, and consolidating 
Party organizations after the Third Plenum of the Party Cen- 
tral Committee, because in certain cases the Party's organiza- 
tional work was conducted mechanically without regard to the 
conditions newly created by the war. While some Party or- 
ganizations, oblivious of the actual circumstances, especially of 
the circumstances of the wartime and our Party's mass charac- 
ter, erroneously followed a "closed-door" policy in the work of 
admitting new members, others resorted to a punitive policy in 
tightening the Party discipline. Formalism and bureaucratism 
were manifested in rearing and educating the Party nuclei and 
in selecting and allocating the cadres. Then certain Party or- 
ganizations, not correctly understanding the Party's policy, 
were inclined to undermine the United Democratic Fatherland 
Front, and were bureaucratic in leading the masses. 

Such leftist errors manifested in the work of some Party 
organizations, unless they were checked promptly, might have 
weakened the Party organizationally, divorced it from the mas- 
ses and hampered the strengthening of the worker-peasant 
alliance. 

227 



Such a situation created in the Party was due to the anti- 
Party sectarian element Huh Ga I who had wormed himself into 
the central body of the Party and perpetrated anti-Party acts. 
It was also attributable to some Party functionaries and or- 
ganizations. They failed to study the Party work profoundly 
and were indifferent to the regular organizational and political 
work of the Party, only engrossed in rush work under the pre- 
text of the war conditions. 

It was under these circumstances that the Party Central 
Committee called the Fourth Plenum in November 1951. At this 
plenum Marshal Kim II Sung delivered the report "On Some 
Shortcomings in the Organizational Work of the Party 
Organizations." 

Laying stress on the pressing question of strengthening 
the ties between the Party and the masses, Marshal Kim II Sung 
once again clarified the mass character of our Party and the 
corresponding organizational line. He sharply analysed and 
criticized the leftist errors of some Party functionaries and or- 
ganizations that deviated from the Party's organizational line. 

Under the conditions of the wartime, expanding and con- 
solidating the Party was of particular significance. Consider- 
able numbers of Party members were killed during the tempor- 
ary retreat period or on the front and in the rear. Particular- 
ly, in the rear the number of Party nuclei decreased because 
many Party members had joined the army. It was, therefore, 
necessary first of all to expand and strengthen constantly the 
Party ranks through regular growth of the Party membership. 
This was essential for raising the organizational and mobiliz 
ing role of the Party and for strengthening the ties between 
the Party and the masses. Moreover, on the front and in the 
rear, there appeared many who displayed patriotic devotion. By 
accepting them promptly into the Party, the Party ranks could 
be expanded and strengthened and the fighting strength of the 
Party could be increased. 

Marshal Kim II Sung, pointing out in his report the 
errors manifested in accepting new members, stated that the 
Party membership should be expanded and strengthened by ac- 
cepting such patriotic workers, soldiers, toiling peasants and 
working intellectuals. At the same time he asked for high re- 
volutionary vigilance against the infiltration of spies, alien ele- 

228 



merits, impure elemenis and antagonistic elements. An end 
must be put to the harmful practice of conducting the growth 
of the Party membership as a rush work, but it must be carried 
on in a systematic way, strictly based on the principles and 
procedures governing individual enrolment set forth in the 
rules of the Party. 

Also the report criticized as a serious error the adopting 
ofpunitive measures for allegedly strengthening the Party 
discipline. It was emphasized that the growth of the Party 
in numbers should be accompanied by qualitative growth. To 
this end, the Party organizations, it was pointed out, should 
raise the ideological level of the Party members, especially the 
newly enrolled members, through strengthening Marxist-Lenin- 
ist education. 

Utmost attention should be directed to the work of train- 
ing the Party nuclei. In view of the fact that considerable num- 
bers of Party nuclei had been killed in the war, the question of 
training the Party nuclei was of special importance in the 
struggle for consolidating the Party ranks. Particularly in the 
rear the work of training the Party nuclei was of great im- 
portance for consolidating the Party's rural stronghold and 
strengthening the rear, in the light of the greater part of the 
Party nuclei having been mobilized to the front. 

Marshal Kim II Sung went on to point out the wrong 
views held by some Party organizations towards the United 
Democratic Fatherland Front. He stressed the necessity of 
strengthening the ties with the associate political parties and 
rallying the entire people more firmly around the Party for vic- 
tory in the Fatherland Liberation War. To this end, he called 
upon the Party organizations to have a deeper understanding of 
the Party's policy with regard to the United Front, strengthen 
systematically the work of the United Front, maintain close ties 
with the leadership of the associate political parties, especially 
with the ordinary members, and increase the influence of our 
Party upon them by instilling progressive ideologies into them, 
thereby inspiring them to take an active part in everything for 
winning the war. In his report, therefore, Marshal Kim II Sung 
called upon the whole Party to unfold a struggle against bure- 
aucratism and formalism in the Party work in order to con- 
solidate the Party ranks and fortify the front and the rear. 



The Fourth Plenum of the Party Central Committee dis 
cussed the report of Marshal Kim II Sung, and decisions were 
taken on the line and speedy improvement of the Party's 01- 
ganizational work. 

Following the decisions of the Fourth Plenum, the Party 
Central Committee mobilized the whole Party to their imple- 
mentation. 

Hundreds of thousands of progressive workers, toiling 
peasants, and working intellectuals were drawn into the Party 
with a membership of one million, raising greatly the fighting 
strength of our Party. 

At the same time measures were taken for strengthening 
the work of training the Party nuclei, consolidating the pri- 
mary Party organizations, and raising the political and theore- 
tical level of the Party members, with a view to ensuring the 
qualitative growth of the Party. The error of applying an un- 
principled punitive attitude manifested in the re-registration of 
Party members was also quickly corrected. 

As a result, the guidance level of the Party organizations 
was raised and the Party members came to take an active part in 
the Party work. Inner-Party criticism was strengthened and 
bureaucratic style of work corrected to a considerable measure, 
giving fuller scope to inner-Party democracy. This further pro- 
moted the organizational and mobilizing role of the Party or- 
ganizations and the role of the Party members as torch-bearers 
on the front and in the rear. 

The work of the United Democratic Fatherland Front was 
also improved and strengthened; the role of the Party as the 
leader and pilot further enhanced; and solid ties formed be- 
tween the Party and the popular masses. 

In the People's Army the political organs and Party or- 
ganizations took steps for implementing the decisions of the 
Fourth Plenum of the Party Central Committee. 

A large number of armymen who were boundlessly loyal 
to the Party and the fatherland and had fought valiantly, were 
admitted to the Party, which greatly enhanced the Party's 
role in the People's Army. This went a long way towards fur- 
ther increasing the fighting capacity of the People's Army at 
the front. 

After the Fourth Plenum of the Party Central Committee, 
the Party unrolled a powerful whole-Party struggle against 

230 



bureaucratism, taking decisive measures for consolidating the 
people's government bodies and enhancing their role. In this, 
Marshal Kim II Sung's speech. "The Duty and Role of the 
Local Government Bodies in the Present Stage" delivered in 
February 1952 at the joint meeting of the chairmen of the peo- 
ple's committees and leading personnel of the Party organiza- 
tions of the provinces, cities and counties, was of great signi- 
ficance. 

In his speech Marshal Kim II Sung, clarifying the charac- 
ter of the people's power, emphasized that the basic duties of 
the people's power of the moment were to carry out the nation- 
wide struggle against the reactionary Syngman Rhee clique 
and foreign invaders and execute under the leadership of the. 
Workers' Party of Korea the function of people's democra- 
tic dictatorship thoroughly. 

Then he set forth the concrete task of further strengthen- 
ing the people's power. 

Marshal Kim II Sung called for a resolute struggle 
for wiping out the remnants of Japanese imperialist and 
old feudalistic ideologies, as well as the bureaucratic style 
of work. Emphasizing particularly that the cadres and the en- 
tire Party members should have the revolutionary mass view- 
point, Marshal Kim II Sung said: "The functionaries of the 
people's government bodies should endeavour to become work- 
ers truly serving the people, who know how to rely on the 
people in their work, to view things from the standpoint of 
the people's interests in their daily work, to mobilize the peo- 
ple in a proper manner, to educate the people, to learn from 
and know how to serve the people." 

Then Marshal Kim II Sung called upon the people to wage 
a struggle for increased production and economization, and a- 
gainst such phenomena as embezzling and wasting state pro 
perties. Moreover, the guidance level of the functionaries of the 
people's government bodies should be raised. In conduct- 
ing the business emphasis should be placed on the ri peo- 
ple's committees, and the political and theoretical level of the 
functionaries be raised. 

The historic February Speech of Marshal Kim II Sung be- 
came a programme of action in opposing bureaucratism, 
strengthening the people's power, and enhancing its role. 
Guided by the February Speech, our people unrolled a whole- 

231 



Party, nation-wide struggle against bureaucratism, embezzle- 
ment, waste and for increased production and economization. 

The Party and government functionaries carried out a re- 
solute struggle against the remnants of the old ideologies, en- 
deavoured to enhance collective guidance in work and eliminate 
the bureaucratic style of work through concrete, effective guid- 
ance to their lower bodies. And those who had embezzled and 
wasted state properties were duly dealt with. 

As a result, the role of the people's government bodies was 
enhanced, and the ties between the Party, people's power and 
the masses were further consolidated. The entire people, rally- 
ing still more firmly around the Workers' Party and the Gov- 
ernment and in response to the February Speech of Marshal 
Kim II Sung, rose up as one with high political enthusiasm in 
the struggle for increasing the war-time production and con- 
solidating the rear still further. 

Our Party, in parallel with 
the struggle for greater war- 
SUCCESSFUL FULFILMENT time production, organized 

OF THE WARTIME NATION- and guided the struggle for 

AL ECONOMIC PLAN FOR implementing the decisions 

1952 further consolida- of the Fourth Plenum of the 

TION OF THE REAR Party Central Committee and 

the tasks outlined in Mar- 
shal Kim II Sung's February 
Speech. 
Already in 1951, a marked success was noted in the re- 
habilitation and reconstruction work. The total industrial out- 
put exceeded the year's plan by 9.6 per cent; in the fourth 
quarter the production of light industry increased three times 
that in the first quarter. The spring sowing was carried out in 
a shorter time than before the war, and the state plan for 
spring sowing was exceeded by 1.3 per cent, despite all the 
difficulties and hardships arising from the ravages wrought by 
the enemy during our retreat. 

Based on the successes achieved in 1951, the war-time na- 
tional economic plan for 1952 was drawn up. The keynote of 
the plan was that all the resources latent in the country be 
turned to fullest account for the speedy restoration of the rav- 
aged industry and development of the rural economy in order 

232 



to satisfy the increasing requirements of the front and the rear 
and stabilize the people's living under war conditions. 

At the same time the Party, in anticipation of the postwar 
rehabilitation and construction, included in the 1952 national 
economic plan the tasks of laying economic foundation. 

However, many difficulties and hardships had to be over- 
come in carrying out the 1952 national economic plan. The pro- 
duction and communication facilities had been severely demo- 
lished. There was a shortage of raw material for the wartime 
production. Then in the countryside there were not enough 
foodstuffs, draught animals, fertilizer and farm imple- 
ments. In 1952 the labour power in the rural areas was more 
than 35 per cent below that in the prewar time. Particularly in 
the summer of 1952 the U.S. imperialists bombed all the 
hydropower stations of our country in an attempt to comple- 
tely devastate our industry and agriculture. 

Under such circumstances, the Party, first of all, took 
measures for turning to account all the labour power and 
materials in the country. To this end, the work of exploiting 
mineral resources was initiated on a nation-wide scale and a 
movement for collection of waste metal launched. 

At the same time, the Party stepped up further the strug- 
gle for greater production and economization in keeping with 
the spirit of the February Speech. Throughout the country a 
struggle was unfolded for economization of food and materials 
and for rigid control over finance. Moreover, administrative 
organs were simplified and non-productive manpower 
cut, with the released personnel assigned to production. The 
Party strengthened political work among the working people to 
bring their initiative into full play, and organized and pushed 
dhead in a big way an emulation drive for increasing wartime 
production. 

Particularly to ensure the production of munitions, the 
Party concentrated main efforts on the construction of scores 
of large factories in 1952, particularly machine-building 
factories. This was a very important move not only from 
the military and strategic standpoint, but also from the 
standpoint of future industrial development. And this was 
proved to be a far-sighted measure for laying the foundation 
for the postwar industrialization of the country. To this end, 
despite the difficult conditions of the wartime, the Party sent 

233 



hundreds of industrial cadres to fraternal countries to acquire 
advanced technology. 

In the 1952 economic construction, the Party paid serious 
attention to the work of consolidating the co-operative organi- 
zations organizationally and economically. This was of great 
importance under the condition in which most of the state- 
owned production establishments had been destroyed and pro- 
duction reduced on account of the war. Moreover, this move 
made the small commodity producers realize the advantages of 
collectivization. Various types of producers' and fishermen's co- 
operatives were organized throughout the country and these 
cooperatives played an important role in the wartime economic 
construction. 

No less attention was directed to the rural areas. 

Under the conditions in which the war was assuming a 
protracted character and the industrial installations were 
demolished, developing the rural economy represented the key 
to the consolidation of the rear. Consequently, the Party sent 
able workers to the countryside, while the Government took 
steps for relieving the shortage of labour, draft animals, farm 
implements, seed grain, etc. The Party also encouraged the 
adoption of advanced farming methods and organized in a big 
way a movement for mutual aid and cooperation among the 
peasants. 

The Party always directed deep attention to the "mutual 
aid team" and "ox-share team," which were widely 
introduced among the peasants in response to the 
words of Marshal Kim II Sung. This was of great importance 
not only for overcoming the shortage of labour and draft ani 
mals under the war conditions, but also for teaching the peas- 
ants the spirit of collectivisation, a new mode of production 
and life. So the Party gave every possible help to this 
movement, with the object of ensuring the agricultural produc- 
tion of the war time and in anticipation of the postwar agricul- 
tural co-operativization. Along with this, the farm-machine hire 
stations were expanded, more farm implements were turned 
out, and labour aid teams were dispatched to the countryside. 
Then throughout the country hundreds of state and provincial 
crop and stock farms were newly established. 

The Party's special solicitude was constantly directed to 
the poor peasants, bereaved families of patriotic martyrs and 



234 



army dependents. A nation-wide movement was organized for 
aiding them and the Government either reduced or cancelled 
the tax-in-kind, irrigation fees and repayment of loaned grain. 
Then measures were taken for rooting out the exploitation of 
peasants by usurers. At the same time, guidance and assistance 
were given to the side-line producers' and fishermen's co-opera- 
tives. And the work of the peasants' banks was improved while 
the Government made funds available to the peasants. 

In the light of the shortage of chemical fertilizer, the 
Party Central Committee addressed an open letter in July 1952 
to the entire Party members and the peasants of the country, 
calling for a popular movement for preparing more compost. 

In the field of commerce, everything was done to strength- 
en the state and cooperative trade organizations. On the other 
hand, individual trade and industry were both restrained and 
utilized in an effective manner, while a struggle was waged a- 
gainst profiteers. 

While taking these measures for economic construction, 
the Party organized in the early part of 1952 the national con- 
ferences of activists in the fields of industry, transport, rail- 
ways, agriculture and stock-breeding. At these activists' con- 
ferences, the Party set forth in detail the tasks for every 
branch of the national economy to tackle in 1952 tinder the 
difficult circumstances of the wartime. The entire workers, 
technicians, office employees, and peasants were called upon to 
display patriotic devotion and inventiveness for the successful 
fulfilment of these enormous tasks, keeping pace with the men 
and officers who were fighting heroically on the front. 

Inspired by the correct wartime economic policy of the 
Party and the wise guidance and the appeal of its Central 
Committee, the entire working people came out in an all-out 
struggle for overfulfilling production plans for 1952. 

The workers, technicians and office employees in the in- 
dustrial field put up a heroic, creative labour struggle to en- 
sure wartime production. To this end, they unfolded an exten- 
sive emulation movement for increased production, applying 
new work methods and establishing new, high work norms. 

In 1952 some 50,000 new ideas and suggestions were ad- 
vanced by our workers in their struggle for increased produc- 

235 



tion, which went a long way towards tiding over the existing 
difficulties and bringing about a rise in productivity. In the 
struggle for increased production, a great number of workers 
became labour innovators, and their working methods were 
immediately popularized throughout the country. As a result, 
the work norms of the workers were markedly raised in 1952 
compared with the prewar time. 

In the struggle for increasing production during the war 
our youth set an outstanding example through the "youth front 
work-team movement," "youth workshop movement" and 
"democratic youth pit movement," etc. They worked even when 
the electric supply was cut by the enemy bombing, turning 
the belt with their own hands. They stood always in the van 
of the collective innovation movement. 

Particularly, the railway workers had to surmount un- 
speakable difficulties. The enemy's bombing defied description. 
In May 1952, the enemy intensified its bombing of the railways 
7 times that in January 1951. 

As railway lines, bridges, tunnels, locomotive depots and 
marshalling yards were constantly pounded by the enemy 
planes, major transport facilities had to be evacuated to safer 
places. However, our courageous railway workers successfully 
ensured night transport to the front with the support of the 
railway units of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese 
People's Volunteers. The railway workers braved the danger of 
running their blacked-out trains. They repaired the locomotives 
damaged by the enemy's strafing and bombing. Though railway 
facilities were damaged, the workers kept trains running. In 
case of emergency, they shunted trains by pushing them by 
hands to save military goods from the enemy's air raid. The 
railway workers also effectively unfolded a short-distance run 
movement. Then there were the heroic railway guards who 
repaired and guarded the railway lines. They reconstructed 420 
bridges including the Taidong and Chungchung bridges and 
94 -tunnels. Despite the difficult wartime conditions, they laid 
240 km of railway lines. They also cleared away numerous time- 
bombs. 

Motor transport units shipped promptly provisions 
and ammunition to the front and various supplies to produc- 

236 



lion enterprises over the mountains in the pitch dark night and 
through the shower of enemy bombs and shells. 

Following the lead of the working class, the entire peas- 
ants, inspired by the correct wartime agricultural policy of the 
Party, rose up as one in the struggle for increasing agricultural 
production so as to secure more foodstuffs and raw materials 
for the front and the rear. 

In response to the call of the Party and Marshal 
Kim II Sung, they helped each other to overcome the shortage 
of provisions, seed grains, labour power, draught animals and 
farm implements. A mutual aid movement was extensively 
waged during the sowing season between the villages and ri. 
"Labour-exchange teams" and "ox-share teams" were organiz- 
ed almost in every village. 

Thanks to the mutual aid movement, spring tillage, sowing 
and rice transplanting were completed in many local areas 15 
to 20 days earlier than usual despite sharp shrinkage in lab- 
our compared with the prewar period. And the entire peasants 
waged a strenuous struggle for translating into practice the 
call of the Party for expanding the area under crop. Displaying 
their creativeness, they strove to expand the sown area by 
tilling idle land, filling in bomb craters, removing trenches and 
improving stony fields. Women drove vigorously a ploughing 
campaign. In place of their brothers and husbands 
who had gone to the front, the women became the major labour 
force in the rural areas. In 1952 alone, 1,037 model women 
peasants were awarded orders and medals by the state for 
their labour achievements. 

During the war, field work in the countryside was done in 
the same tense circumstance as on the battle field. Peasants in 
the coastal areas organized armed work teams and carried out 
rice transplanting and weeding, maintaining sharp vigilance 
against the enemy spies. In 1952 peasants dug bomb shelters 
around the fields, set up air raid alarm posts and camouflaged 
themselves and animals while working. In the areas near the 
front they worked at night. 

The Party and Government directed serious attention to 
introducing advanced farming methods into the farming and 
raising per unit area harvest. To this end, short courses were 
organized, and in 1952 the number of those peasants who at- 
tended such courses topped 1,200,000. 

237 



In this way an extensive emulation drive for raising the 
per unit area yield was waged among the peasants. The num- 
ber of model peasants who gathered high yields grew. The 
peasants also displayed patriotic enthusiasm in aiding the 
front in addition to their struggle for increasing food produc- 
tion. They rebuilt the damaged roads, bridges and railways to 
keep the supply route open to the front. A mass movement for 
aiding the bereaved family members of the patriots and army 
dependents was launched. Besides they waged an extensive 
movement throughout the country for donating rice to aid the 
front. 

The 1952 national economic plan was overfulfilled thanks 
to the Party's correct organization and mobilization of the 
patriotic enthusiasm of the people in the rear in conformity 
with the spirit of the Fourth Plenum of the Party Central 
Committee and the February Speech of Marshal Kim II Sung. 
The gross industrial output increased by 19 per cent in 1952 
compared with 1951. During the same period, the volume of 
railway and motor freightage rose by 13 per cent, and grain 
output by 13 per cent. With the increase of industrial produc- 
tion and the aid from the brother countries, retail commodity 
turnover rose considerably while retail prices dropped mark 
edly. 

Such achievements in industry, transport and agriculture 
in 1952 not only made it possible to meet the demand of the 
front but also opened a new prospect for the steady develop- 
ment of the national economy. And the Party and Government 
could take steps for improving the living conditions of the 
working people. 

In March 1952 the Government issued grain loans to the 
war-afflicted peasants, and in June cancelled the tax-in-kind in 
arrears and part of tax-in-kind for early crops of 1952. In 
September 1952, measures were taken for the workers, technici- 
ans and office employees as well as for the urban population to 
tide over the winter while a huge amount of state fund was 
appropriated for the repair of dwelling houses. Also in Sep- 
tember 1952 the Party and Government increased food ration 
to the family members of workers, technicians and office em- 
ployees by means of providing with additional food grains at a 
low price. Poor peasants were exempted from the payment of 

238 



tax-in-kind for 1952 and state grain loans. And the retail prices 
were cut down by 20-25 per cent, while the trade network 
which had been concentrated only in cities was expanded to 
rural and fishing villages. 

During the year of 1952 many state and provincially-run 
agricultural and stock farms were set up or expanded to enlist 
war refugees in cities and rural villages so as to stabilize their 
living. And in January 1953 the universal free medical service 
system was instituted. 

For the development of the wartime educational and cul 
tural work the Party and Government carried out an overall 
reorganization of the educational and cultural work in confor- 
mity with the wartime conditions. New teachers were trained 
and a re-education programme was adopted for teachers; 
schools were evacuated to mountainous and safe places; new 
textbooks were compiled. As a result, most of the school age 
children were enrolled in schools. Junior and senior middle 
schools and specialized schools were open despite numerous 
difficulties, and by the end of 1952 all institutes of higher 
learning had re-opened. Upholding the wartime educational 
and cultural policy of the Party, the country's school teachers 
exerted themselves to give schooling to the children 
overcoming all the wartime difficulties. Under the enemy's 
ceaseless bombing, strafing and bombardment, they fearlessly 
protected pupils and continued lessons in dugouts and shelters. 

And the Party took every measure for the promotion of 
science. In April 1952 a national scientists meeting was held. 
The meeting set forth the tasks confronting nation's scientists 
in the economic construction during the wartime as well as in 
preparing the postwar rehabilitation and construction. In 
October of the same year the Academy of Sciences of the Demo- 
cratic People's Republic of Korea was founded. Our intellec- 
tuals in response to the instructions of Marshal Kim II Sung 
given at the national scientists meeting made a great contribu- 
tion to the wartime production by rehabilitating the damaged 
industrial establishments. And numerous innovation proposals 
and new ideas were advanced by them. 

Thanks to all such measures taken by the Party, the peo- 
ple's living was stabilized and improved even in the flames of 
the severe war. And the people's political zeal surged. Thus the 

239 



Korean people, rallied still firmer around the Party and Gov- 
ernment, heroically overcame all the difficulties in 1952 in 
the rear. Moreover, making unparalleled high labour exploits 
under the guidance of the Party and Government, the people 



The ever growing aid from 
MOUNTING INTERNATION- the peoples of the Soviet U- 

ALIST AID FROM THE nion, the People's Republic 

BROTHER COUNTRIES of China and other fraternal 

countries played a very signi- 
ficant role in the Korean 
people's struggle for consolidating the rear. 

The moral and political support and material aid given to 
the Korean people by the world freedom-loving people from the 
very first day of the Fatherland Liberation War further increas- 
ed as the war dragged on and the atrocities of the U.S. im- 
perialists became more naked. And the international prestige of 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea further rose. 

Of special significance was the lofty proletarian interna- 
tionalist aid from the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Re- 
public and other countries of the socialist camp. Invariably 
pursuing the peace-loving foreign policy, the countries of the 
socialist camp waged an active struggle for putting an end 
to the U.S. imperialists' aggressive war against Korea and 
for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. 

In defence of the Korean people, the great Soviet Union 
strongly and repeatedly demanded at various international con- 
ferences an immediate stop to the sanguinary U.S. armed inter- 
vention in Korea. The peaceful initiative put forth in his radio 
speech in June 1951 by the Soviet delegate to the U.N. served 
as an occasion of starting the Korean armistice talks. 

However, defying the sincere efforts of the Korean people 
and the Soviet Union for putting an end to the bloodshed in 
Korea, the U.S. imperialists continuously attempted to extend 
the Korean war behind the screen of the armistice talks. Under 
these circumstances, at the 6th and 7th sessions of the U.N. 
General Assembly and the U.N. Security Council meetings the 
Soviet Union exposed before the whole world the despicable 

240 



manoeuvres of the U.S. imperialists to frustrate the Korean 
armistice talks and resolutely denounced the U.S. scheme to 
extend the war. The Soviet Union also condemned the sangu- 
inary acts of the U.S. imperialists who conducted a germ and 
chemical warfare in Korea, slaughtered the Korean and Chinese 
prisoners of war and hindered the repatriation of the POWs. 

At the Seventh Session of the U.N. General Assembly, the 
Soviet Union, spurning the unreasonable stand of the U.S. im- 
perialists, presented a most reasonable resolution on the arm- 
istice in Korea and the peaceful solution of the Korean ques- 
tion, thereby contributing greatly to the successful progress of 
the armistice negotiations. 

The firm stand and sincere efforts of the Soviet Union for 
preventing the third world war and consolidating world peace 
by ending the Korean war were incentive to the world peace 
movement, encouraging the freedom-loving people of the world 
to render greater support to the Korean people. The Soviet peo- 
ple continued to give valuable material and moral aid to the 
Korean people who were struggling to win freedom and inde- 
pendence. 

The Soviet people sent large quantities of provisions, 
clothes, medicines, farm machines and implements, building and 
transport machines and various kinds of articles of cultural 
use. They also dispatched medical teams. In the summer of 1952 
when our country was faced with the worst food situation the 
Soviet people sent us 50,000 tons of foodstuffs gratis. They 
also sent tens of thousand tons of chemical fertilizers, thou- 
sands of farm machines and lorries including over four hun- 
dred tractors and large quantities of daily necessaries. All this 
was a great help to the Korean people in the wartime economic 
construction. 

The proletarian internationalist support and aid of tht 
Soviet people inspired the fighting spirit of the Korean people 
and confirmed their conviction in the final victory. 

Together with the Soviet people, the fraternal people of 
China also rendered a sincere aid to the Korean people. 

Men and officers of the Chinese People's Volunteers, the 
best sons and daughters of the Chinese people, together with 
the Korean People's Army, overcoming ail the difficulties and 
hardships, demonstrated their invincible might from the first 

241 



day of their entry into the Korean war against the U.S. im- 
perialist aggressors, the common enemy of the Korean and 
Chinese people. They displayed unparalleled heroism on the 
Korean front, exhibiting the true embodiment of the proletarian 
internationalist spirit, while in the rear they aided the Korean 
people with the kindred love. 

They economized their food to relieve the Korean war re- 
fugees and helped the Korean peasants in farming and in re 
habilitating and building dykes and irrigation projects. They 
also gave medical help to the Korean people. 

The noble deed of internationalist martyr Lo Sheng-chiao 
who saved a Korean boy at the cost of his life was a true ex- 
pression of the love that the members of the Chinese People's 
Volunteers held towards the Korean people. 

And the Chinese people waged a nation-wide movement: 
"Resist American aggression and aid Korea, protect the homes 
and defend the country!" Resolutely they denounced the U.S. 
armed aggression against the Korean people. Quantities of 
foodstuffs and aid goods were given to the Korean people. Be- 
tween 1950 and 1952 alone, they sent 192 waggonloads of 
foodstuffs, 110,000 blankets, over 300,000 quilted clothes in ad- 
dition to large quantities of daily necessary goods. 

Moreover, Chinese medical teams came to Korea. Expres- 
sing firm solidarity with the Korean people, the Chinese people 
dispatched on two occasions comfort missions of the Chinese 
people to encourage the fighting Korean people. And the Chi- 
nese people took home many Korean war orphans to rear. 

And the peoples of the other fraternal countries — Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, the German Democratic 
Republic, Bulgaria, Albania, the Mongolian People's Republic 
and the Democratic Republic of Viet-nam — rendered enormous 
material and moral aid and support to the Korean people. A 
steady stream of aid funds, fabrics, clothings, foodstuffs, medi- 
cines, and other relief goods reached Korea from these countries. 

At the time when our peasants were facing difficulty in 
farming, handicapped by the great loss of draught animals 
due to the atrocities of the U.S. imperialists, the fraternal 
Mongolian people lent a helping hand on several occasions by 
sending large numbers of domestic animals. 

The peoples of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland, Hungary 
and Bulgaria dispatched medical teams to Korea and the peo- 

235 



pics of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
the German Democratic Republic and Mongolia took thousands 
of our war orphans to rear in their countries. The people-, 
of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Mongolia and 
Viet-nam sent their delegations to inspire us to victory. Gen- 
erous gifts and inspiring letters flowed from the peoples of the 
fraternal countries to the Korean people in an unbroken 
stream. 

Such disinterested aid and support of the Soviet Union, the 
Chinese People's Republic, and other socialist countries to the 
Korean people were convincing proof of proletarian interna- 
tionalist friendship formed among the countries of the socialist 
camp. 

International encouragement and support from honest- 
minded peoples of capitalist countries and the peoples of the 
newly-born independent states and colonial dependent coun- 
tries in Asia and Africa to the Korean people increased day by 
day. The oppressed people backed the Korean people with 
burning ardour, taking the struggle of the Korean people as a 
paragon and banner in their national liberation struggle. 

The freedom-loving peoples' aid to the Korean people de- 
veloped as a part of the world peace movement. The shout: 
"U.S. imperialists, take your bloody hands off Korea!" rang out 
more powerfully throughout the world. 

The reinforced proletarian internationalist support and aid 
of the peoples of the great Soviet Union, China and other fra- 
ternal countries and the expanded encouragement from the 
peace-loving people the world over further enhanced the 
prestige of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 

At the same time, this greatly conduced to the further con- 
solidation of the rear of the Korean people in their fight 
against the U.S. imperialists and spurred them on to the 
struggle for a final victory in the Fatherland Liberation War. 

During the Fatherland 
Liberation War, contrary to 
the situation in the northern 
part of the country, the plight 
of the people in South Korea 
under the rule of the U.S. 

243 



WRETCHED WARTIME SITUA- 
TION IN SOUTH KOREA AND 
PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE 



imperialists and Syngman Rhee clique went from bad to worse. 

During the Korean war, the U.S. imperialist aggressors 
completely reduced South Korea to a U.S. colony politically, 
economically and militarily. 

The American imperialists set up the U.N. Civil Assistance 
Command (UNCAC) under the direct control of the U.S. 8th 
Army Command in Seoul and other major cities as well as in 
all the operational districts and welded together the whole ad 
ministrative network through this organization. The UNCAC 
controlled everything in South Korea ranging from industry, 
finance, food administration, culture and education down to is- 
suing permits for change of residence, selling train tickets, 
travel and even bringing firewood into Seoul. 

In addition they set up the so-called "U.N. Korean Recon- 
struction Agency" (UNKRA) in December 1950 and held in 
their grip the major branches of South Korean industry. 

In this way the Syngman Rhee puppet regime became a 
mere appendage to the UNCAC and a cannon fodder col- 
lecting center to aid the U.S. imperialists in their aggressive 
war and served as a U.S. tool to oppress the South Korean 
people. 

With a view to converting South Korea into a reliable 
springboard in their aggressive designs, the U.S. imperialists 
and the traitorous Syngman Rhee clique intensified the mili- 
tary, fascist terror policy in South Korea. They stiffened their 
fascist rule. 

Every means was used to stamp out the revolutionary, 
democratic forces by oppressing and disbanding the Workers' 
Party organizations, people's power organs and public organi- 
zations which were restored in the South during the, first stage 
of the war. All the results of democratic reforms were trampled 
underfoot and members of the Workers' Party and other pa- 
triots were wantonly killed. During the period of 14 months 
following the outbreak of the war up until August 1951, the 
U.S. imperialists and the Syngman Rhee traitors massacred 
over 2 million people in the most bloodcurdling manner. 

From December 1951, the American imperialists and 
Syngman Rhee hordes proclaimed martial law over more than 
80 per cent of the whole area of South Korea, oppressing and 
killing en masse the people. Thus the people were denied even 

244 



the elementary political rights and the whole of South Korea 
was turned into a huge prison and slaughter house. 

On top of this, the national economy crumbled to pieces 
and the people were impoverished beyond description owing to 
the harsh war-time pillage of the U.S. imperialists and Syng- 
man Rhee clique. 

The South Korean industry, most of which had already 
gone bankrupt before the war, was totally ruined owing to the 
barbarous devastation by the U.S. imperialist armed aggres- 
sors, a shortage of raw materials and equipment, and to the 
influx of U.S. surplus goods. 

According to official figures released by the South Korean 
puppet regime, as of 1952, the South Korean textile industry 
had dwindled to 37 per cent, metal industry to 15 per cent and 
foodstuff industry to 30 per cent as against the period just 
before the war. 

Peasants were driven to ruin and compelled to leave the 
land owing to the spurious "agrarian reform" which the pup- 
pet regime enforced to pacify the South Korean peasants who 
were all out in demand of a reform like that carried out in the 
northern part of the country 

The treacherous Syngman Rhee gang, by forcing the poor 
peasants to buy land, took away 65 to 80 per cent of their 
harvest as redemption grain for "distributed" land, taxes on 
acquisition of the land and so forth, in lieu of the rent, while 
keeping up the forced grain delivery system. 

Besides this scores of onerous taxes, pressganging of rural 
youth and middle-aged men into the puppet army ana the lack 
of animal power, farm implements and fertilizer sharply cut 
down the South Korean agricultural production. This inevitably 
led to a shortage of over one million tons of grain in 1952 
alone. 

Despite the serious deterioration of production facilities 
and the drastic cutback in production, the expenses for the so- 
called "U.N. Forces" and other military outlay went up by 
leaps and bounds every year. This naturally brought forth in- 
flation and price rise, taking the price index in Seoul in June 
1950 as 100, it had jumped to the staggering figure of 1,312 in 
June 1952. During the same period, particularly the price of 
foodstuffs rose above 18 times on an average and the price of 
rice 30.7 times. 

245 



This being the case, the South Korean people were in the 
grip of poverty, hunger and death. As of the first part of 1952, 
according to the figures released by the Syngman Rhee puppet 
regime in April 1952, there were upwards of 10,460,000 people, 
wandering about towns and villages of South Korea with no 
means of living whatever. Around five millions of them were 
living in the so-called war refugee camps set up in South Korea, 
but thousands upon thousands of them died of hunger and 
sickness due to neglect on the part of the U.S. imperialists and 
Syngman Rheeites. 

Such state of affairs inevitably fanned the anger of the 
South Korean people against the U.S. imperialists and Syngman 
Rhee bandits. 

In face of the military and police terror sweeping South 
Korea, the patriotic people in the South waged a courageous 
country-saving struggle in support of the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea and against the aggressive war of the U.S. 
imperialists and traitorous, anti-national policy of the Syngman 
Rhee clique. 

Youth and students as well as progressive people of all 
strata of South Korea organized the "Union of Anti-Imperial- 
ist and Country-saving Struggle" in Seoul, Inchon, Pusan, 
Wonju and other areas. Workers and peasants launched strikes 
and uprisings. 

The South Korean working class resolutely fought against 
the U.S. imperialists and their minions despite the adverse con- 
ditions of untold terrorism and slaughter. In November 1951, 
over 10,000 Inchon dockers went on strike, U.S. military goods 
were burned on the central pier in Pusan by the longshoremen, 
and the U.S. embassy was set on fire. Then the First U.S. 
Arsenal in Pusan was blown up in December, causing serious 
losses to the enemy. The strike of the workers of the Chosun 
Textile Mill in Pusan in January 1952, another strike at the 
first work section of supply center No. 55, U.S. army in Chin- 
hae in February, the dynamiting and burning down of the to- 
bacco factory under the Monopoly Bureau by the workers in 
Taegu and the strike at the Juan saltern near Inchon in April 
broke out one after another. 

Such fights developed into a mass struggle as seen in the 
general strike in Pusan which was waged in July 1952 by the 
stevedores who refused to unload U.S. war goods. 

246 



The peasants likewise put up a staunch struggle against 
the U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rhee clique. In April 1952 
the peasants in Hwapyung of South Chulla Province and in 
Hamyang of South Kyungsang Province rose in revolt to take 
back the plundered grain, and in June and July thousands of 
peasants took part in burning the warehouse belonging to the 
Okchun Credit Association in North Choongchung Province and 
grain storage in Kwangju. 

Youth and students resorted to uprisings or strikes in op- 
position to the pressganging by the Syngman Rhee puppet re- 
gime. They evaded in every way conscription in the puppet 
army. For instance, in August 1952 more than one thousand 
young men herded up in a primary school building in Kwang- 
ju killed over 50 armed guards in a riot and ran away. Some of 
them joined the partisans. 

During this period our partisan detachments operating in 
the southern part of the country under the guidance of the un- 
derground organizations of the Workers' Party of Korea 
steadily consolidated their ranks with the firm conviction of 
victory. 

In co-ordination with the activities of the Korean and Chi- 
nese forces, they dealt heavy blows to the enemy applying 
diverse forms of tactics according to circumstances, and con- 
centrated their efforts on organizing and mustering the masses 
of the people in the patriotic struggle against the fascist rule 
of the U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rhee traitors. 

Our partisans operating all over South Korea, mainly in 
North and South Chulla Provinces and North and South 
Kyungsang Provinces, raided Jinju, Ulsan, Namwon, Jungeup, 
Yungdong and other strategic points of the U.S. imperialists 
and Syngman Rheeites. They also wrecked military trains, 
wiped out detachments of U.S. soldiers as well as puppet 
armymen and police. Stubbornly they fought to liberate the 
people. 

In South Korea, the U.S. imperialists and Syngman Rhee 
clique calculated that the rear was stable. But they were quite 
mistaken. 

247 



SECTION 4 



Positive Defence of the Korean and Chinese People's 

Army Units. Enemy's Germ Warfare. Enemy's 

"Keumhwa Offensive" Crushed 



In 1952, while successfully 
carrying out the measures for 
consolidating the rear, the 
Party, relying on the econo- 
mic achievements the work- 
ing people had scored and 
the ever increasing interna- 
tionalist aid, vigorously or- 
ganized and conducted the 
work for reinforcing the 



BUILDING OF SUBTER- 

RANEAN DEFENCE POSI- 

TIONS. GROWTH OF THE 
FIGHTING STRENGTH OF 
THE KOREAN PEOPLES 

ARMY 



The U.S. imperialists, with a view to attaining their ag- 
gressive end, pushed ahead with militarization of economy, 
arms expansion and preparations for extending the Korean war, 
while deliberately dragging on the Korean armistice negotia- 
tions. 

By the early part of 1952, the U.S. imperialists brought in 
more men to the Korean front — the U.S. 40th and 45th divi- 
sions. In addition the puppet Syngman Rhee army was rein- 
forced after the American system. Great numbers of South Ko- 
rean youth were forced into the South Korean army to bolster 
up its strength, from 10 divisions to 12, and 6 detached regi- 
ments. Moreover, seven new service divisions were formed, 
while many training centres, military schools, and technical 
units were set up. 

In 1952 the enemy had about 550,000 men in the ground 
forces including the armies of U.S. satellites. Then American 
troops in Japan numbering more than 60,000 were ready to 
come to the Korean front at a minute's notice. 

248 



Thus, altogether the enemy had ground forces numbering 
more than 610,000, including their forces in Japan, for the 
Korean front. 

Besides, the enemy had over 2,800 combat planes of vari- 
ous' types and more than 360 men-of-war in the Korean theatre 
of war. 

In 1952 the enemy hurled large numbers of troops and 
combat materials, and made several frenzied attempts to launch 
an offensive. And with more ferocity they bombed our peaceful 
towns and villages in the rear. The enemy, in gross violation 
of the international law and human morality, went so far as 
to employ on a large scale poison gas and germ bombs. 

Under such conditions, Marshal Kim II Sung, the Supreme 
Commander of the Korean People's Army, issued orders to 
build subterranean defensive positions along the front for a 
positive defense. And the Supreme Commander instructed 
the men and officers to raise decisively its fighting power so as 
to repel and smash the offensive of the enemy, and continue to 
deal heavy blows at the enemy. 

The Party mobilized the men and officers for the carrying 
out of the Supreme Commander's instructions. 

From November 1951, the Korean People's Army and Chi- 
nese People's Volunteers started to build subterranean defensive 
positions along the main front line and on the east and west 
coasts. 

The building of such impregnable subterranean defensive 
positions was necessary in view of the fact that the enemy had 
hundreds of planes, tanks and heavy field pieces in Korea. Day 
in and day out they pounded our positions with bombs and 
shells. Consequently, to protect the man-power and arms from 
the enemy's heavy bombing, artillery fire, tanks and poison gas, 
and stop the enemy's advance before they reached our defence 
line, subterranean defensive positions had to be built. 

Upholding Marshal Kim II Sung's words, the men and of- 
ficers of the Korean and Chinese people's armies rose up under 
the slogan: "Let's build subterranean defensive positions!" dis- 
playing revolutionary zeal to overcome difficulties. 

249 



In the early days tools and explosives were short. The 
armymen built smithies on the front and collected scrap 
iron to make chisels, hammers and picks. 

The soldiers, however, with the help of sappers, succeeded, 
during the winter, in building subterranean positions in the 
main defence areas in defiance of continued bombing and artil- 
lery fire of the enemy. Moreover, our men repulsed the enemy's 
limited offensives. The building of subterranean defensive posi- 
tions at the personal initiative of Marshal Kim II Sung was the 
first to be seen in the history of military art. 

The strategic importance of the subterranean positions was 
fully proved in the subsequent defensive operations. 

Subterranean passages proved to be impregnable as de- 
fensive positions in the mountainous areas. 

From the subterranean positions our army units launched 
counter-attacks on the enemy, inflicting heavy losses on him in 
manpower and war equipment. 

The subterranean position proved to be a powerful means 
of attaining the ultimate end of defensive battle. With the 
building of the subterranean positions, our defensive line be- 
came impregnable. 

Drawing on the experiences gained so far, the Party re- 
equipped the People's Army with arms suitable to Korea's ter- 
rain and the actual conditions of the People's Army. Measures 
were taken for reinforcing artillery, while more mortars and 
automatic weapons, particularly mortars were given to the 
army. To suit the mountainous terrain of Korea the number of 
guns, especially howitzers was decisively augmented. 

Also the People's Army air force was reinforced in order 
to counter the superior enemy air force. The Korean People's 
Army air force, in close co-ordinated operation with that of the 
Chinese People's Volunteers, dealt severe blows to the enemy 
and compelled the enemy bombers to fly chiefly at night. Fol- 
lowing the autumn of 1952, our air force seized the command 
of the air in the areas north of the Chungchun River. 

Even in the difficult conditions of war, the Party paid seri- 
ous attention to training more competent and able officers. New 

250 



military academies and training centres were opened or the 
existing ones expanded to train officers and re-educate the of- 
ficers in the service. In 1952 alone, 45 per cent of the total of- 
ficers received re-education. 

Each unit and combined unit of the People's Army con- 
ducted its own training to educate officers according to the 
unit's mission. As a result, officers acquired new military and 
political knowledge and gained experiences in battles. 
Moreover, the number of reserve officers had iftcreased con- 
siderably. 

Reinforcing the company was an important factor in 
strengthening the People's Army. And at the personal initia- 
tive of the Supreme Commander Marshal Kim II Sung a 
' model company" drive started in all units of the People's 
Army in 1952. 

The entire armymen took part in the "model company" 
drive with a high degree of military and political enthusiasm. 
In one year of 1952, 398 companies were honoured as model 
companies while tens of thousands of soldiers won the honour 
of model soldiers. They set an example in battles and political 
training, in observing discipline and displaying lofty moral 
character. 

In defiance of the difficult conditions of war, our army 
units successfully conducted in 1952 military manoeuvres and 
political training in accordance with the correct strategic plan 
mapped out by the Supreme Commander. 

Our army units conducted extensive battle practice accord- 
ing to their combat missions, particularly in mountainous dis- 
tricts and at night. Suffice it to say that these battle practices 
generalized the valuable experiences gained in the course of 
the war and helped our men acquire advanced military art. 

Party political work in units was stepped up in 1952, serv- 
ing as the decisive guarantee for raising the fighting efficiency 
of the armed forces. 

The Party carried out the work on an extensive scale to 
inspire their armymen to heroic feats. The policy and decisions 
of the Party and Government, orders of the Supreme Com- 
mander and the righteous character and aim of the war were 

252 



explained to the members of the armed forces. The fighting 
power of the army units was reinforced through the establish- 
ment of iron military discipline in the units. And patriotism of 
the armymen was enhanced while their hatred to the enemy 
intensified. 

Particularly the Political Committee of the Party Central 
Committee, with a view to further strengthening the Party 
political work in the army, adopted on July 7, 1952 the decision: 
"On the Proceeding of the Party Political Work in the People's 
Army and the Measures for Strengthening It." 

In its decision, the Political Committee of the Party Cen- 
tral Committee pointed out the existence of defects in the work 
of some Party organizations and political organs of the Peo- 
ple's Army. Party spirit of some men and officers, particularly 
some officers, became relaxed. Their class consciousness became 
blunt and there was a tendency to rest on their laurels. 

The Political Committee of the Party Central Committee 
set forth the tasks of decisively raising the level of Party or- 
ganizational and political educational work for reinforcing in 
every way the fighting power of the army units. In its decision 
the Political Committee stressed that the political organs and 
Party organizations in the army units should further heighten 
revolutionary vigilance, and maintain strained posture of the 
armymen, and strengthen one-man command. 

Political organs and Party organizations in the army units 
explained thoroughly the nature of one-man command to the 
commanding officers and strengthened the education of the 
commanding officers so that they rely on the political 
organs and Party organizations in their work and actively 
strive to raise their Party spirit and improve the art of 
leadership. 

In accordance with the decision of the Political Committee 
of the Party Central Committee, in August and September 
1952, Party organizations of all levels in the People's Army 
units conducted elections to new leading bodies. This was an 
important event in further raising the role of the Party organi- 
zations and Party members in the army units and the fighting 
power of the army. Party members in the army units set an 

253 



example of self-sacrifice by their deeds and heroic struggle, 
making for a greater fighting power of our army units. 

A series of measures were also taken to enhance the sol- 
diers' ideological level and the discipline. 

Marxist-Leninist education, political study course, political 
agitation and cultural education in the army units tended to 
enhance the fidelity and devotion of the soldiers to the father- 
land, to the Party and the leader. Moreover, their conviction 
of victory was strengthened while their hatred of the enemy was 
heightened. And men and officers were imbued with proletarian 
internationalism. 

As a result, morale of the men and officers of the People's 
Army kept rising and their fighting capacity enhanced mark- 
edly. 

In December 1952. the Presidium of the Supreme People's 
Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea adopt- 
ed a decree on conferring military titles on senior commanding 
staff members and officers of the Korean People's Army. 

The institution of military titles signified the improvement 
of the officers and generals of the People's Army in their mili- 
tary and political qualifications, enhancement of their sense of 
responsibility and ability as organizers as well as the growth 
and strengthening of the People's Army in the course of the 
war. 



Due to the measures taken 
by the Party, the rear was 

POSITIVE DEFENCE BY THE r .. ,• , . , . .. 

further consolidated and the 

KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY w&$ reinforced with 

FRUSTRATION OF ENEMY'S modem equipment) while 

GERM WARFARE armymen's morale rose high- 

er and the subterranean posi- 
tions were fortified. 
Beginning with 1952, the enemy continuously reinforced 
its manpower and combat materials with the aim of breaking 
through the defence line of the Korean and Chinese forces. Not 
only the enemy stepped up its reconnaissance activities, but also 

254 



attempted in vain to launch limited offensives in a number of 
areas. 

In its attempt to break through our defence positions, the 
enemy on July 9, 1952 started action against Height 153.7 in the 
area northwest of Kansung. Prior to the offensive, the enemy 
picked a regiment to undergo several weeks' special training 
for this purpose. 

Preceded by heavy bombing and bombardment, the enemy 
reinforced with fresh troops encircled the height and tried to 
close in on it from all sides. 

Our soldiers on the height under the protection of heavy 
gun fires successfully drove back the repeated enemy's 
onslaughts, and made a counter-attack on the enemy troops 
and repulsed them. In the 14-hour battle, more than 900 ene- 
mies were killed, wounded or captured. 

The battle on Height 153.7 was one of the living examples 
of the fight at the subterranean position. 

All along the front, our army units frustrated every enemy's 
offensive. 

On the orders of the Supreme Commander Marshal Kim 
11 Sung in December 1951, the army units on the front exten- 
sively formed storming parties,, aircraft hunters' teams, tank- 
destroyers' teams, snipers' teams, heavy machine-gunners' 
groups and mobile-artillery teams. 

These groups fought to put out of action even one more 
enemy soldier, airplane, tank or one more man-of-war. They 
inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in manpower and combat 
materials, striking terror to the hearts of enemy soldiers and 
demoralizing them. 

In the first eight months of 1952, the combined units of the 
Korean People's Army made over 450 assaults on the enemy. 

In its attempt to thwart our assaults, the enemy reinforced 
its positions and kept strict watch. But our storming parties 
broke through the enemy's line across the network of strict 
watch, wire-entanglements and mine fields, and destroyed 
enemy's commanding posts, staff, communication centres, gun 
positions, munition dumps, roads and bridges. 

255 



In the early March of 1952, a 60-men storming party made 
up of infantrymen, sappers and scouts made a surprise attack 
on a nameless hill west of Height 851 on the eastern front, in- 
flicting heavy casualties on the enemy. 

In July 1952, our storming parties hit the enemy on Height 
351 south of Kosung, a stronghold of the enemy on the eastern 
front, from three sides. A part of the storming parties blocked 
the enemy's retreat route making it impossible for the enemy to 
get reinforcements. In half an hour, the storming parlies knock- 
ed off one enemy company and captured the height. 

In these battles our sub-unit, when storming into enemy 
position, was stopped by a stretch of wire-entanglements. Shin 
Ji Soon, a sapper, threw his body over the entanglements to 
pave the way for his comrades-in-arms. 

For four days the enemy desperately tried to retake the 
height. One enemy regiment as well as a large force of artillery 
and scores of aircraft were thrown in. But our storming parties 
repulsed the counter-attack of the preponderant enemy. More 
than 1,500. enemy were killed, wounded or captured in these bat- 
tles. Our artillery, smashing the enemy's defence fortifications 
i'nd silencing its guns, provided an effective protection to the 
storming parties. 

Thus the combined units of the Korean and Chinese forces 
held initiative on the front, dealing telling blows at the enemy. 

From March 1952, activities of our snipers became more 
intense. 

Waging a positive defensive battle, our units not only had 
to crush the attacking enemy but also inflict losses upon the 
enemy's manpower and combat materials. And our snipers' 
teams, heavy machine-gun teams and mobile artillery teams 
played a big role. 

Under the orders of the Supreme Commander Marshal 
Kim II Sung, in the early months of 1952, one-inonth sniper 
training courses were held turning out 5.892 excellent snipers. 
From March 1952, activities of these snipers were stepped up. 
Sometimes they went within 400 metres of the enemy line. Be- 
tween March and mid-December of 1952 alone, the snipers kil- 
led and wounded 10,727 enemy soldiers and officers. 



256 



And the heavy machine-gun teams and mobile artillery 
teams, while providing an effective cover ior the snipers, in- 
tensified their activities. The sniper teams, heavy machine-gun 
and mobile artillery teams struck terror into the enemy's hearts, 
and the enemy moved around only at night. 

Our tank destroyers' teams carrying anti-tank mines and 
hand-grenades boldly dashed into the enemy line to smash the 
onrushing enemy tanks. 

The 5-member tank destroyers' team led by Pak Jung Keun 
broke into an enemy tank centre in Mundeungri line on the 
eastern front, and stayed there' for several days laying anti- 
tank mines in the tank routes. In this way they destroyed as 
many as 28 enemy tanks. 

The extensive activities of our tank destroyers' teams im- 
peded the action of enemy tanks, and forced the enemy to keep 
a strict guard over every tank even behind their defensive line. 

Along with this, our aircraft hunters' teams also stepped 
up their activities. 

Realizing that they could neither break through our de- 
fensive line nor gain their aggressive end on the battle front, 
the enemy set out to use germ and chemical weapons at the 
front and in the rear on a large scale in flagrant violation of 
the internationally recognized laws of war. 

The criminal germ warfare plan had long been prepared 
by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Then the U.S. J.C.S. 
ordered Ridgway, Commander of the "U.N. Forces" to 
start the germ warfare in Korea in October 1951. The order was 
to the effect that at the first stage the germ warfare would be ex- 
perimented in moderation, then be gradually expanded. 

The instructions were soon conveyed to Weyland, Com- 
mander of the U.S. Far East Air Force, who on his part ordered 
Commanders of the U.S. 5th Air Force in Korea and of the U.S. 
19th Bomber Wing in Okinawa to wage the germ warfare in 
Korea. 

Thus already from November 1951, the enemy began to em- 
ploy bacteriological weapons. 

During 2 months from January 28 to March 31, 1952, the 
U.S. imperialists dropped germ bombs and various objects car- 

258 



rying insects infected with lethal germs more than 700 times 
and over 400 places of the northern part of our Republic. 

Between January 28 and 29, 1952, the enemy planes scat- 
tered en masse insects such as flies and fleas carrying cholera, 
pest and other infectious germs in the area of Ichun, Kangwon 
Province. In February, they dropped a great number of germ- 
infected fleas, spiders, mosquitoes, ants, flies and crickets in 
Chulwon, Pyunggang, Keumhwa districts and in the area east 
of the North Han River and the district north of Pyunggang. 

In March 1952, the U.S. imperialists extended the germ 
warfare to our rear. The enemy dropped germ-ridden bombs 
and objects on numerous places in the northern part including 
Suheung, Jairyung and Hwangjoo counties in Hwanghai Pro- 
vince, Joonghwa, Kangdong and Kaichun counties in South 
Pyongan Province, Pakchun County, North Pyongan Province, 
and Kowon County, South Hamkyung Province. 

U.S. planes dropped germ weapons in Northeast China. 

Between February 27 and April 9, 1952, the enemy used 
poison gas shells on 33 occasions. 

From then on, the enemy employed germ and chemical 
weapons on a larger scale. 

The American aggressors used the Japanese germ warfare 
criminals in their bacteriological warfare in Korea, and U.S. 
Ship "No. 1091" was mobilized to supply the U.S. army with 
germ weapons. 

But no diabolical acts could save the U.S. imperialists. 

In accordance with the decisions and orders of the Mili- 
tary Commission, anti-epidemic committees including the State 
Extraordinary Anti-Epidemic Committee were formed in various 
localities, organs, factories and enterprises and rural and fish- 
ing villages. 

Aircraft watch posts were set up everywhere so as to locate 
and remove germ bombs promptly Energetic efforts were made 
to disinfect the districts infected with germs and remove infec- 
tious insects. Under the direction of the Anti-Epidemic Commit- 
tee, the entire people were inoculated against epidemics. 

The nation-wide anti-germ struggle waged for more than 
one year foiled completely the germ warfare by which the 
U.S. imperialists sought to exterminate the Korean people. 

259 



The U.S. imperialists did their utmost to cover up their in- 
human, criminal germ warfare. But no sophistry could deceive 
the freedom-loving people throughout the world. The Party 
and Government exposed before the whole world the atrocious 
germ warfare of the American imperialists in Korea, evoking 
the wrath of the honest-minded peoples the world over. 

An investigation committee came from China to investi 
gate the U.S. germ warfare. Then the International Demo- 
cratic Lawyers' Association dispatched its representatives to 
make an on-the-spot investigation of the U.S. crimes in Korea 
and the International Scientists' Group arrived in Korea to in- 
vestigate the germ warfare in Korea and China. After their 
investigation these groups exposed and condemned the disgrace- 
ful and criminal germ atrocities committed by the U.S. im- 
perialists. 

The savage germ warfare waged by the enemy, far from 
bringing them good results, brought nothing but political and 
moral defeat. 

As their germ and chemical warfare failed, the bestial 
nature of the U.S. imperialists became more ferocious. Nov/ 
they decided to bomb and shell to wipe out our peaceful towns 
and rural villages. 

The U.S. Army Command openly announced that they 
would make all-out bombing on 78 cities and towns in North 
Korea, and then set "bombing weeks" in the summer of 1952. 

Between June 22 and 24, 1952, hundreds of U.S. planes 
made violent raids on the Soopoong, Jangjin-gang, Huhchun- 
gang, and Boojun-gang Power Stations. Then on July 11 and 
12, the U.S. air force involving over 400 planes carried out the 
most inhuman, indiscriminate bombing and machine-gunning 
on Pyongyang and its neighbouring villages. More than 6,000 
bombs, large and small, were dropped in Pyongyang alone, 
killing over 6,000 innocent people. Thereafter, the U.S. air force 
attacked towns and rural villages, even remote mountainous 
hamlets. They showered bombs of various types and strafed 
peasants working in the field, women washing on the riverside, 
students studying in schools and children playing on the 
streets. 

During the one year of 1952 alone, they showered over 
200,000 large and medium bombs, more than 500 million bullets, 

260 



about 400,000 rocket shells and over 15 million napalm bombs 
over the peaceful towns and villages. During one year, the 
enemy dropped 52,380 bombs of various types including germ 
bombs in Pyongyang and its neighbouring villages. 

But, with all the inhuman bombing or destructive acts, the 
American imperialists failed to attain their dirty aims. 

In accordance with the orders of the Supreme Commander 
to further intensify the anti-aircraft operations, our army rein- 
forced the anti-aircraft teams, and encouraged in every way ac- 
tivities of aircraft hunters. They dealt heavy blows to the enemy 
air force, striking terror into the enemy pilots' hearts. 

As the fighting strength of the People's Army and its anti- 
aircraft fire were reinforced and the activities of pursuit planes 
and aircraft hunters were intensified, the U.S. air force was 
obliged from the latter part of 1951 to change its tactics from 
day activities to night activities. Their planes kept flying at 
a high altitude instead of low flights and flew in formation, 
not in single flight. And gradually their air space shrank. 

With the change of the enemy's tactics and activities, our 
aircraft hunters' tactics too changed. 

The Supreme Headquarters of the Korean People's Army 
called a model aircraft hunters conference in February 1952. 
At the conference the hunters exchanged experiences gained in 
hunting enemy planes, and took new steps to cope with the new 
activities and tactics of the enemy. 

When they first started aircraft hunting their main tactics 
were to wait "for the enemy planes and attack them. But now 
they lured enemy planes by moving positions or setting up 
dummy targets. Moreover, they carried out their activities in the 
day time as well as at night. 

Thus, hundreds of aircraft-hunting teams shot down as 
many as 1,219 enemy planes during 1952 alone. 

The aircraft-hunting teams were organized on the front 
at the initiative of Marshal Kim II Sung. Aircraft hunting took 
place on a mass scale since. It showed that they could fight 
successfully enemy planes of various types with small arms of 
various calibre, and demonstrated clearly the excellent military 
art of the Korean People's Army. 

The anti-aircraft units of the People's Army shot down 
752 enemy planes including B-29s during 1952. Particularly, 

261 



the 19th and 23rd Guard Antiaircraft Units distinguished 
themselves. 

Though the U.S. air force bombed most savagely our sup- 
ply lines, it could not stop the flow of supplies to the front. 

Fighters of our transport units and railway and motor 
transport workers ensured successfully the night transport, 
braving the unprecedentedly severe bombing and strafing. Thus 
the "air pressure" pursued by the American imperialists came 
to naught due to the heroic fight of the Korean people. 

In order to defend the east and west coasts from the 
enemy's intrusion, our naval units, in cooperation with 
coast artillerymen, successfully laid mines to prevent enemy 
vessels from approaching our coasts. At the same time they 
waged a heroic fight against enemy vessels which indiscri- 
minately bombarded our peaceful populated areas. They sank 
or destroyed 25 enemy vessles of various types including 
cruisers. 

While intensifying the germ warfare and barbarous bomb- 
ing both on our front line and rear, the American im- 
perialists kept resorting to vicious tricks at the truce talks. 

At truce talks an agreement was reached on the third item 
on the agenda — the question of composition and authority of 
the cease-fire and armistice supervisory organization on the 
basis of our reasonable proposals on May 2, 1952. 

It was decided that the Neutral Nations Supervisory Com- 
mission be composed of representatives of Poland, Czechoslo- 
vakia, Sweden and Switzerland, and 5 entry ports of each side 
(entry ports of our side — Shinuijoo, Chungjin, Heungnam, 
Alanpo and Shinanjoo; those of the enemy side — Pusan, Inchon, 
Taegu, Kangneung, and Kunsan) were designated. 

From February 6, 1952 the 5th item on the agenda, pro- 
blems to be proposed to the governments of the countries con- 
cerned, was discussed, and the amendments put forward by our 
side were adopted on February 19. The amendments stipulated 
to convene a political conference of higher level for the peaceful 
settlement of the Korean question within 3 months after the 
armistice agreement came into force, and to propose to the gov- 
ernments of the countries concerned to discuss the questions of 
withdrawing all foreign forces from Korea and solving peace- 
fully the Korean question. 

But, in the matter of the repatriation of POWs — the 4th 

263 



item on the agenda — the U.S. imperialists brought another 
stalemate in the negotiations. The enemy side insisted on the 
repatriation of all the POWs held by our side, but about the 
prisoners that they held only "applicants" would be repatriated 
-their inhuman, most disgraceful "voluntary repatriation." 

While repeating the absurd "voluntary repatriation" at the 
truce negotiations, the U.S. imperialists perpetrated inhuman, 
barbarous outrages against the unarmed POWs of our side un- 
der the label of "screening" in an attempt to legalize-their 
"voluntary repatriation." 

Forcing the POWs of our side to agree to the "voluntary 
repatriation" so that the U.S. aggressors could detain and use 
them for cannon fodder, the U.S. imperialists conduct- 
ed interrogations and screening of our men whom they held. 
They tortured and killed ruthlessly the POWs of our side who 
were not "willing" to "refuse" the repatriation. 

Suffice it to cite here the appeal of 6,223 POWs held in 
the enemy POW camps on Koje Island. The appeal dated 
May 23, 1952 was addressed to the Supreme Commander 
Marshal Kim II Sung and the compatriots in the fatherland. 

"... Death is impending over us every hour. Our comrades 
are being -killed day and night. U.S. guards armed to teeth 
walk around the camps torturing us savagely. They drag our 
comrades away to shoot them secretly or openly. They drive 
hundreds of our comrades into gas chambers and torture rooms. 
A great number of our patriots are carried away in iron-barred 
prison cars or police motor cycles to the seaside to be shot and 
thrown into the sea, or are taken to the seaside or remote 
places to be killed with poisonous gas or germs... Koje Island 
is a hell for us." 

In the enemy POW camps on Koje, Bongam, and Ryong- 
cho islands known as the islands of death, large numbers of 
POWs of our side were murdered ruthlessly or even used 
for the experimental objects of germ, chemical and atomic 
weapons. 

In June-July 1952, the enemy forcibly "released" over 
38,000 POWs of our side, blocking their way to return to the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 

However, no outrages or persecution could break the will 
of the POWs of our side or bend their ardent desire for return- 
ing to the D.P.R.K. The savagery of the American aggres- 

264 



sors against the POWs of our side only served to lay bare the 
true colour of the "voluntary repatriation" and the American 
styled "humanism." 

The enemy conducted germ warfare, scorched our land, 
forcibly detained or murdered POWs of our side. But the enemy 
could not bring the Korean people and their army to their 
knees. The more barbarous U.S. atrocities and its machinations 
became, the more intense our hatred of the enemy grew. 

Moreover, the freedom-loving peoples throughout the world, 
protesting against and denouncing the U.S. atrocities in Korea, 
raised their angry voice: "U.S. armed aggressors, stop your ag- 
gressive acts at "once!" 

In such conditions, the Korean and Chinese people's forces, 
having taken lirmly the initiative on the front, launched a 
more furious and large-scale battles from the autumn of 1952. 

From the latter part of September 1952, the Korean and 
Chinese units launched simultaneously counter-attacks on im- 
portant enemy positions in many areas. 

Between September 18 and October 3, 1952, the Korean 
and Chinese forces assaulted 20 of the most important enemy's 
strategic points. Our army units seized 6 heights held by the 
enemy, and killed, wounded, or captured over 10,000 enemy 
soldiers. 

Above all, the battle on Height 854.1 (10 kilometres south- 
east of Ipori) on the eastern front, the battle on Height 572.4 
(north of Uwoonri) on the central front, and the battle on 
Height 222.9 (10 kilometres east of Saknyung) on the western 
front were outstanding tactical counterattacks. 

The battle on Height 854.1 was waged by the Korean Peo- 
ple's Army units between September 21 and 22. Our army units 
under cover of darkness penetrated to a position 100 to 150 
metres away from the enemy line, then suddenly opened fire 
on the enemy from three sides. Within half an hour the units 
captured the height wiping out all the encircled enemy. 

From dawn next day the enemy made 15 attacks in an at- 
tempt to retake the height under cover of a huge fleet of air- 
craft, scores of tanks, and a terrific artillery barrage. But our 
fighters inflicted heavy casualties upon the enemy in close co- 
operation with the artillerymen. Then they withdrew from the 
height on their own. In this battle our army units killed, wound- 
ed, or captured more than 1,400 enemy soldiers and officers, and 

265 



destroyed the enemy's military equipment including 5 tanks. 

Our fighters displayed peerless intrepidity and boldness 
and showed an example of socialist patriotism in the battle. 

The leader of a storming party Han Sung Choon and its 
member Jo Byung Ho crushed more than 10 enemy gun posi- 
tions and 18 dugouts, and raided the enemy battalion com- 
mand, killing the battalion commander and capturing a com- 
pany commander. When the charge of their company was on 
the brink of being rebuffed, squad leader Shin Ki Chul and 
private Pak Won Jin, though seriously wounded, blocked the 
embrasures of enemy's heavy machine-guns with their bodies, 
paving the way for their company to win the -battle. 

On September 18, the Chinese People's Volunteer units 
launched against Height 222.9 on the western front under 
cover of the fire of over 100 artillery pieces and 10 tanks. The 
fighters of the Chinese Peoples' Volunteers broke through the 
enemy's strong points and seized the height in a matter of 40 
minutes, killing, wounding, or capturing more than 200 enemy 
soldiers and officers. 

Having lost the height, the enemy made more than 20 
desperate attacks against the Height supported by a large 
force of artillery, tanks and aircraft. But the heroic Chinese 
People's Volunteers repulsed stubbornly every attack of the 
enemy, killing, wounding, or capturing over 790 enemy sol- 
diers and officers. 

Thereafter, tactical counter-attacks continued. Between 
October 6 and 14 our army units attacked 27 points of the enemy 
along the front line extending from Mundeungri on the eastern 
front to the lower reaches of the Imjin River on the western 
front, capturing 9 strong points and inflicting heavy losses upon 
the enemy's manpower and combat materials. 

For example, in these storming battles, the Korean Peo- 
ple's Army units killed, wounded, or captured more than 19,000 
enemy soldiers and officers, destroyed 276 guns of various 
calibre, 3,153 gun positions of various kinds, 208 motor-cars, 
225 tanks, and sank 49 enemy vessels. 

As the fighting efficiency of the Korean People's Army and 
the Chinese People's Volunteers was immeasurably strengthen- 
ed through the tactical counter-attacks, it became quite clear 
that they could break through any defence position of the 
enemy. 



266 



— 7 It W as shown that all the 

f savagery and barbarity of 

ENEMY'S 1952 KEUMHWA th § A a g , , „ s , „ r s br0 ught 

OFFENSIVE" CRUSHED j them „ „ t h " , They too re- 

\ alized that their vicious 



A , .j,,,., ., A g repatriation nf 
POWs could not be materialized. Yet they were far from giv- 
ing up. On October 8, the U.S. delegation unilaterally declared 
an adjournment of the truce negotiations. And on October 14 
they began the "Keumhwa offensive." 

With the "Keumhwa offensive" the enemy hoped to crush 
our armies on the central and eastern fronts by seizing the 
"iron triangle point" of Keumhwa, Pyonggang and Chulwon. 
The enemy, while directing its main blow towards the Keum- 
hwa and Hoivang area, was to strike simultaneously Ichun and 
Shinkosan in cooperation with the troops landing at Tongchun 
to augment their strength. And then they planned to extend the 
front to the north. 

The Keumhwa offensive had another purpose. The enemy 
thought that by military pressure, they could make our side 
accept their preposterous demand at the truce negotiations and, 
at the same time, encourage the aggressive circles of the U.S. 
and its satellites which were bent on extending the Korean war 
through the 7th Session of the U.N. General Assembly. 

On October 14, the enemy started attacks along 20 km bat- 
tle line extending from Samgaksan south of Pyonggang to the 
north of Keumhwa, throwing in 4 divisions, several hundreds 
of tanks and aircraft and thousands of various guns. 

The enemy poured an average of more than 24,000 
shells a day on our positions, sometimes as much as 300,000 
shells, around the clock. Every day more than 70 aircraft drop- 
ped over 500 large bombs, napalm bombs included. Between 30 
and 70 tanks took part in the attack every day. Then the 
enemy's ground forces made more than 10 charges a day on 
our positions. 

But they could not break through our line held firmly by 
the Chinese People's Volunteers. Then the enemy narrowing the 
zone of their action directed their main fire to heights 597.5 
and 537.5 on the left and right sides of the Sanggam Ridge. 
The enemy's plan was to secure the Osungsan region north of 

268 



Keumhwa. With the concentrated enemy bombing and shelling, 
it was difficult for the Chinese People's Volunteers to hold the 
heights, and they withdrew to the subterranean defensive posi- 
tions from where they resisted stubbornly the onrushing enemy. 

The numerically superior enemy succeeded in securing the 
heights but they failed either to exploit their success or pene- 
trate deep into our line because of the strong resistance of the 
Chinese People's Volunteers. 

The soldiers of the Chinese People's Volunteers in the sub- 
terranean positions were almost entirely cut off from outside. 
The supply of food, water and ammunition shrank. The soldiers 
fought without food or water several days on end. 

The enemy tried to seal the entrance to the tunnels. They 
concentrated fire on the entrance, and used flame-throwers. In 
cendiary bombs and gasoline bombs were exploded into the en- 
trance. As the days went by, the air inside the tunnels became 
foul. Yet the brave soldiers of the Chinese People's Volunteers 
held out 14 days in the tunnels. Moreover, they continuously 
hit back the enemy, killing more than 1,600 men and officers. 

Powerful offensive battles were waged by the Chinese 
People's Volunteers when they were reinforced, and by the be- 
ginning of November they regained ail the positions. Up to 
November 25 the enemy had repeatedly launched attacks on 
our defensive positions but failed. These exploits made by the 
units of the Chinese People's Volunteers on the Sanggam Ridge 
area will shine forever in the pages of the history of the Father- 
land Liberation War of the Korean people. 

Soldiers of the 8th Company of the 134th Infantry Regi- 
ment who fought in tunnel No. 1, Height 597.9, showed an 
outstanding example of mass heroism. They held their position 
until only scores of them remained. 

In the Sanggam Ridge battle a great number of Heroes 
and model soldiers emerged: Hero Huang Chi-kuang secured 
the victory of his unit by blocking an enemy's gun embrasure 
with his own body, Hero Hu Hsiu-dao repulsed repeatedly the 
numerically superior enemy and Hero Sun Chan-yuan jumped 
into the enemy position carrying a bomb to give wholesale 
death to the enemy. 

Particularly noteworthy was the selfless aid of the local 
inhabitants given to the soldiers of the Chinese People's Volun- 
teers during the difficult Sanggam Ridge battle. 

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Thousands of peasants volunteered to help the hard pres- 
sed soldiers. While carrying supplies, they organized detach- 
ments of stretcher-bearers to evacuate the wounded. 

Especially, the parental love of Pak Jai Keun and other 
stretch-bearers towards the Chinese People's Volunteers will 
live forever in the memory of the Korean and Chinese peoples 
as a symbol of the unbreakable friendship between the two 
peoples. 

Peasant Pak Jai Keun gave his life to save a wounded 
volunteer when he was evacuating wounded Chinese Peo- 
ple's Volunteers from the firing line to the rear. Although he 
himself was fatally wounded by the enemy bombing, he pro- 
tected the wounded soldier with his own body and saved him. 

Two young peasant women Oh Yung Ja and Pak Byong 
Ok, while evacuating the wounded Chinese People's Volunteers 
to the field hospital, realized that the lives of the wounded 
were in danger from excessive bleeding. So when they reached 
the field hospital they voluntarily gave a transfusion of their 
blood to the wounded. 

In the month of November alone, 8,337 peasants of Sang- 
hyungri, Keumhwa County, participated in carrying stretchers. 
They helped to bring ammunition and foodstuffs to the soldiers 
of the Chinese People's Volunteers and evacuated the wounded 
soldiers to the rear. 

The people of the Sanggam Ridge area brought to the 
Chinese People's Volunteers wild greens and vegetables and 
firewood they had collected. Then the local women washed their 
uniforms and made footwear and gloves for them. The local 
art circle members frequently visited the Chinese units to give 
performances. 

In this way the Korean people helped men and officers of 
the Chinese People's Volunteers who were aiding the Korean 
people with their blood. The people loved and respected them as 
their real brothers. 

During the 40-day Sanggam Ridge battle the units of the 
Chinese People's Volunteers killed or wounded more than 25,000 
enemy soldiers and officers, shot down or damaged more than 
200 enemy aircraft and destroyed a great number of tanks. 

While the units of the Chinese People's Volunteers were 
engaged in stubborn defensive battles in the Sanggam Ridge 
area, the units of the Korean People's Army on the eastern 

271 



front delivered powerful counter-attacks on heights 851, 351 and 
other hills. 

In the battle for Height 851 which took place on November 
2 our soldiers killed or wounded more than 290 enemies and 
destroyed many enemy gun positions. On November 9 our men 
attacked Height 351 and in only five minutes after the onslaught 
began completely seized the height, killing, wounding and 
capturing more than 600 enemy men and officers. 

And the enemy's landing plan in the Tongchun area was 
crushed. 

The enemy units who had planned a landing operation near 
Tongchun were to join eventually with other forces operating 
in the Keumhwa area. 

In the early part of October, before the "Keumhwa offen- 
sive," the enemy concentrated more than 300 war vessels, in- 
cluding one battleship, 6 cruisers, and 21 destroyers around 
Alsum Island off Tongchun. On October 15 the enemy started 
a terrific bombardment from the sea in addition to bombing by 
140 aircraft to pave the way for a landing. 

When the enemy vessels approached the shore under cover 
of a naval barrage and protection of its air force our 
coastal artillery and coastal defence units kept silent until the 
enemy vessels were within 6-7 kilometres from the shore. Then 
suddenly our guns opened fire. Two of the enemy's men-of-war 
sank to the bottom of the sea. And the enemy hurriedly with- 
drew. This was their last attempt of landing operations. 

Thus the enemy's "Keumhwa offensive" — the enemy's "big- 
gest offensive" of 1952, which lasted from October 14 to 
November 25, was completely crushed on the land and sea by 
the heroic fight of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese 
People's Volunteers. 

Through these battles the militant friendship and unity 
between the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's 
Volunteers were further strengthened and their fighting spirit 
was heightened with every passing day. 

The enemy's morale sank low. Soldiers of the aggressive 
U.S. army and its mercenaries as well as the soldiers of the 
Syngman Rhee's army began to realize that they were dying to 
fatten the U.S. millionaires. And enemy soldiers in great nui 



im- 



272 



hers deserted and came over to the People's Army. Yet, the 
U.S. aggressive circles refused to wash their hands of Korea. 
On the contrary they made another attempt to extend the ag- 
gressive war in Korea during the period from the end of 1952 
to the early days of 1953. 



SECTION 5 

Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Workers' 

Party of Korea. Frustration of the Attempt of Enemy's 

"New Offensive" in Early 1953 

During the period from the 
end of 1952 to the early days 

FIFTH PLENUM OF THE of ,953 tfae military and 

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF political situation of our 

THE WORKERS' PARTY OF CQUntry entere( j a ngw stage 

KOREA. LIQUIDATION OF ag thjJ enemy p i anned another 

THE PAK HUN YUNG LI M offensive despite the „. 

SEUNG YUP ESPIONAGE peatjjd humiliating setb acks 

CLIQUE along the 38th parallel. 

In the course of more than 
two years of the war in Ko- 
rea the socialist camp was further consolidated and became 
stronger. The fraternal peoples of the socialist camp and the 
world peace-loving people supported and encouraged the Ko- 
rean people more than ever. And this further inspired to vic- 
tory in the Fatherland L iberation War the Korean people whose 
might kept growing. 

Contrary to this, contradictions in the imperialist camp, 
and the crisis of the capitalist economy were further aggravat- 
ed as a result of the continuous heavy military, political and 
moral defeat that the U.S. armed aggressors suffered in the 
Korean war. U.S. imperialism fell into a dilemma. Nevertheless, 
the U.S. imperialists refused to draw lessons from their 
continuous defeats but tried to expand the aggressive war in 
Korea in every way. To ensure huge war profits and to find a 
way out of their ever worsening political and economic crisis, 
they planned to extend the Korean war. 

273 



The U.S. war-mongers, invoking their voting machine in 
the United Nations, forced the Seventh U.N. Genera 1 Assembly 
in November 1952 to "pass" the "resolution" on extending the 
Korean war. Eisenhower, an army general, was installed in the 
office of President in place of Truman who was blamed for the 
crushing defeat in the Korean war. 

Eisenhower openly stated in his campaign speech that 
America's creativeness, vision and production system were 
again concentrated Oil war and that America's economy was a 
war economy and America's boom was a war boom. 

Eisenhower came to Korea in the closing days of 1952 to 
inspect the front line. He blared that military action was pre- 
ferable to negotiation, revealing his scheme to continue and 
extend the Korean war. Eisenhower's adventurous programme 
envisaged a large-scale offensive in Korea, employing new type 
weapons including atomic weapons and guided missiles, bomb- 
ing of Northeast China, blockading China and conducting di- 
versionary operations on the Chinese mainland. 

The U.S. aggressors were to land large forces on the 
west and east coasts of Korea in the early part of 1953 to 
form a powerful second front connecting Hanchun, Pyongyang 
and Wonsan. Then, the enemy figured, our front would be isolat- 
ed from the rear and he could besiege and deal blows to our 
main forces. 

To put into practice this adventurous plan, U.S. generals 
and military experts frequented South Korea. Large numbers 
of U.S. warships were assembled in the Korean waters while 
numerous aircraft and large forces of enemy troops were mo- 
bilized to this end. 

Then the U.S. imperialists, under the slogan of "making 
Asians fight Asians" increased the puppet Syngman Rhee's 
army to 16 divisions in 1953 and worked out a plan to 
drag their mercenaries, Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek's sol- 
diers, into the Korean war. 

The situation confronting the Party was thus a grave one. 
The enemy's attempt to launch a "new offensive" had to be 
frustrated; the Korean war should not be extended; and final 
victory in the Fatherland Liberation War had to be ensured. 

For the accomplishment of these tasks, the Party had to 
further strengthen organizationally and ideologically the Party 

274 



itself, the organizer of the Korean people's victory in the Father- 
land Liberation War. 

However, certain undesirable phenomena were revealed 
within the Party. 

Following the Fourth Plenum of the Party Central Com- 
mittee, hundreds of thousands of forerunners who had 
displayed patriotic enthusiasm on the front and' in the rear were 
admitted to the Party, thereby rapidly reinforcing the militancy 
of the Party. However, a certain disparity was created between 
the quantitative and qualitative growth of the Party due to a 
number of shortcomings in Party organizational and ideologi- 
cal work. Considerable improvements were made in the Party 
organizational work after the Fourth Plenum of the Party Cen- 
tral Committee, but the Party organizational work was stiil 
below the level commensurate with the Party's political tasks. 

The war dragged on and difficulties rose one after the 
other. It was revealed that some Party and government work- 
ers, management personnel of economic establishments and 
Party members were lacking in Party spirit. Placing individual 
interests above those of the Party and revolution, some com- 
mitted criminal acts against the Party, and some were getting 
soft and blunting vigilance, being carried away by victory; 
while the bureaucratic style of work tending to estrange the 
masses from the Party persisted Furthermore, the survivals 
of factionalism detrimental to the unity and solidarity of the 
Party and liberalistic tendency began to appear nakedly. Es- 
pecially, the Pak Hun Yung-Li Seting Yup espionage, factionist 
clique, rallying around them factionists and renegades, worked 
underhand to undermine the unity and solidarity of the Party. 
Moreover, the traitorous clique, as was confirmed later, was 
scheming to overthrow the Party and Government by staging 
an armed revolt on the orders of the U.S. imperialists coincid- 
ing with Eisenhower's "new offensive." 

Under such condition, the Party was confronted with the 
urgent task of ensuring unity of ideology and will, unanimity 
of action within the Party for strengthening itself organiza- 
tionally and ideologically. Besides, in order to strengthen the 
unity and solidarity of the Party and to be powerful enough to 
frustrate the enemy's "new offensive" and ensure victory in the 
war, the Party had to purge itself of all shades of unhealthy 
tendencies. 



In Decertibei 1952, the Fifth Plenum of the Party Central 
Committee was convened to solve this urgent, weighty task. 

At the Plenum, Marshal Kim II Sung made the report: 
"Organizational and Ideological Strengthening of the Workers' 
Party Constitutes Basis for Our Victory." 

In his report, Marshal Kim II Sung made an analysis of 
the international political situation which was developing in 
favour of the Korean people, summed up the Party's struggle 
for consolidating the front and the rear since the Fourth 
Plenum, and set forth a number of militant tasks for further 
strengthening the Party organizationally and ideologically. 
Then he went on to define expressly the characteristics of the 
Korean revolution and class character of the Fatherland Libera- 
tion War: 

"This struggle is, in its historical significance and cori 
tent, an anti-imperialist national liberation revolution for safe- 
guarding the freedom and independence of our country from 
foreign imperialist aggressors on the one hand, and on the 
other it is a popular democratic revolution for defending the 
People's Republic and for achieving territorial integrity under 
the banner of the People's Republic" by overthrowing the 
traitorous Syngman Rhee clique, pro-Japanese reactionaries, 
imperialists' hirelings, national traitors, landlords and com- 
prador capitalists who serve the U.S. imperialists as their 
allies or props. 

Marshal Kim II Sung analysed and criticised the defects 
in the Party organizational leadership, and presented the tasks 
of continuously improving the qualitative composition of the 
Party. He stressed that the disparity between the quantitative 
and qualitative growth of the Party should be erased through 
Ihe intensification of the class education of the Party members. 
The guidance of the leading personnel should be brought 
to a level commensurate with the tasks confronting the 
Party. Moreover, he added that collective leadership 
should be strengthened and the guidance be brought closer 
to the masses, while the role of the Party organs should be ele- 
vated as the organs giving political guidance and that of the 
Party functionaries as the political leaders. Marshal Kim II 
Sung stressed that the defects of Party organs and function- 
aries assuming administrative work be corrected. 

It was stressed that in the Party organizational work the 

276 



selection and allocation of cadres should be improved and the 
verification on the fulfilment of Party decisions be strengthened. 
Especially the report trenchantly pointed out that the survivals 
of factionalism detrimental to the unity of ideology and action 
within the Party and the liberalistic tendency were still existing. 

The report emphasized that Party spirit of the Party mem- 
bers should be fortified first of all, and explicitly defined the 
way of measuring Party spirit as follows: 

"To fortify Party spirit means that every member of the 
Workers' Party is boundlessly faithful to the Party, takes an 
active part in the Party work, places the interest of the revolu- 
tion and the Party above individual interests, always upholds 
the interest and principle of the Party wherever and in what- 
ever condition he may be, combats resolutely every shade of 
incorrect, wrong ideology, strictly abides by the discipline in 
the Party life, and strengthens the ties between the Party and 
people." 

Marshal Kim 11 Sung pointed out that the majority of the 
Party members had strong Party spirit but some were still 
lacking in Parly spirit; he criticized the phenomena of selfish- 
ness, liberalism, nepotism, and factionalism, and stressed thai 
a vigorous struggle should be waged against factionalism. Then 
he exposed and analysed the manifestations of the survivals 
of factionalism and their harmfulness, and referred to the ne 
cessity of intensifying the struggle against the survivals of 
factionalism. He added: 

"Our Party cannot fail to pay serious attention to the fact 
that if the remnants of factionalism are permitted to remain 
they will, as the experiences of the People's Democracies and 
our brother Parties show, in the long run tread the path to the 
espionage of the enemy." 

For the strengthening of the unity and solidarity of the 
Party and particularly for the intensification of the light agains' 
factionalism, the report stressed that the struggle for tempering 
Party spirit should be waged vigorously and the principle of 
democratic centralism should be strictly adhered to by strength- 
ening the organizational discipline within the Party. It was 
pointed out in the report that criticism, the sharpest weapon in 
tempering Party spirit, should be strengthened. 

The report pointed out that the primary Party organiza- 
tions, the basic unit of the Party, should be strengthened, and 

277 



their role as organizers anci mobilizers and the vanguard 
role of the Party members in carrying the war to a victorious 
end should be elevated. In this connection, the report laid stress 
on bringing up nuclei in the primary Party organizations, 
strengthening the Party life of the Party members, actively 
drawing the Party members in the Party work, and developing 
in every way inner-Party democracy. 

The report called for improving the method of Party work 
and strengthening the ties between the Party and the masses; 
it criticised the fact that bureaucratic and commanding methods 
of work still existed, and stressed that the'leading personnel 
should establish revolutionary mass viewpoint by adhering to 
the mass line of the Party. 

A number of defects in the Party ideological work were 
criticised. The report presented the tasks of ending dogmatism 
and formalism and establishing individuality in the Party ideo- 
logical work. It was criticized that the Party ideological work 
was being carried out in a dogmatic and formalistic way with- 
out regard to the level of the masses and divorced from the 
practical matters, and accordingly individuality was not es- 
tablished in the Party ideological work. 

In conclusion, Marshal Kim II Sung made an analysis 
of the new military situation created in our country, showed the 
way of achieving ultimate victory, and presented the tasks of 
watching with sharp vigilance the enemy's move, making full 
preparations ideologically and militarily for dealing a decisive 
blow at the enemy, should it make a military venture, and 
bringing about a radical turn in the war situation. 

In connection with Marshal Kim II Sung's report, the Fifth 
Plenum set forth a number of militant tasks. 

The Plenum stressed that for strengthening the Party or- 
ganizationally and ideologically it was necessary to intensify 
the work of tempering Party spirit of every Party member, 
liquidating liberalism and the survivals of factionalism to be 
found to some extent within the Party, and further strengthen 
the unity and solidarity of the Party. 

The Plenum also laid down the tasks of further consolidat- 
ing the front and the rear and reinforcing the People's Army 
to counter the enemy's attempt of "new offensive." 

The Fifth Plenum of the Party Central Committee, con- 

278 



vened at a time when the war was raging, marked a historic 
event in consolidating the Party organizationally and ideologi- 
cally, and played a tremendous role in further strengthening 
the "fighting power of the Party and hastening final victory in 
the war. 

After the Plenum, the Party organizations of all levels and 
the entire Party members, firmly rallied around the Party Cen- 
tral Committee, unfolded a whole Party struggle for carrying 
through the decisions of the Plenum. 

The entire Party members studied deeply the documents 
of the Fifth Plenum of the Party Central Committee while re- 
viewing their Party life, and the Party organizations, with a 
high degree of political enthusiasm, waged a vigorous ideologi- 
cal struggle for strengthening the organizational discipline 
within the Party, and exposing and criticizing factionists and 
liberalists. 

The whole Party struggle for implementing the decisions 
of the Fifth Plenum brought about a radical turn in the Party 
and government work, and particularly in the work for further 
consolidating the front and rear to counter the enemy's "new 
offensive." 

Inner-Party democracy and collective leadership of the 
Party organs were strengthened; Party spirit of the Party mem- 
bers, their activeness in the Party work and political awakening 
were further raised; and criticism and self-criticism, particular- 
ly criticism from below, were strengthened. 

And, in the course of studying the documents of the Fifth 
Plenum, the crimes of the U.S. -hired Pak Hun Yung-Li Seung 
Yup espionage clique were brought to light. They had wormed 
their way into the Party and government organs and, con- 
cealing for a long time their true colour, had committed 
espionage acts, murder, destructive and factionist acts. 

The U.S. imperialists, while openly pursuing an aggressive 
policy towards Korea, smuggled spies and wreckers into our 
ranks with the aim of attaining with ease their aggressive end 
by undermining from within the revolutionary movement in 
Korea. 

The Pak Hun Yung-Li Seung Yup clique that made their 
way to the leading posts of the Party organizations in South 
Korea after liberation by craftily disguising their true colour 
schemed to realize their political aim by relying on the U.S. 

279 



imperialist aggressive forces. Those counter-revolutionaries, 
on the orders of their patron, the U.S. imperialists, destroyed 
our Party in South Korea, split the democratic forces and 
wrecked the labour movement and partisan struggle in South 
Korea. 

After they came over to the North, these elements schemed 
to split and disorganize our Party. They marshalled factionists 
and alien elements to sabotage the Party and government work, 
spread bourgeois ideology, slandered the decisions of the Party 
in their attempt to estrange the people from the Party, and 
systematically furnished the U.S. intelligence agencies with the 
secrets of the Party, government and military affairs. 

On the orders of the U.S. imperialists, these sinister ele- 
ments went so far as to prepare on several occasions armed 
revolt to overthrow the Party and Government synchronizing 
with the enemy's "offensives" and "landing operations." They 
were out to overthrow the people's democratic system, establish 
a bourgeois system and help the U.S. imperialists colonize Ko- 
rea and enslave the Korean people. 

But their criminal subversive activities failed, because the 
Party had a firm leading core formed by the communists head- 
ed by Marshal Kim II Sung, the whole Party was united around 
it and the whole Party had grown into an iron rank. 

The liquidation of the Pak Hun Yung-Li Seung Yup clique 
was also an event of great importance in strengthening the 
Party's unity and ensuring its purity. And it was another tel- 
ling blow to the U.S. imperialists who, expecting much of their 
hired spies, invaded Korea and planned to extend their aggres- 
sive war. 

Drawing on the important political lessons gained in lay- 
ing bare and liquidating the Pak Hun Yung-Li Seung Yup es- 
pionage clique, the Party, after the Fifth Plenum of its Central 
Committee, waged a powerful struggle for further strengthen- 
ing the unity and solidarity of the Party. The struggle against 
factionalism was intensified. At the same time, measures were 
taken for strengthening the Party guidance in the Party and 
government organs, for the strict observance of the principles 
of Party life laid down in the Party Rules and Party's or- 
ganizational leadership, and for the promotion of the inner- 
Party democracy and criticism. The Party called on the Party 

280 



members and the masses to sharpen all the more their revolu- 
tionary vigilance, and organized and unfolded the anti-espion- 
age struggle as a nation-wide drive. 

In view of the fact that difficulties were cropping up one 
after another owing to the prolongation of the war and that the 
enemy's attempt to launch a "new offensive" had become more 
naked, the Party strengthened the work of the Party organiza- 
tions, raised Party spirit of the Party members and gave full 
play to the initiative of the Party members, thereby enhancing 
the role of the Party organizations as the organizers and mo- 
bilizes and the vanguard role of the Party members. 

The Party intensified the fight against bureaucratic and 
formalistic styles of work which impeded the implementation 
of its policy for the victory in the war, and worked to strength- 
en in every way its ties with the masses. The ideological work 
of arming the Party members and the masses with socialist 
patriotism and proletarian internationalism was strengthened 
so that they could, with the firm conviction of victory, overcome 
all difficulties, smash the enemy's attempt to launch a "new 
offensive" and fight all the more resolutely for the final victory 
in the war. 

While working for the consolidation of its organizations, 
the Party also took measures for further strengthening the peo- 
ple's government bodies which function for translating the 
Party policy into practice. 

With a view to improving the ri people's committees which 
function for putting into practice the policy of the Party and 
Government among the masses, sub-county was abolished and 
several ri were merged into one in accordance with the decree 
of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of December 
22, 1952. Competent personnel, tested and tempered, were as- 
signed to the ri people's committees. As the ri was placed 
directly under county, measures were taken to reduce the size 
of the county so as to promptly improve the work of the local 
government organs. 

Through the struggle for implementing the decisions of the 
Fifth Plenum of the Party Central Committee, the Party purged 
itself of impure elements: unity of the Party was further 
strengthened; Party members enhanced their Party spirit and 
the militancy of the Party was stepped up. This constituted the 

281 



decisive guarantee for the Korean people's ultimate victory in 
the war. 

Had the Party Central Committee headed by Marshal 
Kim II Sung not taken in good time measures for strengthening 
the Party organizationally and ideologically and had it failed 
to unmask and smash the Pak Hun Yung-Li Seung Yup espion- 
age group, the struggle of the Korean people for frustrating the 
attempt of the U.S. imperialists to make a "new offensive," it 
was clear, might have been more difficult. 



The Party, while streng- 
thening itself after the Fifth 
HIGH-RANKING OFFICERS' Plenum of the Party Central 

CONFERENCE IN DECEM- Committee, took measures to 

BER 1952. MARSHAL KIM counter the enemy's immi- 

IL SUNG'S SPEECH: "LET nent "new offensive." 

US STRENGTHEN THE Towards the end of Decem- 

PEOPLE'S ARMY!" ENE- ber 1952, a high-ranking of- 

MY'S "NEW OFFENSIVE" ficers' conference was called. 

AT THE BEGINNING OF At the conference Marshal 

1953 CRUSHED Kim II Sung delivered a 

historic speech: "Let Us 
Strengthen the People's 

Army!" 
Analysing the nature and character of the Korean war from 
the view-point of Marxism-Leninism and elucidating the 
character and nature of the People's Army which was 
organized, brought up and strengthened by the Workers' Party 
of Korea, Marshal Kim II Sung in his report reviewed the 
growth of the Korean People's Army in the course of the 
Fatherland Liberation War. Then, pointing out shortcomings 
disclosed in the course of the war, he set forth the strategy 
and tactics to counter the enemy's large-scale "new offensive." 
Marshal Kim II Sung demanded that every unit and all 
the men and officers of the People's Army step up revolution- 
ary vigilance against the enemy for the final victory of the 
Fatherland Liberation War. They should be fully ready for the 
long-drawn out war and large scale battles. 

He emphasized the following measures to be taken: First, 

282 



the entire men and officers must be taught the just cause of 
our work, and be kept in readiness for a protracted 
war. Ideological work must be intensified so as to prepare 
all the combatants not only to repulse the enemy but also strike 
a fatal blow at them, should the enemy venture to launch 
another offensive or landing operation. The Party educational 
and political work, he went on, must be centered on bolstering 
the military discipline and one-man command, on intensifying 
the hatred of the enemy, on guarding military secrets and on 
taking good care of weapons. 

Next, Marshal Kim II Sung stressed the importance of 
better coordination between units in battle and of strengthen 
ing the defence on land and on the sea. We must stop the 
enemy, not allow them to make landings. In defensive battles 
we must sharply raise military efficiency of our units, do the 
utmost to wear out the enemy, and destroy his manpower and 
military supplies. Marshal Kim II Sung pointed out that the 
operational and tactical training of the commanders and staff 
officers must be improved at a rapid pace, and our reconnais- 
sance bettered. We must persistently and stubbornly prepare 
for a final blow to the enemy. 

Then Marshal Kim II Sung emphasized that the training 
of various units must be strengthened. To this end, the com- 
batants must learn tactics and do more target practice. 
Moreover, the training must be done in the fields or forests 
under the conditions similar to the actual battles. More than 
40 per cent of training was to be devoted to night operation. 
Every combatant must become expert in handling his weapon. 
The supply forces must discharge their duties demanded by the 
modern warfare. It must be kept in mind that the outcome of 
operations depends upon the timely supply of ammunition and 
foodstuffs to the front. 

The speech delivered by Marshal Kim II Sung provided a 
theoretical document which applied scientifically the experien 
ces of the Fatherland Liberation War based on the theory of 
Marxism-Leninism and the advanced military art. At 
the same time it was practical programme of strengthening 
organization, education and fighting power of the People's 
Army. 

28.3 



Based on the decision of the Fifth Plenum and Marshal 
Kim II Sung's speech the high-ranking officers' conference 
reviewed the conduct of the war and took concrete measures 
for frustrating the enemy's "new offensive". The conference 
decided upon practical problems on strengthening the fighting 
power of the People's Army. 

The high-ranking officers' conference was of great 
significance in further strengthening and developing the Peo- 
ple's Army and in preparing fully for dealing with the enemy's 
"new offensive." 

As the enemy's plan for the new offensive became more 
apparent after the conference, Marshal Kim II Sung gave 
orders on December 30, 1952 to strengthen our defensive posi- 
tions and preparations for action, to frustrate and crush 
enemy's every move on the land and sea. Not even one inch of 
the precious land of the fatherland must be allowed to fall 
into the hands of the enemy, and the country should be made 
an impregnable fortress. 

Following this, in January 1953, the Central Committee of 
the Workers' Party of Korea addressed a letter to all the Party 
organs and members calling upon them to prepare for the de- 
cisive battle against the enemy. 

In its letter the Party Central Committee asked all the 
Party members to be prepared fully for the enemy's "new 
offensive" which seemed impending. Should the enemy attempt 
an attack or a landing adventure every member of the Party, 
the entire heroic men and officers and all the people should 
rise up as one to take part in the decisive battle and destroy 
the enemy. 

In response to the appeal of the Party, the entire people 
on the front and in the rear with the Party members in the 
van rose up to prepare for the decisive battle under the slogans 
"Hold the soil of our fatherland to the death" "Glorify the 
name of Party member in waging the decisive battle - for the 
people and the country!" 

The political organs and the Party organizations of the 
People's Army called upon the entire men and officers to study 
the documents of the Fifth Plenum of the Party Central Com- 
mittee and the high-ranking officers' conference, the orders of 

284 



the Supreme Commander and the letter from the Central Com- 
mittee of the Party. Members of the armed forces were called 
upon to carry out the tasks set before them. 

Particularly Marshal Kim II Sung visited the front to 
inspire the men and officers to the peerless loyalty to the 
Party and encourage them with firmer conviction in victory. 

The entire servicemen were imbued with the political zeal 
and their morale was very high. These were their slogans: 
"Safeguard every inch of our fatherland to the last drop of our 
blood!" "Let us keep the enemy's landing parties from setting 
even a step on our land!" "Push them into the East and West 
Seas and wipe them from our land!" "Our strength is inex- 
haustible!" "Everything to the decisive battle for annihilating 
the enemy!" "Let's go forward along the path indicated by 
the leader!" 

Preparations for the coming enemy's assault were thus 
stepped up. Along the entire front and on both east and west 
coasts the defensive tunnel positions totalling 1,621 km were 
built and additional structures and barricades were 
reinforced. Particularly, in every point where the enemy was 
expected to attempt landing strong defence was established. 
The Supreme Headquarters of the Korean People's Army 
ordered more troops, reserve troops in particular, to important 
coastal points. Then stimulated war exercises were held 
extensively. 

While strong defences were built up, the navy mined the 
East and West seas. And our airforce too was fully ready to 
meet the oncoming enemy. 

The Chinese People's Volunteers too stepped up prepara- 
tions for battle against the enemy's offensive. New deployment 
of troops was made, tunnel positions were reinforced, and the 
political work among the men and officers was strengthened. 

As on the front, in the rear too, the entire people waged a 
struggle to frustrate the enemy's "new offensive". The Party 
carried out the political and ideological work among the 
broad masses calling on them to come out in the decisive battle 
with the enemy and display indomitable spirit. The unity and 
consolidation of the ranks of the Party and the political, 
ideological unity of the people were strengthened more than 

279 



ever. And the entire people rallied still more firmly around the 
Party and the Government headed by Marshal Kim 11 Sung. 

Thus, the entire people were determined to devote the last 
drop of their blood to annihilating and driving out the enemy 
from the dear land of ours. They resolved to participate as one 
in the decisive battle to win final victory in the Fatherland 
Liberation War. "All for the victory in the war!" was the peo- 
ple's slogan. They waged a strong self-sacrificing struggle for 
aiding the front and strengthening the rear steel-like. Between 
January and April of 1953 alone no less than 798,000 helped 
the soldiers of the People's Army in building the defence on 
the front and along the coasts. 

In every district the patriotic youth with the Party mem- 
bers as the core organized teams to aid the members of the 
armed forces. When fighting was going on these youths carried 
ammunition, food and military supplies to the front and 
evacuated the wounded. And whenever the occasion called for, 
they were ready to become partisans to fight the enemy. 

At the same time a nation-wide drive was made to root 
out spies and maintain rigid wartime order. Our armed self- 
defence corps resolutely struggled against the enemy's agents. 
Moreover they underwent military training for fighting the 
enemy's paratroops. 

The entire workers, technicians, office employees worked 
in factories to produce even one more gun, one more bullet, 
one more metre of cloth, and turn out one more kilogramme 
of ore, braving the enemy's savage bombing. They overfulfill- 
ed their production plans to meet promptly the demand of the 
front, while laying the foundation for the postwar economic 
reconstruction. 

The railway and motor transport workers carried in time 
weapons, ammunition and foodstuffs to the front. The peasants, 
despite the labour shortage, showed their patriotic devotion, 
working day and night. They donated rice for the front and 
restored the damaged highways, bridges and railways. 

Thus all the energies of the people at the front and in the. 
rear were focused on the preparation for the decisive battle 
against the enemy. 

The front and the rear were changed into an impregnable 
fortification. 

288 



As the new year of 1953 was ushered in the Eisenhower's 
"new offensive" scheme became more apparent. Repeatedly, the 
enemy employing large forces tested our defensive strength 
on many points while stepping up their air activities and 
coastal bombardment to intimidate the people in the rear. 

The enemy's artillery fire became intense as the days went 
by. In January they fired more than 24,000 shells every day on 
the positions of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese 
People's Volunteers. But in February they fired every day over 
33,000 shells, then over 44,000 shells in March. The 
enemy put in more than 4,000 aircraft in January. But the num- 
ber went up to over 17,000 in February, and to some 19,000 
in March. 

Most of the U.S. Seventh Fleet mobilized in the Korean 
war were concentrated on the waters off Tongchun, Wonsan 
and Hamheung on the east and Nampo and Hanchun on the 
west. They subjected our coastal towns and villages to the 
most savage bombardment. 

Beginning with January the marine corps of the aggre- 
ssive U.S. navy and air forces conducted an extensive amphi- 
bious training in Japan and along the west coast of South 
Korea. The enemy smuggled armed spies and saboteurs into 
our rear, dropping them from planes to collect military 
information. 

On January 25 the enemy launched its long prepared 
offensive against a height on the west of Chulwon. Prior to the 
attack, the enemy made much fanfare about the battle under 
the command of Van Fleet to be the biggest since the ill-fated 
Keumhwa offensive. A number of American generals, high- 
ranking officers and newspaper men were invited to observe the 
battle. 

Following a ferocious bombing and shelling which 
lasted more than ten days, the enemy opened the battle with 
one American battalion under cover of terrific barrage and 
many planes and tanks. However, our units on the height re- 
pulsed three enemy attacks successively. Moreover, our units 
hit back at the enemy mercilessly. 

Thus the enemy's so-called "model battle" flopped 
miserably. It ended only in a great loss of men and war 
materials for the enemy. 

289 



Particularly, in the battles for Height 565.7 in January 
on the eastern front, 4 km. north of Sachunri, for Height 
883.7 in February on the central front 10 km. west of 
Mundeungri, and for Height 351 on the eastern front and 
Height 222.9 on the western front in March the enemy suf- 
fered heavily. 

Between January and April 1953, our units fought 762 
battles, inflicting heavy casualties upon enemy. During this 
period our soldiers killed, wounded or captured 51,500, 
destroyed over 250 guns of various calibre, 202 tanks, 424 
motor cars in addition to 1,507 enemy aircraft shot down or 
damaged. 

Mention must be made of our snipers in these battles, who 
braving the severe cold penetrated deep into the enemy line, 
sometimes 30 to 50 metres from the enemy position. They 
lay in ambush all day long, shooting down the enemy one by 
one. They killed or wounded 13,130 enemy soldiers in the 
period of four months. The American soldiers lamented: "At 
night there are attacks and in the daytime the snipers." 

Then our coastal defence forces fought off successfully 
the enemy's attempts for amphibious operations. Several 
enemy ships were sent to the bottom of the sea. 

Under such circumstances the U.S. imperialists could 
not carry out the "new offensive" — their final hope in the 
Korean war. 

In 1951, when the Korean People's Army and the Chinese 
People's Volunteers went over to defensive battle, the enemy 
was able to capture a few heights. But in 1952 the enemy could 
not advance even one step though they mobilized larger 
forces. And in 1953 the enemy's long prepared "new offensive 1 
failed even before they started. 

Evidently such stern historical facts brought home to th~ 
U.S. imperialist aggressors that if they persisted in their ag- 
gressive war, they would only invite final ruin and downfall. 
Even the New York Times, commenting on March 15, 1953 
en the Korean war, wrote that every path lying before them 
was danger-ridden and that there was no sure path which 
would lead them to victory. 

290 



SECTION 6 



Counter-Offensive of the Korean-Chinese Forces. Enemy's 
Military, Political, Moral Defeat. Conclusion of the Armistice 

As their "new offensive" 

plan in 1953 failed even 
COUNTER-OFFENSIVE OF before h ^^ ^ Am ^_ 

THE KOREAN-CHINESE FO can inyaders lost a „ h of 

RCES IN THE SUMMER OF yictory j n tfaeir aggressiye 

1 '' war in Korea. They again 

had no alternative but to ask 
for "Deace." At the latter part 
of February, 1953, General Clark, Commander of the "U.N. 
Forces" addressed a communication to our side proposing the 
resumption of the discussion on the exchange of sick and 
wounded prisoners of war. 

In March our side, accepting the enemy's proposal, put 
forward a proposal that with the discussion of the sick and 
wounded POW question the truce negotiations be resumed and 
the POW question be solved to realize cease-fire. Our proposa 
enjoyed full support of the Soviet Government and the world 
peace-loving peoples. The U.S. imperialists driven to the wall 
in the Korean war had no choice but to come back to the 
negotiation hall. They were forced to do so by the sincere efforts 
of the Korean-Chinese side and pressure of world public opinion. 
Thus discussion of the question on the exchange of sick and 
wounded prisoners of war began from April 20, and after a six- 
month break the cease-fire negotiations were resumed on April 
26, 1953. 

Our side advanced new, most realistic proposals on the 
repatriation of the POWs. Our proposals called for handing 
over the POWs, who wanted to be repatriated to the respective 
side within 2 months after the truce agreement came into force 
and those who were not to be repatriated, be turned directly 
over to the Neutral Nations POW Repatriation Committee 
composed of representatives of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Swit- 

291 



zerland, Sweden and India and to the Political Conference of 
a high up. 

But the U.S. imperialists tried to block the way to the 
truce, repeating their absurd assertions to detain forcibly the 
POWs of our side under the label of "voluntary repatriation" 
and "on-the-spot release." And, at the same time, they inten- 
sified the barbarous bombing' on our rear, trying to put "2ir 
pressure" on our people and army. In order to obstruct 
farming, from mid-May they bombed many reservoirs including 
the Kyunryong Reservoir in Soonan Country, the Jamo 
Reservoir in Soonchun County and the Koosung Reservoir in 
Koosung County, while bombing peaceful rural villages. As a 
result, tens of thousands of jungbo of paddy and non-paddy 
fields and many peasant houses were washed away or ruined 
and a great number of lives including women and children 
were drowned. 

U.S. planes attacked power stations, peaceful establish- 
ments, even POW camps and hospitals in the rear, and made 
frequent air-raids on Northeast China. Such repeated brutal 
bombing evoked the indignation and wrath of the Korean peo- 
ple and aroused strong protest of the freedom-loving peoples 
the world over. 

To hasten the truce talks, to inflict heavy losses upon the 
enemy's manpower and combat materials and to capture 
advantageous points, the Korean and Chinese units launched 
three powerful counter-attacks all along the front. 

The first such attack took place between May 13 and 26. Our 
units made 22 attacks on 16 enemy positions on the eastern and 
central fronts. The Korean and Chinese armies killed, wounded, 
or captured large numbers of men and officers of the U.S. and 
puppet armies. The enemy attempted counter-attacks but the 
Korean-Chinese forces successfully drove them off. During 
this period several heights fell into our hands while we with- 
drew from some heights for tactical reasons. 

In the second counter-attack which was carried out from 
May 27 to June 15, no less than 56 fortified enemy positions 
all along the front were hit on 70 occasions. In these battles 
the Korean and Chinese forces achieved their objectives and 
killed, wounded or captured more than 42,000 enemy soldiers. 

292 



In addition, 92 guns of various calibre, 368 machine guns and 
2.541 small arms were taken by us. Besides our forces captured 
or destroyed 11 tanks, 56 motor cars and vast amounts oi 
military equipment. Altogether, 33 heights were restored to our 
hands. 

The battles for Height 811.7 (8 km. southeast of Ipori) and 
Height 351 (south of Kosung) on the eastern front waged by 
the Korean People's Army units, and the battle in the area 
southeast of Keumsung fought by the Chinese People's Volun- 
teers were particularly bitter. 

On June 1, our units struck fiercely at Height 811.7 with 
the strength of over one battalion and with more than 160 
guns of various calibre. In a matter of 33 minutes the height 
which was manned by more than two enemy companies fell 
into our hands. The battle produced many model fighters. Pri- 
vate Pak Yoon Joong smashed an enemy heavy machine-gun 
position. Then he advanced again when he was hit and seri- 
ously wounded in lower legs. But finding an enemy light ma- 
chine-gun position to the left, he crawled there and destroyed 
it with his hand-grenade, and shot with his automatic rifle 
enemy soldiers who fell upon him. He paved the way for his 
unit to win the battle, laying down his life for the Party and 
the country. At the moment of death, he shouted: "Comrades, 
give another wholesale death and more sufferings to the 
enemy! Don't yield even one inch of land to the enemy! Long 
live the Workers' Party of Korea! Long live Marshal Kim 
II Sung!" 

When our forces occupied the height the enemy made 
scores of attacks under cover of many planes, tanks and artil- 
lery, throwing in a large military force. But they were repulsed 
every time. 

On June 2 one battalion of the People's Army launched 
a fierce attack on Height 351 under a terrific fire of more than 
130 guns. Our soldiers removed the enemy's barricades, escap- 
ing the sharp watch of the enemy. Then supported by artillery, 
our battalion occupied the height in a matter of 17 minutes 
and killed, wounded, or captured over 250 enemy soldiers 
and officers. Height 351 was one of the enemy's pride fortifica- 
tions. The enemy spent over two years in building up their 
defence on the height. 

Moreover, a large force of enemy's artillery, more than 10 

293 



war vessels — aircraft-carrier, battleship and cruiser — and 300 
to 400 aircraft were always ready to aid the defence of the 
height. 

But the enemy positions on the height were overrun in a 
few minutes by our soldiers of one battalion. Through this 
battle the People's Army demonstrated to the full its high 
military skill and its ever-growing fighting strength. The bat- 
tle showed that the People's Army could overrun any strong 
enemy's fortified position. The fighters of the Korean People's 
Army displayed a high degree of mass heroism and socialist 
patriotism. 

Kim In Taik, Joo Sang Ha, and Kim Ryong Taik — all 
Heroes of the Republic — blocked the embrasures of the enemy's 
heavy machine-guns with their bodies to pave the way for 
their units in the battle for Height 351. Besides them, many 
model fighters exhibited mass heroism and rendered brilliant 
service. 

To retake Height 351, the enemy pounded it with fury for 
more than 50 days. Many planes and scores of men-of-war 
bombed and shelled our position, but with little success. During 
the battle for Height 351 the enemy suffered over 8,500 
casualties. 

Greatly upset by the fact that their defence line with its 
"impregnable" fortifications was giving way at one point after 
another, the enemy hurriedly brought up 4 divisions out of the 
6 divisions in the second echelon. Driven into such a tight 
corner, they were compelled to give up their absurd stand on 
the POW question, which caused the truce talks to be delayed 
for one year and a half. The enemy accepted the reasonable 
and realistic proposals of our side on the POW question and 
an agreement was signed on June 8. 

Thus the biggest obstacle standing in the way of realizing 
cease-fire was removed and cease-fire seemed certain at any 
moment. 

However, the hearts of the U.S. imperialists and their 
hirelings were not in the peaceful solution of the Korean 
question. 

In mid-June, when it was expected that the signing of the 
truce agreement was almost only a matter of time, the Ameri- 
can imperialists and their running dogs, in flagrant violation 
of the already agreed and signed provisions on the POW re- 

294 



patriation problem, carried out the provocative acts of detain- 
ing forcibly more than 27,000 prisoners of our side under the 
cloak of the so-called "release". Thus another crisis was creat- 
ed in the truce talks. Then the U.S. aggressors incited their 
puppets, the Syngman Rhee clique, to launch a desperate 
campaign against cease-fire and clamour for separate "march 
north" in order to scuttle the cease-fire. Furthermore, they 
stepped up their atrocious bombing of cities, rural villages, 
reservoirs, power stations and peaceful establishments in the 
rear. 

Pressed by the necessity of giving a powerful, effective 
answer to the enemy who was committing one provocation 
after another to delay and wreck the truce, the Korean and 
Chinese units launched the third powerful counter-attack 
between July 13 and 27. 

The Chinese People's Volunteers hit the enemy south 
of Keumsung on the central front while the Korean People's 
Army units attacked enemy positions on a hill southeast of 
height 811.7 and in the area south of Height 351 on the eastern 
front. On the night of July 13 several units of the Chinese 
People's Volunteers started attacks on the front 25 km. 
south of Keumsung under cover of hundreds of guns and broke 
through the enemy defence line at several points within a few 
minutes. 

Within an hour or less our army units overran the enemy 
line which they had spent nearly two years to build up, and 
some of our units advanced more than ten kilometres in a day. 

In close cooperation with other units which broke through 
enemy positions in the vicinity of Kooryongri and Oiyadong 
(3 km. southwest of Keumsung), our units, which broke 
through enemy positions near Joojadong and Aingjung (11 
km. southwest of Keumsung) under cover of heavy gunfire, 
encircled and routed two enemy regiments southwest o. 
Keumsung. 

In the meantime, our units advancing to the north of 
Kwandairi and Mt. Kyoam in the southern area of Keumsung 
encircled and destroyed 5 enemy battalions near Mt. Kyoam 
and Dongsanri and kept up the southward march. And other 
units, which broke through enemy positions in the vicinity of 
Ryonghodong and Songbori southeast of Keumsung, annihi- 
lated several enemy battalions and occupied the enemy's im- 

295 



portant defensive points. 

On the first day of our attack, the enemy's desperate 
resistance was broken and they took to their heels leaving 

large numbers of dead and wounded as well as combat ma- 
terials behind. 

On July 14 there was a heavy rainfall. The roads were 
flooded and military operations were very difficult. But the 
enemy, taking advantage of the conditions, made desperate at- 
tempts to check our advance. 

Our units attacking from the southwestern direction of 
Keumsung withstood the enemy's frantic resistance and oc- 
cupied Mt. Wolbong and Rishildong while other units active 
in the south of Keumsung crossed the Keumsung River and oc- 
cupied the western and northwestern parts of Risungdong 8 
km. south of Keumsung. And the units active in the 
southeast of Keumsung gave hot pursuit to the enemy and 
annihilated them on the northern bank of the Keumsung 
River. Thus already by July 14 our army units had captured a 
vast area covering the northern and eastern parts of the 
Keumsung River, Mt. Wolbong southwest of Keumsung and 
the northern part of Rishildong. 

On the following day our units, pursuing the fleeing 
enemy, reached Mt. Baikam and the Heukwoonto-ryung range. 

lhus our units, successfully driving out the enemy from 
the south of Keumsung, went over on July 16 to defense along 
the line drawn from Bongmi southwest of Keumsung to 
Rishildong, Kanjinhyung (3 kilometres south of Mt. Wolbong), 
Height 602.2 (south of Risundong), Sehyunri and Kwang- 
dairi. Our advance units active in the Mt. Baikam area with- 
drew to the area north of the Keumsung River. 

As our units went over to defense, the enemy launched 
desperate counter-attacks all along the front to regain their 
positions, throwing in a large military force of about 7 divi- 
sions. The enemy was thrown back every time. During 10 days 
up to July 27 the desperate enemy launched furious attacks 
several hundred times. 

But the men and officers of the Chinese People's Volun- 
teers displayed peerless intrepidity and heroism in the 
Keumsung counter-attacks. In these battles many heroes includ- 
ing Li Chia-ja emerged. 

Coincident with the Keumsung counter-attacks waged 

296 



by the Chinese People's Volunteers, the People's Army units 
assaulted the enemy on the hills southeast of Height 811.7 
and in the area south of Height 351 on the eastern front, 
inflicting heavy losses upon him. 

In the third counter-attack, our army units killed, wounded 
or captured over 78,000 enemy soldiers and officers, destroyed 
or captured more than 420 guns of various calibre, 44 tanks, 
279 motor-cars and enormous amount of arms, ammunition and 
combat materials, and liberated a vast area covering 160 square 
kilometres. 

The three big successive powerful counter-attacks launched 
by the combined forces of the Korean People's Army and the 
Chinese People's Volunteers from mid-May to late July showed 
once again the superiority of our power over the enemy, mak- 
ing it quite clear that should the American imperialists and 
Syngman Rhee clique insist on the aggressive war in Korea, 
they would invite only irrevocable ruin upon themselves. 



U.S. IMPERIALISTS' MILITA- 
RY. POLITICAL AND MORAL 
DEFEAT IN THE KOREAN 
WAR. CONCLUSION OF THE 
KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREE- 
MENT 



The U.S. imperialists carri- 
ed out the most cruel war in 
Korea for 3 years. What they 
hoped for was to reduce our 
people to their permanent 
slaves, turn Korea into their 
permanent colony and a 
springboard for war against 
the Soviet Union and the Pe- 
ople's Republic of China, 
ultimately leading to another world war. The self-styled 
"mightiest" U.S. threw into the war one third of its army, 
one fifth of its air force and main forces of its navy 
besides the puppet Syngman Rhee army and armies of its 15 
satellite countries. Altogether, the enemy mobilized more than 
2 million armymen and enormous amount of modern war 
materials to fight Korea. The enemy spent over 20 billion 
dollars and used more than 73 million tons of war supplies for 
the most barbarous war to be recorded in the annals of human 
history. Yet they could not conquer the Korean people and the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Nothing could frighten 
the Korean people, men and officers of the Korean People's 



297 



Army who stood up in the righteous war in defence of the 
freedom and independence of their country. 

Guided by the Workers' Party of Korea and Marshal 
Kim 11 Sung, the Korean People's Army, enjoying the support 
of the brotherly Chinese People's Volunteers, shattered 
thoroughly the myth about the "invincible" U.S. 

The military adventures of the U.S. in Korea exposed 
impotence of the bourgeois military theory, U.S. military art, 
in particular. 

In launching the war in Korea the American imperialists 
calculated that their "technical superiority" would bring the 
Korean people and the young Korean People's Army to their 
knees. No miscalculation, however, could be worse than theirs. 
The Korean people and the People's Army which had taken 
over the glorious patriotic revolutionary tradition of the anti- 
Japanese partisans led by Marshal Kim II Sung fought 
heroically to defend the independence and freedom of the 
country. The heroic fight of the Korean people and 
their armed forces proved powerful enough to beat the U.S. 
military technique, as Marshal Kim 11 Sung duly pointed out 
in the following words. 

"Americans tried to tackle military tasks only with techni- 
que. But as experiences in the Korean war show, predominance 
in technique alone is quite insufficient for winning victory. No 
one can intimidate or conquer with technique alone the people 
who have experienced freedom and independence. The Asian 
people clearly see impotence of U.S. military technique and 
its defeat by the heroic struggle of the Korean People's Army 
and the Chinese People's Volunteers. 

"The Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's 
Volunteers showed that decisive role in any war is played by 
man, not by technique, and technique is effective only when 
the people possess it and wage a just struggle." 

The U.S. imperialists failed to achieve their aggressive 
aims in the Korean war. They suffered heavy losses in men and 
materials and were stopped at the very place where they had 
started the war. The U.S. suffered in Korea the most humiliat- 
ing military defeat in their history of war. 

During the three-year war (June 25, 1950-Juiy 27, 1953) 
the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers 
won the following results: 

298 



1. Soldiers killed, wounded or captured . . . 1,093,839 
Of which 

U.S. army 397,543 

Puppet Syngman Rhee's army .... 667,293 

British, Australian, Canadian, Turkish, Thai, 
Philippine, French, Dutch, Belgian, Greek, 
Columbian, Union of South Africa, New 
Zealand, Ethiopian, and Luxemburg armies 29,003 

2. Booty 

Airplanes 

Tanks ... 374 

Motor-cars 9,239 

Armoured cars ....... 146 

Boats. 12 

Guns of various calibre .... .6,321 

Small arms of various calibre 119,710 

Flame throwers ........ 117 

Communication facilities. .5,788 

Cannon shells 489,260 

Bullets 21,245,071 

Hand-grenades 224,123 

Mines 14,449 

3. Planes shot down or damaged 

Shot down 5,729 

Damaged 6,484 

4. Combat materials destroyed or damaged 

Tanks 2,690 

Motor-cars 4,111 

Armoured cars ........ 45 

Cranes. ... .... 5 

Guns of various calibre .... 1,374 

5. War-vessels sunk ........ 164 

War-vessels damaged ... 93 

Boats sunk ....... .163 

Boats damaged. ...... 132 

The U.S. imperialists suffered not only military defeat but also 
political and moral setback in the Korean war. 

The U.S. imperialists, in their aggressive war in Korea, 
staged every show to cover up their aggressive acts and 

299 



isolate the Korean people by using the name of the U.N. But 
their plot failed. People throughout the world demanded: 
"U.S. imperialists, keep your blood-stained hands off Korea!" 
and the U.S. imperialists found themselves in isolation. 

Every barbarous act was committed by the U.S. armed 
aggressors during the war. Peaceful towns and villages were 
subjected to indiscriminate bombings and bombardments. 
Pillage, destruction, rape and murder were committed by the 
U.S. invaders wherever they were, specially in the areas 
where they held temporarily in the northern part of the country. 
And they even employed bacteriological and chemical weapons. 
They murdered the POWs of our side en masse. These 
atrocities of the U.S. imperialists evoked burning hatred and 
indignation of the freedom-loving people all over the world. 
Moreover, racial discrimination and other discriminatory 
treatment of the Americans toward their mercenary troops 
from the satellites on the one hand, and on the other the U.S 
imperialists' arbitrary acts, their shifting of responsibility for 
defeats on others and the shattered myth about the "invincible" 
U.S., above all the aggressive nature of the war carried out by 
the U.S. imperialists in Korea, were all the very cause of their 
inevitable military, political, moral defeat. And the U.S. im- 
perialists had no choice but to surrender to the Korean people. 

Though they had used every trick to wreck the cease-fire 
talks and continue the Korean war, in the end the U.S. imperi- 
alists had to sign the armistice agreement at the "Peace 
Pagoda" in Panmunjom at 10 a. m. on July 27, 1953. In 
accordance with the armistice agreement, hostilities between 
the two belligerent sides were stopped at 10:00 p. m. on July 
27. And the cease-fire was welcomed not only by the Korean 
people but also by the peace-loving peoples all over the world. 

Thus, the reckless aggressive plan of the U.S. imperialists 
to conquer the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was 
brought to an end, and the just Fatherland Liberation War of 
the Korean people was crowned with a great historic victory. 



300 



CONCLUSION 

The attainment of an armi- 
stice in Korea marked a great 
HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE OF historical victory for the 

THE VICTORY OF THE KO- Korean lg an(J thg Kore . 

REAN PEOPLE IN THE &Q p le , s A over the 

FATHERLAND LIBERATION arme( j invaders of 16 nations 

WAR headed by the U.S. imperial- 

ists and their hirelings — the 
traitorous Syngman Rhee 

clique. 
Through their long history the Korean people have more 
than once taken up arms to defend their freedom and indepen- 
dence. However, at no time did they ever fight such a barbarous 
war as was waged by the "world mightiest" U.S. imperialists 
in Korea. Nor did the country ever experience such danger as 
the U.S. invaders brought about. 

The three-year long war was a stern trial for the Kore- 
an people: the fate of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
hung in the balance, the life and death of the Korean people and 
flic freedom and independence of the country were at stake. The 
U.S. imperialists fostering a wild design of world domination 
mobilized large military forces equipped with modern weapons 
and used every conceivable, diabolical method to reduce the 
Korean people to slavery, crush the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, and turn Korea into a stepping-stone for 

But the Korean people educated and trained by the 
Workers' Party of Korea, overcoming all the unprecedentedly 

stern adversities in their history, fought valiantly the U.S. 
armed aggressors. The Koreanpeople and the Korean Peo- 
ple's Army, with the aid ofthe Chinese People's Volunteers, 
delivered a staggering blow to the enemy. The U.S. imperialists 

303 



suffered in Korea the most shameful crushing defeat in their 
history of war. 

The Korean war demonstrated to the world the might of 
the Korean people and inexhaustible vitality of the people's 
democratic system established in the northern part of the 
country. Through their long history the Korean people on 
several occasions bravely defended their fatherland from for- 
eign invaders. But it was the first time that with such a united 
might as in the Fatherland Liberation War the Korean people 
dealt a crushing" blow at the enemy and won a glorious victory. 
And the victory won by the Korean people in the Fatherland 
Liberation War for freedom and independence was of great 
historic significance. 

Firstly, the Korean people and the People's Army, their 
armed forces, waging a heroic struggle, defended their glorious 
fatherland — the Democratic People's Republic of Korea — from 
the encroachment of the enemy and protected the country's 
freedom and independence and the people's democratic system. 

The founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Ko- 
rea is the greatest achievement made by the Korean people in 
their history. It is the embodiment of the true freedom and in- 
dependence of the Korean people and it is the true people's 
state whose masters are the workers and peasants. And nothing 
was more precious than this for the Korean people. 

Marshal Kim II Sung said: "We Korean people who have 
had bitter experience of the dark colonial rule of the Japanese 
imperialists for about a half century know very well what a 
nation's lot is without a fatherland and what colonial slavery 
is. Fatherland — this is the most valuable thing for our people. 
We Korean people have through their heroic struggle safeguard- 
ed our most precious fatherland — the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea — from the invasion of the imperialist armed 
aggressors." 

The Korean people, who have learned through bitter his- 
torical lessons that a nation without sovereignty cannot ensure 
the independence and prosperity of their fatherland, were fully 
convinced of the fact that the people's democratic system, and 
this alone, provides them with a happy life. Because they 
themselves had enjoyed political rights and freedom, a self- 

304 



supporting economy and material and cultural well-being under 
the people's democratic system after the country's liberation in 
1945. Therefore, the Korean people and the People's Army, 
displaying such heroism and devotion, defended their people's 
democratic system, revolutionary gains, and safeguarded their 
dear fatherland, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
from the barbarous armed invasion of the U.S. imperialists. 

Thus, as an independent state, the Korean people were 
again able to embark upon the path of peaceful, democratic 
construction for achieving unification and independence of the 
country. 

One of the historic victories won by the Korean people in 
the Fatherland Liberation War is that they defended the free- 
dom and independence of the fatherland and consolidated the 
monolithic revolutionary foundation for the unification and in- 
dependence of the fatherland and the radiant socialist-com- 
munist future. Today the Korean people, who have safeguard- 
ed the people's democratic system and revolutionary democra- 
tic base, are working to lay a mighty foundation of socialism 
communism, the ideal of mankind, and toward the peaceful 
unification of the country. 

Secondly, with their heroic struggle, the Korean people and 
their People's Army remarkably enhanced the prestige of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea at home and abroad and 
found themselves in the ranks of the advanced fighters for na- 
tional independence, freedom, peace, democracy and socialism. 
They have won the deep love, respect and support of the world 
people through their great contribution to world peace by 
crushing down the armed U.S. invasion. 

The course of the war clearly showed that the Government 
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the only and 
true government representing and defending the interests of the 
Korean people and faithful to the cause of peace. On the other 
hand the anti-popular character of the puppet Syngman Rhee 
regime and its being a tool of the U.S. war policy was all the 
more clearly revealed. The puppet regime was condemned not 
only by the Korean people, but also by the world people. On the 
world political arena it was conclusively proved that the Demo- 
cratic People's Republic of Korea is. a component factor of 
peace contributing to the consolidation of peace in the FJar 

305 



East and Asia. Our country crushed the U.S. aggressive army, 
defended peace in Asia and the U.S. was forced to sign the 
armistice agreement before the national flag of the Democratic 

People's Republic of Korea. This is an ignominious defeat for 
hte U.S. 

The location of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
has become more distinct on the world map and hundreds of 
millions of people throughout the world will remember forever 
he name of Korea, the Land of Morning Calm, as the symbol 
of an unbending heroic fighter for peace and national in- 
ependence. 

Moreover, through the Fatherland Liberation War the 

Democratic People's Republic of Korea strengthened further the 

fraternal friendship and solidarity with the peoples of the 

socialist countries and consolidated friendly relations with a 

umber of peace-loving countries in Asia and Africa. 

The people the world over now call the Korean people a 

heroic people" and "ardent peace champions," and the 

Workers' Party of Korea, the leading and guiding force of the 

Korean people, an honourable "shock brigade" in the world 

revolutionary movement and labour movement. 

Thirdly, the significance of the Korean people's victory in 
the Fatherland Liberation War lies in the fact that the people's 
democratic system was further consolidated and developed, the 
political and ideological unity of the people further strengthen- 
d. Moreover, the people and the People's Army as well as the 
Party bodies, government organs and social organizations 
were tempered and accumulated rich experiences. 

The U.S. imperialists resorted to a protracted "war of attri 
on" and "destruction" in Korea to wear out the Korean peo- 
ple. But the enemy failed miserably. On the contrary, the peo- 
ple and the People's Army grew and became mightier. Every- 
thing outdated and unsound in the country was completely re- 
vealed and thoroughly repudiated by the peopie. 

Amidst the flames of the war the Korean people and the 
eople's Army were rallied firmer than ever around the Workers' 
arty and Government headed by Marshal Kim II Sung and 
ere boundlessly loyal to the Party and to the cause of the. 
revolution. The political consciousness, the spirit of socialist 
patriotism and the national pride of the people and the People's 



Army reached a new high. Through their practical experiences 
the people and their armed forces became more confident that 
when they fight for justice they are strong enough to defeat 
and win a final victory over the aggressive forces, no matter 
how strong they may be. 

in the rigid trial of the war, our Party further strengthened 
the Marxist-Leninist unity and solidarity of its ranks and 
accumulated practical experiences in organizing and mobilizing 
the people in the severe class struggle. The government organs 
and social organizations too were further strengthened. 

The People's Army — the revolutionary armed forces of the 
Party — gained much combat experience and grew into an in 
domitable army applying the principles of the advanced military 
science to the actual conditions ol our country. Moreover, the 
Korean People's Army further developed the revolutionary 
traditions of the anti-Japanese armed struggle and the noble 
political and moral character of every soldier was raised. 

Mention must be made of the fact that thousands of cadres 
trained and tempered with the ideological make-up of the Party 
einerged in the military, political, economic and cultural spheres 

The experiences, achievements and lessons that the people 
gained and learned in the war became valuable in their revolu- 
tionary movement and in the struggle for the country's unifica 
tion and independence and for the consolidation and develop- 
ment of the people's democratic system. In the course of the war 
the might of the people grew stronger. The country's astonish- 
ing economic and cultural upsurge in the postwar rehabilita- 
tion and construction of the national economy proves that the 
Korean people and their people's democratic system grew into 
an invincible might in the flames of war. 

Fourthly, the Korean people and the People's Army were 
an enormous inspiration to the struggle of progressive man 
kind for peace and democracy, freedom and independence. And 
their influence was strongly felt in the international arena, 
because through their heroic struggle the Korean people ann 
their armed forces dealt a serious military, political and moral 
biow at the U.S. invaders, exposing before the whole world the 
impotence and bestiality of the U.S. imperialists, the ring- 
leader of world imperialism. 

The United States, the strongest in the capitalist world, 
perpetrated most barbarous military acts against the small 

307 



Korea. The United States mobilizing its aggressive army of 
long history used every inhuman method to exterminate the 
Korean people and reduce the whole country to ashes. But the 
U.S. imperialists could not bring the Korean people to their 
knees. Only the true colour of the U.S. imperialists was expos- 
ed to the world through the Korean war. The myth about the 
"invincible" United States was shattered and its much adver- 
tised "American democracy" was brought to light. 

Indeed, the Korean war was the first war in which the 
"civilized" U.S. imperialists bragged about the complete de- 
struction of the cities and rural villages It was the first war in 
which they widely used germ weapons. It was the first war in 
which they used millions of napalm bombs to burn to death the 
peaceful inhabitants, men and women young and old. The 
diabolical cruelty of the U.S. generals who hoisted high the 
U.N. flag made the German fascists blush when it came to 
slaughtering innocent people whom, the world was told, the 
U.N. was going to "rescue" through its "police action." The 
U.S. savagery evoked wrath not only of the Korean people but 
also of the freedom-loving people throughout the world. The 
U.S. aggressors were isolated and became a target of hatred. 

The political and moral defeat of the U.S. imperialists in 
the Korean war was an inspiring factor for uniting all the 
peace-loving, anti-imperialist forces and effecting a powerful 
upsurge in their struggle. The Korean war irrefutably proved 
that U.S. imperialism, and imperialism in general, was the 
vicious foe of peace and human civilization and shameful his- 
torical rubbish. 

The aggressive character of the U.S. imperialists revealed 
in starting the war against the Korean people and their 
schemes to extend the Korean war to drive mankind into a 
horrible ruin, fired the indignation and hatred of all peace-lov- 
ing people the world over. And it caused the isolation of the 
U.S. imperialists from the world people. The U.S. imperialists 
drew other U.N. member states into their criminal war in 
Korea, thereby laying the heavy war burdens upon their "alli- 
es." Moreover, the United States tried to push its "allies" into 
the extended war, while it stepped into the British and French 
spheres of influence to rob its "allies" of their interests. Hence 
even in the imperialist camp the U.S. imperialists faced serious 

308 



political isolation. The Korean war aggravated further the 
contradictions among the imperialist powers. The Korean war 
patently proved that no death-bed struggle of moribund im- 
perialism could save it from its final doom, but would only 
hasten its ruin. 

All their bloodcurdling atrocities and frantic military 
actions brought nothing to the U.S. imperialists. The heroic 
fight of the Korean people brought the U.S. imperialists, the 
ringleader of imperialism, to their knees for the first time in 
their history, before a people of the East upon whom only 
yesterday they had cast a contemptible look. 

Even the Americans themselves were obliged to admit the 
defeat of their army which they had long boasted of being the 
"strongest" in the world. Former U.S. Defence Secretary 
Marshall confessed in effect that the myth was broken and the 
United States was not so strong as others thought. And Sena- 
tor McCarthy lamented that the U.S. suffered a serious defeat 
in Korea. 

By smashing the myth of the "invincible" United States, 
the Korean people helped the people of many countries shake 
off the fear of the "great might" of the United States and 
deepened their conviction that the people whom the imperialists 
humiliated and insulted could win victory if they take up arms 
and fight the enemy. Therefore, the righteous struggle of the 
Korean people became the banner of the anti-imperialist na- 
tional liberation movement of the oppressed nations in the East 
and a symbol of a nation's might and inflexibility. It is not 
fortuitous that today the people who are fighting against 
colonialism and for national independence in Asia and Africa 
say that they are learning from the Korean people how they 
won in the struggle against imperialism. 

The Korean war once again clearly showed that the time 
has gone forever into the past when the imperialists could in- 
vade the territories of other countries, enslave and exploit the 
people at will and that a new era has dawned for the people in 
the East who have been kept in darkness for centuries. 

The historic victory of the Korean people in the war 
tolled the funeral knell of the notorious "positions of 
strength" policy of the U.S. imperialists. 

309 



Fifthly, the Korean people and their armed forces not only 
gloriously safeguarded their fatherland but firmly defended the 
eastern outpost of the socialist camp, making a tremendous 
contribution to the preservation of peace and security in the 
world, the Far East in particular. In this connection Marshal 
Kim II Sung pointed out: 

"The aggressive act against Korea and China was a de- 
cisive step of the U.S. imperialists for the provocation of a 
third world war. But the third world war did not occur. Not 
that the U.S. ruling circles did not want to unleash a world war 
but because the Korean trouble quite unexpectedly turned to 
their disadvantage which frightened them and the wise polici- 
es of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China 
prevented the extension of the Korean conflict to a world war. 
We are proud that the Korean people made a great contribution 
to the cause of preventing the third world war by courageously 
repulsing the invasion by the U.S. aggressors. In the face of 
the indefatigability of our people, the United States failed to 
convert Korea into a military strategic base for attacking the 
People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union." 

In the Korean war, the U.S. imperialists attempted not only 
to conquer the Korean people, but also turn Korea into their 
military strategic base for launching an aggressive war against 
the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. 

The U.S. imperialists regarded the Korean war as the first 
shot for the third world war. Therefore, the Korean war was an 
acute class struggle between the capitalist and socialist systems 
and a fierce struggle between the forces of peace and war. 

Enjoying the support and encouragement of the peoples of 
the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and the aid with 
arms of the fraternal Chinese People's Volunteers, the Korean 
people and the People's Army successfully smashed the U.S. 
aggression, thereby holding in check the U.S. imperialists who 
were out to start the third world war, and safeguarding peace 
in Asia and the world. 

Furthermore, by pushing back the enemy to the very spot 
where they had started the war, the Korean people and the 
People's Army frustrated the aggressive U.S. scheme to break 

310 



of the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic, thereby 
making an enormous contribution to the consolidation and to 
the common cause of the socialist camp. Therefore, the defeat 
of the U.S. imperialists in the Korean war was not only a vic- 
tory for the Korean people but also a victory for the world 
peace-loving people against the warmongers, a victory for the 
socialist system over the capitalist system, as well as a brilliant 
victory for all-conquering Marxism-Leninism. 

The Korean war once again proved before the world that 
no force on earth could break the powerful proletarian interna- 
tionalist unity of the countries in the socialist camp and clearly 
showed that the people who fight for their national independ- 
ence, freedom and peace would always enjoy the powerful sup- 
port of the camp of peace and socialism and the world peace- 
loving forces and would certainly emerge victorious. 



The just Fatherland Libe- 
ration War in which the 
young Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea fought 
against the bestial armed in- 
terventionists of 16 countries 
headed by the U.S. imperial- 
ists was the hardest trial and 



BASIC FACTORS OF THE 
HISTORIC VICTORY IN THF. 
FATHERLAND LIBERATION 

WAR 



gravest test for the Korean people. 

However, the people, their armed forces and the people's 
democratic system, demonstrating their might before the whole 
world, won a brilliant historic victory in the war. Wherein lies 
the source of strength of the people and what were the factors 
ensuring our victory? 

Firstly, it was the invincible vitality of the people's demo- 
cratic system and the steel-like solidarity of the rear. 

The people's democratic system established by the Workers' 
Party of Korea in the northern part of the Republic after libera- 
tion successfully stood the rigid trial of war and unreservedly 
displayed its might. 

Even in the trials of war, the people's democratic system 

311 



ensuree the worker-peasant alliance led by the working class 

and the rock-firm unity and solidarity of the people of all walks 

of life. Moreover, the unbreakable political and moral unity 

of the Korean people made it possible to put the national 

economy on war footing promptly and maintain a high rate of 

production. And the front and the rear were unified in a single 

body for the war. The Korean people who had enjoyed genuine 

freedom and happiness under the people's democratic system 

nsured war-time production to meet the needs of the front 

y producing food, ammunition and other war supplies, 

hey displayed patriotic devotion and unexampled zeal in re- 

ponse to the militant call of the Party: "All for the victory in 

he war!" The people sent their best sons and daughters to the 

ranks of the People's Army and devoted all their strength to 

help the People's Army. Thus the . people's democratic 

system proved vividly in the course of the war that it is 

deccisively superior to the capitalist system and has vitality 

capable of ensuring a solid rear which no capitalist country 

:an have and that the socialist economic system has enormous 

vitality capable of maintaining a high rate of production not 

?nly in peace time but also in the period of war. The Korean 

people and the People's Army won the war by firmly relying 

in the revolutionary democratic base of the Republic and the 

people's democratic system. 

Had not our Party established a revolutionary democratic 
oase in the northern part of the Republic at the initiative of 
Marshal Kim II Sung and not prepared powerful political, 
sconomic and military forces under the people's democratic 
system in time, the Korean people would not have been able to 
repulse the armed aggression of the U.S. imperialists and the 
traitorous Syngman Rhee clique and escape the fate of colonial 
slave. The victory of the Korean people in the war was 
a patent proof of the full correctness of the Party line and 
policy for establishing and strengthening the democratic base. 
Secondly, the Korean people had the strong People's 
Army — the inheritor of the glorious patriotic revolutionary 
traditions of the anti-Japanese partisans headed by Marshal 
Kim II Sung and the revolutionary armed forces of the Workers' 
Party of Korea. 

The People's Army guided and educated by the 
Workers' Party of Korea gloriously fulfilled in the Fatherland 

312 



Liberation War the lofty duty it assumed before the fatherland 
and unreservedly showed its boundless loyalty to the Party and 
the cause of revolution. 

When the war broke out, the Korean People's Army, in 
response to the call of the Party, rose up in the struggle for 
defending the fatherland and fully displayed mass heroism and 
socialist patriotism in safeguarding the Party and revolution- 
ary cause and protecting the socialist gains of the people from 
the enemy's encroachment. 

Like the revolutionary lighters of the anti-Japanese par- 
tisans, they set an example of valour, fortitude and heroism 
for the Party, fatherland and the people even under the most 
complicated and perilous conditions. And they were ready to 
give their lives for victory in the war. 

The great revolutionary idea and the unflinching militant 
spirit of the anti-Japanese partisans lived in the hearts of the 
men and officers of the People's Army in the life-and-death 
fight against the U.S. aggressors and inspired them to the 
heroic fight for safeguarding the Party and the socialist 
fatherland. 

The People's Army was educated in the ideological make- 
up, work style and militant spirit of the valorous anti-Japanese 
partisans. Therefore they never flinched before any danger or 
obstacle and, with firm belief in the validity of the cause of the 
Party and revolution and in our victory, finally emerged 
triumphant from the arduous struggle. The wise leadership of 
the Party as well as the revolutionary tradition of the anti- 
Japanese partisans was responsible for the victory of the Peo- 
ple's Army in the arduous war. This victory enriched the 
revolutionary tradition of the People's Army. The Korean Peo- 
ple's Army displayed without reserve peerless courage, 
unyielding spirit and heroism in the war. Thus there emerged 
over 480 Heroes of the Republic, more than 746,000 were de- 
corated and 13 units and combined units won the title of 
Guard Unit. 

The historic victory our People's Army won in cooperation 
with the Chinese People's Volunteers in frustrating the invasion 
by the "mighty" U.S. imperialists, exhibited the incomparable 
political and moral superiority of our army over the U.S. 
aggressive army and the Syngman Rhee puppet army which 

313 



serve the interests of landlords and capitalists, its primacy over 
them in the realm of military art and its mighty unconquerable 
strength that no one can break. 

Thirdly, it is due to the disinterested proletarian interna- 
tionalist encouragement and support extended to the Korean 
people by the peoples of the Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries. 

The justness of the Korean people's struggle for the coun- 
try's freedom and independence inspired hundreds of millions 
of people throughout the world to render the Korean people 
enormous aid and support and to raise their voice of protest 
against the U.S. imperialist aggressors. 

Particularly, the peoples of the Soviet Union, China and 
other socialist countries gave active aid to the Korean people, 
regarding the Korean people's struggle as their own. For they 
are closely cemented with one and the same Marxist-Leninist 
ideology and social system and the identity of their interests 
and aim in the joint struggle against imperialism and for 
attaining socialist and communist victory. Moreover they are 
deeply concerned for guarding the revolutionary gains of ail 
the socialist states from the enemy's encroachment. 

The Soviet Union exerted every effort for the fair solution 
of the Korean question, exposing and condemning in the in- 
ternational arena the armed aggression of the U.S. imperialists 
against Korea. And it helped greatlyin integrating the struggle 
of the world peace-loving people and the movement for aiding 
and backing the Korean people, standing in the van of the 
peace movement. More, the Soviet people rendered us enor- 
mous material aid. * 

The brotherly Chinese people supported the struggle of the 
Korean people materially and morally. Especially in the most 
trying period of our country, they dispatched their Peo- 
ple's Volunteers composed of their best sons and daughters. 
Shoulder to shoulder with the men and officers of the Korean 
People's Army, the men and officers of the Chinese People's 
Volunteers educated by the Chinese Communist Party discharg- 
ed with credit the sacred mission of resisting American 'ag- 
gression and aiding Korea and set a living example of prole- 
tarian internationalism through their heroic struggle. 

314 



In the sacred fight of aiding the Korean people with their 
blood the men and officers of the Chinese People's Volunteers 
fully displayed heroism, valor, fortitude and lofty virtue. 
After their entry into the Korean war more than 302,000 
Heroes, model, fighters and meritorious fighters emerged from 
among the Chinese People's Volunteers. More than 353,000 
fighters of the Chinese People's Volunteers were awarded 
various orders and medals by the Presidium of the Supreme 
People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Ko- 
rea. Ever fresh will be the militant comradeship between the 
Korean and Chinese peoples sealed in blood on the basis of 
proletarian internationalism. It demonstrated an indestruc- 
tible might which can overpower any enemy. 

The peoples of the socialist countries of Poland, Czechoslo- 
vakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, the German 
Democratic Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic and the 
Democratic Republic of Viet-nam also rendered enormous ma- 
terial aid to the Korean people and encouraged them. 

Through the Fatherland Liberation War the Korean people 
realized more deeply the greatness of proletarian international- 
ism and the valuableness of the friendship and solidarity with 
the peoples of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China 
and other countries of the socialist camp. 

Fourthly, in the van of the Korean people fighting for the 
freedom and independence of the country stood the ever-victo- 
rious Workers' Party of Korea guided by all-conquering 
Marxism-Leninism. 

The Workers' Party of Korea, leading and guiding force of 
the Korean people, brilliantly carried out the enormous organi- 
zational and mobilizing work throughout the whole course of 
the war both at the front and in the rear. 

The correct policy of the Workers' Party of Korea for war 
victory and its successful organizational and mobilizing role 
were a decisive factor in achieving the victory in the war. 

The correct and wise policy of the Party Central Commit- 
tee led by Marshal Kim II Sung was a decisive factor in mobi- 
lizing all the country's potentialities for the successful fight a 
gainst the enemies and in organizing and leading the entire 
people to the one goal, the victory in the war, uniting them a- 
round the Party as one body. 

315 



» 

The Party was the great inspirer calling the entire people 
and the men and officers of the People's Army to the fight for 
the final victory and educating them in the spirit of boundless 
loyalty to the socialist fatherland and of uncompromising hatred 
of the enemy. 

The entire Party members always stood in the van of 
struggle on the front and in the rear setting an example of 
selfless service to the fatherland. Thus they further heightened 
the popular masses' boundless love of and confidence in the 
Party. The monolithic unity of the Party and the people was 
an important factor in further strengthening the might of the 
country in the thick of the flames of the severe war. 

The might of the people united around the Party won vic- 
tory over the U.S. armed imperialists. No aggressive force or 
difficulties could bar the magnificent onward march of the Ko- 
rean people led by the Workers' Party of Korea. 



The Korean people could 
win the historic victory in 

THE WORKERS' PARTY OF the war only under the lead _ 

korea-organizer and ership of the Party Central 

inspirer OF the victory Committee headed by Mar- 

OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE IN shal Kim J] Sung The war 

THE FATHERLAND LIBERA- bore out c l ea rly the fact 

tion war (hat the correct leadership 

of our Party was a decisive 
prerequisite to the stability 
and invincibility of the peo- 
ple's democratic system, and to the achievements scored by our 
people. 

The Workers' Party of Korea, the leading and guiding 
force of our country, was out to bear the brunt of the war 
as the inspirer and organizer of the nation-wide struggle 
against the armed invasion by the U.S. imperialists and their 
minions, the Syngman Rhee clique. 

The Party, first of all, directed great attention to strength- 
ening the Party itself for winning victory in the war. 

The invincibility of the people's democratic system, the 
political and moral unity of the Korean people and the inde- 
structible force of the powerful Korean People's Army are in- 

316 



separable from the great power of the Party and its wise and 
correct leadership. Therefore, the Party was convinced that the 
further consolidation of the ideological and organizational 
unity of the Party, the strengthening of its ranks and the en- 
hancement of its role as the organizer and mobilizer were the 
most important guarantee for the final victory in the war. 
Furthermore, our young Party had to perform the arduous and 
difficult duty of repulsing the armed aggression of 16 nations 
headed by the U.S. imperialists, ringleader of world imperial- 
ism, and their hirelings, Syngman Rhee clique, under the con- 
dition in which there still remained within the Party some 
sectarian elements. Unless the Party had strengthened its unity 
and militant spirit more firmly than ever, the Fatherland 
Liberation War would not have been crowned with historic vic- 
tory. Thanks to the correct leadership of the Party Central Com- 
mittee led by Marshal Kim II Sung, the Party could strengthen 
the steel-like unity and solidarity of its ranks developing it 
into a more powerful mass Party during the war. 

The Third, Fourth and Fifth Plenums of the Party Central 
Committee convened during the wartime were of great signifi- 
cance in consolidating the Party organizationally and ideologi- 
cally. The Party was tempered and gained strength in the 
flames of the war. The entire Party members and people rallied 
as firm as a rock around the Party Central Committee led by 
Marshal Kim II Sung, and the unity and solidarity of the Party 
and the purity of its ranks were consolidated more than before. 
The Party's role as the organizer and mobilizer was enhanced 
remarkably. The revolutionary discipline based on the self- 
consciousness of every Party member was strengthened and his 
Party spirit was steeled. Moreover, a closer link between the 
Party and the masses was established. 

Particularly, the liquidation of the Pak Hun Yung-Li 
Seung Yup clique, the U.S. spies, who had wormed themselves 
into the leading posts of the Party and Government, strength- 
ened the unity and solidarity of the Party. 

The U.S. spy ring had concealed for a long time its true 
colour, and attempted to undermine the Party from within and 
overthrow the Party and the Government at the country's most 
difficult time. 

A convincing proof of the unity and solidarity of the Party 
was provided by the activeness and political enthusiasm of the 

317 



entire Party members to devote themselves to the Party and 
revolution in the difficult period of the war. And the Party's 
militant strength grew immeasurably. 

The members of the Workers' Party of Korea, standing in 
the van of the people, fought devotedly and were ready to give 
their lives for their fatherland and people in the most 
critical period of the country. They were always in the lead in 
the arduous battles on the front and in the rear. In every 
military and labour feat on the front or in the rear was to be 
seen self-sacrificing struggle of the fine sons and daughters of 
the Party. They showed by deed that the Party members were 
ioyal to the interests of the people and that they were the most 
faithful defenders of the people. 

It is not incidental that in the most severe period of our 
history — the Fatherland Liberation War — a great number of 
the best sons and daughters of the people were admitted to 
the Party. It was a living testimony to the unbreakable ties 
between the Party and the people in the most critical period of 
the struggle for the socialist fatherland and the boundless 
trust of the people in the Party. 

The Party organized and mobilized correctly all the forces 
to ensure all the victories in the war while further strengthen- 
ing the organizational and ideological unity and solidarity of 
its ranks and ties with the popular masses. 

The correct policy and wise leadership of the Party 
Central Committee headed by Marshal Kim 11 Sung was a de- 
cisive factor in all the victories of the Korean people. The 
Party Central Committee set forth the correct strategical line 
at every stage of the war and took measures for winning all 
the victories in the war. 

From the first day of the war, the Party took steps for 
reinforcing the fighting power of the People's Army for the 
victory in the war. Therefore, the brilliant victories scored by 
the Korean People's Army in the Fatherland Liberation War 
are linked with the name of the Workers' Party of Korea head- 
ed by Marshal Kim II Sung. 

When the war broke out and its scope was extended, the 
Party saw to it that many divisions were organized rapidly 
and powerful reinforcement of the ranks of the People's Army 
was ensured. The Party sent hundreds of thousands of its 
best members and cadres to the People's Army. Thus the 

318 



People's Army gained in scope and strength in the course of the 
war. Moreover, the Party took measures for strengthening the 
fighting efficiency of the People's Army on the basis of the ex- 
periences attained in battles. The People's Army, under the gui- 
dance of the Party, reorganized its units suitable to the 
peculiarities of each combat zone and to the actual conditions 
of the army, while maneuvers were carried out extensively in 
accordance with operational and tactical duty of each unit. As 
a result, the young Korean People's Army came to possess rich 
war experiences and developed into a powerful army skilled in 
every form of warfare. 

The Party directed great attention to training and re- 
educating commanders and officers of the army. Attention was 
also paid to strengthening the company, the basic unit of the 
army, and to enhancing the quality of non-commissioned of- 
ficers. 

The Party gave profound attention to the Party ideologi- 
cal education among the armymen for sharpening class con- 
sciousness and for raising further the high militant and moral 
traits of each member of the armed forces. With a view to 
further reinforcing the People's Army, the Party established 
the political organs and Party organizations in the army. 
Stress was laid on the work of enhancing the role and sense 
of responsibility of the commanders, the military commissions, 
political organs and Party organizations, for strengthening 
discipline in units. 

The political organs and Party organizations in the army 
performed a great role in carrying through the Party line and 
policy, educating the armymen politically and ideologically, 
encouraging them to heroic deeds, and mobilizing them to the 
implementation of militant tasks. 

The Party members in the van of the armymen showed 
good examples of heroism and bravery and played the main 
role in displaying unyielding stubbornness and fighting spirit. 
Suffice it to point out that 76 per cent of the entire Heroes of the 
Republic who emerged during the war are the Party members. 

Thus the entire men and officers of the People's Army, ral- 
lied firmly around the Party and Government led by Marshal 

319 



Kim II Sung, carried out successfully their difficult combat 
tasks as Red fighters of the Party and steel-like warriors of 
Marshal Kim II Sung in severe battles, displaying great ini- 
tiative and resourcefulness. During the war, over 140,000 
best armymen who displayed patriotic devotion and bra- 
very were admitted to the glorious ranks of the Workers' 
Party of Korea. 

The Party with Marshal Kim II Sung as its leader applied 
creatively the Marxist-Leninist theories and the advanced mili- 
tary science to the actual conditions and peculiarities of the bat- 
tle fields of our country. Moreover, in every stage a compre- 
hensive and scientific analysis was made on the actual mili- 
tary situation and correct strategic tasks were set forth for 
the People's Army to perform. 

The Korean People's Army, under the guidance of the 
Party and Marshal Kim II Sung, solved successfully a number 
of strategic and operational questions in the fields of military 
art; organization and performance of counter-attacks, proper 
decision of main blow directions, close coordination between 
the different branches of the army, utilization of concentrated 
artillery fires in mountain areas and forests, organization ana 
utilization of reserve divisions, positive defensive battles and 
tunnel positions, battles repulsing the enemy's landing parties 
on the sea and in the coastal areas, coastal defence and how to 
combat the technical superiority of the enemy. 

Without the wise policy and distinguished leadership of 
the Workers' Party of Korea headed by Marshal Kim 11 Sung, 
the People's Army could not have won the historic victory in 
the Fatherland Liberation War. 

In order to ensure the victory on the front, the Party car- 
ried out organizational, political and mobilizing work for 
building up a firm rear. 

No sooner had the armed aggression of the U.S. imperial- 
ists and traitorous Syngman Rhee clique begun than the Party 
set up the Military Commission with Marshal Kim II Sung as 
its head for mobilizing all the forces of the Korean people for 
victory in the war, putting the entire nation on a wartime 
footing. The front and the rear were merged into a battle camp 
under the slogans: "All for the front!" "All for vic- 
tory in the war!" Mass political work was stepped up to ex- 
plain and impart to the entire people the justness and charac- 

320 



ter of the Fatherland Liberation War while exposing thorough- 
ly the anti-popular, reactionary aggressive nature of the U.S. 
imperialists and Syngman Rhee clique. The entire people were 
made aware of the danger created in the country and were 
called upon to rise in the struggle for crushing the enemy. 

Through the constant ideological education among the 
masses, the people were convinced more than ever of the ulti- 
mate victory. The people became ardent revolutionaries ready 
to fight selflessly for the Party and revolution and the political 
and moral unity of the people was strengthened further. 

In order to ensure wartime production, to meet fully the 
increasing requirements of the front and to stabilize the peo- 
ple's living, the Party, despite the difficult wartime conditions, 
took various measures for rehabilitating and developing the 
destroyed industrial establishments and the rural economy. 
Factories were evacuated to the mountainous areas from towns 
and coastal areas. 

The entire people, upholding the call of the Party, came 
out in the labour struggle to aid the front. In the shower of 
enemy bombs and shells production was stepped up and mili- 
tary supplies were sent to the front day and night. The gross 
industrial output continued to rise year after year and the 
workers met all the needs of the front. Particularly, 
the workers in the fields of railway and transport carried 
out successfully the tasks of wartime transport, while increas- 
ing every year the volume of war supplies and freight haulage. 
The peasants made labour exploits to supply more food to the 
front and the rear despite countless difficulties and hardships. 

Together with the work of mobilizing the entire nation 
for war victory, the Party strengthened the state and social 
system, a decisive guarantee for consolidating the rear and for 
promoting the political and moral unity of the people. 

Rigid discipline was maintained in the Party, in the gov- 
ernment organs and in the army, and closer relations with the 
masses established. The people's power organs and social or- 
ganizations were strengthened, while every machination of the 
enemy to disturb our rear was crushed. A nation-wide struggle 
was waged against the enemy and the people's vigilance was 
sharpened. 

The Party strengthened political unity of the entire people 

321 



through the consolidation of the United Democratic Fatherland 
Front, which embraced in it all strata of the people led by the 
working class. 

Throughout the war, the Party carried out the work of 
further promoting international solidarity with the Soviet Union, 
the People's Republic of China and other fraternal countries 
as well as the world peace-loving forces. 

The correct and wise guidance of the Workers' Party of 
Korea — this was the basic source and the decisive factor in 
ensuring all the victories scored by the Korean people. 

Unless the Party Central Committee and Marshal 
Kim II Sung personally took measures for victory in time and 
guided organizational and mobilizing work for carry- 
ing through them, the people could have never overcome all 
difficulties and won the victory in the war. 

Marshal Kim II Sung, the beloved leader of the Korean 
people, guided the Korean people on the front and in the rear 
to all victories as Chairman of the Central Committee of the 
Workers' Party of Korea, Premier of the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea, Chairman of the Military Commission of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Supreme Com- 
mander of the Korean People's Army. 

The brilliant victory won by the People's Army in the 
Fatherland Liberation War was closely linked with the lead- 
ership of Marshal Kim II Sung, in particular. 

Marshal Kim II Sung was the organizer and leader of all 
the military operations of the People's Army in the war. 

He applied creatively the Marxist-Leninist theory on war 
and the army, and the principles of the advanced military 
science to the actual conditions of the battle fields of our 
country. At every stage of the war, he set forth the clear-cut 
strategical and operational plans for crushing the enemy. The 
Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democra- 
tic People's Republic of Korea conferred the titles of Marshal 
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Hero of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea on Comrade Kim 
II Sung for his distinguished service. He organized and 
mobilized the entire people to the victory in the war. 

The historic victory won by the Korean people in the 
Fatherland Liberation War under the leadership of the Work- 

322 



•ttm 'tMmmmmmmm 



ers' Party of Korea will shine forever in the glorious history 
of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 

With the same firmness and fighting spirit as shown during 
the great Fatherland Liberation War for freedom and inde- 
pendence, the Korean people are performing heroic feats in the 
postwar struggle for the country's peaceful unification and 
independence and for building socialism in the northern part 
of the Republic, the key tasks of the Korean revolution. 

The just cause of the Korean people will be crowned with 
victory. 

The Korean war affords graphic proof of the fact that no 
force on earth can curb the struggle of a people who enjoy the 
warm support of the mighty socialist camp. The imperialists 
who are peddling war should draw lessons from the Korean 
war and remember the bitter experiences of shameful defeat 
the U.S. imperialists suffered. 

The Korean people, rallied steel-like around the Workers' 
Party of Korea and the Government of the Democratic People's 
Republic of Korea led by Marshal Kim II Sung, will win the ulti- 
mate victory in the struggle for the peaceful unification of the 
country and for building socialism and communism. 



History of the Just Fatherland Liberation 
War of the Korean People 

Published by Foreign Languages Publishing House 
Printed at the Rodong Shinmoon Printing Plant 

Pyongyang, D.P.R.K. 
1961